ClRXVVH  Bk.tCuE^ 

THE  ETHEL  CARR  PEACOCK 

MEMORIAL  COLLECTION 

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Matris  amori  monumentum 

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y>  JVo,... 

TRINITY  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

DURHAM,  N.  C. 

1903 

Gift  of  Dr.  and  Mrs.  Dred  Peacock 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Duke  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/jamesmadison01gays_0 


American  Statesmen 


EDITED  BY 


JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 


*L  S’ to  *40 


American  J>tate£mm 


JAMES  MADISON 


SYDNEY  HOWARD  GAY 


2 5 6 4-3 

BOSTON 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

New  York:  11  East  Seventeenth  Street 
(C6e  Ritasibe  Dress,  <Tam6nbse 
1894 


Copyright,  1884, 

By  SYDNEY  HOWARD  GAY. 

All  rights  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A. 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  0.  Houghton  & Company. 


923,173 

M / g ^ Q 

P 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Page 

The  Virginia  Madisons  1 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Young  Statesman 16 

CHAPTER  III. 

In  Congress 29 

CHAPTER  IV. 

In  the  State  Assembly 47 

CHAPTER  V. 

In  the  Virginia  Legislature 64 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Public  Disturbances  and  Anxieties  ....  76 

CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Constitutional  Convention 88 

CHAPTER  VIH, 

“ The  Compromises  ” 93 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Adoption  of  the  Constitution 115 

2-  f 6 * 0 


VI 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER.  X. 

The  First  Congress 128 

CHAPTER  XI. 

National  Finances. — Slavery 151 

CHAPTER  XII. 

Federalists  and  Republicans 172 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

French  Politics 193 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

His  Latest  Years  in  Congress 216 


CHAPTER  XV. 

At  Home.  — “ Resolutions  of  ’98  and  ’99  ” . . . 234 

CHAPTER  XVI. 


Secretary  of  State 252 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

The  Embargo 264 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Madison  as  President 283 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

War  with  England 301 

CHAPTER  XX. 

Conclusion 321 


INDEX 


339 


JAMES  MADISON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 

James  Madison  was  born  on  March  16,  1751, 
at  Port  Conway,  Virginia ; he  died  at  Montpellier, 
in  that  State,  on  June  28,  1836.  Mr.  John 
Quincy  Adams,  recalling,  perhaps,  the  death  of 
his  own  father  and  of  Jefferson  on  the  same 
Fourth  of  July,  and  that  of  Monroe  on  a subse- 
quent anniversary  of  that  day,  may  possibly  have 
seen  a generous  propriety  in  finding  some  equally 
appropriate  commemoration  for  the  death  of  an- 
other Virginian  President.  For  it  was  quite  pos- 
sible that  Virginia  might  think  him  capable  of  an 
attempt  to  conceal,  what  to  her  mind  would  seem 
to  be  an  obvious  intention  of  Providence : that  all 
the  children  of  the  “ Mother  of  Presidents  ” should 
be  no  less  distinguished  in  their  deaths  than  in 
their  lives  — that  the  “ other  dynasty,”  which 
John  Randolph  was  wont  to  talk  about,  should 
no  longer  pretend  to  an  equality  with  them,  not 


2 


JAMES  MADISON. 


merely  in  this  world,  but  in  the  manner  of  going 
out  of  it.  At  any  rate,  he  notes  the  date  of  Mad- 
ison’s death,  the  twenty-eighth  day  of  June,  as 
“the  anniversary  of  the  day  on  which  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  Convention  of  Virginia  in  1788  had 
affixed  the  seal  of  James  Madison  as  the  father 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  when 
his  earthly  part  sank  without  a struggle  into  the 
grave,  and  a spirit,  bright  as  the  seraphim  that 
surround  the  throne  of  Omnipotence,  ascended  to 
the  bosom  of  his  God.”  There  can  be  no  doubt  of 
the  deep  sincerity  of  this  tribute,  whatever  ques- 
tion there  may  be  of  its  grammatical  construction 
and  its  I’hetoric,  and  although  the  date  is  errone- 
ous. The  ratification  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  by  the  Virginia  Convention  was  on 
June  25,  not  on  June  28.  It  is  the  misfortune  of 
our  time  that  we  have  no  living  great  men  held  in 
such  universal  veneration  that  their  dying  on  com- 
mon days  like  common  mortals  seems  quite  impos- 
sible. Half  a century  ago,  however,  the  propriety 
of  such  providential  arrangements  appears  to  have 
been  recognized  almost  as  one  of  the  “ institu- 
tions.” It  was  the  newspaper  gossip  of  that  time 
that  a “ distinguished  physician  ” declared  that  he 
would  have  kept  a fourth  ex-President  alive  to 
die  on  a Fourth  of  July,  had  the  illustrious  sick 
man  been  under  his  treatment.  The  patient  him- 
self, had  he  been  consulted,  might,  in  that  case, 
possibly  have  declined  to  have  a fatal  illness  pro- 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS,. 


3 


longed  a week  to  gratify  the  public  fondness  for 
patriotic  coincidence.  But  Mr.  Adams’s  appropri- 
ation of  another  anniversary  answered  all  the  pur- 
pose, for  that  he  made  a mistake  as  to  the  date 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  discovered. 

It  was  accidental  that  Port  Conway  was  the 
birthplace  of  Madison.  His  maternal  grandfather, 
whose  name  was  Conway,  had  a plantation  at 
that  place,  and  young  Mrs.  Madison  happened  to 
be  there  on  a visit  to  her  mother  when  her  first 
child,  James,  was  born.  In  the  stately  — not  to 
say,  stilted  — biography  of  him  by  William  C. 
Rives,  the  christened  name  of  this  lady  is  given  as 
Eleanor.  Mr.  Rives  may  have  thought  it  not  in 
accordance  with  ancestral  dignity  that  the  mother 
of  so  distinguished  a son  should  have  been  bur- 
dened with  so  commonplace  and  homely  a name 
as  Nelly.  But  we  are  afraid  it  is  true  that  Nelly 
was  her  name.  No  other  biographer  than  Mr. 
Rives,  that  we  know  of,  calls  her  Eleanor.  Even 
Madison  himself  permits  “ Nelly  ” to  pass  under 
his  eyes  and  from  his  hands  as  his  mother’s  name. 

In  1833-34  there  was  some  correspondence  be- 
tween him  and  Lyman  C.  Draper,  the  historian, 
which  includes  some  notes  upon  the  Madison 
genealogy.  These,  the  ex-President  writes,  were 
‘•made  out  by  a member  of  the  family,”  and  they 
may  be  considered,  therefore,  as  having  his  sanc- 
tion. The  first  record  is  that  “ James  Madison 
was  the  son  of  James  Madison  and  Nelly  Con- 


4 


JAMES  MADISON. 


way.”  On  such  authority  Nelly,  and  not  Eleanor, 
must  be  accepted  as  the  mother’s  name.  This,  of 
course,  is  to  be  regretted  from  the  Rives  point  of 
view  ; but  perhaps  the  name  had  a less  familiar 
sound  a century  and  a half  ago ; and  no  doubt 
it  was  chosen  by  her  parents  without  a thought 
that  their  daughter  might  go  into  history  as  the 
mother  of  a President,  or  that  any  higher  fortune 
could  befall  her  than  to  be  the  respectable  head 
of  a tobacco-planter’s  family  on  the  banks  of  the 
Rappahannock. 

This  genealogical  record  further  says  that  “ his 
[Madison’s]  ancestors,  on  both  sides,  were  not 
among  the  most  wealthy  of  the  country,  but  in 
independent  and  comfortable  circumstances.”  If 
this  comment  was  added  at  the  ex-President’s  own 
dictation  it  was  quite  in  accordance  with  his  un- 
pretentious character.1  One  might  venture  to  say 

1 Dr.  Draper  has  kindly  put  into  our  hands  the  correspondence 
between  himself  and  Mr.  Madison,  and  we  copy  these  genealog- 
ical notes  in  full,  with  the  letter  in  which  they  were  sent,  as  all 
that  the  ex-President  had  to  say  about  his  ancestry  : — 

“ Montpellier,  February  1, 1834. 

“Dear  Sir,  — I have  received  your  letter  of  December  31st, 
and  inclose  a sketch  on  the  subject  of  it,  made  out  by  a member 
of  the  family.  With  friendly  respects, 

“James  Madison.” 

“ James  Madison  was  the  son  of  James  Madison  and  Nelly 
Conway.  He  was  born  on  the  5th  of  March,  1751  (O.  S.),  at 
Port  Conway,  on  the  Rappahannock  River,  where  she  was  at  the 
time  on  a visit  to  her  mother  residing  there. 

“ His  father  was  the  son  of  Ambrose  Madison  and  Frances 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 


5 


as  much  of  a Northern  or  a Western  farmer.  But 
they  did  not  farm  in  Virginia  ; they  planted.  Mr. 
Rives  says  that  the  elder  James  was  “ a large 
landed  proprietor ; ” and  he  adds,  “ a large  landed 
estate  in  Virginia  . . . was  a mimic  common- 
wealth, with  its  foreign  and  domestic  relations, 
and  its  regular  administrative  hierarchy.”  The 
“foreign  relations”  were  the  shipping,  once  a 
year,  a few  hogsheads  of  tobacco  to  a London  fac- 
tor ; the  “ mimic  commonwealths  ” were  clusters 
of  negro-huts,  and  the  “ administrative  hierarchy  ” 
was  the  priest  who  was  more  at  home  at  the  tav- 
ern or  a horse-race  than  in  the  discharge  of  his 
clerical  duties. 

As  Mr.  Madison  had  only  to  say  of  his  immedi- 
ate ancestors,  — which  seems  to  be  all  he  knew 
about  them,  — that  they  were  in  “ independent 
and  comfortable  circumstances,”  so  he  was,  ap- 

Taylor.  His  mother  was  the  daughter  of  Francis  Conway  and 
Rebecca  Catlett. 

“ His  paternal  grandfather  was  the  son  of  John  Madison  and 
Isabella  Minor  Todd.  His  paternal  grandmother,  the  daughter 
of  James  Taylor  and  Martha  Thompson. 

“ His  maternal  grandfather  was  the  son  of  Edwin  Conway  and 
Elizabeth  Thornton.  His  maternal  grandmother,  the  daughter 
of  John  Catlett  and Gaines. 

“ His  father  was  a planter,  and  dwelt  on  the  estate  now  called 
Montpellier  where  he  died  February  27,  1801,  in  the  78th  year  of 
his  age.  His  mother  died  at  the  same  place  in  1829,  February 
11th,  in  the  9Sth  year  of  her  age. 

“ His  grandfathers  were  also  planters.  It  appears  that  his  an- 
cestors, on  both  sides,  were  not  among  the  most  wealthy  of  the 
country,  but  in  independent  and  comfortable  circumstances.” 


6 


JAMES  MADISON. 


parently,  as  little  inclined  to  talk  about  bimself ; 
even  at  that  age  when  it  is  supposed  that  men  who 
have  enjoyed  celebrity  find  their  own  lives  the 
most  agreeable  of  subjects.  In  answer  to  Dr. 
Draper’s  inquiries  he  wrote  this  modest  letter, 
now  for  the  first  time  published:  — 

“Montpellier,  August  9,  1833.' 

“Dear  Sir,  — Since  your  letter  of  the  3d  of  June 
came  to  hand,  my  increasing  age  and  continued  mala- 
dies, with  the  many  attentions  due  from  me,  had  caused 
a delay  in  acknowledging  it,  for  which  these  circum- 
stances must  be  an  apology,  in  your  case,  as  I have 
been  obliged  to  make  them  in  others. 

“ You  wish  me  to  refer  you  to  sources  of  printed  in- 
formation on  my  career  in  life,  and  it  would  afford  me 
pleasure  to  do  so  ; hut  my  recollection  on  the  subject  is 
very  defective.  It  occurs  [to  me]  that  there  was  a bio- 
graphical volume  in  an  enlarged  edition  compiled  by 
General  or  Judge  Rodgers,  of  Pennsylvania,  and  which 
may  perhaps  have  included  my  name,  among  others. 
When  or  where  it  was  published  I cannot  say.  To  this 
reference  I can  only  add  generally  the  newspapers  at 
the  seat  of  government  and  elsewhere  during  the  elec- 
tioneering periods,  when  I was  one  of  the  objects  under 
review.  I need  scarcely  remark  that  a life,  which  has 
been  so  much  a public  life,  must  of  course  be  traced  in 
the  public  transactions  in  which  it  was  involved,  and 
that  the  most  important  of  them  are  to  be  found  in  doc- 
uments already  in  print,  or  soon  to  be  so. 

“ With  friendly  respects,  James  Madison. 

“ Lyman  C.  Draper,  Lockport,  N.  Y.” 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 


1 


The  genealogical  statement,  it  will  be  observed, 
does  not  go  farther  back  than  Mr.  Madison’s 
great-grandfather,  John.  Mr.  Rives  supposes  that 
this  John  was  the  son  of  another  John  who,  as  “the 
pious  researches  of  kindred  have  ascertained,” 
took  out  a patent  for  land  about  1653,  between  the 
North  and  York  rivers  on  the  shores  of  Chesa- 
peake Bay.  The  same  writer  further  assumes 
that  this  John  was  descended  from  Captain  Isaac 
Madison,  whose  name  appears  “ in  a document 
in  the  State  Paper  Office  at  London  containing 
a list  of  the  Colonists  in  1623.”  From  Sains- 
bury’s  Calendar 1 we  learn  something  more  of  this 
Captain  Isaac  than  this  mere  mention.  Under 
date  of  January  24,  1623,  there  is  this  record  : 
“ Captain  Powell,  gunner,  of  James  City,  is  dead ; 
Capt.  Nuce  (?),  Capt.  Maddison,  Lieut.  Craddock’s 
brother,  and  divers  more  of  the  chief  men  re- 
ported dead.”  But  either  the  report  was  not  alto- 
gether true,  or  there  was  another  Isaac  Maddison ; 
for  the  name  appears  among  the  signatures  to  a 
letter  dated  about  a month  later  — February  20  — 
from  the  Governor,  Council,  and  Assembly  of 
Virginia  to  the  King.  It  is  of  record,  also,  that 
four  months  later  still,  on  June  4,  “Capt.  Isaac 
and  Mary  Maddison  ” were  before  the  Governor 

1 Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial  Series,  1574-1660,  Pre- 
served in  the  State  Paper  Department  of  Her  Majesty’s  Public 
Record  Office,  edited  by  W.  Noel  Sainsbury,  Esq.,  etc.  London, 
1860. 


8 


JAMES  MADISON. 


and  Council  as  witnesses  in  the  case  of  Greville 
Pooley  and  Cicely  Jordan,  between  whom  there 
was  a “ supposed  contract  of  marriage,”  made 
“ three  or  four  days  after  her  husband’s  death.” 
But  the  lively  widow,  it  seems,  afterward  “ con- 
tracted herself  to  Will  Ferrar  before  the  Governor 
and  Council,  and  disavowed  the  former  contract,” 
and  the  case  therefore  became  so  complicated  that 
the  court  was  “not  able  to  decide  so  nice  a differ- 
ence.” What  Captain  Isaac  and  Mary  Maddison 
knew  about  the  matter  the  record  does  not  tell 
us ; but  the  evidence  is  conclusive  that  if  there 
was  but  one  Isaac  Maddison  in  Virginia  in  1623 
he  did  not  die  in  January  of  that  year.  Probably 
there  was  but  one,  and  he,  as  Rives  assumes,  was 
the  Captain  Madyson  of  whose  “achievement,” 
as  Rives  calls  it,  there  is  a brief  narrative  in  John 
Smith’s  “ General  History  of  Virginia.” 

Besides  the  record  in  Sainsbury’s  Calendar  of 
the  rumor  of  the  death  of  this  Isaac  in  Virginia, 
in  January,  1623  ; his  signature  to  a letter  to  the 
King  in  February  ; and  his  appearance  as  a wit- 
ness before  the  Council  in  the  case  of  the  widow 
Jordan,  in  June,  it  appears  by  Hotten’s  Lists  of 
colonists,  taken  from  the  Records  in  the  English 
State  Paper  Department,  that  Captain  Isacke 
Maddeson  and  Mai'y  Maddeson  were  living  in  1624 
at  West  and  Sherlow  Hundred  Island.  The  next 
year,  at  the  same  place,  he  is  on  the  list  of  dead  ; 
and  there  is  given  under  the  same  date  “ The 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 


9 


muster  of  Mrs.  Mary  Maddison,  widow,  aged  30 
years.”  Her  family  consisted  of  “ Katherin  Lay- 
den,  child,  aged  7 years,”  and  two  servants. 
Katherine,  it  may  be  assumed,  was  the  daughter 
of  the  widow  Mary  and  Captain  Isaac,  and  their 
only  child.  These  “ musters,”  it  should  be  said, 
appear  always  to  have  been  made  with  great  care, 
and  there  is  therefore  hardly  a possibility  that  a 
son,  if  there  were  one,  was  omitted  in  the  numer- 
ation of  the  widow’s  family,  while  the  name  and 
age  of  the  little  girl,  and  the  names  and  ages  of 
the  two  servants,  the  date  of  their  arrival  in  Vir- 
ginia, and  the  name  of  the  ship  that  each  came 
in,  are  all  carefully  given.  The  conclusion  is  in- 
evitable ; Isaac  Maddison  left  no  male  descend- 
ants, and  President  Madison’s  earliest  ancestor  in 
Virginia,  if  it  was  not  his  great-grandfather  John, 
must  be  looked  for  somewhere  else. 

Mr.  Rives  knew  nothing  of  these  Records.  His 
first  volume  was  published  before  either  Sains- 
bury’s  Calendar  or  Hotten’s  Lists ; and  the  re- 
searches, on  which  he  relied,  “ conducted  by  a 
distinguished  member  of  the  Historical  Society  of 
Virginia  ” in  the  English  State  Paper  Office, 
were,  so  far  as  they  related  to  the  Madisons,  in- 
complete and  worthless.  The  family  was  not, 
apparently,  “coeval  with  the  foundation  of  the 
Colony,”  and  did  not  arrive  “ among  the  earliest 
of  the  emigrants  in  the  new  world.”  That  dis. 
tinction  cannot  be  claimed  for  James  Madison, 


10 


JAMES  MADISON. 


nor  is  there  any  reason  for  supposing  that  he  be- 
lieved it  could  be.  He  seemed  quite  content  with 
the  knowledge  that  so  far  back  as  his  great-grand- 
father his  ancestors  had  been  respectable  people, 
“ in  independent  and  comfortable  circumstances.” 

Of  his  own  generation  there  were  seven  chil- 
dren, of  whom  James  was  the  eldest,  and  alone 
became  of  any  note,  except  that  the  rest  were 
reputable  and  contented  people  in  their  stations  of 
life.  A hundred  years  ago  the  Arcadian  Vir- 
ginia, for  which  Governor  Berkeley  had  thanked 
God  so  devoutly,  — when  there  was  not  a free 
school  nor  a press  in  the  province,  — had  passed 
away.  The  elder  Madison  resolved,  so  Mr.  Rives 
tells  us,  that  his  children  should  have  advantages 
of  education  which  had  not  been  within  his  own 
reach,  and  that  they  should  all  enjoy  them  equally. 
James  was  sent  to  a school  where  he  could  at 
least  begin  the  studies  which  should  fit  him  to 
enter  college.  Of  the  master  of  that  school  we 
know  nothing  except  that  he  was  a Scotchman, 
of  the  name  of  Donald  Robertson,  and  that  many 
years  afterward,  when  his  son  was  an  applicant 
for  office  to  Madison,  then  Secretary  of  State,  the 
pupil  gratefully  remembered  his  old  master,  and 
indorsed  upon  the  application  that  “ the  writer  is 
son  of  Donald  Robertson,  the  learned  Teacher  in 
King  and  Queen  County,  Virginia.” 

The  preparatory  studies  for  college  were  fin- 
ished at  home  under  the  clergyman  of  the  parish, 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 


11 


the  Rev.  Thomas  Martin,  who  was  a member  of 
Mr.  Madison’s  family,  perhaps  as  a private  tutor, 
perhaps  as  a boarder.  It  is  quite  likely  that  it 
was  by  the  advice  of  this  gentleman  — who  was 
from  New  Jersey  — that  the  lad  was  sent  to 
Princeton,  instead  of  to  William  and  Mary  Col- 
lege in  Virginia.  At  Princeton,  at  any  rate,  he 
entered  at  the  age  of  eighteen,  in  1769;  or,  to 
borrow  Mr.  Rives’s  eloquent  statement  of  the 
fact,  “ the  young  Virginian,  invested  with  the 
toga  virilis  of  anticipated  manhood,  we  now  see 
launched  on  that  disciplinary  career  which  is  to 
form  him  for  the  future  struggles  of  life.” 

One  of  his  biographers  says  that  he  shortened 
his  collegiate  term  by  taking  in  one  year  the 
studies  of  the  junior  and  senior  years:  but  that 
he  remained  another  twelve-month  at  Princeton 
for  the  sake  of  acquiring  Hebrew.  On  his  return 
home  he  undertook  the  instruction  of  his  younger 
brothers  and  sisters,  while  pursuing  his  own  stud- 
ies. Still  another  biographer  asserts  that  he  be- 
gan immediately  to  read  law;  but  Rives  gives 
some  evidence  that  he  devoted  himself  to  theol- 
ogy. This  and  his  giving  himself  to  Hebrew  for 
a year  point  to  the  ministry  as  his  chosen  profes- 
sion. But  if  we  rightly  interpret  his  own  words, 
he  had  little  strength  or  spirit  for  a pursuit  of  any 
sort.  His  first  “ struggle  of  life”  was  apparently 
with  ill  health,  and  the  career  he  looked  forward 
to  was  a speedy  journey  to  another  world.  In  a 


12 


JAMES  MADISON.  . 


letter  to  a friend  (November,  1772)  he  writes,  “I 
am  too  dull  and  infirm  now  to  look  out  for  ex- 
traordinary things  in  this  world,  for  I think  my 
sensations  for  many  months  have  intimated  to 
me  not  to  expect  a long  or  healthy  life ; though 
it  may  be  better  with  me  after  some  time ; but  I 
hardly  dare  expect  it,  and  therefore  have  little 
spirit  or  elasticity  to  set  about  anything  that  is 
difficult  in  acquiring,  and  useless  in  possessing 
after  one  has  exchanged  time  for  eternity.”  In 
the  same  letter  he  assures  his  friend  that  he  ap- 
proves of  his  choice  of  history  and  morals  as  the 
subjects  of  his  winter  studies ; but,  he  adds,  “ I 
doubt  not  but  you  design  to  season  them  with  a 
little  divinity  now  and  then,  which,  like  the  phi- 
losopher’s stone  in  the  hands  of  a good  man,  will 
turn  them  and  every  lawful  acquirement  into  the 
nature  of  itself,  and  make  them  more  precious 
than  fine  gold.” 

The  bent  of  his  mind  at  this  time  seems  to 
have  been  decidedly  religious.  He  was  a diligent 
student  of  the  Bible,  and,  Mr.  Rives  says,  “ he 
explored  the  whole  history  and  evidences  of 
Christianity  on  every  side,  through  clouds  of  wit- 
nesses and  champions  for  and  against,  from  the 
fathers  and  schoolmen  down  to  the  infidel  philos- 
ophers of  the  eighteenth  century.”  So  wide  a 
range  of  theological  study  is  remarkable  in  a 
youth  of  only  two  or  three  and  twenty  years  of 
age ; but,  remembering  that  he  was  at  this  time 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 


13 


living  at  home,  it  is  even  more  remai’kable  that 
in  the  bouse  of  an  ordinary  planter  in  Virginia 
a hundred  and  twenty  years  ago  could  be  found  a 
library  so  rich  in  theology  as  to  admit  of  study  so 
exhaustive.  But  in  Virginia  history  nothing  is 
impossible. 

His  studies  on  this  subject,  however,  whether 
wide  or  limited,  bore  good  fruit.  Religious  intol- 
erance was  at  that  time  common  in  his  immediate 
neighborhood,  and  it  aroused  him  to  earnest  and 
open  opposition  ; nor  did  that  opposition  cease  till 
years  afterward,  when  freedom  of  conscience  was 
established  by  law  in  Virginia,  largely  by  his  la- 
bors and  influence.  Even  in  1774,  when  all  the 
colonies  were  girding  themselves  for  the  coming 
revolutionary  conflict,  he  turned  aside  from  a dis- 
cussion of  the  momentous  question  of  the  hour,  in 
a letter  to  his  friend 1 in  Philadelphia,  and  ex- 
claimed with  unwonted  heat : — 

“ But  away  with  politics ! . . . That  diabolical,  hell- 
conceived  principle  of  persecution  rages  among  some  ; 
and,  to  their  eternal  infamy,  the  clergy  can  furnish 
their  quota  of  imps  for  such  purposes.  There  are  at 
this  time  in  the  adjacent  country  not  less  than  five  or 
six  well-meaning  men  in  close  jail  for  publishing  their 
religious  sentiments,  which  in  the  main  are  very  ortho- 
dox. I have  neither  patience  to  hear,  talk,  or  think  of 

1 The  letters  to  a friend,  from  which  we  have  quoted,  were 
written  to  William  Bradford,  Jr.,  of  Philadelphia,  afterward  At- 
torney-General in  Washington’s  administration.  They  are  given 
in  full  in  The  Writings  of  James  Madison,  vol.  i. 


14 


JAMES  MADISON. 


anything  relative  to  this  matter  ; for  I have  squabbled 
and  scolded,  abused  and  ridiculed  so  long  about  it  to  lit- 
tle purpose  that  I am  without  common  patience.” 

These  are  stronger  terms  than  the  mild-tem- 
pered  Madison  often  indulged  in.  But  he  felt 
strongly.  Probably  he,  no  more  than  many 
other  wiser  and  older  men,  understood  what  was 
to  be  the  end  of  the  political  struggle  which  was 
getting  so  earnest ; but  evidently  in  his  mind  it 
was  religious  rather  than  civil  liberty  which  was 
to  be  guarded.  “ If  the  Church  of  England,”  he 
says  in  the  same  letter,  “ had  been  the  established 
and  general  religion  in  all  the  Northern  colonies, 
as  it  has  been  among  us  here,  and  uninterrupted 
harmony  had  prevailed  throughout  the  continent, 
it  is  clear  to  me  that  slavery  and  subjection  might 
and  would  have  been  gradually  insinuated  among 
us.” 

He  congratulated  his  friend  that  they  had  not 
permitted  the  tea-ships  to  break  cargo  in  Philadel- 
phia ; and  Boston,  he  hoped,  would  “ conduct 
matters  with  as  much  discretion  as  they  seem  to 
do  with  boldness.”  These  things  were  interest- 
ing and  important;  but  “away  with  politics! 
Let  me  address  you  as  a student  and  philosopher, 
and  not  as  a patriot.”  Shut  off  from  any  contact 
with  the  stirring  incidents  of  that  year  in  the 
towns  of  the  coast,  he  lost  something  of  the  sense 
of  proportion.  To  a young  student,  solitary,  ill 
in  body,  perhaps  a trifle  morbid,  in  mind,  a lit- 


THE  VIRGINIA  MADISONS. 


15 


tie  discontented  that  all  the  learning  gained  at 
Princeton  could  find  no  better  use  than  to  save 
schooling  for  the  six  youngsters  at  home,  — to  him 
it  may  have  seemed  that  liberty  was  more  seri- 
ously threatened  by  that  outrage,  under  his  own 
eyes,  of  “ five  or  six  well-meaning  men  in  close 
jail  for  publishing  their  religious  sentiments,” 
than  by  any  tax  which  Parliament  could  contrive. 
Not  that  he  overestimated  the  importance  of  this 
wrong,  but  that  he  underestimated  the  importance 
of  that.  He  was  not  long,  however,  in  getting 
the  true  perspective. 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 

Madison’s  place,  both  from  temperament  and 
from  want  of  physical  vigor,  was  in  the  council, 
not  in  the  field.  One  of  his  early  biographers 
says  that  he  joined  a military  company,  raised  in 
his  own  county,  in  preparation  for  war;  but  this, 
there  can  hardly  be  a doubt,  is  an  error.  He 
speaks  with  enthusiasm  of  the  “high-spirited” 
volunteei’s,  who  came  forward  to  defend  “ the  honor 
and  safety  of  their  country  ; ” but  there  is  no  in- 
timation that  he  chose  for  himself  that  way  of 
showing  his  patriotism.  But  of  the  Committee  of 
Safety,  appointed  in  his  county  in  1774,  he  was 
made  a member  — perhaps  the  youngest,  for  he 
was  then  only  twenty-three  years  old. 

Eighteen  months  afterward  he  was  elected  a 
delegate  to  the  Virginia  Convention  of  1776,  and 
this  he  calls  “ my  first  entrance  into  public  life.” 
It  gave  him  also  an  opportunity  for  some  distinc- 
tion, which,  whatever  may  have  been  his  earlier 
plans,  opened  public  life  to  him  as  a career.  The 
first  work  of  the  convention  was  to  consider  and 
adopt  a series  of  resolutions  instructing  the  Vir- 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 


17 


ginian  delegates  in  the  Continental  Congress,  then 
in  session  at  Philadelphia,  to  urge  an  immediate 
declaration  of  independence.  The  next  matter 
was  to  frame  a Bill  of  Rights  and  a Constitution  of 
government  for  the  province.  Madison  was  made  a 
member  of  the  committee  to  which  this  latter  sub- 
ject was  referred.  One  question  necessarily  came 
up  for  consideration  which  had  for  him  a peculiar 
interest,  and  in  any  discussion  of  which  he,  no 
doubt,  felt  quite  at  ease.  This  was  concerning  re- 
ligious freedom.  An  article  in  the  proposed  Dec- 
laration of  Rights  provided  that  “ all  men  should 
enjoy  the  fullest  toleration  in  the  exercise  of  re- 
ligion, according  to  the  dictates  of  conscience, 
unpunished  and  unrestrained  by  the  magistrate, 
unless,  under  color  of  religion,  any  man  disturb 
the  peace,  happiness,  or  safety  of  society.”  It 
does  not  appear  that  Mr.  Madison  offered  any 
objection  to  the  article  in  the  committee ; but 
when  the  report  was  made  to  the  convention  he 
moved  an  amendment.  He  pointed  out  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  recognition  of  an  absolute 
right  and  the  toleration  of  its  exercise  ; for  toler- 
ation implies  the  power  of  jurisdiction.  He  pro- 
posed, therefore,  instead  of  providing  that  “all 
men  should  enjoy  the  fullest  toleration  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  religion,”  to  declare  that  “ all  men  are 
equally  entitled  to  the  full  and  free  exercise  of  it 
according  to  the  dictates  of  conscience  ; ” and  that 
kt  no  man  or  class  of  men  ought,  on  account  of  re- 


18 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ligion,  to  be  invested  with  peculiar  emoluments  or 
privileges,  nor  subjected  to  any  penalties  or  disa- 
bilities, unless,  under  color  of  religion,  the  preser- 
vation of  equal  liberty  and  the  existence  of  the 
State  be  manifestly  endangered.”  This  distinction 
between  the  assertion  of  a right  and  the  promise 
to  grant  a privilege  only  needed  to  be  pointed  out. 
But  Mr.  Madison  evidently  meant  more  ; he  meant 
not  only  that  religious  freedom  should  be  assured, 
but  that  an  Established  Church,  which,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  he  believed  to  be  dangerous  to  lib- 
erty, should  be  prohibited.  Possibly  the  conven- 
tion was  not  quite  ready  for  this  latter  step ; or 
possibly  its  members  thought  that,  as  the  greater 
includes  the  less,  should  freedom  of  conscience  be 
established  a state  church  would  be  impossible, 
and  the  article  might  therefore  be  stripped  of  super- 
erogation and  verbiage.  At  any  rate  it  was  re- 
duced one  half,  and  finally  adopted  in  this  simpler 
form  : “ That  religion,  or  the  duty  we  owe  to  our 
Creator,  and  the  manner  of  discharging  it,  can  be 
directed  only  by  reason  and  conviction,  not  by  force 
or  violence  ; and,  therefore,  all  men  are  equally 
entitled  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion  according 
to  the  dictates  of  conscience.”  Thus  it  stands  to 
this  day  in  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  Virginia,  and  of 
other  States  which  subsequently  made  it  their  own, 
possessing  for  us  the  personal  interest  of  being  the 
first  public  work  of  the  coming  statesman. 

Madison  was  thenceforth  for  the  next  forty 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 


19 


years  a public  man.  Of  tlie  first  Assembly  under 
the  new  Constitution,  he  was  elected  a member. 
For  the  next  session  also  he  was  a candidate,  but 
failed  to  be  returned  for  a reason  as  creditable  to 
him  as  it  was  uncommon  then,  whatever  it  may 
be  now,  in  Virginia.  “ The  sentiments  and  man- 
ners of  the  parent  nation,”  Mr.  Rives  says,  still 
prevailed  in  Virginia,  “ and  the  modes  of  canvass- 
ing for  popular  votes  in  that  country  were  gener- 
ally practiced.  The  people  not  only  tolerated, 
but  expected  and  even  required,  to  be  courted  and 
treated.  No  candidate  who  neglected  those  atten- 
tions could  be  elected.”  But  the  times,  Mr.  Mad- 
ison thought,  seemed  “ to  favor  a more  chaste 
mode  of  conducting  elections,”  and  he  “deter- 
mined to  attempt,  by  an  example,  to  introduce  it.” 
He  failed  signally  ; “ the  sentiments  and  manners 
of  the  parent  nation”  were  too  much  for  him.  He 
solicited  no  votes  ; nobody  got  drunk  at  his  ex- 
pense; and  he  lost  the  election.  An  attempt  was 
made  to  contest  the  return  of  his  opponent  on  the 
ground  of  corrupt  influence,  but,  adds  Mr.  Rives, 
in  his  sesquipedalian  measure,  “for  the  want  of 
adequate  proof  to  sustain  the  allegations  of  the 
petition,  which  in  such  cases  it  is  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  obtain  with  the  requisite  precision,  the  pro- 
ceeding was  unavailing  except  as  a perpetual  pro- 
test upon  the  legislative  records  of  the  country, 
against  a dangerous  abuse,  of  which  one  of  her 
sons,  so  qualified  to  serve  her,  and  destined  to  be 


20 


JAMES  MADISON. 


one  of  her  chief  ornaments,  was  the  early  though 
temporary  victim.”  Mr.  Rives  does  not  mean  that 
Mr.  Madison  was  for  a little  while  in  early  life 
the  victim  of  a vicious  habit ; but  that  he  lost 
votes  because  he  would  do  nothing  to  encourage  it 
in  others. 

The  country  lost  a good  representative,  but 
their  loss  was  his  gain.  The  Assembly  immedi- 
ately elected  him  a member  of  the  governor’s 
council,  and  in  this  position  he  so  grew  in  public 
favor  that,  two  years  afterward  (1780),  he  was 
chosen  as  a delegate  to  the  Continental  Congress. 
He  was  still  under  thirty,  and  had  he  been  even 
a more  brilliant  young  man  than  he  really  was,  it 
would  not  have  been  to  his  discredit  had  he  only 
been  seen  for  the  next  year  or  two,  if  seen  at  all, 
in  the  background.  He  had  taken  his  seat  among 
men,  every  one  of  whom,  probably,  was  his  senior, 
and  among  whom  were  many  of  the  wisest  men  in 
the  country,  not  “ older  ” merely,  but  “ better  sol- 
diers.” 

If  not  the  darkest,  at  least  there  was  no  darker 
year  in  the  Revolution  than  that  of  1780.  Within 
a few  days  of  his  arrival  at  Philadelphia,  Madison 
wrote  to  Jefferson,  — then  governor  of  Virginia,  — 
his  opinion  of  the  state  of  the  country.  It  was 
gloomy  but  not  exaggerated.  The  only  bright 
spot  he  could  see  was  the  chance  that  Clinton’s 
expedition  to  South  Carolina  might  be  a failure ; 
but  within  little  more  than  a month  from  the  date 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 


21 


of  his  letter,  Lincoln  was  compelled  to  surrender 
Charleston,  and  the  whole  country  south  of  Vir- 
ginia seemed  about  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Could  he  have  foreseen  that  calamity, 
his  apprehensions  might  have  been  changed  to 
despair  ; for  he  writes  : — 

“ Our  army  threatened  with  an  immediate  alternative 
of  disbanding  or  living  on  free  quarter  ; the  public  treas- 
ury empty  ; public  credit  exhausted,  nay,  the  private 
credit  of  purchasing  agents  employed,  I am  told,  as  far 
as  it  will  bear  ; Congress  complaining  of  the  extortion 
of  the  people  ; the  people  of  the  improvidence  of  Con- 
gress ; and  the  army  of  both ; our  affairs  requiring  the 
most  mature  and  systematic  measures,  and  the  urgency 
of  occasions  admitting  only  of  temporary  expedients, 
and  these  expedients  generating  new  difficulties;  Con- 
gress recommending  plans  to  the  several  States  for 
execution,  and  the  States  separately  rejudging  the  expe- 
diency of  such  plans,  whereby  the  same  distrust  of  con- 
current exertions  that  had  damped  the  ardor  of  patri- 
otic individuals  must  produce  the  same  effect  among  the 
States  themselves  ; an  old  system  of  finance  discarded  as 
incompetent  to  our  necessities,  an  untried  and  precarious 
one  substituted,  and  a total  stagnation  in  prospect  be- 
tween the  end  of  the  former  and  the  operation  of  the 
latter.  These  are  the  outlines  of  the  picture  of  our 
public  situation.  I leave  it  to  your  own  imagination  to 
fill  them  up.” 

He  saw  more  clearly,  perhaps,  after  the  ex- 
perience of  one  session  of  Congress,  the  true  cause 
of  all  these  troubles  ; at  any  rate  he  was  able,  in 


22 


JAMES  MADISON. 


a letter  written  in  November  of  that  year  (1780), 
to  state  it  tersely  and  explicitly.  The  want  of 
money,  he  wrote  to  a friend,  “ is  the  source  of  all 
our  public  difficulties  and  misfortunes.  One  or 
two  millions  of  guineas  properly  applied  would 
diffuse  vigor  and  satisfaction  throughout  the  whole 
military  department,  and  would  expel  the  enemy 
from  every  part  of  the  United  States.” 

But  nobody  knew  better  than  he  the  difficulty 
of  raising  funds  except  by  borrowing  abroad,  and 
that  this  was  a precarious  reliance.  There  must 
be  some  sort  of  substitute  for  money.  In  specific 
taxation  he  had  no  faith.  Such  taxes,  if  paid  at 
all,  would  be  paid,  virtually,  in  the  paper  currency 
or  certificates  of  the  States,  and  these  had  already 
fallen  to  the  ratio  of  one  hundred  to  one ; they 
kept  on  falling  till  they  reached  the  rate  of  a 
thousand  to  one,  and  then  soon  became  alto- 
gether worthless.  When  the  estimate  for  the 
coming  year  was  under  consideration,  he  proposed 
to  Congress  that  the  States  should  be  advised  to 
abandon  the  issue  of  this  paper  currency.  “ It 
met,”  he  says,  “ with  so  cool  a reception  that  I 
did  not  much  urge  it.”  The  sufficient  answer  to 
the  proposition  was,  that  “ the  practice  was  man- 
ifestly repugnant  to  the  Acts  of  Congress,”  and  as 
these  were  disregarded  and  could  not  be  enforced, 
a mere  remonstrance  would  be  quite  useless.  The 
Union  was  little  more  than  a name  under  the 
feeble  bonds  of  the  Confederation,  and  each 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 


23 


State  was  a law  unto  itself.  Not  that  in  this 
case  there  was  much  reasonable  ground  for  com- 
plaint ; for  what  else  could  the  States  do  ? Where 
there  was  no  money  there  must  be  something 
to  take  its  place  ; a promise  to  pay  must  be  ac- 
cepted instead  of  payment.  The  paper  answered 
a temporary  purpose,  though  it  was  plain  that  in 
the  end  it  would  be  good  for  nothing. 

The  evil,  however,  was  manifestly  so  gi’eat  that 
there  was  only  the  more  reason  for  trying  to  mit- 
igate it,  if  it  could  not  be  cured.  Madison,  like 
the  rest,  had  his  remedy.  He  proposed,  in  a let- 
ter to  one  of  his  colleagues,  that  the  demand  for 
army  supplies  should  be  duly  apportioned  among 
the  people,  their  collection  rigorously  enforced, 
and  payment  made  in  interest-bearing  certificates, 
not  transferable,  but  to  be  redeemed  at  a specified 
time  after  the  war  was  over.  The  plan  would  un- 
doubtedly have  put  a stop  to  the  circulation  of  a 
vast  volume  of  paper  money  if  the  producers 
would  have  exchanged  the  products  of  their  labor 
for  certificates,  useless  at  the  time  of  exchange, 
and  having  only  a possible  prospective  value  in 
case  of  the  successful  termination  of  an  uncertain 
war.  Patriotic  as  the  people  were,  they  neither 
would  nor  could  have  submitted  to  such  a law, 
nor  had  Congress  the  power  to  enforce  it.  But 
Mr.  Madison  did  not  venture  apparently  to  urge 
his  plan  beyond  its  suggestion  tG  his  colleague. 

Why  the  Assembly  of  Virginia  should  have 


24 


JAMES  MADISON. 


proposed  to  elect  an  extra  delegate  to  Congress, 
early  in  1781,  is  not  clear,  unless  it  be  that  one 
of  the  number,  Joseph  Jones,  being  also  a mem- 
ber of  the  Assembly,  passed  much  of  his  time 
in  Richmond.  It  does  not  appear,  however,  that 
the  delegate  extraordinary  was  ever  sent,  per- 
haps because  it  was  known  to  Mr.  Madison’s 
friends  that  it  would  be  a mortification  to  him- 
There  was  certainly  no  good  reason  for  any  dis- 
trust of  either  his  ability  or  his  industry.  One 
could  hardly  be  otherwise  than  industrious  who 
had  it  in  him  — if  the  story  be  true  — to  take  but 
three  hours  out  of  the  twenty-four  for  sleep  during 
the  last  year  of  his  college  course,  that  he  might 
crowd  the  studies  of  two  years  into  one.  He 
seemed  to  love  work  for  its  own  sake,  and  he  was 
a striking  example  of  how  much  virtue  there  is  in 
steadiness  of  pursuit.  Not  that  he  had  at  this 
time  any  special  goal  for  his  ambition.  His  aim 
seemed  to  be  simply  to  do  the  best  he  could  where- 
ever  he  might  be  placed  ; to  discharge  faithfully, 
and  to  the  best  of  such  ability  as  he  had,  whatever 
duty  was  intrusted  to  him.  His  report  of  the 
proceedings  in  the  Congressional  session  of  1782- 
83,  and  the  letters  written  during  those  years  and 
the  year  before,  show  that  he  was  not  merely  dil- 
igent but  absorbed  in  the  duties  of  his  office. 

He  was  more  faithful  to  his  constituents  than 
his  constituents  sometimes  were  to  him.  Any- 
thing that  might  happen  at  that  period  for  want 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 


25 


of  money  can  hardly  be  a matter  of  sui'prise  ; but 
Virginia,  even  then,  should  have  been  able,  it 
would  seem,  to  find  enough  to  enable  its  members 
of  Congress  to  pay  their  board-bills.  He  com- 
plains gently  in  his  Addisonian  way  of  the  incon- 
venience to  which  he  was  put  for  want  of  funds. 
“ I cannot,”  he  writes  to  Edmund  Randolph,  “ in 
anyway  make  you  more  sensible  of  the  importance 
of  your  kind  attention  to  pecuniary  remittances  for 
me,  than  by  informing  you  that  I have  for  some 
time  past  been  a pensioner  on  the  favor  of  Hayne 
Solomon,  a Jew  broker.”  A month  later  he 
writes,  that  to  draw  bills  on  Virginia  has  been 
tried,  “ but  in  vain  ; ” nobody  would  buy  them  ; 
and  he  adds,  “ I am  relapsing  fast  into  distress. 
The  case  of  my  brethren  is  equally  alarming.” 
Within  a week  he  again  writes  : “ I am  almost 
ashamed  to  reiterate  my  wants  so  incessantly  to 
you,  but  they  begin  to  be  so  urgent  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  suppress  them.”  But  the  Good  Sa- 
maritan, Solomon,  is  still  an  unfailing  reliance. 
“ The  kindness  of  our  little  friend  in  Front  Street, 
near  the  coffee  house,  is  a fund  which  will  pre- 
serve me  from  extremities  ; but  I never  resort  to 
it  without  great  mortification,  as  he  obstinately 
rejects  all  recompense.  The  price  of  money  is  so 
usurious,  that  he  thinks  it  ought  to  be  extorted 
from  none  but  those  who  aim  at  profitable  specu- 
lations. To  a necessitous  delegate  he  gratuitously 
spares  a supply  out  of  his  private  stock.”  It  is  a 


26 


JAMES  MADISON. 


pretty  picture  of  the  simplicity  of  the  early  days 
of  the  Republic.  Between  the  average  modern 
member  and  the  money-broker,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, there  would  lurk,  probably,  a contract 
for  carrying  the  mails  or  for  Indian  supplies. 

Relief,  however,  came  at  last.  An  appeal  was 
made  in  a letter  to  the  Governor  of  Virginia, 
which  was  so  far  public  that  anybody  about  the 
executive  office  might  read  it.  The  answer  to 
this  letter,  says  Mr.  Madison,  “ seems  to  chide  our 
urgency.”  But  there  soon  came  a bill  for  two 
hundred  dollars,  which,  he  adds,  “ very  seasonably 
enabled  me  to  replace  a loan  by  which  I had  an- 
ticipated it.  About  three  hundred  and  fifty  more 
(not  less)  would  redeem  me  completely  from  the 
class  of  debtors.”  It  is  to  be  hoped  it  came  with- 
out further  chiding.1 

The  young  member  was  not  less  attentive  to 
his  congressional  duties  because  of  these  little 
difficulties  in  the  personal  ways  and  means.  Mil- 
itary movements  seem,  without  altogether  escap- 
ing his  attention,  to  have  interested  him  the 
least.  In  his  letters  to  the  public  men  at  home, 
which  were  meant  in  some  degree  to  give  such 

1 The  members  of  Congress  were  paid,  at  that  time,  by  the 
States  they  represented.  Virginia  allowed  her  delegates  their 
family  expenses,  including  three  servants  and  four  horses,  house 
rent  and  fuel,  two  dollars  a mile  for  travel,  and  twenty  dollars  a 
day  when  in  attendance  on  Congress.  The  members  were  re- 
quired to  render  an  account,  quarterly,  of  their  household  ex- 
penses, and  the  State  paid  them  when  she  had  any  money. 


THE  YOUNG  STATESMAN. 


27 


information  as,  in  later  times,  the  newspapers  sup- 
plied, questions  relating  to  army  affairs,  even  news 
directly  from  the  army,  occupy  the  least  space. 
They  are  not  always,  for  that  reason,  altogether 
entertaining  reading.  One  would  be  glad,  occa- 
sionally, to  exchange  their  sonorous  and  rounded 
periods  for  any  expression  of  quick,  impulsive 
feeling.  “ I return  you,”  he  writes  to  Pendleton, 
“ my  fervent  congratulations  on  the  glorious  suc- 
cess of  the  combined  armies  at  York  and  Glouces- 
ter. We  have  had  from  the  Commander-in-Chief 
an  official  report  of  the  fact,”  — and  so  forth  and 
so  forth  ; and  then  for  a page  or  more  is  a discus- 
sion of  the  condition  of  British  possessions  in  the 
East  Indies,  that  “ rich  source  of  their  commerce 
and  credit,  severed  from  them,  perhaps  forever  ; ” 
of  “ the  predatory  conquest  of  Eustatia,”  and  of 
the  “ relief  of  Gibraltar,  which  was  merely  a neg- 
ative advantage  ; ” — all  to  show  that  “ it  seems 
scarcely  possible  for  them  much  longer  to  shut 
their  ears  against  the  voice  of  peace.”  There  is 
not  a word  in  all  this  that  is  not  quite  true,  perti- 
nent, reflective,  and  becoming  a statesman  ; but 
neither  is  there  a woi’d  of  sympathetic  warmth 
and  patriotic  fervor  which  at  that  moment  made 
the  heart  of  a whole  people  beat  quicker  at  the 
news  of  a great  victory,  and  in  the  hope  that  the 
cause  was  gained  at  last. 

All  the  letters  have  this  preternatural  solem- 
nity, as  if  each  was  a study  in  style  after  the 


28 


JAMES  MADISON. 


favorite  Addisonian  model.  One  wonders  if  he 
did  not,  in  the  privacy  of  his  own  room,  and  with 
the  door  locked,  venture  to  throw  his  hat  to  the 
ceiling  and  give  one  hurrah  under  his  breath,  at 
the  discomfiture  of  the  vain  and  self-sufficient 
Cornwallis.  But  he  seems  never  to  have  been 
a young  man.  At  one  and  twenty  he  gravely 
warned  his  friend  Bradford  not  “ to  suffer  those 
impertinent  fops  that  abound  in  every  city  to 
divert  you  from  your  business  and  philosophical 
amusements.  ...  You  will  make  them  respect 
and  admire  you  more  by  showing  your  indigna- 
tion at  their  follies,  and  by  keeping  them  at  a 
becoming  distance.”  It  was  his  loss,  however, 
and  our  gain.  He  was  one  of  the  men  the  times 
demanded,  and  without  whom  they  would  have 
been  quite  different  times  and  followed  by  quite 
different  results.  The  sombre  hue  of  his  life  was 
due  partly,  no  doubt,  to  natural  temperament ; 
partly  to  the  want  of  health  in  his  earlier  man- 
hood, which  led  him  to  believe  that  his  days  were 
numbered ; but  quite  as  much,  if  not  more  than 
either,  to  a keen  sense  of  the  responsibility  resting 
upon  those  to  whom  had  fallen  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs. 


CHAPTER  III. 


IN  CONGKESS. 

Madison  had  grown  steadily  in  the  estimation 
of  his  colleagues,  as  is  shown,  especially  in  1783, 
by  the  frequency  of  his  appointment  upon  impor- 
tant committees.  He  was  a member  of  that  one 
to  which  was  intrusted  the  question  of  national 
finances,  and  it  is  plain,  even  in  his  own  modest 
report  of  the  debates  of  that  session,  that  he  took 
an  important  part  in  the  long  discussions  of  the 
subject,  and  exei’cised  a marked  influence  upon 
the  result.  The  position  of  the  government  was 
one  of  extreme  difficulty.  To  tide  over  an  imme- 
diate necessity,  a further  loan  had  been  asked  of 
France  in  1782,  and  bills  were  drawn  against  it 
without  waiting  for  acceptance.  It  was  not  vei’y 
likely,  but  it  was  not  impossible,  that  the  bills 
might  go  to  protest ; but  even  should  they  be  hon- 
ored, so  irregular  a proceeding  was  a humiliat- 
ing acknowledgment  of  poverty  and  weakness,  to 
which  some  of  the  delegates,  Mr.  Madison  among 
them,  were  extremely  sensitive. 

The  national  debt  altogether  was  not  less  than 
forty  million  dollars.  To  provide  for  the  interest 


30 


JAMES  MADISON. 


on  this  debt,  and  a fund  for  expenses,  it  was  nec- 
essary to  raise  about  three  million  dollars  annu- 
ally. But  the  sum  actually  contributed  for  the 
support  of  the  confederate  government  in  1782  was 
only  half  a million  dollars.  This  was  not  from 
any  absolute  inability  on  the  part  of  the  people  to 
pay  more  ; for  the  taxes  before  the  war  were  more 
than  double  that  sum,  and  for  the  first  three  or 
four  years  of  the  war  it  was  computed  that,  with 
the  depreciation  of  paper  money,  the  people  sub- 
mitted to  an  annual  tax  of  about  twenty  million 
dollars.  The  real  difficulty  lay  in  the  character  of 
the  Confederation.  Congress  might  contrive  but 
it  could  not  command.  The  States  might  agree,  or 
they  might  disagree,  or  any  two  or  more  of  them 
might  only  agree  to  disagree  ; and  they  were  more 
likely  to  do  either  of  the  last  two  than  the  first. 
There  was  no  power  of  coercion  anywhere.  All 
that  Congress  could  do  was  to  try  to  frame  laws 
that  would  reconcile  differences,  and  bring  thir- 
teen supreme  governments  upon  some  common 
ground  of  agreement.  To  distract  and  perplex  it 
still  more,  it  stood  face  to  face  with  a well-disci- 
plined and  veteran  army  which  might  at  any  mo- 
ment, could  it  find  a leader  to  its  mind,  march 
upon  Philadelphia  and  deal  with  Congress  as 
Cromwell  dealt  with  the  Long  Parliament.  There 
were  some  men,  probably,  in  that  body,  who  would 
not  have  been  sorry  to  see  that  precedent  fol- 
lowed. Washington  might  have  done  it  if  he 


IN  CONGRESS.  31 

would.  Gates  probably  would  have  done  it  if  he 
could. 

To  avert  this  threatened  danger  ; to  contrive 
taxation  that  should  so  far  please  the  taxed  that 
they  would  refrain  from  using  the  power  in  their 
hands  to  escape  altogether  any  taxation  for  general 
purposes,  was  the  knottj7  problem  this  Congress 
had  to  solve  in  order  to  save  the  Confederacy  from 
dissolution.  There  was  no  want  of  plans  and  ex- 
pedients ; neither  were  there  wanting  men  in  that 
body  who  clearly  understood  the  conditions  of  the 
problem,  and  how  it  might  be  solved,  and  whose 
aim  was  direct  and  unfaltering.  Chief  among 
them  were  Hamilton,  Wilson,  Ellsworth,  and 
Madison.  However  wrong-headed,  or  weak,  or  in- 
temperate others  may  have  been,  these  men  were 
usually  found  together  on  important  questions ; 
differing  sometimes  in  details,  but  unmoved  by 
passion  or  prejudice,  and  strong  from  reserved 
force,  they  overwhelmed  their  opponents  at  the 
right  moment  with  irresistible  argument  and  by 
weight  of  character. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  more  important  ques- 
tions Mr.  Madison  is  conspicuous  — conspicuous 
without  being  obtrusive.  A reader  of  the  debates 
can  hardly  fail  to  be  struck  with  his  familiarity 
with  English  constitutional  law,  and  its  applica- 
tion to  the  necessities  of  this  off-shoot  of  the  Eng- 
lish people  in  setting  up  a government  for  them- 
selves. The  stores  of  knowledge  he  drew  upon 


32 


JAMES  MADISON. 


must  needs  have  been  laid  up  in  the  years  of  quiet 
study  at  home  before  he  entered  upon  public  life. 
For  there  was  no  congressional  library  then  where 
a member  could  “ cram  ” for  debate  ; and  — though 
Philadelphia  already  had  a fair  public  library  — 
the  member  who  was  armed  at  all  points  must 
have  equipped  himself  before  entering  Congress. 
In  this  respect  Madison  probably  had  no  equal, 
except  Hamilton,  and  possibly  Ellsworth.  To 
the  need  of  such  a library,  however,  he  and  others 
were  not  insensible.  As  chairman  of  a commit- 
tee he  reported  a list  of  books  “ proper  for  the 
use  of  Congress,”  and  advised  their  purchase. 
The  report  declared  that  certain  authorities  upon 
international  law,  treaties,  negotiations,  and  other 
questions  of  legislation,  were  absolutely  indispen- 
sable, and  that  the  want  of  them  “ was  manifest 
in  several  Acts  of  Congress.”  But  the  Congress 
was  not  to  be  moved  by  a little  thing  of  that  sort. 

The  attitude  of  his  own  State  sometimes  em- 
barrassed him  in  the  satisfactory  discharge  of  his 
duty  as  a legislator.  The  earliest  distinction  he 
won  after  entering  Congress  was  as  chairman  of  a 
committee  to  enforce  upon  Mr.  Jay,  then  minister 
to  Spain,  the  instructions  to  adhere  tenaciously  to 
the  right  of  navigation  on  the  Mississippi,  in  his 
negotiations  for  an  alliance  with  that  power.  Mr. 
Madison,  in  his  dispatch,  maintained  the  American 
side  of  the  question  with  a force  and  clearness  to 
which  no  subsequent  discussion  of  the  subject  ever 


IN  CONGRESS. 


33 


added  anything.  He  left  nothing  unsaid  that  could 
be  said  to  sustain  the  right  either  on  the  ground  of 
expediency,  of  national  comity,  or  of  international 
law  ; and  his  arguments  were  not  only  in  accord- 
ance with  his  own  convictions,  but  with  the  in- 
structions of  the  Assembly  of  his  own  State.  It 
was  a question  of  deep  interest  to  Virginia,  whose 
western  boundary  at  that  time  was  the  Mississippi. 
But  Virginia  soon  afterward  shifted  her  position. 
The  course  of  the  war  in  the  Southern  States  in 
the  winter  of  1780-81  aroused  in  Georgia  and 
the  Carolinas  renewed  anxiety  for  an  alliance  with 
Spain.  The  fear  of  their  people  was,  that,  in  case 
of  the  necessity  for  a sudden  peace  while  the 
British  troops  were  in  possession  of  those  States 
or  parts  of  them,  they  might  be  compelled  to  re- 
main as  British  territory  under  the  application  of 
the  rule  of  uti  possidetis.  It  was  urged,  therefore, 
that  the  right  to  the  Mississippi  should  be  surren- 
dered to  Spain,  if  it  were  made  the  condition  of 
an  alliance.  In  deference  to  her  neighbors  Vir- 
ginia proposed  that  Mr.  Jay  should  be  reinstructed 
accordingly. 

Mr.  Madison  was  not  in  the  least  shaken  in  his 
conviction.  With  him,  the  question  was  one  of 
right  rather  than  of  expediency.  But  not  many 
at  that  time  ventured  to  doubt  that  representa- 
tives must  implicitly  obey  the  instructions  of  their 
constituents.  He  yielded;  but  not  till  he  had  ap- 
pealed to  the  Assembly  to  reconsider  their  dec! 

3 


34 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Bion.  The  scale  was  turned  ; in  deference  to  the 
wishes  of  the  Southern  States  new  orders  were 
sent  to  Mr.  Jay.  Mr.  Madison,  however,  had  not 
long  to  wait  for  his  justification.  When  the  im- 
mediate dangei’,  which  had  so  alarmed  the  South, 
had  passed  away,  Virginia  returned  to  her  original 
position.  New  instructions  were  again  sent  to 
her  representatives,  and  Mr.  Jay  was  once  more 
advised  by  Congress,  that  on  the  Mississippi  ques- 
tion his  government  would  yield  nothing. 

On  another  question,  two  years  afterward,  Mr. 
Madison  refused  to  accept  a position  of  inconsist- 
ency in  obedience  to  instructions  which  his  State 
attempted  to  force  upon  him.  No  one  saw  moi'e 
clearly  than  he  how  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
preservation  of  the  Confederacy  was  the  settle- 
ment of  its  financial  affairs  on  some  sound  and 
just  basis ; and  no  one  labored  more  earnestly  and 
more  intelligently  than  he  to  bring  about  such  a 
settlement.  Congress  had  proposed  in  1781  a tax 
upon  imports,  each  State  to  appoint  its  own  col- 
lectors but  the  revenue  to  be  paid  over  to  the 
federal  government  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the 
war.  Rhode  Island  alone,  at  first,  refused  her 
assent  to  this  scheme.  An  impost  law  of  five  per 
cent,  upon  certain  imports  and  a specific  duty 
upon  others  for  tweiity-five  years  were  an  essential 
part  of  the  plan  of  1783,  to  provide  a revenue  to 
meet  the  interest  on  the  public  debt  and  for  other 
general  purposes.  That  Rhode  Island  would  con- 


IN  CONGRESS. 


35 


tinue  obstinate  on  this  point  was  more  than  prob- 
able ; and  the  only  hope  of  moving  her  was  that 
she  should  be  shamed  or  persuaded  into  compli- 
ance by  the  combined  influence  of  all  the  other 
States. 

Mr.  Madison  was  as  bitter  as  he  could  ever  be 
in  his  reflections  upon  that  State,  whose  course, 
he  thought,  showed  a want  of  any  sense  of  honor 
or  of  patriotism.  Virginia,  he  argued,  should  re- 
buke her  by  making  her  own  compliance  with  the 
law  the  more  emphatic,  as  an  example  for  all  the 
rest.  But  Virginia  did  exactly  the  other  thing. 
At  the  moment  when  debate  upon  the  revenue 
law  was  the  most  earnest,  and  the  prospect  of 
carrying  it  the  most  hopeful ; when  a committee 
appointed  by  Congress  had  already  started  on 
their  journey  northward  to  expostulate  with,  and, 
if  possible,  conciliate  Rhode  Island  ; — at  that 
critical  moment  came  news  from  Virginia  that  she 
had  revoked  her  assent  of  a previous  session  to 
the  impost  law.  This  was  equivalent  to  instruct- 
ing her  delegates  in  Congress  to  oppose  any  such 
measure.  The  situation  was  an  awkward  one  for 
a representative  who  had  put  himself  among  the 
foremost  of  those  who  were  pushing  this  policy, 
and  who  had  been  making  invidious  reflections 
upon  a State  which  opposed  it.  The  rule  that  the 
will  of  the  constituents  should  govern  the  repre- 
sentative, he  now  declared,  had  its  exceptions,  and 
here  was  a case  in  point.  He  continued  to  en- 


36 


JAMES  MADISON. 


force  the  necessity  of  a general  law  to  provide  a 
revenue,  though  his  arguments  were  no  longer 
pointed  with  the  selfishness  and  want  of  patriot- 
ism shown  by  the  people  of  Rhode  Island.  In  the 
end  his  firmness  was  justified  by  Virginia,  who 
again  shifted  her  position  when  the  new  act  was 
submitted  to  her. 

The  operation  of  the  law  Avas  limited  to  five 
and  twenty  years.  This  Hamilton  opposed,  and 
Madison  supported ; and  in  this  difference  some 
of  the  biogi’aphers  of  both  see  the  foreshadowing 
of  future  parties.  But  it  is  more  likely  that 
neither  of  those  statesmen  thought  of  their  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  difference  of  principle.  The 
question  was,  whether  anything  could  be  gained 
by  a deference  to  that  party  which,  both  felt  at 
that  time,  threatened  to  throw  away,  in  adhering 
to  the  state-rights  doctrine,  all  that  was  gained 
by  the  Revolution.  They  were  agreed  upon  the 
necessity  of  a general  law,  supreme  in  all  the 
States,  to  meet  the  obligation  of  a debt  contracted 
for  the  general  good.  Unless  — wrote  Madison  in 
February  — “ unless  some  amicable  and  adequate 
arrangements  be  speedily  taken  for  adjusting  all 
the  subsisting  accounts  and  discharging  the  public 
engagements,  a dissolution  of  the  Union  will  be 
inevitable.”  He  was  willing,  therefore,  to  tem- 
porize, that  the  necessary  assent  of  the  State  to 
such  a law  might  be  gained.  Nobody  hoped  that 
the  public  debt  would  be  paid  off  in  twenty-five 


IN  CONGRESS. 


37 


years  ; but  to  assume  to  levy  a federal  tax  in  the 
States  for  a longer  period,  or  till  the  debt  should 
be  discharged,  might  so  arouse  state  jealousy  that 
it  would  be  impossible  to  get  an  assent  to  the  law 
anywhere.  If  the  law  for  twenty-five  years  should 
be  accepted,  the  threatened  destruction  of  the 
government  would  be  escaped  for  the  present,  and 
it  might,  at  the  end  of  a quarter  of  a century, 
be  easj"  to  reenact  the  law.  At  any  rate  the  evil 
day  would  be  put  off.  This  was  Madison’s  rea- 
soning. 

But  Hamilton  did  not  believe  in  putting  off  a 
crisis.  He  had  no  faith  in  the  permanency  of  the 
government  as  then  organized.  If  he  were  right, 
what  was  the  use  or  the  wisdom  of  postponing 
a catastrophe  till  to-morrow  ? A possible  escape 
from  it  might  be  even  more  difficult  to-morrow 
than  to-day.  The  essential  difference  between 
the  two  men  was,  that  Madison  only  feared  what 
Hamilton  positively  knew,  or  thought  he  knew. 
It  was  a difference  of  faith.  Madison  hoped  some- 
thing would  turn  up  in  the  course  of  twenty-five 
years.  Hamilton  did  not  believe  that  anything 
good  could  turn  up  under  the  feeble  rule  of  the 
Confederation.  He  would  have  presented  to  the 
States,  then  and  there,  the  question  — would  they 
surrender  to  the  Confederate  Government  the  right 
of  taxation  sb  long  as  that  goverment  thought  it 
necessary  ? If  not,  then  the  Confederation  was  a 
rope  of  sand,  and  the  States  had  resolved  them- 


88 


JAMES  MADISON. 


selves  into  thirteen  separate  and  independent  gov- 
ernments. Therefore  he  opposed  the  condition  of 
twenty-five  years,  and  voted  against  the  bill. 

Nevertheless,  when  it  became  the  law,  he  gave  it 
his  heartiest  support,  and  was  appointed  one  of  a 
committee  of  three  to  prepare  an  address,  which 
Madison  wrote,  to  commend  it  to  the  acceptance 
of  the  States.  Indeed,  the  last  serious  effort  made 
on  behalf  of  the  measure  was  made  by  Hamilton, 
who  used  all  his  eloquence  and  influence  to  in- 
duce the  legislature  of  his  own  State  to  ratify  it. 
It  was  the  law  against  his  better  judgment ; but 
being  the  law  he  did  his  best  to  secure  its  recogni- 
tion. But  it  failed  of  hearty  support  in  most  of 
the  States,  while  in  New  York  and  Pennsylvania 
compliance  with  it  was  absolutely  refused.  Noth- 
ing, therefore,  would  have  been  lost  had  Hamil- 
ton’s firmness  prevailed  in  Congress  ; and  nothing 
was  gained  by  Madison’s  deference  to  the  doc- 
trine of  state-rights,  unless  it  was  that  the  ques- 
tion of  a “more  perfect  Union”  was  put  off  to 
a more  propitious  time,  when  a reconstruction  of 
the  government  under  a new  Federal  Constitution 
was  possible.  Meanwhile  Congress  borrowed  the 
money  to  pay  the  interest  on  money  already  bor- 
rowed ; the  Confederate  Government  floundered 
deeper  and  deeper  into  inextricable  difficulties ; 
the  thirteen  ships  of  state  drifted  farther  and  far- 
ther apart,  with  a fair  promise  of  a general  wreck. 

But  the  bill  contained  another  compromise 


IN  CONGRESS. 


39 


■which  was  not  temporary,  and  once  made  could 
not  be  easily  unmade.  Agreed  to  now,  it  became 
a condition  of  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution four  years  later ; and  there,  as  nobody 
now  is  so  blind  as  not  to  see,  it  was  the  source  of 
infinite  mischief  for  nearly  a century,  till  a third 
reconstruction  of  the  Union  was  brought  about  by 
the  war  of  1861-65.  The  Articles  of  Confedera- 
tion required  that  “ all  charges  of  war  and  all 
other  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the  com- 
mon defense  or  general  welfare  ” should  be  borne 
by  the  States  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  their 
lands.  It  was  proposed  to  amend  this  provision 
of  the  Constitution,  and  for  lands  substitute  popu- 
lation, exclusive  of  Indians  not  taxed,  as  the  basis 
for  taxation.  But  here  arose  at  once  a new  and 
perplexing  question.  There  were,  chiefly  in  one 
portion  of  the  country,  about  750,000  “persons 
held  to  service  or  labor  ” — the  euphuism  for  ne- 
gro slaves  which,  evolved  from  some  tender  and 
sentimental  conscience,  came  into  use  at  this  pe- 
riod. Should  these,  recognized  only  as  property 
by  state  law,  be  counted  as  750,000  persons  by 
the  laws  of  the  United  States?1  Or  should  they, 
in  the  enumeration  of  population,  be  reckoned,  in 
accordance  with  the  civil  law,  as  pro  nullis,  pro 
mortuis , pro  quadrupedibus  ; and  therefore  not  to 
be  counted  at  all  ? Or  should  they,  as  those  who 

1 In  some  of  the  States  slaves  were  reckoned  as  “ chattels  per- 
sonal ; ” in  others  as  “ real  estate.” 


40 


JAMES  MADISON. 


owned  them  insisted,  be  counted,  if  included  in 
the  basis  of  taxation,  as  fractions  of  persons  only? 

The  South  contended  that  black  slaves  were 
not  equal  to  white  men  as  producers  of  wealth, 
and  that,  by  counting  them  as  such,  taxation 
would  be  unequal  and  unjust.  But  whether 
counted  as  units,  or  as  fractions  of  units,  the 
slaveholders  insisted  that  representation  should 
be  according  to  that  enumeration.  The  Northern 
reply  was  that,  if  representation  was  to  be  accord- 
ing to  population,  the  slaves  being  included,  then 
the  slave  States  would  have  a representation  of 
property,  for  which  there  would  be  no  equivalent 
in  States  where  there  were  no  slaves ; but,  if 
slaves  were  enumerated  as  a basis  of  representa- 
tion, then  that  enumeration  should  also  be  taken 
to  fix  the  rate  of  taxation. 

Here,  at  any  rate,  was  a basis  for  an  interesting 
dead-lock.  One  simple  way  out  of  it  would  have 
been  to  insist  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  civil  law; 
to  count  the  slaves  only  as  pro  quadrupedibus , to 
be  left  out  of  the  enumeration  of  population  as 
being  no  part  of  the  State,  as  horses  and  cattle 
were  left  out.  But  the  bonds  of  union  hung 
loosely  upon  the  sisters  a hundred  years  ago ; 
there  was  not  one  of  them  who  did  not  think  she 
was  able  to  set  up  for  herself  and  take  her  place 
among  the  nations  as  an  independent  sovereign ; 
and  it  is  more  than  likely  that  half  of  them  would 
have  refused  to  wear  those  bonds  any  longer  on 


IN  CONGRESS. 


41 


such  a condition.  There  was  no  apprehension 
then  that  slavery  was  to  become  a power  for  evil 
in  the  State  ; but  there  was  intense  anxiety  lest 
the  States  should  fly  asunder,  form  partial  and 
local  unions  among  neighbors,  or  become  entan- 
gled in  alliances  with  foreign  nations,  at  the  sacri- 
fice of  all,  or  much,  that  was  gained  by  the  Revo- 
lution. To  make  any  concession,  therefore,  to 
slavery  for  the  sake  of  the  Union  was  hardly  held 
to  be  a concession. 

The  curious  student  of  history,  however,  who 
loves  to  study  those  problems  of  what  might  have 
happened,  if  events  that  did  not  happen  had  come 
to  pass,  will  find  ample  room  for  speculation  in 
the  possibilities  of  this  one.  Had  there  been  no 
compromise,  it  is  as  easy  to  see  now,  as  it  was 
easy  to  foresee  then,  how  quickly  the  feeble  bond 
of  union  would  have  snapped  asunder.  But  never- 
theless, if  the  North  had  insisted  that  the  slaves 
should  neither  be  counted  nor  represented  at  all, 
or  else  should  be  reckoned  in  full  and  taxes  levied 
accordingly,  the  consequent  dissolution  of  the  Con- 
federacy might  have  had  consequences  which  then 
nobody  dreamed  of.  For  it  is  not  impossible,  it 
is  not  even  improbable,  that,  in  that  event,  the 
year  1800  would  have  seen  slavery  in  the  process 
of  rapid  extinction  everywhere  except  in  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia.  Had  the  event  been  post- 
poned in  those  States  to  a later  period,  it  would 
only  have  been  because  they  had  already  found  in 


42 


JAMES  MADISON. 


the  cultivation  of  indigo  and  rice  a profitable  use 
for  slave-labor,  which  did  not  exist  in  the  other 
slave  States,  where  the  supply  of  slaves  was  rap- 
idly exceeding  the  demand.  There  can  hardly  be 
a doubt  that  in  case  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Con- 
federacy, the  Northern  free-labor  States  would 
soon  have  consolidated  into  a strong  union  of  their 
own.  There  was  every  reason  for  hastening  it, 
and  none  so  strong  for  hindering  it  as  those  which 
were  overborne  in  the  union  which  was  actually 
formed  soon  afterward  between  the  free-labor  and 
slave-labor  States.  To  such  a Northern  union 
the  border  States,  as  they  sloughed  off  the  old 
system,  would  have  been  naturally  attracted  ; nor 
can  there  be  a doubt  that  a federal  union  so 
formed  would  ultimately  have  proved  quite  as 
strong,  quite  as  prosperous,  quite  as  happy,  and 
quite  as  respectable  among  the  nations,  as  one 
purchased  by  compromises  with  slavery,  followed, 
as  those  compi’omises  were,  by  three  quarters  of  a 
century  of  bitter  political  strife  ending  in  a civil 
war. 

But  the  Northern  members  were  no  less  ready  to 
make  compromises  than  Southern  members  were 
to  insist  upon  them,  these  no  more  understanding 
what  they  conceded  than  those  understood  what 
they  gained;  for  the  future  was  equally  concealed 
from  both.  A committee  reported  that  two  blacks 
should  be  rated  as  one  free  man.  This  was  un- 
satisfactory. To  some  it  seemed  too  large,  to 


IN  CONGRESS. 


43 


others  too  small.  Other  ratios,  therefore,  were 
proposed  — three  to  one,  three  to  two,  four  to 
one,  and  four  to  three.  Mr.  Madison  at  last,  “ in 
order,”  as  he  said,  “ to  give  a proof  of  the  sincer- 
ity of  his  professions  of  liberality,”  — and  doubt- 
less he  meant  to  be  liberal,  — proposed  “that 
slaves  should  be  rated  as  five  to  three.”  His  mo- 
tion was  adopted,  but  afterward  reconsidered. 
Four  days  later — April  1st  — Mr.  Hamilton  re- 
newed the  proposition,  and  it  was  carried,  Mad- 
ison says,  “ without  opposition.”1  The  law  on 
this  point  was  the  precedent  for  the  mischievous 
three  fifths  rule  of  the  Constitution  adopted  four 
years  later. 

Youth  finally  overtook  the  young  man  during 
the  last  winter  of  his  term  in  Congress,  for  he  fell 
in  love.  But  it  was  an  unfortunate  experience, 
and  the  outcome  of  it  doubtless  gave  a more  sombre 
hue  than  ever  to  his  life.  His  choice  was  not  a 
wise  one.  Probably  Mr.  Madison  seemed  a much 
older  man  than  he  really  was  at  that  period  of  his 
life,  and  to  a young  girl  may  have  appeared  really 
advanced  in  years.  At  any  rate  it  was  his  un- 
happy fate  to  be  attached  to  a young  lady  of  more 
than  usual  beauty  and  of  irrepressible  vivacity, 

1 J.  C.  Hamilton  says,  in  his  History  of  the  Republic,  that  “ the 
motion  prevailed  by  a vote  of  all  the  States  excepting  Massachu- 
setts and  Rhode  Island.”  But  his  understanding  of  the  question 
is  in  other  respects  incorrect  — misunderstood,  one  may  hope, 
rather  than  misstated  lest  hs  should  give  credit,  for  what  he  con- 
sidered a meritorious  action,  to  Madison. 


44 


JAMES  MADISON. 


— Miss  Catherine  Floyd,  a daughter  of  General 
William  Floyd  of  Long  Island,  N.  Y.,  who  was  one 
of  the  signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
and  who  was  a delegate  to  Congress  from  1774  to 
1783.  Miss  Catherine’s  sixteenth  birthday  was  in 
April  of  the  latter  year ; Madison  was  double  her 
age,  as  his  thirty-second  birthday  was  a month 
earlier.  His  suit,  however,  was  accepted,  and  they 
became  engaged.  But  it  was  the  father  rather 
than  the  daughter  who  admired  the  suitor  ; for 
the  older  statesman  better  under-stood  the  char- 
acter, and  better  appreciated  the  abilities,  of  his 
young  colleague,  and  predicted  a brilliant  career 
for  him.  The  girl’s  wisdom  was  of  another  kind. 
The  future  career  which  she  foresaw  and  wanted 
to  share  belonged  to  a young  clergyman,  who  — 
according  to  the  reminiscences  of  an  aged  relative 
of  hers  — “ hung  round  her  at  the  harpsichord,” 
and  made  love  in  quite  another  fashion  than  that 
of  the  solemn  statesman,  whom  the  old  general 
so  approved  of.  It  is  altogether  a pretty  love 
story,  and  one’s  sympathy  goes  out  to  the  lively 
young  beauty,  who  was  thinking  of  love  and  not 
of  ambition,  as  she  turned  from  the  old  young 
gentleman,  discussing,  with  her  wise  father,  the 
public  debt  and  the  necessity  of  an  impost,  to  that 
really  young  young  gentleman  who  knew  how  to 
hang  over  the  harpsichord,  and  talked  more  to 
the  purpose  with  his  eyes  than  ever  the  other 
could  with  his  lips.  There  is  a tradition  that  she 


IN  CONGRESS. 


45 


was  encouraged  to  be  thus  on  with  the  new  love 
before  she  was  off  with  the  old,  by  a friend  some- 
what older  than  herself ; and  possibly  this  ma- 
turer  lady  may  have  thought  that  Madison  would 
be  better  mated  with  one  nearer  his  own  age.  At 
any  rate  the  engagement  was  broken  off  before 
long  by  the  dismissal  of  the  older  lover,  much  to 
the  father’s  disappointment,  and  in  due  time  the 
young  lady  married  the  other  suitor.  There  is  no 
reason  that  I know  of  for  supposing  that  she  ever 
regretted  that  her  more  humble  home  was  in  a 
rectory,  when  it  might  have  been,  in  due  time, 
had  she  chosen  differently,  in  the  White  House  at 
Washington,  and  that  afterward  she  might  have 
lived,  the  remaining  sixteen  years  of  her  life,  the 
honored  wife  of  a revered  ex-President.  Perhaps, 
however,  she  smiled  in  those  later  years  at  the 
recollection  of  having  laughed  in  her  gay  and 
thoughtless  youth  at  her  solemn  lover,  and  that 
when  at  last  she  dismissed  him,  she  sealed  her 
letter  — conveying  to  him  alone,  it  may  be,  some 
merry  but  mischievous  meaning  — with  a bit  of 
rye-dough.1 

Mr.  Rives  gives  a letter  from  Jefferson  to  Mad- 
ison at  this  time,  which  shows  that  he  stood  in 
need  of  consolation  from  his  friends.  “I  sincerely 

1 For  the  details,  so  far  as  they  can  now  be  recalled,  of  this 
single  romantic  incident  in  Mr.  Madison’s  life,  I am  indebted 
to  Nicoll  Floyd,  Esq.,  of  Moriches,  Long  Island,  a great-grandson 
of  General  William  Floyd. 


46 


JAMES  MADISON, 


lament,”  Mr.  Jefferson  wrote  in  his  philosophical 
way,  “ the  misadventure  which  has  happened,  from 
whatever  cause  it  may  have  happened.  Should  it 
be  final,  however,  the  world  presents  the  same  and 
many  other  resources  of  happiness,  and  you  pos- 
sess many  within  yourself.  Firmness  of  mind  and 
unintermitting  occupation  will  not  long  leave  you 
in  pain.  No  event  has  been  more  contrary  to  my 
expectations,  and  these  were  founded  on  what  I 
thought  a good  knowledge  of  the  ground.  But  of 
all  machines  ours  is  the  most  complicated  and 
inexplicable.”  It  was  Solomon  who  said,  “ there 
be  three  things  which  are  too  wonderful  for  me, 
yea  four  which  I know  not.”  This  fourth  was, 
“ the  way  of  a man  with  a maid.”  . He  might 
have  added  a fifth  — the  way  of  a maid  with  a 
man  — which,  evidently,  is  what  Jefferson  meant. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 

As  the  election  of  the  same  delegate  to  Con- 
gress for  consecutive  sessions  was  then  forbidden 
by  the  law  of  Virginia,  Mr.  Madison  was  not  re- 
turned to  that  body  in  1784.  For  a brief  inter- 
val of  three  months  he  made  good  use  of  his  time, 
we  are  told,  by  continuing  his  law  studies,  till  in 
the  spring  of  that  year  he  was  chosen  to  repre- 
sent his  county  in  the  Virginia  Assembly.  It  may 
be  that  “ the  sentiments  and  manners  of  the  pa- 
rent nation,”  which  he  lamented  seven  years  be- 
fore, had  passed  away,  and  nobody  now  insisted 
upon  the  privilege  of  getting  drunk  at  the  candi- 
date’s expense  before  voting  for  him.  But  it  is 
more  likely  that  the  electors  had  not  changed. 
The  difference  was  in  the  candidate ; they  did  not 
need  to  be  allured  to  give  their  votes  to  a man 
whom  they  were  proud  to  call  upon  to  represent 
the  county.  Mr.  Madison’s  reputation  was  already 
made  by  his  three  years  in  Congress,  and  he  now 
easily  took  a place  among  the  political  leaders  of 
his  own  State. 

The  position  was  hardly  less  conspicuous  or  less 


48 


JAMES  MADISON. 


influential  than  that  which  he  had  held  in  the  na- 
tional Congress.  What  each  State  might  do  was  of 
quite  as  much  importance  as  anything  the  Federal 
Government  might  or  could  do.  Congress  could 
neither  open  nor  close  a single  port  in  Virginia  to 
commerce,  whether  domestic  or  foreign,  without 
the  consent  of  the  State  ; it  could  not  levy  a tax 
of  a penny  on  anything,  whether  goods  coming  in 
or  products  going  out,  if  the  State  objected.  As 
a member  of  Congress,  Mr.  Madison  might  pro- 
pose or  oppose  any  of  these  things  ; as  a member 
of  the  Vii-ginia  House  of  Delegates,  he  might,  if 
his  influence  was  strong  enough,  carry  or  forbid 
any  or  all  of  them,  whatever  might  be  the  wishes 
of  Congress.  It  was  in  the  power  of  Virginia  to 
influence  largely  the  welfare  of  her  neighbors,  so 
far  as  it  depended  upon  commerce,  and  indirectly 
that  of  every  State  in  the  Union. 

In  the  Assembly,  as  in  Congress,  Mr.  Madison’s 
aim  was  to  increase  the  powers  of  the  Federal 
Government,  for  want  of  which  it  was  rapidly  sink- 
ing into  imbecility  and  contempt.  “ I acceded,” 
he  says,  “ to  the  desire  of  my  fellow-citizens  of 
the  county  that  I should  be  one  of  its  representa- 
tives in  the  legislature,”  to  bring  about  “ a rescue 
of  Jhe  Union  and  the  blessings  of  liberty  staked 
on  it  from  an  impending  catastrophe.”  Early  in 
the  session  the  Assembly  assented  to  the  amend- 
ment to  the  Articles  of  Confederation  proposed  at 
the  late  session  of  Congress,  which  substituted 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 


49 


population  for  a land-valuation  as  the  basis  of  rep- 
resentation and  of  taxation.  The  Assembly  also 
asserted  that  all  requisitions  upon  the  States  for 
the  support  of  the  general  government  and  to  pro- 
vide for  the  public  debt  should  be  complied  with, 
and  payment  of  balances  on  old  accounts  should 
be  enforced  ; and  it  assented  to  the  recommenda- 
tion of  Congress  that  that  body  should  have  power 
for  a limited  period  to  control  the  trade  with  for- 
eign nations  having  no  treaty  with  the  United 
States,  in  order  that  it  might  retaliate  upon  Great 
Britain  for  excluding  American  ships  from  her 
West  India  colonies.  All  these  measures  were  de- 
signed for  “the  rescue  of  the  Union,”  and  they 
had,  of  course,  Madison’s  hearty  support.  For  it 
was  absolutely  essential,  as  he  believed,  that  some- 
thing should  be  done  if  the  Union  was  to  be  saved, 
or  to  be  made  worth  saving.  But  there  were  ob- 
stacles on  all  sides.  The  commercial  States  were 
reluctant  to  surrender  the  control  over  trade  to  Con- 
gress ; in  the  planting  States  there  was  hardly  any 
trade  that  could  be  surrendered.  In  Virginia  the 
tobacco  planter  still  clung  to  the  old  ways.  He 
liked  to  have  the  English  ship  take  his  tobacco 
from  the  river  bank  of  his  own  plantation,  and  to 
receive  from  the  same  vessel  such  coarse  goods  as 
were  needed  to  clothe  his  slaves,  with  the  more  ex- 
pensive luxuries  for  his  own  family,  — drygoods 
for  his  wife  and  daughter ; the  pipe  of  madeira,  the 
coats  and  breeches,  the  hats,  boots,  and  saddles  for 


50 


JAMES  MADISON. 


himself  and  his  sons.  He  knew  that  this  year’s 
crop  went  to  pay — if  it  did  pay  — for  last  year’s 
goods,  and  that  lie  was  always  in  debt.  But  the 
debt  was  on  running  account,  and  did  not  matter. 
The  London  factor  was  skillful  in  charges  for  in- 
terest and  commissions,  and  the  account  for  this 
year  was  always  a lien  on  next  year’s  crop.  He 
knew,  and  the  planter  knew,  that  the  tobacco  could 
be  sold  at  a higher  price  in  New  York  or  Phila- 
delphia than  the  factor  got,  or  seemed  to  get,  for 
it  in  London  ; that  the  goods  sent  out  in  exchange 
were  charged  at  a higher  price  than  they  could  be 
bought  for  in  the  Northern  towns.  Nevertheless, 
the  planter  liked  to  see  his  own  hogsheads  rolled 
on  board  ship  by  his  own  negroes  at  bis  own 
wharf,  and  receive  in  return  his  own  boxes  and 
bales  shipped  direct  from  London  at  his  own  order, 
let  it  cost  what  it  might.  It  was  a shiftless  and 
ruinous  system  ; but  the  average  Virginia  planter 
was  not  over-quick  at  figures,  nor  even  at  reading 
and  writing.  He  was  proud  of  being  lord  of  a 
thousand  or  two  acres,  and  one  or  two  hundred 
negroes,  and  fancied  that  this  was  to  rule  over,  as 
Mr.  Rives  called  it,  “ a mimic  commonwealth, 
with  its  foreign  and  domestic  relations,  and  its  reg- 
ular administrative  hierarchy.”  He  did  not  com- 
prehend that  the  isolated  life  of  a slave  plantation 
was  ordinarily  only  a kind  of  perpetual  barbecue, 
with  its  rough  sports  and  vacuous  leisure,  where 
the  roasted  ox  was  largely  wasted  and  not  always 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 


51 


pleasant  to  look  at.  There  was  a rude  hospitality, 
where  food,  provided  by  unpaid  labor,  was  cheap 
and  abundant,  and  where  the  host  was  always  glad 
to  welcome  any  guest  who  would  relieve  him  of  his 
own  tediousness  ; but  there  was  little  luxury  and 
no  refinement  where  there  was  almost  no  culture. 
Of  course  there  were  a few  homes  and  families  of 
another  order,  where  the  women  were  refined  and 
the  men  educated  ; but  these  were  the  exceptions. 
Society  generally,  with  its  bluff,  loud,  self-con- 
fident but  ignorant  planters,  its  numerous  poor 
whites,  destitute  of  lands  and  of  slaves,  and  its 
mass  of  slaves  whose  aim  in  life  was  to  avoid  work 
and  escape  the  whip,  was  necessarily  only  one  re- 
move from  semi-civilization. 

It  was  not  easy  to  indoctrinate  such  a people, 
more  arrogant  than  intelligent,  with  new  ideas. 
By  the  same  token  it  might  be  possible  to  lead 
them  into  new  ways  before  they  would  find  out 
whither  they  were  going.  Mr.  Madison  hoped  to 
change  the  wretched  system  of  plantation-com- 
merce by  a port  bill,  which  he  brought  into  the 
Assembly.  Imposts  require  custom-houses,  and 
obviously  there  could  not  be  custom-houses  nor 
even  custom-officers  on  every  plantation  in  the 
State.  The  bill  proposed  to  leave  open  two  ports 
of  entry  for  all  foreign  ships.  It  would  greatly 
simplify  matters  if  all  the  foreign  trade  of  the 
State  could  be  limited  to  these  two  ports  only.  It 
would  then  be  easy  enough  to  enforce  imposts, 


52 


JAMES  MADISON. 


and  the  State  would  have  something  to  surrender 
to  the  Federal  Government  to  help  it  to  a revenue, 
if,  happily,  the  time  should  ever  come  when  all 
the  States  should  assent  to  that  measure  of  salva- 
tion for  the  Union.  Not  that  this  was  the  pri- 
mary object  of  those  who  favored  this  port  law  ; 
but  the  question  of  commerce  was  the  question  on 
which  everything  hinged,  and  its  regulation  in 
each  State  must  needs  have  an  influence,  one  way 
or  the  other,  upon  the  possibility  of  strengthening, 
even  of  preserving,  the  Union.  Everything  de- 
pended upon  reconciling  these  state  interests  by 
mutual  concessions.  The  South  was  jealous  of 
the  North,  because  trade  flourished  at  the  North 
and  did  not  flourish  at  the  South.  It  seemed  as 
if  this  was  at  the  expense  of  the  South,  and  so, 
in  a certain  sense,  it  was.  The  problem  was  to 
find  where  the  difficulty  lay,  and  to  apply  the 
remedy. 

If  commerce  flourished  at  the  North  where  each 
of  the  States  had  one  or  two  ports  of  entry  only, 
why  should  it  not  flourish  in  Virginia,  if  regulated 
in  the  same  way?  If  those  centres  of  trade  bred 
a race  of  merchants,  who  built  their  own  ships, 
bought  and  sold,  did  their  own  carrying,  competed 
with  and  stimulated  each  other,  and  encroached 
upon  the  trade  of  the  South,  why  should  not 
similar  results  follow  in  Virginia  if  she  should 
confine  her  trade  to  two  or  three  ports  ? If  the 
buyer  and  the  seller,  the  importer  and  the  con' 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY.  53 

suraer,  went  to  a common  place  of  exchange  in 
Philadelphia,  New  York,  and  Boston,  and  pros- 
perity followed  as  a consequence,  why  should  they 
not  do  the  same  thing  at  Norfolk?  This  was 
what  Madison  aimed  to  bring  about  by  the  port 
bill.  But  it  was  impossible  to  get  it  through  the 
legislature  till  three  more  ports  were  added  to 
the  two  which  the  bill  at  first  proposed.  When 
the  planters  came  to  understand  that  such  a law 
would  take  away  their  cherished  privilege  of  trade 
along  the  banks  of  the  rivers,  wherever  anybody 
chose  to  run  out  a little  jetty,  the  opposition  was 
persistent.  At  every  succeeding  session,  till  the 
new  Federal  Constitution  was  adopted,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  repeal  the  act ; and  though  that  was 
not  successful,  each  year  new  ports  of  entry  were 
added.  It  did  not,  indeed,  matter  much  whether 
the  open  ports  of  Virginia  were  two  or  whether 
they  were  twenty.  There  was  a factor  in  the 
problem  which  neither  Mr.  Madison  nor  anybody 
else  would  take  into  the  account.  It  was  possible, 
of  course,  if  force  enough  were  used,  to  break  up 
the  traffic  with  English  ships  on  the  banks  of  the 
rivers  ; but  when  that  was  done,  commerce  would 
follow  its  own  laws,  in  spite  of  the  acts  of  the 
legislature,  and  flow  into  channels  of  its  own  choos- 
ing. It  was  not  possible  to  transmute  a planting 
State,  where  labor  was  enslaved,  into  a commercial 
State,  where  labor  must  be  free. 

However  desirous  Mr.  Madison  might  be  to 


54 


JAMES  MADISON. 


transfer  the  power  over  commerce  to  the  Federal 
Government,  he  was  compelled,  as  a member  of 
the  Virginia  legislature,  to  care  first  for  the  trade 
of  his  own  State.  No  State  could  afford  to  neglect 
its  own  commercial  interests  so  long  as  the  thirteen 
States  remained  thirteen  commercial  rivals.  It 
was  becoming  plainer  and  plainer  every  day,  that 
while  that  relation  continued,  the  less  chance  there 
was  that  thirteen  petty,  independent  States  could 
unite  into  one  great  nation.  No  foreign  power 
would  make  a treaty  with  a government  which 
could  not  enforce  that  treaty  among  its  own  peo- 
ple. Neither  could  any  separate  portion  of  that 
people  make  a treaty,  as  any  other  portion,  the 
other  side  of  an  imaginary  line,  need  not  hold  it 
in  respect.  What  good  was  there  in  revenue  laws, 
or,  indeed,  in  any  other  laws  in  Massachusetts 
which  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  disregarded  ? 
or  in  New  York,  if  New  Jersey  and  Pennsyl- 
vania laughed  at  them  ? or  in  Virginia,  if  Mary- 
land held  them  in  contempt  ? 

But  Mr.  Madison  felt  that,  if  he  could  bi’ing 
about  a healthful  state  of  things  in  the  trade  of 
his  own  State,  there  was  at  least  so  much  done 
towards  bringing  about  a healthful  state  of  things 
in  the  commerce  of  the  whole  country.  There 
came  up  a practical,  local  question  which,  when 
the  time  came,  he  was  quick  to  see  had  a logical 
bearing  upon  the  general  question.  The  Poto- 
mac was  the  boundary  line  between  Virginia  and 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 


55 


Maryland ; but  Lord  Baltimore’s  charter  gave  to 
Maryland  jurisdiction  over  the  river  to  the  Vir- 
ginia bank ; and  this  right  Virginia  had  recog- 
nized, claiming  only  for  herself  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Potomac  and  the  Pocomoke.  Of  course 
the  laws  of  neither  State  were  regarded  when  it 
was  worth  while  to  evade  them  : and  nothing  was 
easier  than  to  evade  them,  since  to  the  average 
human  mind  there  is  no  privilege  so  precious  as 
a facility  for  smuggling.  Nobody,  at  any  rate, 
seems  to  have  thought  anything  about  the  matter 
till  it  came  under  Madison’s  observation  after  his 
return  home  from  Congress.  To  him  it  meant 
something  more  than  mere  evasion  of  state  laws 
and  frauds  on  the  state  revenue.  The  subject  fell 
into  line  with  his  reflections  upon  the  looseness  of 
the  bonds  that  held  the  States  together,  and  how 
unlikely  it  wras  that  they  would  ever  grow  into  a 
respectable  or  prosperous  nation  while  their  pres- 
ent relations  continued.  Virtually  there  was  no 
maritime  law  on  the  Potomac,  and  hardly  even 
the  pretense  of  any.  What  could  be  more  absurd 
than  to  provide  ports  of  entry  on  one  bank  of  a 
river,  while  on  the  other  bank,  from  the  source  to 
the  sea,  the  whole  counti’y  was  free  to  all  comers  ? 
If  the  laws  of  either  State  were  to  be  regarded 
on  the  opposite  bank,  a treaty  was  as  necessary 
between  them  as  between  any  two  contiguous 
States  in  Emope. 

Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson,  who  was  now  a del- 


56 


JAMES  MADISON. 


egate  in  Congress,  pointing  out  this  anomalous 
condition  of  tilings  on  the  Potomac,  and  suggest- 
ing that  he  should  confer  with  the  Maryland  del- 
egates upon  the  subject.  The  proposal  met  with 
Jefferson’s  approbation  ; he  sought  an  interview 
with  Mr.  Stone,  a delegate  from  Maryland,  and, 
as  he  wrote  to  Madison,  “ finding  him  of  the  same 
opinion,  [I]  have  told  him  I would,  by  letters, 
bring  the  subject  forward  on  our  part.  They  will 
consider  it,  therefore,  as  originated  by  this  con- 
versation.” Why  “ they  ” should  not  have  been 
permitted  to  “consider  it  as  originated”  from 
Madison’s  suggestion  that  Jefferson  should  have 
such  a conversation  is  not  quite  plain  ; for  it  was 
Madison,  not  Jefferson,  who  had  discovered  that 
here  was  a wrong  that  ought  to  be  righted,  and 
who  had  proposed  that  each  State  should  appoint 
commissioners  to  look  into  the  matter  and  apply  a 
remedy.  So,  also,  so  far  as  subsequent  negotia- 
tion on  this  subject  had  any  influence  in  bringing 
about  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787,  it 
was  only  because  Mr.  Madison,  having  suggested 
the  first  practical  step  in  the  one  case,  seized  an 
opportune  moment  in  that  negotiation  to  suggest 
a similar  practical  step  in  the  other  case.  As  it  is 
so  often  said  that  the  Annapolis  Convention  of 
1786  was  the  direct  result  of  the  discussion  of  the 
Potomac  question,  it  is  worth  while  to  explain 
what  they  really  had  to  do  with  each  other. 

The  Virginia  commissioners  were  appointed 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 


57 


early  in  the  session  on  Mr.  Madison’s  motion. 
Maryland  moved  more  slowly,  and  it  was  not  till 
the  spring  of  1785  that  the  commissionei’s  met. 
They  soon  found  that  any  efficient  jurisdiction 
over  the  Potomac  involved  more  interests  than 
they,  or  those  who  appointed  them,  had  consid- 
ered. Existing  difficulties  might  be  disposed  of  by 
agreeing  upon  uniform  duties  in  the  two  States, 
and  this  the  commissioners  recommended.  But 
when  the  subject  came  before  the  Maryland  leg- 
islature it  took  a wider  range. 

The  Potomac  Company,  of  which  Washington 
was  president,  had  been  chartered  only  a few 
mouths  before.  The  work  it  proposed  to  do  was 
to  make  the  upper  Potomac  navigable,  and  to  con- 
nect it  by  a good  road  with  the  Ohio  River.  This 
was  to  encourage  the  settlement  of  Western  lands. 
Another  company  was  chartered  about  the  same 
time  to  connect  the  Potomac  and  Delaware  by  a 
canal,  where  inter-state  traffic  would  be  more  im- 
mediate. Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  must  nec- 
essarily have  a deep  interest  in  both  these  proj- 
ects, and  the  Maryland  legislature  proposed  that 
those  States  be  invited  to  appoint  commissioners 
to  act  with  those  whom  Maryland  and  Virginia 
had  already  appointed  to  settle  the  conflict  be- 
tween them  upon  the  question  of  jurisdiction  on 
the  Potomac.  Then  it  occurred  to  somebody : if 
four  States  can  confer,  why  should  not  thirteen  ? 
The  Maryland  legislature  thereupon  suggested 


58 


JAMES  MADISON. 


that  all  the  States  be  invited  to  send  delegates  to 
a convention  to  take  up  the  whole  question  of 
American  commerce. 

While  this  was  going  on  in  Maryland,  the  Vir- 
ginia legislature  was  considering  petitions  from 
the  principal  ports  of  the  State  praying  that  some 
remedy  might  be  devised  for  the  commercial  evils 
from  which  they  were  all  suffering.  The  port 
bill  had  manifestly  proved  a failure.  It  was  only 
a few  weeks  before  that  Madison  had  complained, 
in  a letter  to  a friend,  that  “ the  trade  of  the  coun- 
try is  in  a most  deplorable  condition  ; ” that  the 
most  “shameful  frauds”  wete  committed  by  the 
English  merchants  upon  those  in  Virginia,  as  well 
as  upon  the  planters  who  shipped  their  own  to- 
bacco ; that  the  difference  in  the  price  of  tobacco 
at  Philadelphia  and  in  Virginia  was  from  eleven 
shillings  to  fourteen  shillings  in  favor  of  the 
Northern  ports ; and  that  “ the  price  of  merchan- 
dise here  is,  at  least,  as  much  above,  as  that  of  to- 
bacco is  below,  the  Northern  standard.”  He  was 
only  the  more  confirmed  in  his  opinion  that  there 
was  no  cure  for  these  radical  evils  except  to  sur- 
render to  the  Confederate  Government  complete 
control  over  commerce.  The  debate  upon  these 
petitions  was  hot  and  long.  It  brought  out  the 
strongest  men  on  both  sides,  Madison  leading 
those  who  wished  to  give  to  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  trade  with  foreign  counh'ies  when  no 
treaty  existed ; to  make  uniform  commercial  laws 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY.  59 

for  all  the  States;  and  to  levy  an  impost  of  five 
per  cent,  on  imported  merchandise,  as  a provision 
for  the  public  debt  and  for  the  support  of  the 
Federal  Government  generally.  A committee,  of 
which  he  was  a member,  at  length  reported  in- 
structions to  the  delegates  of  the  State  in  Con- 
gress to  labor  for  the  consent  of  all  the  States  to 
these  propositions.  But  in  Committee  of  the 
Whole  the  resolutions  were  so  changed  and  quali- 
fied— especially  in  limiting  to  thirteen  years  the 
period  for  which  Congress  was  to  be  intrusted 
with  a power  so  essential  to  the  existence  of  the 
government  — that  the  measure  was  given  up  by 
its  friends  as  hopeless. 

But  before  the  report  was  disposed  of  Mr.  Mad- 
ison prepared  a resolution,  to  be  offered  as  a sub- 
stitute, with  the  hope  of  reaching  the  same  end  in 
another  way.  This  resolution  provided  for  the 
appointment  of  five  commissioners,  — Madison  to 
be  one  of  them,  — “ who,  or  any  three  of  whom, 
shall  meet  such  commissioners  as  may  be  ap- 
pointed in  the  other  States  of  the  Union,  at  a 
time  and  place  to  be  agreed  on,  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  trade  of  the  United  States  ; to  ex- 
amine the  relative  situations  and  trade  of  said 
States ; to  consider  how  far  a uniform  system  in 
their  commercial  regulations  may  be  necessary  to 
their  common  interest  and  their  permanent  har- 
mony ; and  to  report  to  the  several  States  such  an 
act,  relative  to  this  great  object,  as,  when  unani- 


60 


JAMES  MADISON. 


mously  ratified  by  them,  will  enable  the  United 
States,  in  Congress,  effectually  to  provide  for  the 
same.”  This  he  was  careful  not  to  offer  himself, 
but,  as  he  says,  it  was  “ introduced  by  Mr.  Tyler, 
an  influential  member,  — who,  having  never  served 
in  Congress,  had  more  the  ear  of  the  House  than 
those  whose  services  there  exposed  them  to  an  im- 
putable bias.”  He  adds  that  “it  was  so  little  ac- 
ceptable, that  it  was  not  then  persisted  in.” 

About  the  same  time  the  action  of  the  Mary- 
land legislature  on  the  Potomac  question,  and 
the  report  of  the  Potomac  commissioners,  came 
up  for  consideration.  Mr.  Madison  said  afterward 
that,  as  Maryland  thought  the  concurrence  of 
Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  were  necessary  to  the 
regulation  of  trade  on  that  river,  so  those  States 
would,  probably,  wish  to  ask  for  the  concurrence 
of  their  neighbors  in  any  proposed  arrangement. 
“ So  apt  and  forcible  an  illustration,”  he  adds, 
“ of  the  necessity  of  an  uniformity  throughout  all 
the  States  could  not  but  favor  the  passage  of  a 
resolution  which  proposed  a convention  having 
that  for  its  object.” 

As  one  of  the  Potomac  commissioners,  he  knew, 
of  course,  what  was  coming  from  Maryland,  and 
“ how  apt  and  forcible  an  illustration  ” it  would 
seem,  when  it  did  come,  of  that  resolution  which 
he  had  written  and  had  induced  Mr.  Tyler  to 
offer.  It  did  not  matter  that  the  resolution  had 
been  at  the  moment  “so  little  acceptable,”  and 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 


61 


therefore  “ not  then  persisted  in.”  It  was  where 
it  was  sure,  in  the  political  slang  of  our  day,  to 
do  the  most  good.  And  so  it  came  about.  All 
that  Maryland  had  proposed,  growing  out  of  the 
consideration  of  the  Potomac  question,  the  Vir- 
ginia legislature  acceded  to.  Then,  on  the  last 
day  of  the  session,  the  Madison-Tyler  resolution 
was  taken  from  the  table,  where  it  had  lain  quietly 
for  nearly  two  months,  and  passed.  If  some,  who 
had  been  contending  all  winter  against  any  action 
which  should  lead  to  a possibility  of  strengthening 
the  Federal  Government,  failed  to  see  how  impor- 
tant a step  they  had  taken  to  that  very  end ; if 
any,  who  were  fearful  of  Federal  usurpation  and 
tenacious  of  state-rights,  were  blind  to  the  fact 
that  the  resolution  had  pushed  aside  the  Potomac 
question  and  put  the  Union  question  in  its  place, 
Mr.  Madison,  we  may  be  sure,  was  not  one  of  that 
number.  He  had  gained  that  for  which  he  had 
been  striving  for  years. 

The  commissioners  appointed  by  the  resolution 
soon  came  together.  They  appointed  Annapolis 
as  the  place,  and  the  second  Monday  of  the  fol- 
lowing September  (1786)  as  the  time  of  the  pro- 
posed national  convention ; and  they  sent  to  all 
the  other  States  an  invitation  to  send  delegates  to 
that  convention. 

On  September  11  commissioners  from  Virginia, 
Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  New 
York  assembled  at  Annapolis,  Others  had  been 


62 


JAMES  MADISON. 


appointed  by  North  Carolina,  Rhode  Island,  Mas- 
sachusetts, and  New  Hampshire,  but  they  were 
not  present.  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  Maryland, 
and  Connecticut  had  taken  no  action  upon  the 
subject.  As  five  States  only  were  represented, 
the  commissioners  “ did  not  conceive  it  advisable 
to  proceed  on  the  business  of  their  mission,”  but 
they  adopted  an  address,  written  by  Alexander 
Hamilton,  to  be  sent  to  all  the  States. 

All  the  represented  States,  the  address  said,  had 
authorized  their  commissioners  “ to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  trade  and  commerce  of  the  United 
States ; to  consider  how  far  an  uniform  system 
in  their  commercial  intercourse  and  regulations 
might  be  necessaiy  to  their  common  interest  and 
permanent  harmony.”  But  New  Jersey  had  gone 
farther  than  this ; her  delegates  were  instructed 
“ to  consider  how  far  an  uniform  system  in  their 
commercial  regulations  and  other  important  mat- 
ters, might  be  necessary  to  the  common  interest 
and  permanent  harmony  of  the  several  States.” 
This,  the  commissioner’s  present  thought,  “ was  an 
improvement  on  the  original  plan,  and  will  de- 
serve to  be  incorporated  into  that  of  a future  con- 
vention.” They  gave  their  reasons  at  length  for 
this  opinion,  and,  in  conclusion,  urged  that  com- 
missioners fi’om  all  the  States  be  appointed  to 
meet  in  convention  at  Philadelphia  on  the  second 
Monday  of  the  following  May  (1787),  “to  devise 
such  further  provisions  as  shall  appear  to  them 


IN  THE  STATE  ASSEMBLY. 


63 


necessai'y  to  render  tlie  Constitution  of  the  Fed- 
eral Government  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
Union.” 

In  the  coiu’se  of  the  winter  delegates  to  this 
convention  were  chosen  by  the  several  States. 
Virginia  was  the  first  to  choose  her  delegates ; 
Madison  was  among  them,  and  at  their  head  was 
George  Washington. 


CHAPTER  V. 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE. 

That  the  Annapolis  Convention  ever  met  to 
make  smooth  the  way  for  the  more  important  one 
which  came  together  eight  months  afterward  and 
framed  a permanent  Constitution  for  the  United 
States,  was  unquestionably  due  to  the  persistence 
and  the  political  adroitness  of  Mr.  Madison.  But 
it  was  not  exceptional  work.  The  same  diligence 
and  devotion  to  public  duty  mark  the  whole  of 
this  period  of  three  years  through  which  he  con- 
tinued a member  of  the  state  legislature.  As 
chairman  of  the  judiciary  committee  he  reduced 
with  much  labor  the  old  colonial  statutes  to  a 
body  of  laws  befitting  the  condition  of  free  citi- 
zens in  an  independent  State.  From  his  first  to 
his  last  session  he  contended,  though  without  suc- 
cess, for  the  faith  of  treaties  and  the  honest  pay- 
ment of  debts.  The  treaty  with  England  pro- 
vided that  there  should  be  “no  lawful  impediment 
on  either  side  to  the  recovery  of  debts  heretofore 
contracted.”  The  legislature  notified  Congress 
that  it  should  disregard  this  provision,  on  the  plea 
that  in  relation  to  “slaves  and  other  property  ” it 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE . 65 

had  not  been  observed  by  Great  Britain.  Mr. 
Madison  did  not  then  know  that — as  he  said 
three  years  later  — “the  infractions  [of  the 
treaty]  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  preceded 
even  the  violation  on  the  other  side  in  the  in- 
stance of  the  negroes.”  He  maintained,  neverthe- 
less, that  the  settlement  of  the  difficulty,  if  it  had 
any  real  foundation,  belonged  to  Congress,  the 
party  to  the  treaty,  and  not  to  a State  which  had 
surrendered  the  treaty-making  power ; and  that 
in  common  honesty  one  planter  was  not  relieved 
from  his  obligation  to  pay  a London  merchant  for 
goods  and  merchandise  received  before  the  war, 
because  other  planters  had  not  been  paid  for  the 
negroes  and  horses  they  had  lost  when  the  British 
troops  invaded  Virginia.  At  each  of  the  three 
sessions  of  the  legislature,  while  he  was  a member, 
he  tried  to  bring  that  body  to  adopt  some  line  of 
conduct  which  should  not — to  use  his  own  words 
— “extremely  dishonor  us  and  embarrass  Con- 
gress.” It  was  useless ; the  repudiators  were 
quite  deaf  to  any  appeals  either  to  their  honor  or 
their  patriotism. 

On  another  question  both  he  and  his  State  were 
more  fortunate.  Religious  freedom  had  to  be 
once  more  fought  for,  and  he  was  quick  to  come 
to  the  defense  of  a right  which  had  first  called 
forth  his  youthful  enthusiasm.  Two  measures 
were  brought  forward  from  session  to  session  to 
secure  for  the  church  the  support  of  the  state. 

5 


66 


JAMES  MADISON. 


The  first  was  a bill  for  the  incorporation  of  relig- 
ious societies  ; but  when  it  was  pushed  to  its  final 
passage  it  provided  for  the  incorporation  of  Epis- 
copal churches  only.  For  this  Mr.  Madison  con- 
sented to  vote,  though  with  reluctance,  in  the 
hope  that  the  church  party  would  be  so  far  satis- 
fied with  this  measure  as  to  abstain  from  pushing 
another  which  was  still  more  objectionable. 

He  was  disappointed.  Naturally  those  who 
had  carried  their  first  point  were  the  moi’e,  not 
the  less,  anxious  for  further  success.  Now  it  was 
insisted  that  there  should  be  a universal  tax  “ for 
the  support  of  teachers  of  the  Christian  religion.” 
The  tax-payer  was  to  be  permitted  to  name  the 
religious  society  for  the  support  of  which  he  pre- 
ferred to  contribute.  If  he  declined  this  volun- 
tary acquiescence  in  the  law,  the  money  would  be 
used  in  aid  of  a school ; but  from  the  tax  itself 
none  were  to  be  exempt  on  any  pretext.  Madi- 
son was  quick  to  see  in  such  a law  the  possibility 
of  religious  intolerance,  of  compulsory  uniformity 
enforced  by  the  civil  power,  and  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  any  freedom  of  conscience  or  opinion. 
The  act  did  not  define  who  were  and  who  were 
not  “ teachers  of  the  Christian  religion,”  and  that 
necessarily  would  be  left  to  the  courts  to  decide. 
A state  church  would  be  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence ; for  it  was  not  to  be  supposed  that  any 
dominant  sect  would  rest  till  it  secured  the  recog- 
nition by  law  of  its  own  denomination  as  the  sole 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE. 


67 


representative  of  the  Christian  religion.  To  ex- 
pect anything  else  was  to  ignore  the  teachings  of 
all  history. 

The  burden  of  opposition  and  debate  fell,  at 
first,  almost  solely  upon  Madison.  Some  of  the 
wisest  and  best  men  of  the  State  were  slow  to  see, 
as  he  saw,  that  religious  freedom  was  in  danger 
from  such  legislation.  There  was,  it  was  said,  a 
sad  falling-off  in  public  morality  as  indifference  to 
religion  increased.  There  was  no  cure,  it  was  de- 
clared, for  prevalent  and  growing  corruption  ex- 
cept in  the  culture  of  the  religious  sentiment,  and 
the  teachers  of  religion,  therefore,  must  be  upheld 
and  supported.  But  granting  all  this,  Madison 
saw  that  the  proposed  remedy  would  be  to  give 
not  bread  but  a stone,  and  a stone  that  would  be 
used  in  return  as  a weapon.  It  was  impossible  to 
regulate  religious  belief  by  act  of  the  Assembly, 
and  therefore  it  was  worse  than  foolish  to  try. 

It  was  due  to  him  that  the  question  was  post- 
poned from  one  session  to  the  next.  A copy  of 
the  bill  was  sent,  meanwhile,  into  every  county  of 
the  State  for  the  consideration  of  the  people,  and 
that  was  aided  by  a “ Memorial  and  Remon- 
strance,” written  by  Madison,  which  was  circu- 
lated everywhere  for  signature,  in  readiness  for 
presentation  to  the  next  legislature.  The  bill, 
the  memorial  said,  would  be  “ a dangerous  abuse 
of  power,”  and  the  signers  protested  against  it 
with  unanswerable  arguments,  taking  for  a start- 


68 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ing-point  the  assertion  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  “that 
religion,  or  the  duty  we  owe  to  our  Creator,  and 
the  manner  of  discharging  it,  can  be  directed  only 
by  reason  and  conviction,  not  by  force  or  violence.” 
It  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  many  signed  this 
remonstrance,  not  so  much  because  they  believed 
it  to  be  true,  as  because  it  was  a protest  against  a 
tax;  that  others  were  more  moved  by  jealousy  of 
the  power  of  the  Episcopal  Church  than  they  were 
by  anxiety  to  protect  religious  liberty  outside  of 
their  own  sects.  But  whatever  the  motives,  the 
movement  was  too  formidable  to  be  disregarded. 
It  was  made  a test  question  in  the  election  of 
members  for  the  legislature  of  1785-86  ; at  that 
session  the  bill  for  the  support  of  religious  teach- 
ers was  rejected,  and  in  place  of  it  was  passed  “an 
act  for  establishing  religious  freedom,”  written  by 
Jefferson  seven  years  before.  This  provided  “ that 
no  man  shall  be  compelled  to  frequent  or  support 
any  religious  worship,  place,  or  ministry  whatso- 
ever, nor  shall  be  enforced,  restrained,  molested, 
or  burthened  in  his  body  or  goods,  nor  shall  other- 
wise suffer  on  account  of  his  religious  opinions  or 
belief  ; but  that  all  men  shall  be  free  to  profess, 
and  by  argument  maintain,  their  opinions  in  mat- 
ters of  religion,  and  that  the  same  shall  in  no 
wise  diminish,  enlarge,  or  affect  their  civil  capac- 
ities.” 1 

1 With  how  much  interest  Jefferson  watched  the  progress  of  this 
controversy  he  showed  in  his  letters  from  Paris.  In  February, 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE. 


69 


In  the  memorial  and  remonstrance  Madison 
had  said  : “ If  this  freedom  be  abused,  it  is  an 
offense  against  God,  not  against  man.  To  God, 
therefore,  not  to  man,  must  an  account  of  it  be  ren- 
dered.” If  the  people  of  Virginia  did  not  clearly 
comprehend  this  doctrine  in  all  its  length  and 
breadth  a hundred  years  ago,  it  is  not  quite  easy 
to  say  who  were  then,  or  who  are  now  at  liberty 
to  throw  stones  at  them.  The  assertion  of  the 
broadest  religious  freedom  was  no  more  new  then 
than  it  is  true  that  persecution  for  opinion’s  sake 
is  now  only  an  ancient  evil.  It  was  not  till  fifty 

1786,  he  wrote  to  Madison,  “I  thank  you  for  the  communication 
of  the  remonstrance  against  the  assessmeut.  Mazzei,  who  is  now 
in  Holland,  promised  me  to  have  it  published  in  the  Leyden  Ga- 
zette. It  will  do  us  great  honor.  I wish  it  may  be  as  much  ap- 
proved by  our  Assembly,  as  by  the  wisest  part  of  Europe.” 
Again,  in  December  of  the  same  year,  he  says,  “ The  Virginia  Act 
for  religious  freedom  has  been  received  with  infinite  approbation  in 
Europe,  and  propagated  with  enthusiasm.  I do  not  mean  by  the 
governments,  but  by  the  individuals  who  compose  them.  It  has 
been  translated  into  French  and  Italian,  has  been  sent  to- most  of 
the  courts  of  Europe,  and  has  been  the  best  evidence  of  the  false- 
hood of  those  reports,  which  stated  us  to  be  in  anarchy.  It  is  in- 
serted in  the  Encyclope'die,  and  is  appearing  in  most  of  the  publica- 
tions respecting  America.  In  fact,  it  is  comfortable  to  see  the  stand- 
ard of  reason  at  length  erected,  after  so  manj’’  ages,  during  which 
the  human  mind  had  been  held  in  vassalage  by  kings,  priests,  and 
nobles  ; and  it  is  honorable  for  us  to  have  produced  the  first  legis- 
lature who  had  the  courage  to  declare,  that  the  reason  of  man 
may  be  trusted  with  the  formation  of  his  own  opinions  ! ” This 
latter  passage  is  characteristic,  and  many  who  do  not  like.  Jeffer- 
son will  read  between  the  lines  the  exultation  of  a man  who  was 
not  always  careful  to  draw  the  line  between  religious  liberty  and 
irreligious  license. 


70 


JAMES  MADISON. 


years  after  Virginia  bad  refused  to  tax  her  citi- 
zens for  the  support  of  religious  teachers,  that 
Massachusetts  repealed  the  law  that  had  long  im- 
posed a similar  burden  upon  her  people. 

It  was  in  1786,  the  last  year  of  Madison’s  ser- 
vice in  the  Virginia  Assembly  before  he  returned 
to  Congress,  that  the  craze  of  paper  money  broke 
out  again  through  all  the  States.  The  measure 
was  carried  in  most  of  them,  followed  in  the  end 
by  the  usual  disastrous  consequences.  Madison’s 
anxiety  was  great  lest  his  own  State  should  be 
carried  away  by  this  delusion,  and  he  led  the  op- 
position against  some  petitions  sent  to  the  Assem- 
bly praying  for  an  issue  of  currency.  The  vote 
against  it  was  too  large  to  be  due  altogether  to 
his  influence ; but  he  gave  great  strength  and 
concentration  to  the  opposition.  In  Virginia  to- 
bacco certificates  supplied  in  some  measure  the 
want  of  a circulating  medium,  and  it  was,  there- 
fore, easier  there  than  in  some  of  the  other  States 
to  resist  the  clamor  for  a paper  substitute  for  real 
money.  A tobacco  certificate  at  least  represented 
something  worth  money.  Madison  assented  to 
a bill  which  authorized  the  use  of  such  certifi- 
cates. But  his  “acquiescence,”  he  wrote  to  Wash- 
ington, “ was  extorted  by  a fear  that  some  greater 
evil,  under  the  name  of  relief  to  the  people,  would 
be  substituted.”  He  was  “ far  from  being  sure,” 
he  added,  that  he  “ did  right.”  But  no  evils  with 
which  he  had  to  reproach  himself  followed  that 


measure. 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE.  71 

These  three  years  of  Iris  life  were  probably 
among  the  happiest,  if  they  were  not  altogether 
the  happiest,  in  his  long  public  career.  There 
was  little  disappointment  or  anxiety,  and  evi- 
dently much  genuine  satisfaction  as  he  saw  how 
certainly  he  was  gaining  a high  place  in  the  esti- 
mation of  his  fellow-citizens  for  his  devotion  to  the 
best  interests  of  his  native  State.  In  the  recesses 
of  the  legislature  he  had  leisure  for  studies  in 
which  he  evidently  found  great  contentment.  He 
traveled  a good  deal  at  intervals,  especially  at  the 
North  ; learned  much  of  the  resources  and  char- 
acter of  the  people  outside  of  Virginia,  and  be- 
came acquainted  with  the  leading  men  among 
them.  Jefferson  urged  him  to  pass  a summer 
with  him  in  Paris ; and  some  foreign  diplomatic 
service  was  open  to  him,  had  he  expressed  a will- 
ingness to  accept  it.  But  he  preferred  to  know 
something  more  of  his  own  country  while  he  had 
the  leisure  ; and  if  his  life  was  to  be  passed  in 
public  service,  as  now  seemed  probable  to  him,  he 
chose,  at  least  for  the  present,  to  serve  his  country 
at  home,  where  he  thought  be  was  more  needed, 
rather  than  abroad.  In  his  orders  for  books  sent 
to  Jefferson  the  direction  of  his  studies  is  evident. 
He  sought  largely  for  those  which  treated  of  the 
science  of  government ; but  they  were  not  con- 
fined to  that  subject.  Natural  histoi’y  had  great 
charms  for  him.  He  was  a diligent  student  of 
Buffon,  and  was  anxious  to  find,  if  possible,  the 


72 


JAMES  MADISON. 


plates  of  his  thirty-one  volumes,  in  colors,  that  he 
might  adorn  the  walls  of  his  room  with  them.  He 
made  careful  comparisons  between  the  animals  of 
other  continents,  as  described  and  portrayed  by 
the  naturalist,  and  similar  orders  in  America.  All 
new  inventions  interested  him.  “I  am  so  pleased,” 
he  writes,  “ with  the  new  invented  lamp  that  I 
shall  not  grudge  two  guineas  for  one  of  them.” 
He  had  seen  “ a pocket  compass  of  somewhat 
larger  diameter  than  a watch,  and  which  may  be 
carried  in  the  same  way.  It  has  a spring  for 
stopping  the  vibration  of  the  needle  when  not  in 
use.  One  of  these  would  be  very  convenient  in 
case  of  a ramble  into  the  western  country.”  A 
small  telescope,  he  suggests,  might  be  fitted  on  as 
a handle  to  a cane,  which  might  “ be  a source  of 
many  little  gratifications,”  when  “ in  walks  for  ex- 
ercise or  amusement  objects  present  themselves 
which  it  might  be  matter  of  curiosity  to  inspect, 
but  which  it  was  difficult  or  impossible  to  ap- 
proach.” Jefferson  writes  him  of  a new  invention, 
a pedometer ; and  he  wants  one  for  his  own 
pocket.  Trifles  like  these  show  the  bent  of  his 
mind  ; and  they  show  a contented  mind  as  well. 

While  writing  of  important  acts  of  the  legis- 
lature of  1785,  he  is  careful  to  give  other  infor- 
mation in  a letter  to  Jefferson,  which  is  not  unin- 
teresting as  written  ninety-eight  years  ago,  and 
written  by  him. 

“I.  Rumsey,”  he  says,  “by  a memorial  to  the  last 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE.  73 

session,  represented  that  he  had  invented  a mechanism 
by  which  a boat  might  be  worked  with  little  labor,  at  the 
rate  of  from  twenty-five  to  forty  miles  a day,  against 
a stream  running  at  the  rate  of  ten  miles  an  hour,  and 
prayed  that  the  disclosure  of  his  invention  might  be  pur- 
chased by  the  public.  The  apparent  extravagance  of  his 
pretensions  brought  a ridicule  upon  them,  and  nothing 
was  done.  In  the  recess  of  the  Assembly  he  exemplified 
his  machinery  to  General  Washington  and  a few  other 
gentlemen,  who  gave  a certificate  of  the  reality  and  im- 
portance of  the  invention,  which  opened  the  ears  of  this 
Assembly  to  a second  memorial.  The  act  gives  a mo- 
nopoly for  ten  years,  reserving  a right  to  abolish  it  at 
any  time  by  paying  £10,000.  The  inventor  is  soliciting 
similar  acts  from  other  States,  and  will  not,  I suppose, 
publish  the  secret  till  he  either  obtains  or  despairs  of 
them.” 

This  intelligence  was  evidently  not  unheeded 
by  Jefferson.  In  writing,  some  months  after  he 
received  it,  to  a friend  on  the  application  of  steam- 
power  to  grist-mills,  then  lately  introduced  in 
England,  he  adds  : “ I hear  you  are  applying  the 
same  agent  in  America  to  navigate  boats,  and  I 
have  little  doubt  but  that  it  will  be  applied  gen- 
erally to  machines,  so  as  to  supersede  the  use  of 
water-ponds,  and  of  course  to  lay  open  all  the 
streams  for  navigation.”  Nor  does  Madison  seem 
to  have  been  one  of  those  who  doubted  if  anything 
was  to  come  of  Rumsey’s  invention.  All  this  was 
less  than  a hundred  years  ago,  and  now  there  is  a 
steam-ferry  between  New  York  and  Europe  run- 
ning about  twice  a day. 


74 


JAMES  MADISON. 


In  a similar  letter,  a year  later,  he  is  careful, 
among  grave  political  matters,  to  remember  and 
report  to  the  same  friend  that  in  the  sinking  of  a 
well  in  Richmond,  on  the  declivity  of  a hill,  there 
had  been  found,  “about  seventy  feet  below  the 
surface,  several  large  bones,  apparently  belonging 
to  a fish  not  less  than  the  shark ; and,  what  is  more 
singular,  several  fragments  of  potter’s  ware  in  the 
style  of  the  Indians.  Befoi-e  he  [the  digger] 
reached  these  curiosities  he  passed  through  about 
fifty  feet  of  soft  blue  clay.”  Mr.  Madison  had 
only  just  heard  of  this  discovery,  and  he  had  not 
seen  the  unearthed  fragments.  But  he  evidently 
accepts  the  story  as  true  in  coming  from  “ unex- 
ceptionable witnesses.”  He  adds,  as  a corrobora- 
tion, that  he  is  told  by  a friend  from  Washington 
County  of  the  finding  there,  in  the  sinking  of  a 
salt-well,  “of  the  hip-bone  of  the  incognitum,  the 
socket  of  which  was  about  eight  inches  in  diam- 
eter.” Such  things  were  peculiarly  interesting  to 
Jefferson,  and  Madison  was  too  devoted  a friend 
to  him  to  leave  them  unnoticed.  But  they  were 
hardly  less  interesting  to  himself,  though  he  had 
not  much  of  Jefferson’s  habit  of  scientific  investi- 
gation. That  “the  potter’s  ware  in  the  style  of 
the  Indians”  should  be  found  so  deeply  buried 
only  seems  to  him  “ singular ; ” nor,  indeed,  is  there 
any  record,  so  far  as  we  know,  that  this  particular 
fact  was  any  more  suggestive  to  Jefferson,  though 
apparently  so  likely  to  arouse  his  inquiring  mind 


IN  THE  VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE. 


75 


to  seek  for  some  satisfactory  explanation.  But 
his  geological  notions  were  too  positive  to  admit 
even  of  a doubt  as  to  the  age  of  man.  Supposing 
a Creator,  he  assumed  that  “ he  created  the  earth 
at  once,  nearly  in  the  state  in  which  we  see  it,  fit 
for  the  preservation  of  the  beings  he  placed  on 
it.”  Theorist  as  he  was  himself,  he  had  little  pa- 
tience with  the  other  theorists  who  were  already 
beginning  to  discover  in  the  structure  of  the  earth 
the  evidence  of  successive  geological  eras.  The 
different  strata  of  rocks  and  their  inclination  gave 
him  no  trouble.  He  explained  them  all  by  the  as- 
sumption that  “ rock  grows,  and  it  seems  that  it 
grows  in  layers  in  every  direction,  as  the  branches 
of  trees  grow  in  all  directions.”  That  evidences 
of  the  existence  of  man  should  be  found  with  a 
super-imposed  weight  of  earth  seventy  feet  in 
thickness  would  present  to  him  no  difficulty.  If 
the  fact  had  specially  aroused  his  attention  he 
would  have  explained  it  in  some  ingenious  way  as 
the  result  of  accident. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES. 

In  February,  1787,  Madison  again  took  a seat 
in  Congress.  It  was  an  anxious  period.  Sbays’s 
rebellion  in  Massachusetts  had  assumed  rather 
formidable  possibilities,  and  seemed  not  unlikely 
to  spread  to  other  States.  Till  this  storm  should 
blow  over,  the  important  business  of  Congress  was 
to  raise  money  and  troops ; in  reality,  to  go  to  the 
help  of  Massachusetts,  if  need  should  be,  though 
the  object  ostensibly  was  to  protect  a handful  of 
people  on  the  frontier  against  the  Indians.  It  was 
a striking  instance  of  the  imbecility  of  the  gov- 
ernment under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  that 
it  could  only  undertake  to  suppress  rebellion  in  a 
State  under  the  pretense  of  doing  something  else 
which  came  within  the  law.  Massachusetts,  it  is 
true,  was  quite  able  to  deal  with  her  insurgents  ; 
but  when  Congress  convened  it  was  not  known  in 
New  York  that  Lincoln  had  dispersed  the  main 
body  of  them  at  Petersham.  Nevertheless,  a like 
difficulty  might  arise  at  any  moment  in  any  other 
of  the  States,  where  the  strength  to  meet  it  might 
be  quite  inadequate. 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES.  77 

Madison’s  ideal  still  was,  the  Union  before  the 
States,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  States ; the  whole 
before  the  parts,  to  save  the  parts  ; the  binding 
the  fagot  together  that  the  sticks  might  not  be 
lost.  “ Our  situation,”  he  wrote  to  Edmund  Ran- 
dolph, in  February,  “ is  becoming  every  day  more 
and  more  critical.  No  money  comes  into  the  fed- 
eral treasury ; no  respect  is  paid  to  the  federal  au- 
thority ; and  people  of  reflection  unanimously 
agree  that  the  existing  Confederacy  is  tottering  to 
its  foundation.  Many  individuals  of  weight,  par- 
ticularly in  the  eastern  district,  are  suspected  of 
leaning  toward  monarchy.  Other  individuals  pre- 
dict a partition  of  the  States  into  two  or  more 
confederacies.  It  is  pretty  certain  that  if  some 
radical  amendment  of  the  single  one  cannot  be 
devised  and  introduced,  one  or  the  other  of  these 
revolutions,  the  latter  no  doubt,  will  take  place.” 

It  is  not  impossible  that  Madison  himself  may 
have  had  some  faith  in  this  suspicion  that  “ indi- 
viduals of  weight  in  the  eastern  district  ” were 
inclined  to  a monarchy.  For  such  suspicion,  how- 
ever, there  could  be  little  real  foundation.  There 
were,  doubtless,  men  of  weight  who  thought  and 
said  that  monarchy  was  better  than  anarchy. 
There  were,  doubtless,  impatient  men  then  who 
thought  and  said,  as  there  are  impatient  men  now 
who  think  and  say,  that  the  rule  of  a king  is  better 
than  the  rule  of  the  people.  But  there  was  no  dis- 
loyalty to  government  by  the  people  among  those 


78 


JAMES  MADISON. 


who  only  maintained  that  the  English  in  America 
must  draw  from  the  common  heritage  of  English 
institutions  and  English  law  the  material  where- 
with to  build  up  the  foundations  of  a new  nation. 
No  intelligent  and  candid  man  doubts  now  that 
they  were  wise ; nor  would  it  have  been  long 
doubted  then,  had  it  not  so  speedily  become  mani- 
fest that,  if  the  stigma  of  “ British  ” was  once  af- 
fixed to  a political  party,  any  appeal  from  popular 
prejudice  to  reason  and  common  sense  was  hope- 
less. 

There  were  a few  persons  who  would  have  done 
away  with  the  divisions  of  States  and  establish 
in  their  place  a central  government.  Those  most 
earnest  in  maintaining  the  autonomy  of  States  de- 
clared that  such  a government  was,  as  Luther 
Martin  of  Maryland  called  it,  of  “ a monarchical 
nature.”  What  else  could  that  be  but  a mon- 
archy? An  insinuation  took  on  the  form  of  a 
logical  deduction  and  became  a popular  fallacy. 
Yet  those  most  earnest  for  a central  government 
only  sought  to  establish  a stable  rule  in  place  of 
no  rule  at  all ; or,  worse  still,  of  the  tyranny  of 
an  ignorant  and  vicious  mob  under  the  outraged 
name  of  democracy,  into  which  there  was  danger 
of  drifting.  Whether  their  plan  was  wise  or  fool- 
ish, it  did  not  mean  a monarchy.  Even  of  Shays’s 
misguided  followers  Jefferson  said  : “I  believe  you 
may  be  assured  that  an  idea  or  desire  of  return- 
ing to  anything  like  their  ancient  government 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES.  79 

never  entered  into  their  heads.”  As  Madison 
knew  and  said,  the  real  danger  was  that  the  States 
would  divide  into  two  confederacies,  and  only  by 
a new  and  wiser  and  stronger  union  could  that  ca- 
lamity be  averted. 

To  gain  the  assent  of  most  of  the  States  to  a 
convention  was  surmounting  only  the  least  of  the 
difficulties.  Three  weeks  before  the  time  of  meet- 
ing Madison  wrote : “ The  nearer  the  crisis  ap- 
proaches, the  more  I tremble  for  the  issue.  The 
necessity  of  gaining  the  concui’rence  of  the  con- 
vention in  some  system  that  will  answer  the  pur- 
pose, the  subsequent  approbation  of  Congress,  and 
the  final  sanction  of  the  States,  present  a series  of 
chances  which  would  inspire  despair  in  any  case 
where  the  alternative  was  less  formidable.”  He 
said,  in  the  first  month  of  the  session  of  that  body, 
that  “ the  States  were  divided  into  different  inter- 
ests, not  by  their  difference  of  size,  but  by  other 
circumstances ; the  most  material  of  which  re- 
sulted partly  from  climate,  but  principally  from 
the  effects  of  their  having  or  not  having  slaves. 
These  two  causes  concurred  in  forming  the  great 
division  of  interests  in  the  United  States.  It  did 
not  lie  between  the  large  and  small  States.  It 
lay  between  the  Northern  and  Southern.” 

During  the  earlier  weeks  of  this  session  of  Con- 
gress, and,  indeed,  for  some  months  before,  events 
had  made  so  manifest  this  difference  of  interest, 
coincident  with  the  difference  in  latitude,  that 


80 


JAMES  MADISON. 


there  seemed  little  ground  for  hope  that  any  good 
would  come  out  of  a constitutional  convention. 
The  old  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi was  again  agitated.  The  South  held  her 
right  to  that  river  to  be  of  much  more  value  than 
anything  she  could  gain  by  a closer  union  with 
the  North,  and  she  was  quite  ready  to  go  to  war 
with  Spain  in  defense  of  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Northern  States  were  quite  indifferent  to  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  not  disposed  ap- 
parently to  make  any  exertion  or  sacrifice  to  secure 
it.  Just  now  they  were  anxious  to  secure  a com- 
mercial treaty  with  Spain  ; but  Spain  insisted,  as 
a preliminary  condition,  that  the  United  States 
should  relinquish  all  claim  to  navigation  upon  a 
river  whose  mouths  were  within  Spanish  terri- 
tory. In  the  Northern  mind  there  was  no  doubt 
of  the  value  of  trade  with  Spain  ; and  there  was 
a good  deal  of  doubt  whether  there  was  any- 
thing worth  contending  for  in  the  right  to  sail 
upon  a river  running  through  a wilderness  where, 
as  yet,  there  were  few  inhabitants,  and  hardty  any 
trade  worth  talking  about.  More  than  that : there 
was  unquestionably  a not  uncommon  belief  at  the 
North  and  East,  that  the  settlement  and  prosper- 
ity of  the  West  would  be  at  the  expense  of  the 
Atlantic  States.  Perhaps  that  view  of  the  matter 
was  not  loudly  insisted  upon  ; but  many  were  none 
the  less  persuaded  that,  if  population  was  attracted 
westward  by  the  hope  of  acquiring  rich  and  cheap 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES.  81 

lands,  prosperity  and  power  would  go  with  it.  At 
any  rate,  those  of  this  way  of  thinking  were  not 
inclined  to  forego  a certain  good  for  that  which 
would  profit  them  nothing,  and  might  do  them 
lasting  harm. 

For  these  reasons,  spoken  and  unspoken,  the 
Northern  members  of  Congress  were  at  first  quite 
willing,  for  the  sake  of  a commercial  treaty,  to 
concede  to  Spain  the  exclusive  control  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. But  to  pacify  the  South  it  was  proposed 
that  the  concession  to  Spain  should  be  for  only 
five  and  twenty  years.  If  at  the  end  of  that  period 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  should  be  worth 
contending  for,  the  question  could  be  reopened. 
The  South  was,  of  course,  rather  exasperated  than 
pacified  by  such  a proposition.  The  navigation  of 
the  river  had  not  only  a certain  value  to  them 
now,  but  it  was  theirs  by  right,  and  that  was  rea- 
son enough  for  not  parting  with  it  even  for  a 
limited  period.  Concessions  now  would  make  the 
reassertion  of  the  right  the  more  difficult  by  and 
by.  If  it  must  be  fought  for,  it  would  lessen  the 
chance  of  success  to  put  off  the  fighting  five  and 
twenty  years.  Indeed,  it  could  not  be  put  off,  for 
war  was  already  begun  in  a small  way.  The 
Spaniards  bad  seized  American  boats  on  trading 
voyages  down  the  river,  and  the  Americans  had 
retaliated  upon  some  petty  Spanish  settlements. 
Spain,  moreover,  seemed  at  first  no  more  inclined 
to  listen  to  compromise  than  the  South  was. 


82 


JAMES  MADISON. 


England  watched  this  controversy  with  interest. 
She  had  no  expectation  of  X’ecovering  for  herself 
the  Floridas,  which  she  had  lost  in  the  war  of  the 
Revolution,  and  had  finally  ceded  to  Spain  by  the 
treaty  of  1783;  but  -she  was  quite  willing  to  see 
that  Power  get  into  trouble  on  the  Mississippi 
question  ; and  more  than  willing  that  it  should 
threaten  the  peace  and  union  of  the  States.  Her 
own  boundary  line  west  of  the  Alleghanies  might 
possibly  be  extended  far  south  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
if  the  Northern  and  Southern  States  should  divide 
into  two  confederacies ; but,  apart  from  any  lust 
of  territory,  she  rejoiced  at  anything  that  threat- 
ened to  check  the  growth  of  her  late  colonies. 

Fortunately,  however,  the  question  was  disposed 
of,  before  the  Constitutional  Convention  met  at 
Philadelphia,  by  the  failure  to  secure  a treaty. 
The  Spanish  minister,  Guardoqui,  consented,  at 
length,  after  long  resistance,  to  accept  as  a com- 
promise the  navigation  of  the  river  for  five  and 
twenty  years ; but  Mr.  Jay,  who  was  willing, 
could  he  have  had  his  way,  to  concede  anything, 
found  at  that  stage  of  the  negotiations  Le  could 
not  command  votes  enough  in  Congress  to  secure 
a treaty  even  in  that  modified  form.  Hitherto  he 
had  relied  upon  a resolution,  passed  by  Congress 
in  August,  1786,  by  the  vote  of  seven  Northern 
States  against  five  Southern.  This,  it  was  assumed, 
repealed  a resolution  of  the  year  before,  and  au- 
thorized the  Secretary  to  make  a treaty.  The 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES.  83 

resolution  of  the  year  before,  August,  1785,  bad 
been  passed  by  the  votes  of  nine  States,  and  was  in 
confirmation  of  a provision  of  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation declaring  that  “ no  treaties  with  foreign 
powers  should  be  entered  into  but  by  the  assent 
of  nine  States.”  The  minority  contended  that 
such  a resolution  could  not  be  repealed  by  the 
vote  of  only  seven  States,  for  that  would  be  to 
violate  a fundamental  condition  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation.  It  is  easy  to  see  now  that  there 
ought  not  to  have  been  a difference  among  honor- 
able  men  on  such  a point  as  that.  Nevertheless 
Mr.  Jay,  supported  by  some  of  the  strongest  North- 
ern men,  held  that  the  votes  of  seven  States  could 
be  made,  in  a roundabout  way,  to  authorize  an  act 
which  the  Constitution  declared  should  never  be 
lawful  except  with  the  assent  of  nine  States.  So 
the  Secretary  went  on  with  his  negotiations  and 
came  to  terms  with  the  Spanish  minister. 

In  April  the  Secretary  was  called  upon  to  report 
to  Congress  what  was  the  position  of  these  nego- 
tiations. Then  it  first  publicly  appeared  that  a 
treaty  was  actually  agreed  upon  which  gave  up 
the  right  to  the  Mississippi  for  a quarter  of  a cen- 
tury. But  it  was  also  speedily  made  plain  by 
various  parliamentary  motions,  that  the  seven 
votes  which  the  friends  of  such  a treaty  had  re- 
lied upon,  had  fallen  from  seven  — even  could 
that  number  in  the  end  have  been  of  use  — to,  at 
best,  four.  The  New  Jersey  delegates  had  been 


84 


JAMES  MADISON. 


instructed  not  to  consent  to  the  surrender  of  the 
American  right  to  the  use  of  the  Mississippi ; a 
new  delegate  from  Pennsylvania  had  changed  the 
vote  of  that  State  ; and  Rhode  Island  had  also 
gone  over  to  the  other  side.  “ It  was  considered, 
on  the  whole,”  wrote  Madison,  “ that  the  project 
for  shutting  the  Mississippi  was  at  an  end.” 

These  details  are  not  unimportant.  Forty-five 
years  afterward  Madison  wrote,  that  “ his  main  ob- 
ject, in  returning  to  Congress  at  this  time,  was  to 
bring  about,  if  possible,  the  canceling  of  Mr.  Jay’s 
project  for  shutting  the  Mississippi.”  Probably 
it  had  occurred  to  nobody  then  that  within  less 
than  twenty  years  the  Province  of  Louisiana 
would  belong  to  the  United  States,  when  their 
right  to  the  navigation  of  the  river  could  be  no 
longer  disputed.  But,  so  long  as  both  its  banks 
fi’om  the  thirty-first  degree  of  latitude  southward 
to  the  Gulf  remained  foreign  territory,  it  was  of 
the  last  importance  to  the  Southern  States,  whose 
territory  extended  to  the  Mississippi,  that  the 
right  of  way  should  not  be  surrendered.  If  a 
treaty  with  Spain  could  be  carried  that  gave  up 
this  right,  and  the  Southern  States  should  be  com- 
pelled to  choose  between  the  loss  of  the  Mississippi 
and  the  loss  of  the  Union,  there  could  be  little 
doubt  as  to  what  their  choice  would  be.  It  was 
not  a question  to  be  postponed  till  after  the  Phil- 
adelphia convention  had  convened ; if  not  dis- 
posed of  before,  the  convention  might  as  well  not 
meet. 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES.  85 

Madison’s  letters,  while  the  question  was  pend- 
ing, show  great  anxiety.  He  was  glad  to  know 
that  the  South  was  of  one  mind  on  this  subject 
and  would  not  yield  an  inch.  He  was  quite  con- 
fident that  his  own  State  would  take  the  lead,  as 
she  soon  did,  in  the  firm  avowal  of  Southern 
opinion.  But  he  rejoiced  that  the  question  did 
not  come  up  in  the  Virginia  legislature  till  after 
the  act  was  passed  to  send  delegates  to  the  Phila- 
delphia Convention.  That  he  looked  upon  as  a 
point  gained,  and  the  delegates  were  presently 
appointed ; hut  he  still  despaired  of  any  good 
coming  of  the  convention,  unless  “Mr.  Jay’s  proj- 
ect for  shutting  the  Mississippi  ” could  be  first 
got  rid  of. 

In  a recent  work 1 Mr.  Madison  is  represented 
as  having  “ struck  a bargain  ” with  the  Kentucky 
delegates  to  the  Virginia  Assembly,  agreeing  to 
speak  on  behalf  of  a petition  relating  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi question,  provided  the  delegates  from  Ken- 
tucky— then  a part  of  Virginia  — would  vote 
for  the  representation  of  Virginia  at  Philadel- 
phia. A “ bargain  ” implies  an  exchange  of  one 
thing  for  another,  and  Madison  had  no  convic- 
tions in  favor  of  closing  the  Mississippi  to  ex- 
change for  a service  rendered  on  behalf  of  a 
measure  for  which  he  wished  to  secure  votes. 
Moreover,  no  bargain  was  necessary.  It  was  not 

1 A History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States.  Vol.  I.  By 
John  Bach  McMaster. 


86 


JAMES  MADISON. 


easy  to  find  any  body  in  Virginia  who  needed  to 
be  persuaded  that  the  right  to  the  Mississippi  must 
not  be  surrendered.  Madison  wrote  to  Monroe  in 
October,  1786,  that  it  would  “be  defended  by  the 
legislature  with  as  much  zeal  as  could  be  wished. 
Indeed,  the  only  danger  is  that  too  much  resent- 
ment may  be  indulged  by  many  against  the  fed- 
eral councils.”  His  only  apprehension  was  lest 
the  Mississippi  question  should  come  up  in  the  As- 
sembly before  the  report  from  the  Annapolis  Con- 
vention should  be  disposed  of,  for  if  that  were 
accepted  the  appointment  of  delegates  to  Phila- 
delphia was  assured.  “ I hope,”  he  wrote  to 
Washington  in  November,  “the  report  will  be 
called  for  before  the  business  of  the  Mississippi 
begins  to  ferment.”  It  happened  as  he  wished. 
“ The  recommendation  from  Annapolis,”  he  wrote 
again  a week  later,  “ in  favour  of  a general  re- 
vision of  the  federal  system  was  unanimously 
agreed  to  ; ” — (the  emphasis  is  his  own.)  He 
afterward  reported  to  Jefferson  that  “ the  pro- 
ject for  bartering  the  Mississippi  to  Spain  was 
brought  before  the  Assembly  after  the  preceding 
measure  had  been  adopted.”  There  was  neither 
delay  nor  difficulty  in  securing  the  unanimous  con- 
sent of  the  Assembly  to  resolutions  instructing 
the  members  of  Congress  to  oppose  any  conces- 
sion to  Spain.  But  Madison’s  anxiety  was  not  in 
the  least  relieved  by  the  speedy  appointment  of 
delegates  to  the  Philadelphia  Convention  ; for,  he 


PUBLIC  DISTURBANCES  AND  ANXIETIES.  87 

wrote  presently  to  Washington,  “I  am  entirely 
convinced,  from  what  I observe  here  (at  Rich- 
mond), that,  unless  the  project  of  Congress  can 
be  reversed,  the  hopes  of  carrying  this  State  into 
a proper  federal  system  will  be  demolished.”  He 
had  already  said,  in  the  same  letter,  that  the  res- 
olutions on  the  Mississippi  question  had  been 
“agreed  to  unanimously  in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates,” and  three  days  before  the  letter  was  writ- 
ten the  delegates  to  Philadelphia  had  been  ap- 
pointed. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION. 

Mr.  Madison  is  called  “ the  Father  of  the  Con- 
stitution.” A paper  written  by  him  was  laid  before 
his  colleagues  of  Virginia,  before  the  meeting  of 
the  Constitutional  Convention  at  Philadelphia,  and 
was  made  the  basis  of  the  “Virginia  plan,”  as  it 
was  called,  out  of  which  the  Constitution  was 
evolved.  In  another  way  his  name  is  so  identified 
with  it  that  one  cannot  be  forgotten  so  long  as  the 
other  is  remembered.  From  that  full  and  faithful 
report  of  the  proceedings  of  the  convention,  in 
which  his  own  part  was  so  active  and  conspicuous, 
we  know  most  that  we  do,  or  ever  can,  know  of 
the  perplexities  and  trials,  the  concessions  and 
triumphs,  the  acts  of  wisdom,  and  the  acts  of 
weakness  of  that  body  of  men  whose  coming  to- 
gether time  has  shown  to  have  been  one  of  the 
important  events  in  the  history  of  mankind. 

Then  it  is  also  true  that  no  man  had  worked 
harder,  perhaps  none  had  worked  so  hard,  to 
bring  the  public  mind  to  a serious  consideration 
of  affairs  and  a recognition  of  the  necessity  of  re- 
organizing the  government,  if  the  States  were  to 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION.  89 

be  held  together.  Never,  it  seemed,  had  men  bet- 
ter reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the  result  of  their 
labors  when,  a few  months  later,  the  new  Consti- 
tution was  accepted  by  all  the  States.  Yet  the 
time  was  not  far  distant  when  even  Madison  would 
be  in  doubt  as  to  the  character  of  this  new  bond 
of  union,  and  as  to  what  sort  of  government  had 
been  secured  by  it.  Nor  till  he  had  been  dead 
near  thirty  years  was  it  to  be  determined  what 
union  under  the  Constitution  really  meant  ; nor 
till  three  quarters  of  a century  after  the  adoption 
of  that  instrument  was  the  more  perfect  union 
formed,  justice  established,  domestic  tranquillity 
insured,  the  general  welfare  promoted,  and  the 
blessings  of  liberty  secured  to  all  the  people, 
which  by  that  great  charter  it  was  intended,  in 
1787,  to  ordain  and  establish.  All  the  difficulties, 
which  they  who  framed  it  escaped  by  their  work, 
were  as  nothing  to  those  which  it  entailed  upon 
their  descendants. 

Two  parties  went  into  the  convention.  On  one 
point,  of  course,  they  were  agreed,  else  they  would 
never  have  come  together  at  all : that  a united 
government  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
was  a failure,  and,  unless  some  remedy  should  be 
speedily  devised,  States  with  common  local  inter- 
ests would  gravitate  into  separate  and,  perhaps, 
antagonistic  nationalities.  But  the  differences  be- 
tween these  two  parties  were  radical,  and  for  a 
time  seemed  insurmountable.  One  proposed  sim- 


90 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ply  to  repair  tlie  Articles  of  Confederation  as  tliey 
might  overhaul  a machine  that  was  out  of  gear ; 
the  other  proposed  to  form  an  altogether  new  Con- 
stitution. One  wanted  a merely  federal  govern- 
ment ; not,  however,  meaning  by  that  term  what 
the  other  party  — soon,  nevertheless,  to  be  known 
as  Federalists  — were  striving  for;  but  a confed- 
eration of  States,  each  independent  of  all  the  rest 
and  supreme  in  its  own  right,  while  consenting  to 
unite  with  the  rest  in  a limited  government  for 
the  administration  of  certain  common  interests.1 

This  idea  of  the  independence  of  the  States  was 
a survival  of  the  old  colonial  system,  when  each 
colony  under  its  distinct  relation  to  the  crown  had 
attained  a growth  of  its  own  with  its  separate  in- 
terests. Each  of  these  colonies  had  become  a 

1 Those  who  were  zealous  for  state-rights,  and  opposed  to  a 
central  government,  called  the  system  they  wished  to  reestablish 
a Federal  System  — a confederacy  of  States.  It  was  too  conven- 
ient, and  probably  too  popular  a term  to  be  lost,  and  the  other 
party  adopted  it  when  the  new  Constitution  was  formed.  The 
Federalist  was  the  name  chosen  for  the  volume  in  which  were 
collected  the  papers,  written  first  under  the  signature  of  “ A Cit- 
izen of  New  York,”  but  afterward  changed  to  “ Publius,”  in  sup- 
port cf  the  new  Constitution,  by  Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay.  In 
one  of  the  earlier  papers,  Mr.  Hamilton  refers  to  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  which  were  to  be  superseded,  as  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution ; but  in  the  later  papers  Madison  is  careful  to  refer  to 
the  proposed  form  of  government  as  the  Federal  Constitution, 
and  Federal  soon  came  to  be  the  distinguishing  name  of  the  party 
which  first  came  into  power  under  the  new  Constitution.  What- 
ever may  be  said  of  Madison’s  other  title,  his  right  to  that  of  fa- 
ther of  the  Federal  party  can  hardly  be  disputed. 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION.  91 

State.  The  Revolution  had  secured  to  each,  it  was 
maintained,  a separate  independence,  achieved,  it 
was  true,  by  united  efforts,  but  not  therefore  bind- 
ing them  together  as  a single  nation.  It  was  held 
as  a legitimate  result  of  that  doctrine  that  each 
State,  not  the  people  of  the  State  whether  many 
or  few,  should  be  represented  by  the  same  number 
of  votes  in  a federal  government  as  they  were  un- 
der the  Articles  of  Confederation,  because  such  a 
government  was  a union  of  States  not  of  a people. 

All  men,  it  was  argued,  — going  back  to  a state 
of  nature,  — are  equally  free  and  independent; 
and  when  a government  is  formed  every  man  has 
an  equal  share  by  natural  right  in  its  formation 
and  in  its  subsequent  conduct.  While  numbers 
are  few  every  member  of  the  State  exercises  his 
individual  right  in  person,  and  none  can  rightfully 
do  more  than  this,  however  wise,  or  powerful,  or 
rich  he  may  be.  But  when  government  by  the 
whole  body  of  the  people  becomes  cumbersome 
and  inconvenient  through  increase  of  numbers,  the 
individual  citizen  loses  none  of  his  rights  by  in- 
trusting their  exercise  to  representatives,  in  choos- 
ing and  instructing  whom  all  have  an  equal  voice. 
So  when  States  are  united  in  a confederacy  each 
State  has  the  same  relation  to  that  government 
that  individuals  have  to  each  other  in  a single 
State.  They  are  free  and  equal,  and  none  has  a 
larger  share  of  rights  in  the  confederacy  because 
its  people  are  more  numerous,  or  because  it  is 


92 


JAMES  MADISON. 


richer  or  more  powerful,  th;in  the  rest.  In  such  a 
confederacy  it  is  not  the  individual  citizen  who  is 
to  be  represented,  but  the  individual  State.  In 
such  a confederacy  there  would  be  the  same  rep- 
resentation for  a State,  say  of  ten  thousand  inhab- 
itants, as  for  one  of  fifty  thousand.  This,  it  was 
maintained,  preserved  equality  of  suffrage  in  the 
equality  of  States  ; while  the  representation  of  the 
individual  citizens  of  the  States  would  be  in  real- 
ity inequality  of  suffrage  because  the  autonomy  of 
the  State  would  be  lost  sight  of.  If  in  such  a case 
it  were  asked,  what  had  become  of  the-  rights 
which  the  majority  of  forty  thousand  had  inher- 
ited from  nature ; the  answer  was  that  those 
rights  were  preserved  and  represented  in  the 
state  government.  The  difficulty,  nevertheless, 
remained  : how  to  reconcile  in  practice  this  doc- 
trine of  the  equal  rights  of  States,  where  there 
might  be  a minority  of  persons,  with  the  actual 
rights  of  the  whole  people  where,  according  to  the 
underlying  democratic  doctrine,  the  good  of  the 
whole  must  be  decided  by  the  larger  number. 

Those  who  proposed  only  to  amend  the  old 
Articles  of  Confederation  and  opposed  a new  Con- 
stitution, objected  that  a government  formed  un- 
der such  a Constitution  would  be  not  a federal, 
but  a national,  government.  Luther  Martin  said, 
when  he  returned  to  Maryland,  that  the  delegates 
“ appeared  totally  to  have  ^forgot  the  business  for 
which  we  were  sent.  ...  We  had  not  been  sent 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION.  93 

to  form  a government  over  the  inhabitants  of 
America  considered  as  individuals.  . . . That  the 
system  of  government  we  were  intrusted  to  pre- 
pare was  a government  over  these  thirteen  States ; 
but  that  in  our  proceedings  we  adopted  principles 
which  would  be  right  and  proper  only  on  the  sup- 
position that  there  were  no  state  governments  at 
all,  but  that  all  the  inhabitants  of  this  extensive 
continent  were  in  their  individual  capacity,  with- 
out government,  and  in  a state  of  nature.”  He 
added  that,  “ in  the  whole  system  there  was  but 
one  federal  feature,  the  appointment  of  the  sena- 
tors by  the  States  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  that 
is  by  their  legislatures,  and  the  equality  of  suf- 
frage in  that  branch ; but  it  was  said  that  this 
feature  was  only  federal  in  appearance.” 

The  Senate,  the  second  house  as  it  was  called 
in  the  convention,  was  in  part  created,  it  is  need- 
less to  say,  to  meet,  or  rather  in  obedience  to,  rea- 
soning like  this.  There  was  almost  nobody  who 
would  have  been  willing  to  abandon  the  state 
governments,  as  there  was  next  to  nobody  who 
wanted  a monarchy.  “ We  were  eternally  trou- 
bled,” Martin  said,  “with  arguments  and  prece- 
dents from  the  British  government.”  He  could 
not  get  beyond  the  fixed  notion  that  those  whom 
he  opposed  were  determined  to  establish  “ one  gen- 
eral government  over  this  extensive  continent,  ot 
a monarchical  nature.”  If  he,  and  those  who 
agreed  with  him,  sincerely  believed  this  to  be 


94 


JAMES  MADISON. 


true,  it  was  natural  enough  that  the  frequent  al- 
lusions to  British  precedents,  as  wise  rules  for 
American  guidance  in  constructing  a government, 
should  be  looked  upon  as  an  unmistakable  hanker- 
ing after  lost  flesh-pots.  Should  the  state  govern- 
ments be  swept  away  it  might  be  that,  in  time  of 
danger  from  without  or  of  peril  from  internal  dis- 
sensions, the  country,  under  “a  government  of  a 
monarchical  nature,”  might  drift  back  to  its  old 
allegiance.  If  those  who  feared,  or  said  they 
feared,  this  were  not  quite  sincere,  the  temptation 
was  almost  irresistible  to  use  such  ai-guments  to 
arouse  popular  prejudice  against  political  oppo- 
nents. It  is  curious  that  Madison  seemed  quite 
unconscious  of  how  much  the  frequent  allusions 
in  his  articles  in  “ The  Federalist”  to  the  British 
Constitution  might  strengthen  these  accusations 
of  the  opposition  ; while  he  half  believed  that  the 
same  thing  in  others  showed  in  them  a leaning  to- 
ward England,  from  which  he  knew  that  he  him- 
self was  quite  free. 

The  Luther  Martin  protestants  were  too  radical 
to  remain  in  the  convention  to  the  end,  when  they 
saw  that  such  a confederacy  as  they  wanted  was 
impossible.  But  there  were  not  many  who  went 
the  length  they  did  in  believing  that  a strong  cen- 
tral government  was  necessarily  the  destruction 
of  the  state  governments.  Still  fewer  were  those 
who  would  have  brought  this  about  if  they  could. 
That  the  rights  of  the  States  must  be  preserved 


TEE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION.  95 

was  tlie  general  opinion  and  determination,  and  it 
was  not  difficult  to  do  this  by  limiting  the  powers 
of  the  higher  government,  or  federal  as  it  soon 
came  to  be  called,  and  by  the  organization  of  the 
second  house,  the  Senate,  in  which  all  the  States 
had  an  equal  representation.  The  smaller  States 
were  satisfied  with  this  concession,  and  the  larger 
were  willing  to  make  it,  not  only  for  the  sake  of 
the  Union,  but  because  of  the  just  estimate  in 
which  they  held  the  rights  belonging  to  all  the 
States  alike.  The  real  difficulty,  as  Madison  said 
in  the  debate  on  that  question,  and  as  he  repeated 
again  and  again  after  that  question  was  settled, 
was  not  between  the  larger  and  smaller  States, 
but  between  the  North  and  the  South;  between 
those  States  that  held  slaves  and  those  that  had 
none. 

Slavery  in  the  Constitution,  which  has  given  so 
much  trouble  to  the  Abolitionists  of  this  century, 
and,  indeed,  to  everybody  else,  gave  quite  as  much 
in  the  last  century  to  those  who  put  it  there.  Many 
of  the  wisest  and  best  men  of  the  time,  Southern- 
ers as  well  as  Northerners,  and  among  them  Mad- 
ison, were  opposed  to  slavery.  They  could  see 
little  good  in  it,  hardly  even  any  compensation  for 
the  existence  of  a system  so  full  of  evil.  There 
was  hardly  a State  in  the  Union  at  that  time  that 
had  not  its  emancipation  society ; and  there  was 
hardly  a man  of  any  eminence  in  the  country  who 
was  not  an  officer,  or  at  least  a member,  of  such 


96 


JAMES  MADISON. 


a society.  Everywhere  north  of  South  Carolina, 
slavery  was  looked  upon  as  a misfortune  which  it 
was  exceedingly  desirable  to  be  free  from  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment;  everywhere  north  of 
Mason  and  Dixon’s  Line,  measures  had  already 
been  taken,  or  were  certain  soon  to  be  taken,  to 
put  an  end  to  it ; and  by  the  Ordinance  for  the 
government  of  all  the  territory  north  of  the  Ohio 
River,  it  was  absolutely  prohibited  by  Congress,  in 
the  same  year  in  which  the  Constitutional  Con- 
gress met. 

But  it  was,  nevertheless,  a thing  to  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  which  the  anti-slavery  people 
of  that  time  could  consent  without  any  violation 
of  conscience.  Bad  as  it  was,  unwise,  wasteful, 
cruel,  a mockery  of  every  pretense  of  respect  for 
the  rights  of  man,  they  did  not  believe  it  to  be 
absolutely  wicked.  If  they  had  so  believed,  let  us 
hope  they  would  have  washed  their  hands  of  it. 
As  it  was,  it  was  only  a question  of  expediency 
whether,  for  the  sake  of  the  Union,  they  should 
protect  the  system  of  slavery,  and  give  to  the 
slave-holders,  as  slave-holders,  a certain  degree  of 
political  power.  To  refuse  to  admit  a slave-hold- 
ing State  into  the  Union  did  not  occur,  probably, 
to  the  most  earnest  opponent  of  the  system  ; for 
that  would  have  been  simply  to  say  that  there 
should  be  no  Union.  That  was  what  Madison 
meant  in  saying  so  repeatedly  that  the  real  dif- 
ficulty in  the  way  was,  not  the  difference  between 


THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION.  97 

the  large  and  the  small  States,  but  the  difference 
between  the  slave-holding  and  the  non  slave-hold- 
ing States.  If  there  could  be  no  conciliation  on 
that  point  there  could  be  no  Union. 

Some  hoped,  perhaps,  rather  than  believed,  that 
slavery  was  likely  to  disappear  ere  long  at  the 
South  as  it  was  disappearing  at  the  North.  It  is 
an  impeachment  of  their  intelligence,  however, 
to  suppose  that  they  relied  much  upon  any  such 
hope.  The  simple  truth  is  that  slavery  was  then, 
as  it  continued  to  be  for  three  quarters  of  a cen- 
tury longer,  the  paramount  interest  of  the  South. 
To  withstand  or  disregard  it  was  not  merely  diffi- 
cult, but  was  to  brave  immediate  possible  dangers 
and  sufferings,  which  are  never  voluntarily  en- 
countered except  in  obedience  to  the  highest  sense 
of  duty  ; or  to  meet  a necessity,  from  which  there 
was  no  manly  way  of  escape.  The  sense  of  abso- 
lute duty  was  wanting  ; the  necessity,  it  was  hoped, 
might  be  avoided  by  concessions.  It  can  only  be 
said  for  those  who  made  them  that  they  did  not 
see  what  fruitful  seeds  of  future  trouble  they  were 
sowing  in  the  Constitution. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


“THE  COMPROMISES.” 

The  question  with  the  North  was,  how  far  could 
it  yield ; with  the  South,  how  far  could  it  en- 
croach. It  turned  mainly  on  representation  ; on 
“the  unimportant  anomaly,”  as  Mr.  George  Tick- 
nor  Curtis  calls  it  in  his  “ History  of  the  Consti- 
tution,” “ of  a representation  of  men  without  po- 
litical rights  or  social  privileges.”  However  much 
they  differed  upon  the  subject  in  the  convention, 
there  was  nobody  then  and  there  who  regarded 
the  question  as  “unimportant;”  nor  was  there  a 
political  event  to  happen  for  the  coming  eighty 
years  that  it  did  not  influence  and  generally  gov- 
ern. There  were  some  who  maintained  at  first 
that  the  slave  population  should  not  be  repre- 
sented at  all.  Hamilton  proposed  in  the  first  days 
of  the  convention  “ that  the  rights  of  suffrage  in 
the  national  legislature  ought  to  be  proportioned 
to  the  number  of  free  inhabitants.”  Madison  was 
willing  to  concede  this  in  one  branch  of  the  legis- 
lature, provided  that  in  the  representation  in  the 
other  House  the  slaves  were  counted  as  free  in- 
habitants. The  constitution  of  the  Senate  subse. 
quently  disposed  of  that  proposition. 


“ THE  COMPROMISES .” 


99 


But  why  should  slaves  be  represented  at  all  ? 
“ They  are  not  free  agents,”  said  Patterson,  a del- 
egate to  tlie  convention  from  New  Jersey;  they 
“ have  no  personal  liberty,  no  faculty  of  acquiring 
property ; but,  on  the  contrary,  are  themselves 
property,  and,  like  other  property,  entirely  at  the 
will  of  the  master.  Has  a man  in  Virginia  a 
number  of  votes  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
his  slaves  ? And  if  negroes  are  not  represented 
in  the  States  to  which  they  belong,  why  should 
they  be  represented  in  the  general  government? 
. . . If  a meeting  of  the  people  was  actually  to 
take  place  in  a slave  State,  would  the  slaves  vote  ? 
They  would  not.  Why,  then,  should  they  be  rep- 
resented in  a federal  government  ? ” There  could 
be  but  one  reply ; but  that  was  one  which  it 
would  not  have  been  wise  to  make.  It  was  slave 
property  that  was  to  be  represented,  and  this 
would  not  be  submitted  to  among  slave-holders  as 
against  each  other,  while  yet  they  were  a unit  in 
insisting  upon  it  in  a union  with  those  who  were 
not  slave-holders.  Among  themselves  slavery 
needed  no  protection;  their  safety  was  in  equal- 
ity. But  to  their  great  interest  every  non-slave- 
holder was,  in  the  nature  of  things,  an  enemy ; and 
prudence  required  that  the  power  either  to  vote 
him  down  or  to  buy  him  up  should  never  be  want- 
ing. It  was  as  much  a matter  of  instinct  as  of 
deliberation,  for  love  of  life  is  the  first  law.  The 
truth  was  covered  up  in  Madison’s  specious  asser- 


100 


JAMES  MADISON. 


tion  that  “every  peculiar  interest,  whether  in 
any  class  of  citizens  or  any  description  of  States, 
ought  to  be  secured  as  far  as  possible.”  The  only 
“ peculiar  ” interest,  however,  belonging  either  to 
citizens  or  States,  that  was  imbedded  in  the  Con- 
stitution, was  slavery. 

So  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania  asked : “ Are  they 
[the  slaves]  admitted  as  citizens  — then  why  are 
they  not  admitted  on  an  equality  with  white  citi- 
zens ? Are  they  admitted  as  property  — then 
why  is  not  other  property  admitted  into  the  com- 
putation ? ” He  was  willing,  howevei’,  to  concede 
that  it  was  a difficulty  to  be  “ overcome  by  the 
necessity  of  compromise.” 

Never,  probably,  in  the  history  of  legislation, 
was  there  a more  serious  question  debated.  Com- 
promise is  ordinarily  understood  to  mean  an  ad- 
justment by  mutual  concessions,  where  there  are 
rights  on  both  sides.  Here  it  meant  whether  the 
side,  which  had  no  shadow  of  right  whatever  to 
that  which  it  demanded,  would  consent  to  take  a 
little  less  than  the  whole.  It  was  the  kind  of 
compromise  made  between  the  bandit  and  his  vic- 
tim when  the  former  decides  that  he  will  not  put 
himself  to  the  trouble  of  shooting  the  othei’,  and 
will  even  leave  him  his  shirt.  It  was  not  diffi- 
cult to  understand  that  horses  and  cattle  could  be 
justly  counted  only  where  property  was  to  be  the 
basis  of  representation.  Yet  the  slaves,  who  were 
counted,  were,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  either  per- 


THE  COMPROMISES.” 


101 


sonal  property  or  real  estate  ; and  were  no  more 
represented  as  citizens  than  if  they  also  had  gone 
upon  all  fours.  Their  enumeration,  nevertheless, 
was  carried,  and  it  so  increased  the  representative 
power  of  their  masters  that  inequality  of  citizen- 
ship became  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
government.  This,  of  course,  was  to  form  an  oli- 
garchy, not  a democracy.  Practically  the  govern- 
ment was  put  in  the  hands  of  a class ; and  there 
it  remained  from  the  moment  of  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  to  the  Rebellion  of  1860  ; while 
that  class,  including  those  of  so  little  consequence 
as  to  own  only  a slave  or  two,  in  its  best  estate, 
probably  never  exceeded  ten  per  centum  of  the 
whole  people. 

There  was,  if  one  may  venture  to  say  so,  a sin- 
gular confusion  in  the  minds  of  the  venerable 
fathers  of  the  republic  on  this  subject.  They 
could  not  quite  get  rid  of  the  notion  that  the 
slaves,  being  human,  ought  to  be  included  in  the 
enumeration  of  population,  notwithstanding  that 
their  enumeration  as  citizens  must  necessarily  dis- 
appear in  their  representation  as  chattels.  Slaves, 
as  slaves,  were  the  wealth  of  the  South,  as  ships, 
for  example,  were  the  wealth  of  the  North  ; but, 
being  human,  the  mind  was  not  shocked  at  hav- 
ing the  slaves  reckoned  as  population  in  fixing  the 
basis  of  representation,  though  in  reality  they 
only  represented  the  masters’  ownership.  But 
nobody  would  have  been  at  a loss  to  see  the  ab- 


102 


JAMES  MADISON. 


surdity  of  counting  three  fifths  of  the  Northern 
ships  as  population.  Even  a Webster  Whig  of 
sixty-five  years  later  could,  perhaps,  have  under- 
stood that  that  was  something  more  than  an 
“ unimportant  anomaly.”  There  was  no  clearer- 
headed  man  in  the  convention  than  Gouverneur 
Morris ; yet  he  said  that  he  was  “ compelled  to 
declare  himself  reduced  to  the  dilemma  of  doing 

O 

injustice  to  the  Southern  States  or  to  human  na- 
ture ; and  he  must  do  it  to  the  former.”  C.  C. 
Pinckney  of  South  Carolina  declared  that  he  was 
“alarmed”  at  such  an  avowal  as  that.  Yet  had 
the  question  been  one  of  counting  three  fifths  of 
the  Northern  ships  in  the  enumeration  of  popu- 
lation, Morris  would  have  discovered  no  “ di- 
lemma,” and  Pinckney  nothing  to  be  “ alarmed  ” 
at.  So  palpable  an  outrage  on  common  sense 
would  have  been  merely  laughed  at  by  both. 

In  reply  to  Pinckney,  however,  Morris  grew 
bolder.  “ It  was  high  time,”  he  said,  “ to  speak 
out.”  He  came  there  “ to  form  a compact  for  the 
good  of  America.  He  hoped  and  believed  that  all 
would  enter  into  such  compact.  If  they  would 
not,  he  was  ready  to  join  with  any  States  that 
would.  But  as  the  compact  was  to  be  voluntary, 
it  is  in  vain  for  the  Eastern  States  to  insist  on 
what  the  Southern  States  will  never  agree  to.  It 
is  equally  vain  for  the  latter  to  require  what  the 
other  States  can  never  admit : and  he  verily  be- 
lieved the  people  of  Pennsylvania  will  never 


‘ ‘ THE  C OMPR  OMISES.  ’ ’ 


108 


agree  to  a representation  of  negroes  : ” of  negroes, 
he  meant,  counted  as  human  beings,  not  for  their 
own  representation,  but,  as  ships  might  be  counted, 
for  the  increased  representation  of  those  who  held 
them  as  property.  The  next  day  he  “ spoke  out  ” 
still  more  plainly.  “ If  negroes,”  he  said,  “ were 
to  be  viewed  as  inhabitants,  . . . they  ought  to 
be  added  in  their  entire  number,  and  not  in  the 
proportion  of  three  fifths.  If  as  property,  the 
word  wealth  was  right,”  — as  the  basis,  that  is, 
of  representation.  The  distinction  that  had  been 
set  up  by  Madison  and  others  between  the  North- 
ern and  Southern  States  he  considered  as  heret- 
ical and  groundless.  But  it  was  persisted  in,  and 
“he  saw  that  the  Southern  gentlemen  will  not  be 
satisfied,  unless  they  see  the  way  open  to  their 
gaining  a majority  in  the  public  councils.  . . . 
Either  this  distinction  [between  the  North  and 
the  South]  is  fictitious  or  real ; if  fictitious,  let  it 
be  dismissed,  and  let  us  proceed  with  due  confi- 
dence. If  it  be  real,  instead  of  attempting  to 
blend  incompatible  things,  let  us  at  once  take  a 
friendly  leave  of  each  other.” 

But  could  they  take  “ a friendly  leave  of  each 
other  ? ” Should  a union  be  secured  on  the  terms 
the  South  offered  ? or  should  it  be  declined,  as 
Morris  proposed,  if  it  could  not  be  a union  of 
equality  ? The  next  day  Madison  again  set  forth 
the  real  issue,  quietly  but  unmistakably.  “ It 
seemed  now,”  he  said,  “ to  be  pretty  well  under- 


104 


JAMES  MADISON. 


stood,  that  the  real  difference  of  interests  lay,  not 
between  the  large  and  small,  but  between  the 
Northern  and  Southern  States.  The  institution 
of  slavery  and  its  consequences  formed  the  line  of 
discrimination.”  There  is  sometimes  great  power, 
as  he  well  knew,  in  firm  reiteration.  So  long  as 
slavery  lasted  the  lesson  he  then  inculcated  was 
never  forgotten.  Thenceforward,  as  then,  “the 
line  of  discrimination,”  in  Southern  politics,  lay 
with  “ slavery  and  its  consequences.”  One  side 
would  abate  nothing  of  its  demands  ; there  could 
be  no  “friendly  leave”  unless  the  determination, 
on  the  other  side,  to  overcome  the  desire  for  union 
and  take  the  consequences  was  equally  firm. 

When  the  question  again  came  up,  however, 
Morris  had  not  lost  heart.  His  talk  was  the  talk 
of  a modern  abolitionist : — 

“ He  never  would  concur  in  upholding  domestio 
slavery.  It  was  a nefarious  institution.  It  was  the 
curse  of  heaven  on  the  States  where  it  prevailed. 
Compare  the  free  regions  of  the  Middle  States,  where 
a rich  and  noble  cultivation  marks  the  prosperity  and 
happiness  of  the  people,  with  the  misery  and  poverty 
which  overspread  the  barren  wastes  of  Virginia,  Mary- 
land, and  the  other  States  having  slaves.  Travel 
through  the  whole  continent,  and  you  behold  the  pros- 
pect continually  varying  with  the  appearance  and  dis- 
appearance of  slavery.  . . . Proceed  southwardly,  and 
every  step  you  take  through  the  great  regions  of 
slavery  presents  a desert  increasing  with  the  increasing 


THE  COMPROMISES 


105 


proportion  of  these  wretched  beings.  Upon  what  prin- 
ciple is  it  that  the  slaves  shall  be  computed  in  the  rep- 
resentation ? Are  they  men  ? Then  make  them  citizens, 
and  let  them  vote.  Are  they  property?  Why  then  is 
no  other  property  included  ? The  houses  in  this  city 
[Philadelphia]  are  worth  more  than  all  the  wretched 
slaves  who  cover  the  rice  swamps  of  South  Carolina. 
. . . And  what  is  the  proposed  compensation  to  the 
Northern  States  for  a sacrifice  of  every  principle  of 
right,  of  every  impulse  of  humanity  ? They  are  to  bind 
themselves  to  march  their  militia  for  the  defense  of  the 
Southern  States,  for  their  defense  against  those  very 
slaves  of  whom  they  complain  ? They  must  supply 
vessels  and  seamen  in  case  of  foreign  attack.  The  leg- 
islature will  have  indefinite  power  to  tax  them  by  ex- 
cises and  duties  on  imports,  both  of  which  will  fall 
heavier  on  them  than  on  the  Southern  inhabitants ; for 
the  Bohea  tea  used  by  a Northern  freeman  will  pay 
more  tax  than  the  whole  consumption  of  the  miserable 
slave,  which  consists  of  nothing  more  than  his  physical 
subsistence  and  the  rags  that  cover  his  nakedness.  . . . 
Let  it  not  be  said  that  direct  taxation  is  to  be  propor- 
tioned to  representation.  It  is  idle  to  suppose  that  the 
general  government  can  stretch  its  hand  directly  into 
the  pockets  of  the  people  scattered  over  so  vast  a coun- 
try. . . . He  would  sooner  submit  himself  to  a tax  for 
paying  for  all  the  negroes  in  the  United  States,  than 
saddle  posterity  with  such  a Constitution.” 

So  much  of  this  as  was  not  already  fact  was 
prophecy.  Yet  not  many  weeks  later  this  impas- 
sioned orator  put  his  name  to  the  Constitution, 


106 


JAMES  MADISON. 


though  it  had  grown  meanwhile  into  larger  pro- 
slavery proportions.  There  was  undoubtedly  some 
sympathy  with  him  among  a few  of  the  members  ; 
but  the  general  feeling  was  more  truly  expressed  a 
few  days  later  by  Rutledge  of  South  Carolina,  in 
the  debate  on  the  continuance  of  the  African  slave- 
trade.  “Religion  and  humanity,”  he  said,  “had 
nothing  to  do  with  this  question.  Interest  alone 
is  the  governing  principle  with  nations.  The 
true  question  at  present  is,  whether  the  Southern 
States  shall  or  shall  not  be  parties  to  the  Union. 
If  the  Northern  States  consult  their  interest,  they 
will  not  oppose  the  increase  of  slaves,  which  will 
increase  the  commodities  of  which  they  will  be- 
come the  carriers.”  The  response  came  from 
Connecticut,  Oliver  Ellsworth  saying  : “ Let  every 
State  import  what  it  pleases.  The  moi’ality  or 
wisdom  of  slavery  are  considerations  belonging  to 
the  States  themselves.  What  enriches  a part  en- 
riches the  whole,”  — especially  Newport  and  its 
adjacent  coasts,  he  might  have  added,  with  its 
trade  to  the  African  coast. 

But  a Virginian,  George  Mason,  had  another 
tone.  He  called  the  traffic  “ infernal.”  “ Slavery,” 
he  went  on,  “discourages  arts  and  manufactures. 
The  poor  despise  labor  when  performed  by  slaves. 
They  prevent  the  emigration  of  whites,  who 
really  enrich  and  strengthen  a country.  They 
produce  the  most  pernicious  effect  on  manners. 
Every  master  of  slaves  is  born  a petty  tyrant. 


THE  COMPROMISES: 


107 


They  bring  the  judgment  of  heaven  on  a coun- 
try. As  nations  cannot  be  rewarded  or  punished 
in  the  next  world,  they  must  be  in  this.  By  an 
inevitable  chain  of  causes  and  effects  Providence 
punishes  national  sins  by  national  calamities.” 

These  were  warnings  worth  heeding.  But  Ells- 
worth retorted  with  a sneer : “ As  he  had  never 
owned  a slave,  he  could  not  judge  of  the  effect  of 
slavery  on  character.”  He  said,  however,  that, 
“ if  it  was  to  be  considered  in  a moral  light,  we 
ought  to  go  farther,  and  free  those  already  in  the 
country.”  But,  so  far  from  that,  he  thought  it 
would  be  “ unjust  toward  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia,”  in  whose  “ sickly  rice  swamps  ” negroes 
died  so  fast,  should  there  be  any  intermeddling  to 
prevent  the  importation  of  fresh  Africans  to  labor, 
and,  of  course,  to  perish  there.  Perhaps  it  was 
this  shrewd  argument  of  the  Connecticut  delegate 
that  suggested,  half  a century  afterward,  to  a Mis- 
sissippi agricultural  society  the  economical  cal- 
culation that  it  was  cheaper  to  use  up  a gang  of 
negroes  every  few  years,  and  supply  its  place  by  a 
fresh  gang  from  Virginia,  than  rely  upon  the 
natural  increase  that  would  follow  their  humane 
treatment  as  men  and  women.  His  colleague, 
Roger  Sherman,  came  to  Ellsworth’s  aid.  It 
would  be,  he  thought,  the  duty  of  the  general 
government  to  prohibit  the  foreign  trade  in  slaves, 
and  should  this  be  left  in  its  power,  it  would  prob- 
ably be  done.  But  he  would  not,  if  the  Southern 


108 


JAMES  MADISON. 


States  made  it  the  condition  of  consenting  to  the 
Constitution  that  the  trade  should  be  protected, 
leave  it  in  the  power  of  the  general  government 
to  do  that  which  he  acknowledged  that  it  should, 
and  probably  would,  do. 

Delegates  from  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  de- 
clared that  to  be  the  condition  — among  them  C. 
C.  Pinckney  of  South  Carolina.  “ He  should  con- 
sider,” he  said,  “a  rejection  of  the  clause  as  an 
exclusion  of  South  Carolina  from  the  Union.” 
Nevertheless  he  said  to  the  people  at  home,  when 
they  came  together  to  consider  the  Constitution  : 
“We  are  so  weak  that  by  ourselves  we  could  not 
form  a union  strong  enough  for  the  purpose  of 
effectually  protecting  each  other.  Without  union 
with  the  other  States,  South  Carolina  must  soon 
fall.”  On  the  part  of  that  State  it  had  been  a 
game  of  brag  all  along.  The  first  lesson  in  the 
South  Carolinian  policy  was  given  in  the  Consti- 
tutional Convention.  Of  the  result,  this  was 
Pinckney’s  summing  up  to  his  constituents  : — 

“ By  this  settlement  we  have  secured  an  unlimited  im- 
portation of  negroes  for  twenty  years ; nor  is  it  declared 
that  the  importation  shall  be  then  stopped  ; it  may  be 
continued.  We  have  a security  that  the  general  gov- 
ernment can  never  emancipate  them,  for  no  such  author- 
ity is  granted.  . . . We  have  obtained  a right  to  re- 
cover our  slaves,  in  whatever  part  of  America  they  may 
take  refuge,  which  is  a right  we  had  not  before.  In 
short,  considering  all  circumstances,  we  have  made  the 


“ THE  COMPROMISES." 


109 


best  terms,  for  the  security  of  this  species  of  property,  it 
was  in  our  power  to  make.  We  would  have  made  better 
if  we  could,  but  on  the  whole  1 do  not  think  them  bad.” 


A more  moderate  and  a more  significant  state- 
ment could  hardly  have  been  made. 

On  the  foreign  slave-trade  Madison  had  little 
to  say,  but,  like  most  of  the  Southern  delegates 
north  of  the  Carolinas,  he  was  opposed  to  it. 

“ Twenty  years,”  he  said,  “ will  produce  all  the^ 
mischief  that  can  be  apprehended  from  the  liberty 
to  import  slaves.  So  long  a term  will  be  more 
dishonorable  to  the  American  character  than  to 
say  nothing  about  it  in  the  Constitution. ” The/ 
words  are  a little  ambiguous,  though  he  is  his  own 
reporter.  But  what  he  meant  evidently  was,  that 
any  protection  of  the  trade  would  dishonor  the  na- 
tion ; for  at  another  point  of  the  debate,  on  the 
same  day,  he  said  that  “ he  thought  it  wrong  to 
admit  in  the  Constitution  the  idea  that  there  could 
be  property  in  men.”  Such  property  he  was 
anxious  to  protect  as  the  great  Southern  inter- 
est, so  long  as  it  lasted ; but  he  was  not  willing 
to  strengthen  it  by  permitting  the  continuance  of 
the  African  slave-trade  for  twenty  years  longer 
under  the  sanction  of  the  Constitution.  But  he 
held  it  to  be,  as  he  wrote  in  “ The  Federalist,” 

“ a great  point  gained  in  favor  of  humanity,  that 
a period  of  twenty  years  may  terminate  forever 
within  these  States  a traffic  which  has  so  long  and 
so  loudly  upbraided  the  barbarism  of  modern  pol- 


110 


JAMES  MADISON. 


icy.”  He  added,  “ the  attempt  that  had  been 
made  to  pervert  this  clause  into  an  objection 
against  the  Constitution,  by  representing  it  as  a 
criminal  toleration  of  an  illicit  practice,”  was  a 
misconstruction  which  he  did  not  think  deserving 
of  an  answer. 

It  was,  in  fact,  a bargain  which  he  had  not  ap- 
proved of,  and  did  not  now  probably  care  to  talk 
about.  It  was  made  at  the  suggestion  of  Gouver- 
neur  Morris,  who  moved  that  the  foreign  slave- 
trade,  a navigation  act,  and  a duty  on  exports  be 
referred  for  consideration  to  a committee.  “ These 
things,”  he  said,  “may  form  a bargain  among  the 
Northern  and  Southern  States.”  When  the  com- 
mittee reported  in  favor  of  the  slave-trade,  C.  C. 
Pinckney  proposed  that  its  limitation  should  be 
extended  from  1800  to  1808.  Gorham  of  Massa- 
chusetts seconded  the  motion,  and  it  was  carried 
by  the  addition  of  the  votes  of  New  Hampshire, 
Massachusetts,  and  Connecticut  to  those  of  Mary- 
land, North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia. 

The  committee  also  reported  the  substitution  of 
a majority  vote  for  that  of  two  thirds  in  legisla- 
tion relating  to  commerce.  The  concession  was 
made  without  much  difficulty,  a Georgia  delegate, 
and  three  of  the  four  South  Carolina  delegates 
favoring  it,  two  of  the  latter  frankly  saying  they 
did  so  to  gratify  New  England.  It  was,  C.  C. 
Pinckney  said,  “the  true  interest  of  the  Southern 
States  to  have  no  regulation  of  commerce  ; ” but 


THE  COMPROMISES. 


Ill 


he  assented  to  this  proposition,  and  his  constitu- 
ents “ would  be  reconciled  to  this  liberality,”  be- 
cause, among  other  considerations,  of  “ the  liberal 
conduct  [of  the  New  England  States]  towards 
the  views  of  South  Carolina.”  There  was  no 
question  of  the  meaning  of  this  sudden  avowal  of 
friendly  feeling.  Jefferson  relates  in  his  “ Ana,” 
on  the  authority  of  George  Mason,  a member  of 
the  convention,  that  Georgia  and  South  Carolina 
had  “ struck  up  a bargain  with  the  three  New 
England  States,  that  if  they  would  admit  slaves 
for  twenty  years,  the  two  Southernmost  States 
would  join  in  changing  the  clause  which  required 
two  thirds  of  the  legislature  in  any  vote.” 

The  settlement  of  these  questions  was  an  oppor- 
tune moment  for  the  introduction  of  that  relating 
to  fugitive  slaves.  Butler  of  South  Carolina  im- 
mediately proposed  a section  which  should  secure 
their  return  to  their  masters,  and  it  was  passed 
without  a word.  As  Pinckney  said  in  the  passage 
already  quoted,  when  he  went  back  to  report  to 
his  constituents,  “ it  is  a right  to  recover  our  slaves 
in  whatever  part  of  America  they  may  take  ref- 
uge, which  is  a right  we  had  not  before.” 

It  is  notable  how  complete  and  final  a settle- 
ment of  the  slavery  question  “ these  compromises,” 
as  they  were  called,  seemed  to  be  to  those  who 
made  them.  They  were  meant  to  be,  as  Mr.  Mad- 
ison called  them,  “ adjustments  of  the  different 
interests  of  different  parts  of  the  country,”  and 


112 


JAMES  MADISON. 


being  once  agreed  upon  they  were  considered  as 
having  the  binding  force  and  stability  of  a con- 
tract. The  evils  of  slavery  were  set  forth  as  an 
element  in  the  negotiation,  but  no  question  of  es- 
sential morality  was  raised  that  brought  the  system 
within  the  category  of  forbidden  wrong.  What- 
ever results  might  follow  would  be  limited,  it  was 
thought,  by  the  terms  of  the  contract ; whereas,  in 
fact,  the  actual  results  were  not  foreseen,  and  could 
not  be  guarded  against,  except  by  the  refusal  to 
enter  into  any  contract  whatever. 

On  all  other  questions  involving  political  prin- 
ciples,— the  just  relations  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment and  the  governments  of  the  States ; the  re- 
lations between  the  larger  and  the  smaller  States ; 
the  regulation  of  the  functions  of  the  executive, 
the  legislative,  and  the  judicial  departments  of 
government,  — on  all  these  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  brought  to  bear  the  profoundest  wis- 
dom. When  one  reflects  upon  the  magnitude  and 
character  of  the  work,  Madison’s  conclusion  seems 
hardly  extravagant,  that  “ adding  to  these  consid- 
erations the  natural  diversity  of  human  opinions 
on  all  new  and  complicated  subjects,  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  consider  the  degree  of  concord  which  ulti- 
mately prevailed  as  less  than  a miracle.”  There 
were,  nevertheless,  the  gravest  and  most  anxious 
doubts  how  far  the  Constitution  would  stand  the 
test  of  time ; yet  as  a system  of  government  for  a 
nation  of  freemen  it  remains  to  this  day  practically 


THE  COMPROMISES 


113 


unchanged.  But  where  its  architects  thought 
themselves  wisest  they  were  weakest.  That  which, 
they  thought  they  had  settled  forever  was  the  one 
thing  which  they  did  not  settle.  Of  all  the  “ ad- 
justments ” of.  the  Constitution,  slavery  was  pre- 
cisely that  one  which  was  not  adjusted. 

Madison’s  responsibility  for  this  result  was  that 
of  evei’y  other  delegate,  — no  more  and  no  less. 
Neither  he  nor  they,  whether  more  or  less  opposed 
to  slavery,  saw  in  it  a system  so  subversive  of  the 
rights  of  man  that  no  just  government  should  tol- 
erate it.  That  was  reserved  for  a later  genera- 
tion, and  even  that  was  slow  to  learn.  To  the 
fathers  it  was,  at  worst,  only  an  unfortunate  and 
unhappy  social  condition,  which  it  would  be  well 
to  be  rid  of  if  this  could  be  done  without  too  much 
sacrifice  ; but  otherwise,  to  be  submitted  to,  like 
any  other  misfortune. 

While  it  did  exist,  however,  Madison  believed 
it  should  be  protected,  though  not  encouraged,  as 
a Southern  interest.  The  question  resolved  itself 
into  one  of  expediency, — of  union  or  disunion. 
What  disunion  would  be,  he  knew,  or  thought  he 
knew.  Perhaps  he  was  mistaken.  Disunion,  had 
it  come  then,  might  have  been  the  way  to  a true 
union.  “ We  are  so  weak,”  said  C.  C.  Pinckney, 
“ that  by  ourselves  we  could  not  form  a union 
strong  enough  for  the  purpose  of  effectually  pro- 
tecting each  other.  Without  union  with  the  other 
States,  South  Carolina  must  soon  fall.”  But  he 
8 


114 


JAMES  MADISON. 


was  careful  to  say  this  at  home,  not  in  Philadel- 
phia. In  the  convention,  Madison  wrote  a month 
after  it  adjourned,  “ South  Carolina  and  Georgia 
were  inflexible  on  the  point  of  the  slaves.”  What 
was  to  be  the  union  which  that  inflexibility  car- 
ried, was  not  foreseen.  It  was  the  children’s 
teeth  that  were  to  be  set  on  edge. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION. 

Madison’s  labors  for  the  Constitution  did  not' 
cease  when  the  convention  adjourned,  although 
he  was  not  at  that  moment  in  a hopeful  frame  of 
mind  in  regard  to  it.  Within  a week  of  the  ad-; 
journment  he  wrote  to  Jefferson:  “I  hazard  an 
opinion,  that  the  plan,  should  it  he  adopted,  will 
neither  effectually  answer  its  national  object,  nor 
prevent  the  local  mischiefs  which  excite  disgusts 
against  the  state  governments.” 

But  this  feeling  seems  to  have  soon  passed 
away.  Perhaps,  when  he  devoted  himself  to  a 
careful  study  of  what  had  been  done,  he  saw,  in 
looking  at  it  as  a whole,  how  just  and  true  it  was 
in  its  fair  proportions.  He  now  diligently  sought 
to  prove  how  certainly  the  Constitution  would  an- 
swer its  purpose  ; how  wisely  all  its  parts  were 
adjusted  ; how  successfully  the  obstacles  to  a per- 
fect union  of  the  States  had  been,  as  he  thought, 
overcome ; how  carefully  the  rights  of  the  sepa- 
rate States  had  been  guarded,  while  the  needed 
general  government  would  be  secured.  Whether 
there  should  be  an  American  nation  or  not  de- 


116 


JAMES  MADISON. 


pended,  as  he  had  believed  for  yeai’s,  upon 
whether  a national  Constitution  could  be  agreed 
upon.  Now  that  it  was  framed  he  believed  that 
upon  its  adoption  depended  whether  there  should 
be,  or  should  not  be,  a nation.  In  September,  as 
he  wrote  to  Jefferson,  he  was  in  doubt;  in  Febru- 
ary he  wrote  to  Pendleton : “ I have  for  some 
time  been  persuaded  that  the  question  on  which 
the  proposed  Constitution  must  turn  is  the  simple 
one,  whether  the  Union  shall  or  shall  not  be 
continued.  There  is,  in  my  opinion,  no  middle 
ground  to  be  taken.” 

Those  who  would  have  called  a second  conven- 
tion to  revise  the  labors  of  the  first  had  no  sympa- 
thy from  him.  He  not  only  doubted  if  the  work 
could  be  done  so  well  again ; he  doubted  if  it 
could  be  done  at  all.  With  him,  it  was  this  Con- 
stitution or  none.  “ Every  man,”  he  said  in  “The 
Federalist,”  referring  to  a picture  he  had  just 
drawn  of  the  perils  of  disunion,  — “ every  man 
who  loves  peace,  every  man  who  loves  his  country, 
every  man  who  loves  liberty,  ought  to  have  it  ever 
before  his  eyes,  that  he  may  cherish  in  his  heart 
a due  attachment  to  the  Union  of  America,  and 
be  able  to  set  a due  value  on  the  means  of  preserv- 
ing it.”  This  “means”  was  the  Constitution.  . 

Of  the  eighty  papers  of  “ The  Federalist”  he 
wrote  twenty-nine ; Hamilton  writing  forty-six, 
and  Jay  only  five.  These  famous  essays,  of  wider 
repute  than  any  other  American  book,  are  yet 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  117 

more  generally  accepted  upon  faith  than  upon 
knowledge.  But  at  that  time,  when  the  new  Con- 
stitution was  in  the  mind  and  on  the  tongue  of 
every  thoughtful  man,  they  were  eagerly  read  as 
they  followed  each  other  rapidly  in  the  columns 
of  a New  York  newspaper.  They  were  an  ar- 
mory, wherein  all  who  entered  into  the  contro- 
versy could  find  such  weapons  as  they  could  best 
handle.  What  governments  had  been,  what  gov- 
ernments ought  to  be,  and  what  the  political 
union  of  these  American  States  would  be  under 
their  new  Constitution,  were  questions  on  which 
the  writers  of  these  papers  undertook  to  answer 
all  reasonable  inquiries,  and  to  silence  all  cavils. 
Madison  would  undoubtedly  have  written  more 
than  his  two  fifths  of  them,  had  he  not  been  called 
upon  early  in  March  to  return  to  Virginia ; for  the 
work  was  of  the  deepest  interest  to  him,  and  the 
popularity  of  the  papers  would  have  stimulated  to 
exertion  one  as  indolent  as  he  was  industrious. 

But  the  canvass  for  the  election  of  delegates  to 
the  Constitutional  Convention  of  Virginia  called 
him  home.  He  had  been  nominated  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  his  county,  and  his  friends  had  urged 
him  to  return  before  the  election,  for  there  was 
reason  to  fear  that  the  majority  was  on  the  wrong 
side.1" : Henry,  Mason,  Randolph,  Lee,  and  others 
among  the  most  influential  men  of  Virginia,  were 
opposed  to  the  Constitution.  There  must  be 
somebody  in  the  convention  to  meet  strong  men 


118 


JAMES  MADISON. 


like  these,  and  Madison  was  urged  to  take  the 
stump  and  canvass  for  his  own  election.  Even 
this  he  was  willing  to  do  at  this  crisis,  if  need  be, 
though  he  said  it  would  be  at  the  sacrifice  of  every 
private  inclination,  and  of  the  rule  which  hitherto 
from  the  beginning  of  his  public  career  he  had 
strictly  adhere  d to,  — never  to  ask,  directly  or  in- 
directly, for  votes  for  himself. 

It  is  quite  possible,  even  quite  probable,  that 
Mr.  Madison  had  little  of  that  gift  which  has  al- 
ways passed  for  eloquence,  and  is,  indeed,  elo- 
quence of  a certain  kind.  If  we  may  trust  the 
reports  of  his  contemporaries,  though  he  wanted 
some  of  the  graces  of  oratory,  he  was  not  wanting 
in  the  power  of  winning  and  convincing.  His  ar- 
guments were  often,  if  not  always,  prepared  with 
care.  If  there  was  no  play  of  fancy,  there  was  no 
forgetfulness  of  facts.  If  there  was  lack  of  imag- 
ination, there  was  none  of  historical  illustration, 
when  the  subject  admitted  it.  If  manner  was  for- 
gotten, method  was  not.  His  aim  was  to  prove 
and  to  hold  fast ; to  make  the  wrong  clear,  and  to 
put  the  right  in  its  place  ; to  appeal  to  reason,  not 
to  passion,  nor  to  prejudice ; to  try  his  cause  by 
the  light  of  clear  logic,  hard  facts,  and  sound 
learning;  to  convince  his  hearers  of  the  truth,  as 
he  believed  in  it,  not  to  take  their  judgment  cap- 
tive by  surprise  with  harmonious  modulation  and 
grace  of  movement.  Not  his  neighbors  only,  but 
the  most  zealous  of  the  Fedei’alists  of  the  State, 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  119 

sent  him  to  the  convention.  It  was  there  that 
such  eloquence  as  he  possessed  was  peculiarly 
needed.  The  ground  was  to  be  fought  over  inch 
by  inch,  and  with  antagonists  whom  it  would  be 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  beat.  There  was  to 
be  contest  over  every  word  of  the  Constitution 
from  its  first  to  its  last.  “ Give  me  leave,”  cried 
Patrick  Henry  in  his  opening  speech,  “ to  demand 
what  right  had  they  to  say  ‘We  the  people’  in- 
stead of  ‘We  the  States  ? ’ ” He  began  at  the  be- 
ginning. It  was  the  gage  of  the  coming  battle ; 
the  defenders  were  challenged  to  show  that  any 
better  union  than  that  already  in  existence  was 
needed,  and  that  in  this  new  Constitution  a better 
union  was  furnished. 

As  month  after  month  passed  away  while  the 
Constitution  was  befoi’e  the  people  for  adoption, 
the  anxiety  of  the  Federalists  grew,  lest  the  requi- 
site nine  States  should  not  give  their  assent.  But 
when  eight  were  secured  there  was  room  to  hope 
even  for  unanimity,  if  Virginia  should  come  in  as 
the  ninth.  Should  she  say  Yes,  the  Union  might 
be  perfect ; for  the  remaining  States  would  be  al- 
most sure  to  follow  her  lead.  But  should  she  say 
No,  the  final  result  would  be  doubtful,  even  if  the 
requisite  nine  should  be  secured  by  the  acquies- 
cence of  one  of  the  smaller  States.  This-answer 
could  not,  of  course,  depend  altogether  upon  one 
man,  but  it  did  depend  more  upon  Madison  than 
upon  anybody  else. 


120 


JAMES  MADISON. 


The  convention  was  in  session  nearly  a month. 
At  the  end  of  a fortnight  he  was  not  hopeful. 
“The  business,”  he  wrote  to  Washington,  “is  in 
the  most  ticklish  state  that  can  be  imagined. 
The  majority  will  certainly  be  very  small,  on 
whatever  side  it  may  finally  lie  ; and  I dare  not 
encourage  much  expectation  that  it  will  be  on  the 
favorable  side.”  But  his  fears  stimulated  rather 
than  discouraged  him.  He  was  always  on  his 
feet ; always  ready  to  meet  argument  with  ax’gu- 
ment ; always  prompt  to  appeal  from  passion  to 
reason;  quick  to  brush  aside  mere  declamation, 
and  to  bring  the  minds  of  his  hearers  back  to  a 
calm  consideration  of  how  much  was  at  stake,  and 
of  the  weight  of  the  responsibility  resting  on  that 
convention.  Others  were  no  less  earnest  and  dili- 
gent than  he ; but  he  was  easily  chief,  and  the 
burden  and  heat  of  the  day  fell  mainly  upon  him. 
Probably  when  the  convention  assembled  the  ma- 
jority were  opposed  to  the  Constitution  ; but  its 
adoption  was  carried  at  last  by  a vote  of  eiglity- 
nine  to  seventy-nine.  Thenceforth  opposition  in 
the  remaining  States  was  hopeless. 

New  Hampshire  — though  the  fact  was  not 
known  in  Virginia  — preceded  that  State  by  a 
few  days  in  accepting  the  Constitution,  so  that 
the  requisite  nine  were  secured  befox-e  the  conven- 
tion at  Richmond  came  to  a decision.  But  it  was 
her  decision,  nevertheless,  that  l'eally  settled,  so 
far  as  can  be  seen  now,  the  question  of  a perma- 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  121 

nent  Union.  Had  the  vote  of  Virginia  been  the 
other  way  it  is  not  likely  that  Hamilton  would 
have  carried  New  York,  or  that  North  Carolina 
and  Rhode  Island  would  have  finally  decided  not 
to  be  left  in  solitude  outside.  What  the  history 
of  the  nine  united  States  only,  with  four  disunited 
States  among  them,  might  have  been,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  know,  and  quite  useless  to  conjecture. 
The  conditions  which  some  of  the  States  attached 
to  the  act  of  adoption ; the  addition  of  a Bill  of 
Rights ; proposed  amendments  to  the  Constitu- 
tion ; and  the  suggestion  of  submitting  it  to  a sec- 
ond convention,  were  matters  of  comparatively 
little  moment,  when  the  majority  of  ten  delegates 
was  secured  at  Richmond.  These  were  questions 
that  could  be  postponed.  “ The  delay  of  a few 
years,”  Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson,  “will  assuage 
the  jealousies  which  have  been  artificially  created 
by  designing  men,  and  will  at  the  same  time  point 
out  the  faults  which  call  for  amendment.” 

Immediately  after  the  adjournment  of  the  Rich- 
mond Convention  he  returned  to  New  York,  where 
the  Confederate  Congress  was  still  in  session. 
That  body  had  little  to  do  now  but  decide  upon 
the  time  and  place  of  the  inauguration  of  the 
new  government.  Madison  had  entered  upon  his 
thirty-eighth  year,  and  we  get  an  interesting 
glimpse  of  him  as  he  appeared  at  this  time  of  his 
life  to  an  intelligent  foreigner.  “ Mr.'  Warville 
Brissot  has  just  arrived  here,’  he  wrote  to  Jetfer- 


122 


JAMES  MADISON. 


son  in  August,  1788.  This  was  Brissot  de  War- 
ville,  a Frenchman  of  the  new  philosophy,  — . 
whose  head,  nevertheless,  his  compatriots  cut  off, 
a few  years  later,  — then  traveling  in  America  to 
observe  the  condition  and  progress  of  the  new  Re- 
public. His  tour  extended  to  nearly  all  the 
States ; he  met  with  most  of  the  distinguished 
men  of  the  country  ; and  he  made  a careful  and 
intelligent  use  of  his  many  opportunities  for  ob- 
servation. On  his  return  to  France  he  wrote  an 
entertaining  volume,  — “ New  Travels  in  the 
United  States  of  America,”  — still  to  be  found  in 
some  old  libraries.  What  he  says  of  Madison  is 
worth,  repeating,  not  only  for  the  impression  he 
made  upon  an  observant  stranger,  but  as  the  evi- 
dence of  the  contemporary  estimate  of  his  charac- 
ter and  reputation,  which  De  Warville  must  have 
gathered  from  others. 

“ The  name  of  Madison,”  he  writes,  “ celebrated  in 
America,  is  well  known  in  Europe  by  the  merited  eulo- 
gium  made  of  him  by  his  countryman  and  friend,  Mr. 
Jefferson. 

“ Though  still  young,  he  has  rendered  the  greatest 
services  to  Virginia,  to  the  American  Confederation, 
and  to  liberty  and  humanity  in  general.  He  contrib- 
uted much,  with  Mr.  White,  in  reforming  the  civil  and 
criminal  codes  of  his  country.  He  distinguished  him- 
self particularly  in  the  convention  for  the  acceptation  of 
the  new  federal  system.  Virginia  balanced  a long  time 
in  adhering  to  it.  Mr.  Madison  determined  to  it  the 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  123 

members  of  the  convention,  by  his  eloquence  and  logic. 
This  Republican  appears  to  be  about  thirty-eight  years 
of  age.  He  had,  when  I saw  him,  an  air  of  fatigue  ; 
perhaps  it  was  the  effect  of  the  immense  labors  to  which 
he  has  devoted  himself  for  some  time  past.  His  look 
announces  a censor,  his  conversation  discovers  the  man 
of  learning,  and  his  reserve  was  that  of  a man  con- 
scious of  his  talents  and  of  his  duties. 

“ During  the  dinner,  to  which  he  invited  me,  they 
spoke  of  the  refusal  of  North  Carolina  to  accede  to  the 
new  Constitution.  The  majority  against  it  was  one 
hundred.  Mr.  Madison  believed  that  this  refusal  would 
have  no  weight  on  the  minds  of  the  Americans,  and 
that  it  would  not  impede  the  operations  of  Congress.  I 
told  him  that  though  this  refusal  might  be  regarded  as  a 
trifle  in  America,  it  would  have  great  weight  in  Eu- 
rope ; that  they  would  never  inquire  there  into  the  mo- 
tives which  dictated  it ; nor  consider  the  small  conse- 
quence of  this  State  in  the  confederation  ; that  it  would 
be  regarded  as  a germ  of  division,  calculated  to  retard 
the  operations  of  Congress ; and  that  certainly  this  idea 
would  prevent  the  resurrection  of  American  credit. 

“ Mr.  Madison  attributed  this  refusal  to  the  attach- 
ment of  a great  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  that  State  to 
their  paper  money  and  their  tender  act.  He  was  much 
inclined  to  believe  that  this  disposition  would  not  remain 
a long  time.” 

In  October  the  Virginia  Assembly  met.  Two 
thirds  of  its  members  were  opposed  to  the  new 
Constitution,  and  at  their  head  was  Patrick 
Henry,  his  zeal  against  it  not  in  the  least  abated 


124 


JAMES  MADISON. 


because  he  had  been  defeated  in  the  late  con- 
vention. The  acceptance  of  the  Constitution  by 
that  representative  body  could  not  be  recalled. 
But  the  Assembly  could,  at  least,  protest  against 
it,  and  was  led  by  Henry  to  call  upon  Congress  to 
convene  a second  national  convention  to  do  over 
again  the  work  of  the  first.  The  legislature  was 
to  elect  senators  for  the  first  Senate  under  the 
new  government ; and  it  was  also  to  divide  the 
State  into  districts  for  its  representation  in  the 
lower  House  of  Congress.  In  ordinary  fairness, 
as  the  State  had,  in  a popular  convention,  so  re- 
cently accepted  the  Constitution,  the  party  then 
in  the  majority  was  entitled  to  at  least  one  of  the 
representatives  in  the  Senate.  But  Henry  nom- 
inated both,  and  could  command  votes  enough  to 
elect  them.  In  modern  party  usage  this  would 
seem  quite  unobjectionable  ; indeed,  a modern  pol- 
itician who  should  not  use  such  an  advantage  for 
his  party  would  be  considered  as  unfit  for  practi- 
cal politics.  But  a hundred  years  ago  it  was 
thought  sharp  practice,  and  a fair  proportion  of 
Henry’s  partisans  refused  to  be  bound  by  it.  One 
of  Henry’s  nominees  was  elected  by  a majority  of 
twenty  over  Madison  ; but  in  the  case  of  the  other 
that  majority  was  reduced  more  than  half,  and  a 
change  of  five  more  votes  would  have  elected 
Madison. 

He  had,  however,  neither  expected  nor  wished 
to  be  sent  to  the  Senate,  while  he  did  hope  to  be 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  125 

elected  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  The 
Senate  was  intended  to  he  the  more  dignified 
body,  requiring  in  its  members  a certain  style  of 
living  for  which  wealth  was  indispensable.  Mad- 
ison had  not  the  means  to  give  that  kind  of  social 
support  to  official  position  ; but  he  could  afford  to 
belong  to  that  body  where  a member  was  not  the 
less  l’espectable  because  his  whole  domestic  estab- 
lishment might  be  a bachelor’s  room  in  a board- 
ing-house. 

Virginia  was,  as  he  wrote  to  Washington,  “ the 
only  instance  among  the  ratifying  States  in  which 
the  politics  of  the  legislature  are  at  variance  with 
the  sense  of  the  people,  expressed  by  their  repre- 
sentatives in  convention.”  This  had  enabled 
Henry  and  a majority  of  his  friends  to  elect  sen- 
ators who,  representing  “ the  politics  of  the  legis- 
lature,” did  not  represent  “ the  sense  of  the  peo- 
ple ” in  regard  to  the  national  Constitution.  But 
in  the  election  of  members  of  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, the  sense  of  the  people  was  to  be 
again  appealed  to,  and  a new  way  must  be  de- 
vised for  asserting  the  supremacy  of  legislative 
power.  The  cleverness  of  Elbridge  Gerry  of 
Massachusetts,  many  years  later,  under  similar 
circumstances,  introduced  a new  word  into  the 
language  of  the  country,  and,  it  was  supposed 
at  the  time,  a new  device  in  American  politics. 
But  what  has  since  been  known  as  “ Gerryman- 
dering ” was  really  the  invention  of  Pati’ick 


126 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Henry.  Th  is  method  of  arranging  counties  into 
congressional  districts  in  accordance  with  their 
political  affinities,  without  regard  to  their  geo- 
graphical lines,  Henry  attempted  to  do  with  Mr. 
Madison’s  own  county.  By  joining  it  to  distant 
counties  it  was  expected  that  an  anti-Federal  ma- 
jority would  be  secured  large  enough  to  insure  his 
defeat.  The  attempt  to  elect  him  to  the  Senate 
was,  Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson,  “defeated  by 
Mr.  Henry,  who  is  omnipotent  in  the  present  leg- 
islature.” He  adds  that  Henry  “ has  taken  equal 
pains,  in  forming  the  counties  into  districts  for 
the  election  of  representatives,  to  associate  with 
Orange  such  as  are  most  devoted  to  his  politics 
and  most  likely  to  be  swayed  by  the  prejudices 
excited  against  me.”  The  scheme,  however,  was 
unsuccessful,  perhaps  partly  because  of  the  indig- 
nation which  so  dishonorable  a measure  to  defeat 
a political  opponent  excited  throughout  the  State. 
Madison  entered  upon  an  active  canvass  of  his 
district  against  James  Monroe,  who  had  been 
nominated  as  a moderate  anti-Federalist,  and  de- 
feated him.  It  was  winter-time,  and  in  the  ex- 
posure of  some  of  his  long  rides  his  ears  were 
frozen.  In  later  life  he  sometimes  laughingly 
pointed  to  the  scars  of  these  wounds  received,  he 
said,  in  the  service  of  his  country. 

Thus  Henry’s  “ Gerrymander,”  like  many  an- 
other useful  and  curious  device,  brought  neither 
profit  nor  credit  to  the  original  inventor.  Had 


ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  1^ 

Henry  acted  in  the  broader  spirit  of  the  modern 
politician,  who  sees  that  he  serves  himself  best 
who  serves  his  party  best,  he  would  have  disposed 
of  every  Federal  county  in  the  State  as  he  dis- 
posed of  Orange.  As  it  was,  he  only  aroused  a 
good  deal  of  indignation  and  defeated  himself  by 
openly  aiming  to  gratify  his  personal  resentments. 
Had  he  scattered  his  shot  for  the  general  good  of 
the  party  he  would,  perhaps,  have  brought  down 
his  particular  bird. 


CHAPTER  X. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 

The  Confederate  Congress,  at  its  final  session 
in  1788,  had  fixed  the  time  for  the  election  of 
President  and  Vice-President  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  the  time  and  place  for  the  meeting  of 
the  first  Congress  of  the  new  government.  The 
day  appointed  was  the  first  Wednesday  of  the  fol- 
lowing March,  and  as  that  date  fell  on  the  fourth 
of  the  month,  a precedent  was  established  which 
has  ever  since  been  observed  in  the  installation  of 
a new  President.  The  place  was  not  so  easily 
determined.  The  choice  lay  between  New  York 
and  Philadelphia,  and  the  struggle  was  prolonged, 
not  because  the  question  of  the  temporary  seat  of 
government  was  of  much  moment,  but  because  of 
the  influence  the  decision  might  have  upon  the 
future  settlement  of  the  permanent  place  for  the 
capital. 

No  quorum  of  the  new  Congress  was  present  at 
New  York  on  March  4,  1789,  and  neither  House 
was  organized  until  early  in  April.  On  the  28d, 
Washington  arrived  ; and  on  the  30th  he  took  the 
oath  of  office  as  first  President  of  the  United 


THE  FIRST  COR  GEE SS. 


129 


States,  standing  on  the  balcony  of  Federal  Hall, 
at  the  corner  of  Wall  and  Broad  Streets,  a site 
now  occupied  by  another  building  used  as  the  sub- 
treasury. A week  before,  when  tbe  ceremonies 
proper  for  such  an  occasion  were  a subject  of  dis- 
cussion in  Congress,  the  question  of  fitting  titles 
for  the  President  and  Vice-President  came  up  for 
consideration.  It  was  decided  that  when  the  Pres- 
ident arrived  the  Vice-President  should  meet  him 
at  the  door  of  the  Senate  Chamber,  lead  him  to 
the  chair,  and  then,  in  a formal  address,  inform 
him  that  the  two  Houses  were  ready  to  witness 
the  administration  of  tbe  oath  of  office.  “Upon 
this,”  says  John  Adams,  in  a letter  written  three 
years  afterward,  “ I arose  in  my  place  and  asked 
the  advice  of  tbe  Senate,  in  what  form  I should 
address  him,  whether  I should  say,  4 Mr.  Wash- 
ington,’ ‘ Mr.  President,’  ‘ Sir,’  ‘ May  it  please 
your  Excellency,’  or  what  else?  I observed  that 
it  had  been  common  while  he  commanded  the 
army  to  call  him  ‘His  Excellency,’  but  I was  free 
to  own  it  would  appear  to  me  better  to  give  him 
no  title  but  ‘ Sir,’  or  £ Mr.  President,’  than  to  put 
him  on  a level  with  a governor  of  Bermuda,  or 
one  of  bis  own  ambassadors,  or  a governor  of  any 
one  of  our  States.” 

Thereupon  the  question  went  to  a conference 
committee  of  both  Houses,  who  reported  that  no 
other  title  would  be  proper  for  either  President 
or  Vice-President,  at  any  time,  than  these  which 
9 


130 


JAMES  MADISON. 


were  given  by  the  Constitution.  To  this  report 
the  Senate  disagreed  and  appointed  a new  com- 
mittee. This  proposed  that  the  President  should 
be  called,  “ His  Highness,  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  Protector  of  their  Liberties.” 
When  wise  men  are  absurd  they  presume  on  their 
prerogative.  The  Senate  accepted  the  report,  but 
the  House  had  the  good  sense  to  reject  it,  consent- 
ing, however,  to  leave  the  question  in  abeyance. 
On  these  proceedings  Mr.  Madison  thus  com- 
mented in  a letter  to  Jefferson  : — 

“ My  last  inclosed  copies  of  the  President’s  inaugural 
speech,  and  the  answer  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. I now  add  the  answer  of  the  Senate.  It  will 
not  have  escaped  you  that  the  former  was  addressed 
with  a truly  republican  simplicity  to  George  Washing- 
ton, President  of  the  United  States.  The  latter  follows 
the  example,  with  the  omission  of  the  personal  name, 
but  without  any  other  than  the  constitutional  title.  The 
proceeding  on  this  point  was,  in  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, spontaneous.  The  imitation  by  the  Senate  was 
extorted.  The  question  became  a serious  one  between 
the  two  Houses.  J.  Adams  espoused  the  cause  of  titles 
with  great  earnestness.  His  friend,  R.  II.  Lee,  al- 
though elected  as  a republican  enemy  to  an  aristocratic 
Constitution,  was  a most  zealous  second.  The  projected 
title  was,  His  Highness  the  President  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Protector  of  their  Liberties.  Had  the 
project  succeeded,  it  would  have  subjected  the  President 
to  a severe  dilemma,  and  given  a deep  wound  to  our  in- 
fant government.” 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


131 


Washington  has  sometimes  been  accused  of 
wishing  for  the  title  of  “ His  Highness,”  and  of 
having  suggested  it.  Had  this  been  true,  Madi- 
son would  have  been  certain  to  know  it,  and  he 
was  quite  incapable  of  asserting  in  that  case  that 
such  a title  would  have  been  to  the  President  “ a 
severe  dilemma.”  About  Mr.  Adams  he  was  per- 
haps mistaken,  as  he  might  easily  have  been,  since 
he  was  not  a member  of  the  Senate  and  probably 
heard  only  a confused  report  of  how  the  question 
was  brought  before  that  body.  As  Mr.  Adams’s 
letter,  quoted  just  now,  shows,  he  regarded  the 
charge  as  a calumny  and  resented  it.  He  gave 
them,  according  to  his  own  statement,  no  other 
opinion  than  that  he  preferred  “ Sir,”  or  “ Mr. 
President,”  as  a more  proper  address  than  “ Ex- 
cellency,” a title  then,  as  now,  pertaining  to  gov- 
ernors of  States.  He  probably  took  no  further 
part  in  the  debate,  but  it  is  not  impossible  that  he 
may  in  private  have  avowed  a preference  for  some 
other  and  higher  title  than  either  “ Mr.  Presi- 
dent ” or  “Your  Excellency.”  “ For,”  he  said  in 
the  explanatory  letter  to  his  friend,  “ I freely  own 
that  I think  decent  and  moderate  titles,  as  distinc- 
tions of  offices,  are  not  only  harmless,  but  useful 
in  society ; and  that  in  this  country,  where  I know 
them  to  be  prized  by  the  people  as  well  as  their 
magistrates  as  highly  as  by  any  people  or  any 
magistrates  in  the  world,  I should  think  some  dis- 
tinction between  the  magistrates  of  the  national 


132 


JAMES  MADISON. 


government  and  those  of  the  state  governments 
proper.”  A distinction  might  be  proper  enough 
if  there  were  to  be  any  titles  whatever ; but  cer- 
tainly they  were  the  wiser  who  preferred  good 
home-spun  to  threadbare  old  clothes.  Had  rags 
of  that  sort  been  made  a legal  uniform  it  is  almost 
appalling  to  reflect  upon  the  absurdities  to  which 
the  national  fondness  for  titles  would  have  carried 
us. 

From  March  4 to  April  1,  though  the  House  of 
Representatives  met  daily,  there  were  not  mem- 
bers enough  present  to  make  a quorum.  The  first 
real  business  brought  before  the  House,  except 
that  relating  to  its  organization,  was  introduced 
by  Madison,  two  days  after  the  inauguration.  It 
was  a proposition  to  raise  a revenue  by  duties  on 
imports,  and  by  a tonnage  duty  on  all  vessels, 
American  and  foreign,  bringing  goods,  wares,  or 
merchandise  into  the  United  States.  The  essen- 
tial weakness  of  the  late  Confederacy  was,  first  of 
all,  to  be  remedied  by  uniform  rules  for  the  regu- 
lation of  trade.  Revenue  must  be  provided  for 
the  support  of  government,  and  that  in  a way 
which  should  not  be  oppressive  to  the  people. 
Commerce,  Mr.  Madison  said,  “ought  to  be  as 
free  as  the  policy  of  nations  will  admit;”  but 
government  must  be  supported,  and  taxes,  the 
least  burdensome  and  most  easily  collected,  are 
those  derived  from  duties  on  imports.  He  agreed, 
however,  as  he  said  on  the  second  day  of  the  de- 


TEE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


133 


bate,  with  those  who  would  so  adjust  the  duties 
on  foreign  goods  as  to  protect  the  “infant  manu- 
factories ” of  the  country.  With  little  interrup- 
tion this  subject  was  debated  for  the  first  six 
weeks  of  the  opening  session  of  the  First  Congress. 
No  other  could  have  been  hit  upon  to  test  so  thor- 
oughly the  strength  of  the  new  bond  of  union. 
It  was  to  brush  aside  all  those  trade  regulations  in 
the  several  States  which  each  had  hitherto  thought 
essential  to  its  prosperity.  Every  interest  in  the 
country  was  to  be  considered,  and  their  different, 
sometimes  opposing,  claims  to  be  reconciled. 

New  England  was  sure  that,  should  the  tax  on 
molasses  be  too  high,  the  distilleries  would  be  shut 
up,  and  a great  New  England  industry  destroyed. 
Nor  would  the  injury  stop  there.  The  fisheries, 
as  well  as  the  distilleries,  would  be  ruined.  For 
three  fifths  of  the  fish  put  up  for  the  West  Indies 
could  find  no  market  anywhere  else;  and  a market 
existed  there  only  because  molasses  was  taken  in 
exchange.  A prohibitory  duty  on  that  article, 
or  a duty  that  should  seriously  interfere  with  its 
importation,  would  well-nigh  destroy  the  fisheries. 
What  then  would  become  of  the  nursery  of  Amer- 
ican seamen  ? With  no  seamen  there  would  be 
no  ship-building.  What  sadder  picture  than  this 
of  a New  England  without  rum,  without  codfish, 
without  seamen,  and  without  ships.  One  can 
easily  conceive  that  even  in  that  restrained  and  dig- 
nified First  Congress  there  was  no  want  of  serious 


134 


JAMES  MADISON. 


and  alarmed  expostulation,  and  even  some  threat- 
ening talk  from  such  men  as  the  tranquil  Good- 
hue,  the  thoughtful  and  scholarly  Ames,  and  the 
impulsive  Gerry. 

Then  the  South,  for  her  part,  was  alarmed  lest, 
among  other  things,  too  high  a tonnage  duty 
should  leave  her  tobacco,  her  rice,  and  indigo  rot- 
ting in  the  fields  and  warehouses  for  want  of  ships 
to  take  them  to  market.  She  had  no  ships  of  her 
own  and  could  have  none,  and  she  invited  the 
ships  of  the  rest  of  the  world  to  come  for  her 
products  and  bring  in  return  all  she  needed  for 
her  own  consumption.  The  picture  of  the  possi- 
ble ruin  of  New  England  was  as  nothing  to  that 
of  the  Southern  planter  scanning  the  horizon  with 
weary  eyes,  in  vain,  for  the  sight  of  a sail,  while 
behind  him  was  a dangerous  crowd  of  hungry 
blacks  with  nothing  to  do.  That  desolation  seemed 
complete  to  the  southernmost  States  when  it  was 
also  proposed  to  levy  a tax  of  ten  dollars  upon 
every  slave  imported.  In  short,  the  whole  sub- 
ject bristled  with  difficulties.  The  problem  was 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  how  to  tax  everything, 
and  at  the  same  time  convince  everybody  that  the 
scheme  was  for  the  general  good,  while  nobody’s 
special  interests  were  sacrificed.  The  “ infant 
industries,”  to  which  Mr.  Madison  alluded,  really 
received  no  special  consideration  in  the  final  ad- 
justment, and  they  were  too  feeble  then  even  to 
cry  for  nursing.  They  have  grown  sti’onger  since 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


135 


though  they  are  “ infants  ” still  ; and  they  should 
never  cease  to  be  grateful  to  him  who,  however 
unwittingly,  gave  them  a name  to  live  by  for  a 
hundred  years. 

But  the  most  remarkable  part  of  the  debate  was 
that  upon  the  proposition  of  Mr.  Parker  of  Vir- 
ginia, to  impose  a duty  upon  the  importation  of 
slaves.  Could  the  progress  of  events  have  been 
foreseen,  that  proposal  might  have  been  regarded 
as  meant  to  protect  an  “ infant  industry  ” of  the 
northernmost  slave  States.  But  the  wildest  imag- 
ination then  could  not  conceive  of  the  domestic 
slave-trade  of  a few  years  later,  when  a chief 
source  of  the  prosperity  of  Virginia  would  be  her 
virgintial  crop  of  young  men  and  women  to  be 
shipped  for  New  Orleans  and  a market.  But  Mr. 
Parker  had  no  ulterior  motive  when  he  avowed 
his  regret  that  the  Constitution  had  failed  to  pro- 
hibit the  importation  of  slaves  from  Africa,  and 
hoped  that  the  duty  he  proposed  would  prevent, 
in  some  degree,  a traffic  which  he  pronounced  “ir- 
rational and  inhuman.”  It  would  have  been  dif- 
ficult to  have  found  a Virginian  of  that  day  who 
would  not  have  taken  down  his  shot-gun  on  hear- 
ing that  there  were  miscreants  prowling  about  his 
kitchen  doors  in  the  hope  of  buying  up  the  strong- 
est young  people  of  his  household  for  export  to 
the  Southwest. 

Judging  from  the  imperfect  report  of  the  debate 
upon  the  subject,  it  would  seem  that  the  bargain 


136 


JAMES  MADISON. 


relative  to  tlie  slave-trade,  made  in  the  Constitu- 
tional Convention  of  two  years  before  between 
New  England  and  the  two  southernmost  States, 
might  still  hold  good.  Or  there  may  have  been  a 
new  bargain  ; or,  perhaps,  both  sides  trusted  to  a 
tacit  recognition  of  the  eternal  fitness  of  things, 
and  made  common  cause  where  legislation  threat- 
ened at  the  same  time  the  distillery  and  the  slave- 
ship.1  At  any  rate  the  extreme  Southerners 
expressed  surprise  at  the  audacity  which  would 
disturb  a compromise  of  the  Constitution ; the 
extreme  Northerners  deprecated  it  as  quite  un- 
called for  in  any  consideration  of  the  subject  of 
revenue.  The  principle  of  Mr.  Parker’s  motion, 
Mr.  Sherman  of  Connecticut  thought,  was  to  cor- 

1 Eleven  years  afterward,  when  the  question  of  prohibiting  the 
carrying  on  the  slave-trade  from  American  ports  came  up,  one 
John  Brown  of  Rhode  Island  said  in  Congress,  “ Our  distilleries 
and  manufactories  were  all  lying  idle  for  want  of  an  extended  com- 
merce. lie  had  been  well  informed  that  on  those  coasts  [African] 
New  England  rum  was  much  preferred  to  the  best  Jamaica  spir- 
its, and  would  fetch  a better  price.  Why  should  it  not  be  sent 
there,  and  a profitable  return  be  made  1 Why  should  a heavy 
fine  and  imprisonment  [of  slave-traders]  be  made  the  penalty  for 
carrying  on  a trade  so  advantageous  1 ” Sixty  years  later  still, 
there  was  another  Brown  in  Providence,  Rhode  Island,  who  was 
a member  of  the  Committee  of  the  Kansas  Aid  Society  of  New 
England.  He  was  about  to  withdraw  from  it  for  want  of  time  to 
attend  to  its  duties,  — had,  indeed,  actually  sent  in  his  resignation, 
— when  news  came  of  the  doings  of  another  John  Brown  at 
Harper’s  Ferry.  The  resignation  was  instantly  recalled,  with  the 
remark  that  it  was  not  a time  for  Browns  to  seem  to  be  backward 
on  the  question  of  slavery.  Such  is  the  irony  of  coincidence  in 
names. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


137 


rect  a moral  evil ; the  principle  of  the  bill  before 
the  House  was  to  raise  a revenue.  At  some  other 
time  he  would  be  willing  to  consider  the  question 
of  taxing  the  importation  of  negroes  on  the  ground 
of  humanity  and  policy ; but  it  was  a sufficient 
reason  with  him  for  not  admitting  it  as  an  object 
of  revenue  that  the  burden  would  fall  upon  two 
States  only.  Fisher  Ames  of  Massachusetts  could 
only  take  counsel  of  his  conscience.  From  his 
soul,  he  said,  he  detested  slavery ; and  — forget- 
ting, apparently,  that  this  tax  was  provided  for  by 
the  Constitution — he  doubted  whether  imposing 
it  “ would  not  have  the  appearance  of  authorizing 
the  practice  ” of  trading  in  slaves.  This  was  his 
reason  for  wishing  to  postpone  the  subject.  But 
Mr.  Livermore  of  New  Hampshire  was  more  in- 
genious still.  If  the  imported  negroes  were  goods, 
wares,  or  merchandise,  they  would  come  within  the 
title  of  the  bill,  and  be  taxed  under  the  general 
rule  of  five  per  centum,  which  would  be  about  the 
same  rate  as  ten  dollars  a head  ; but  if  they  were 
not  goods,  wares,  or  merchandise,  then  such  im- 
portation could  not  properly  be  included  in  the 
consideration  of  the  question  of  a revenue  from 
duties  on  such  articles  of  trade. 

Mr.  Madison  came  to  the  help  of  his  colleague, 
and  brushed  aside  the  sophistries  of  the  New  Eng- 
land allies  of  the  slave-traders.  If  there  were 
anything  wanting  in  the  title  of  the  bill  to  cover 
this  particular  duty,  it  was  easy  to  add  it.  If  the 


138 


JAMES  MADISON. 


question  was  not  one  of  taxation  because  it  was 
one  of  humanity,  it  would  be  quite  as  difficult  to 
deal  with  it  under  any  other  bill  for  levying  a 
duty  as  under  this.  If  the  tax  seemed  unjust  be- 
cause it  bore  heavily  upon  a single  class,  that 
would  be  a good  reason  for  remitting  many  taxes 
which  there  was  no  hesitation  in  imposing.  If 
ten  dollars  seemed  a heavy  duty,  a little  calcula- 
tion would  show  that  it  was  only  about  the  pro- 
posed ad  valorem  duty  of  five  per  centum  on  most 
other  importations.  “ It  is  to  be  hoped,”  he  added, 
“ that  by  expressing  a national  disapprobation 
of  this  trade  we  may  destroy  it,  and  save  our- 
selves from  reproaches,  and  our  posterity  the  im- 
becility ever  attendant  on  a country  fdled  with 
slaves.”  “ If  there  is  any  one  point,”  he  contin- 
ued, “ in  which  it  is  clearly  the  policy  of  this  na- 
tion, so  far  as  we  constitutionally  can,  to  vary  the 
practice  obtaining  under  some  of  the  state  gov- 
ernments, it  is  this.  ...  It  is  as  much  the  inter- 
est of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina  as  of  any  in  the 
Union.  Every  addition  they  receive  to  their  num- 
ber of  slaves  tends  to  weaken  and  render  them  less 
capable  of  self-defense.  ...  It  is  a necessary 
duty  of  the  general  government  to  protect  every 
part  of  the  empire  against  danger,  as  well  internal 
as  external.  Everything,  therefore,  which  tends 
to  increase  this  danger,  though  it  may  be  a local 
affair,  yet,  if  it  involves  national  expense  or  safety, 
becomes  of  concern  to  every  part  of  the  Union,  and 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


139 


is  a proper  subject  for  the  consideration  of  those 
charged  with  the  general  administration  of  the 
government.”  No  Northern  man,  except  Elbridge 
Gerry  of  Massachusetts,  supported  this  measure  ; 
and  none  from  the  Southern  States,  except  three 
of  the  Virginia  members,  with  Madison  leading. 
As  the  foreign  slave-trade  was  protected  in  the 
Constitution  for  twenty  years  by  a bargain  be- 
tween the  two  southernmost  States  and  New  Eng- 
land ; so  now  the  same  influence  staved  off  the 
imposition  of  the  tax  which  was  a part  of  the  con- 
sideration to  be  given  for  that  constitutional  pro- 
tection of  the  trade.  It  is  not  a creditable  fact  ; 
but  it  is,  nevertheless,  a fact  and  a representative 
one  in  the  history  of  the  United  States.  And  it 
is  to  Madison's  great  honor  that  he  had  neither 
part  nor  lot  in  it. 

After  six  weeks  of  earnest  debate,  an  amicable 
and  satisfactory  agreement  was  made  to  impose  a 
moderate  duty  upon  pretty  much  everything  im- 
ported, except  slaves  from  Africa.  It  was  liter- 
ally a tariff  for  revenue;  but  it  was  a settlement 
that  settled  nothing  definitely,  except  that  the 
provision  of  the  Constitution  for  a tax  of  ten  dol- 
lars on  imported  slaves  should  be  a dead  letter. 
Thenceforth  the  policy  of  free  trade  was  estab- 
lished, so  far  as  African  slaves  were  concerned,  till 
the  traffic  was  supposed  to  cease  by  constitutional 
limitation  and  Act  of  Congress  in  1808.1 

1 The  subsequent  legislation  on  this  subject  is  a curious  exem- 


140 


JAMES  MADISON. 


The  determination  to  protect  the  commercial 
interests  of  the  country,  beyond  the  point  of  mere 
revenue,  was  more  manifest  in  fixing  the  rate  of 
duty  upon  tonnage  than  in  duties  upon  importa- 
tions. It  was  generally  agreed,  after  much  debate, 
that  American  commerce  had  better  be  in  Amer- 
ican hands,  and  a difference  of  twenty  cents  a ton 
was  made  between  the  tax  upon  domestic  and  that 
upon  foreign  ships,  as  a measure  of  protection  to 
American  shipping.  Mr.  Madison  proposed  to 
make  it  still  larger,  but  the  House  would  only 
agree  to  increase  it  to  forty  cents  on  ships  belong- 
ing to  powers  with  which  the  United  States  had 

plification  of  the  ingenuity  with  which  any  law  obnoxious  to  the 
owners  of  slaves  was  got  rid  of,  when  it  was  clear  that  it  could 
not  be  defeated  by  force  of  numbers.  In  1806  a final  attempt  was 
made  to  impose  the  duty  of  ten  dollars  upon  slaves  imported,  and 
a resolution  passed  in  favor  of  it.  This  was  referred  to  a com- 
mittee, with  instructions  to  bring  in  a bill.  A bill  was  reported 
and  pushed  so  far  as  a third  reading,  when  it  was  recommitted, 
which  put  it  off  for  a year.  When  it  next  appeared  it  was  a bill 
for  the  prohibition  of  the  importation  of  slaves,  in  accordance 
with  the  constitutional  provision  that  the  traffic  should  cease  in 
1808.  The  new  question,  after  some  debate,  in  which  there  was 
no  allusion  to  the  tax,  was  postponed  for  further  consideration. 
But  it  never  again  came  before  the  House.  A month  later,  Febru- 
ary 13,  1807,  a bill  from  the  Senate,  providing  that  the  foreign 
slave-trade  should  cease  on  the  first  day  of  the  following  January, 
was  received  and  immediately  concurred  in,  and  that  seems  to 
have  been  silently  accepted  as  disposing  of  the  whole  subject.  No 
tax  was  ever  paid  ; but  the  importation  of  slaves,  notwithstand- 
ing the  law  to  put  an  end  to  importation  in  1808.,  continued  at  the 
rate,  it  was  estimated,  of  about  fifteen  thousand  a year.  Proba- 
bly it  never  ceased  altogether  till  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion 
of  1860. 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


141 


no  treaties.  The  Senate,  however,  refused  to  ad- 
mit this  distinction,  and  insisted  that  all  foreign 
ships  should  be  subject  to  the  same  tonnage  duty 
without  regard  to  existing  treaties.  The  House 
assented,  lest  the  bill  should  be  lost  altogether. 
This  proposed  differential  duty  on  foreign  vessels 
was  as  clearly  aimed  at  Great  Britain  as  if  that 
power  had  been  named  in  the  bill.  Nor,  indeed, 
was  there  an}r  attempt  at  concealment ; for  it  was 
openly  avowed  that  America  had  no  formidable 
rival  except  the  English,  who  already  largely  con- 
trolled the  commerce  of  the  United  States.  In 
the  debates  and  in  the  final  decision  of  the  ques- 
tion is  shown  clearly  enough  the  difference  of 
opinion  and  of  feeling,  which  soon  made  the  divid- 
ing line  between  the  two  great  parties  of  the  first 
quarter  of  a century  under  the  Constitution.  No- 
body then  foresaw  how  bitter  that  difference  of 
party  was  to  be,  nor  what  disastrous  consequences 
would  follow  it. 

Mr.  Madison  was  among  the  most  zealous  of 
those  who  insisted  upon  a discrimination  against 
Great  Britain.  He  thought  it  should  be  made 
for  the  dignity  no  less  than  for  the  interest  of  the 
United  States.  He  had  no  fear,  he  said,  “of  en- 
tering into  a commercial  warfare  with  that  na- 
tion.” England,  he  believed,  could  do  this  coun- 
try no  harm  by  any  peaceful  reprisals  she  could 
devise.  She  supplied  the  United  States  with  no 
article  either  of  necessity  or  of  luxury  that  the 


142 


JAMES  MADISON. 


people  of  the  United  States  could  not  manufacture 
for  themselves.  He  called  those  “ Anglicists  ” 
who  did  not  agree  with  him,  and  who  believed 
that  it  was  in  the  power  of  Great  Britain  to  hinder 
or  to  help  immensely  the  prosperity  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  not  of  so  much  moment' what 
America  bought  of  England,  as  it  was  that  Eng- 
land should  consent  to  free  trade  with  her  colo- 
nies ; and  on  every  account  it  was  wiser  to  concili- 
ate than  to  defy  Great  Britain  ; wiser  to  induce 
her  to  enter  into  a friendly  commercial  alliance, 
than  to  provoke  her  to  retaliate  upon  the  feeble 
commerce  of  this  country,  upon  which  she  had  so 
strong  a grip.  Madison  had  shown  himself,  before 
this  time,  half  credulous  of  the  charges  of  a lean- 
ing toward  England  and  toward  monarchy,  made 
by  those  who  wanted  a congress  of  petty  States, 
against  those  who  wanted  a strong  national  gov- 
ernment. If,  however,  there  were  Anglicism  on 
one  side,  so  there  was  quite  as  much  Gallicism,  if 
not  a good  deal  more,  on  the  other.  In  writing 
to  Jefferson  of  the  probability  that  the  Senate 
would  make  no  discrimination  in  the  tonnage  du- 
ties, he  said  that  in  that  case  “ Great  Britain  will 
be  quieted  in  the  enjoyment  of  our  trade,  as  she 
may  please  to  regulate  it,  and  France  discouraged 
from  her  efforts  at  a competition,  which  it  is  not 
less  our  interest  than  hers  to  promote.”  What- 
ever may  be  thought  of  this  first  concession  of 
the  new  government  to  England,  it  is  quite  as 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


143 


much  the  coming  party  leader  as  the  statesman 
who  speaks  here.  It  may  not  be  doubted  that  he 
sincerely  thought  it  to  be,  as  he  said,  “ impolitic, 
in  every  view  that  can  be  taken  of  the  subject,  to 
put  Great  Britain  at  once  on  the  footing  of  the 
most  favored  nation.”  But  the  relation  of  Amer- 
ican interests  to  English  intei’ests  was  evidently 
already  associated  in  his  mind  with  the  relations 
of  France  and  England,  so  soon  to  be  the  absoi'b- 
ing  question  in  American  politics. 

The  impost  act  was  followed  by  others  hardly 
less  important  in  putting  the  new  Constitution 
into  operation  under  its  first  Congress.  The  di- 
rection of  business  seems,  by  common  consent, 
to  have  been  intrusted  to  Mr.  Madison  among 
the  many  able  men  of  that  body ; doubtless,  be- 
cause of  his  thorough  familiarity  with  the  Consti- 
tution, and  of  his  methodical  ways.  He  was  sure 
to  bring  things  forward  in  their  due  order,  to  pro- 
vide judiciously  for  the  more  immediate  needs. 
The  impost  bill  secured  the  means  to  work  with ; 
the  next  necessity  was  to  organize  the  machinery 
to  do  the  work.  Resolutions  to  create  the  execu- 
tive departments  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  the  Treas- 
ury, and  of  War,  were  offered  by  Mr.  Madison. 
These  were  required  in  general  terms  by  the  Con- 
stitution, with  a single  officer  at  the  head  of  each, 
to  be  appointed  by  the  President  “by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.”  The  man- 
ner of  the  appointment  of  subordinate  officers  was 


144 


JAMES  MADISUK. 


provided  for  by  the  Constitution,  but  the  manner 
of  their  removal  from  office  was  not.  Was  the 
tenure  of  office  to  be  good  behavior?  Were  the 
incumbents  removable,  with  or  without  cause  ? 
If  the  power  of  removal  existed,  did  it  vest  in 
the  power  that  appointed,  that  is,  in  the  President 
and  Senate  conjointly,  or  in  the  President  alone? 

As  the  Constitution  was  silent,  the  question  had 
to  be  settled  on  its  own  merits.  With  all  the  ar- 
guments that  could  be  urged,  either  on  one  side  or 
the  other,  we  are  familiar  enough  in  our  time, 
coming  up  as  the  question  so  often  does  in  changes 
in  state  constitutions  and  municipal  charters,  and 
in  the  discussion  of  the  necessity  for  civil  service 
reform.  There  is  this  essential  difference,  how- 
ever, between  now  and  then ; we  know  the  mis- 
chiefs that  come  from  the  power  of  official  re- 
moval, which  were  then  only  dimly  apprehended. 
The  power  of  removal  from  office  belonged,  Mr. 
Madison  believed,  rightfully  to  the  Chief  Magis- 
trate, and  if,  by  some  unhappy  chance  the  wrong 
man  should  find  his  way  to  that  position  and  abuse 
the  power  intrusted  to  him,  “the  wanton  removal 
of  meritorious  officers  would,”  he  said,  “ subject 
the  President  to  impeachment  and  removal  from 
his  own  high  trust.” 

Lofty  political  principles  like  these  may  still  be 
found  in  the  platforms  of  modern  political  par- 
ties,  — 

“ The  souls  of  them  fumed-forth,  the  hearts  of  them  torn-out.” 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


145 


But  Mr.  Madison  believed,  at  least,  that  he  be- 
lieved in  them.  There  is  in  politics  as  in  religion 
an  accepted  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith  ; and 
this,  perhaps,  sustained  him  when,  twelve  years 
later,  as  Jefferson's  Secretary  of  State,  he  learned 
from  his  chief  that,  as  “ Federalists  seldom  died 
and  never  resigned,”  party  necessities  must  find  a 
way  of  supplementing  the  law  of  nature.  Jeffer- 
son was  a little  timid  in  applying  the  remedy,  but 
Madison  lived  long  enough  to  see  Jackson  boldly 
remove,  in  the  course  of  his  administration,  about 
two  thousand  office-holders,  whose  places  he  wanted 
as  rewards  for  his  own  political  followers.  From 
that  time  to  this  there  has  not  been  a President 
who  might  not,  if  Madison’s  doctrine  was  sound, 
have  been  impeached  for  a “ wanton  ” abuse  of 
power. 

Though  the  Constitution  had  been  adopted  by 
the  States,  it  was  not  without  objections  by  some 
of  them.  To  meet  these  objections  Mr.  Madison 
proposed  twelve  amendments  declaratory  of  cer- 
tain fundamental  popular  rights,  which,  it  was 
thought  by  many  persons,  were  not  sufficiently 
guarded  by  the  original  articles.  This,  also,  was 
left  to  him  to  do,  no  doubt  because  of  his  thor- 
ough knowledge  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the 
points  wherein  it  was  still  imperfect,  as  well  as 
those  wherein  it  had  better  not  be  meddled  with. 
The  amendments,  as  finally  agreed  to  after  long 
debate,  were  essentially  those  which  he  proposed, 
10 


146 


JAMES  MADISON. 


and  in  clue  time  ten  of  them  were  ratified  by  the 
States.  The  two  that  were  not  accepted  referred 
only  to  the  number  of  representatives  in  the 
House,  and  to  the  pay  of  members  of  Congress. 

It  was  hoped  that  the  selection  of  a place  for 
the  permanent  seat  of  government  would  be  made 
by  this  Congress.  There  was  much  talk  of  the 
centres  of  wealth,  of  territory,  and  of  population 
then,  and  of  where  such  centres  might  be  in  the 
future.  But  the  question  was  really  a sectional 
one.  The  Northern  members  were  accused  of 
having  made  a bargain  out  of  doors  with  the 
members  of  the  Middle  States.  The  bargain, 
however,  was  only  this  : that  inasmuch  as  it  was 
hopeless  that  the  actual  centre  should  be  chosen 
as  the  site  for  a capital  city,  a place  as  near  as 
possible  to  it  should  be  insisted  upon.  The 
South,  on  the  other  hand,  determined  that  the 
seat  of  government  should  be  within  the  boun- 
daries of  the  Southern  States.  That  was  a fore- 
gone conclusion  with  them,  that  needed  no  bargain. 
The  nearest  navigable  river  to  the  centre  of  pop- 
ulation was  the  Delaware ; but  the  jealousy  of 
New  York  stood  in  the  way  of  any  selection  that 
favored  Philadelphia.  The  Susquehanna  was  pro- 
posed. It  empties  into  Chesapeake  Bay.  North 
of  it  was,  as  Mr.  Sherman  showed,  a population 
of  1,400,000  ; and  south  of  it  1,200,000.  The 
South  wanted  the  capital  on  the  Potomac,  not  be- 
cause it  was  the  centre  of  population  then,  but 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


147 


because  it  might  be  at  some  future  time,  from  the 
growth  of  the  West.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
insisted  that  the  population  south  of  the  Potomac 
was  then  only  960,000,  while  north  of  it  there 
were  1,680,000  people,  and  that  it  was  no  more 
accessible  from  the  West  than  the  Susquehanna 
was.  To  many  members,  moreover,  this  talk 
of  the  great  future  of  the  West  seemed  hardly 
worthy  of  consideration.  It  was  “ an  unmeasur- 
able wilderness,”  and  “when  it  would  be  settled 
was  past  calculation,”  Fisher  Ames  said.  “ It 
was,”  he  added,  “ perfectly  romantic  to  make  this 
decision  depend  upon  that  circumstance.  Proba- 
bly it  will  be  near  a century  before  these  people 
will  be  considerable.”  He  was  nearer  right  when 
he  said  in  the  same  speech  “that  trade  and  manu- 
factures will  accumulate  people  in  the  Eastern 
States  in  proportion  of  five  to  three,  compared 
with  the  Southern.  The  disproportion  will,  doubt- 
less, continue  to  be  much  greater  than  I have  cal- 
culated. It  is  actually  greater  at  present,  for  the 
climate  and  negro  slavery  are  acknowledged  to  be 
unfavorable  to  population,  so  that  husbandry  as 
well  as  commerce  and  manufactures  will  give  more 
people  in  the  Eastern  than  in  the  Southern  States.” 
It  was,  however,  finally  resolved  by  the  House 
“ that  the  permanent  seat  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  ought  to  be  at  some  convenient 
place  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Susquehanna  in 
the  State  of  Pennsylvania;”  and  a bill  accordingly 
was  sent  to  the  Senate, 


148 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Had  the  Senate  agreed  to  this  bill,  there  are 
some  luminous  pages  of  American  history  that 
would  never  have  been  written  ; for  the  progress 
of  events  would  have  taken  quite  another  direc- 
tion had  the  influences  surrounding  the  national 
capital  for  the  first  half  of  this  century  been 
Northern  instead  of  Southern.  But  the  Senate 
did  not  agree.  For  “ the  convenient  place  on  the 
banks  of  the  Susquehanna”  it  substituted  ten 
miles  square  on  the  river  Delaware,  beginning 
one  mile  from  Philadelphia  and  including  the  vil- 
lage of  Germantown.  To  this  amendment  the 
House  agreed,  and  there,  but  for  Madison,  the 
matter  would  have  ended.  He  had  labored  earn- 
estly for  the  site  on  the  Potomac  ; but  failing  in 
that,  he  hoped  to  postpone  the  question  till  the 
next  session  of  Congress,  when  the  representatives 
from  North  Carolina  would  be  present.  He  moved 
a proviso  that  the  laws  of  Pennsylvania  should 
remain  in  force  within  the  district  ceded  by  the 
State  till  Congress  should  otherwise  provide  by 
law.  It  seems  to  have  been  accepted  without  con- 
sideration, a single  member  only  saying  that  he 
saw  no  necessity  for  it.  At  any  rate,  whether 
that  was  Mr.  Madison’s  motive  or  not,  time  was 
gained,  for  it  compelled  the  return  of  the  bill  to 
the  Senate.  This  was  on  September  28,  and  the 
next  day  the  session  was  closed  by  adjournment 
till  the  following  January. 

When  in  that  next  session  the  bill  came  back 


THE  FIRST  CONGRESS. 


149 


from  the  Senate  to  the  House,  a member  from 
South  Carolina  said,  in  the  course  of  debate,  that 
“a  Quaker  State  was  a bad  neighborhood  for  the 
South  Carolinians.”  The  Senate  had  also  come 
to  that  conclusion,  for  the  bill  now  proposed  that 
the  capital  should  be  at  Philadelphia  for  ten 
years  only,  and  should  then  be  removed  to  the 
banks  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  done,  Madison 
wrote  to  Monroe,  by  a single  vote,  for  two  South- 
ern senators  voted  against  it.  But  the  two  sena- 
tors from  North  Carolina  were  now  present,  and 
the  majority  of  one  was  made  sure  of  somehow. 

So  much  was  gained  by  gaining  time,  and  Mad- 
ison thought  the  passage  of  the  bill  through  the 
House  was  possible,  “ but  attended  with  great 
difficulties.”  Did  he  know  how  these  difficulties 
were  to  be  overcome?  “If  the  Potomac  suc- 
ceeds,” he  adds,  “ it  will  have  resulted  from  a for- 
tuitous coincidence  of  circumstances  which  might 
never  happen  again.”  What  the  “fortuitous  co- 
incidence ” was  he  does  not  explain  ; but  the  term 
was  a felicitous  euphuism  to  cover  up  what  in  the 
blunter  political  language  of  our  time  is  called 
“ log-rolling.” 

The  reader  of  this  series  of  biographies  is  al- 
ready familiar  with  Hamilton’s  skillful  barter  of 
votes  for  the  Potomac  site  of  the  capital  in  ex- 
change for  votes  in  favor  of  his  scheme  for  the  as- 
sumption of  the  state  debts.  Madison  seems  not 
to  have  been  ignorant  of  the  progress  of  that  bar- 


150 


JAMES  MADISON. 


gain,  with  which  Jefferson  was  afterward  so  anx- 
ious to  prove  that  he  had  nothing  to  do.  Madison 
earnestly  opposed  the  assumption  of  the  state  debts 
from  first  to  last ; but,  when  he  saw  that  the  meas- 
ure was  sure  to  pass  the  House,  he  wrote  to  Mon- 
roe : “ I cannot  deny  that  the  crisis  demands  a 
spirit  of  accommodation  to  a certain  extent.  If 
the  measure  should  be  adopted,  I shall  wish  it  to 
be  considered  as  an  unavoidable  evil,  and  possibly 
not  the  worst  side  of  the  dilemma.”  In  other 
words,  he  was  willing  to  assent  silently  to  what 
he  believed  to  be  a great  injustice  to  several  of 
the  States,  provided  that  the  bargain  should  be  a 
gain  to  his  own  State.  If  Hamilton  and  Jeffer- 
son were  sinners  in  this  business,  Madison  will 
hardly  pass  for  a saint. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLAVERY. 

Hamilton’s  famous  report  to  the  First  Con- 
gress, as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  made  at 
the  second  session  in  January,  1790.  Near  the 
close  of  the  previous  session  a petition  asking  for 
seme  settlement  of  the  public  debt  was  received 
and  referred  to  a committee  of  which  Madison 
was  chairman.  The  committee  reported  in  favor 
of  the  petition,  and  the  House  accordingly  called 
upon  the  Secretary  to  prepare  a plan  “for  the 
support  of  the  public  credit.” 

So  far  as  Hamilton’s  funding  scheme  provided 
for  that  portion  of  the  debt  due  to  foreigners  it 
was  accepted  without  demur.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  that  there  the  ostensible  creditor  was  the 
real  creditor,  who  should  be  paid  in  full.  The  re- 
port assumed  that  this  was  equally  true  of  the 
domestic  debt.  A citizen  holding  a certificate  of 
the  indebtedness  of  the  government,  no  matter 
how  he  came  by  it,  nor  at  what  price,  was  entitled 
to  payment  at  its  face  value.  But  here  the  ques- 
tion was  raised,  Was  this  ostensible  creditor  the 
sole  creditor?  Was  he,  whose  necessities  had 


152 


JAMES  MADISON. 


compelled  him  to  part  with  the  government's 
note  of  hand  at  a large  discount  when  full  pay- 
ment was  impossible,  to  receive  nothing  now  when 
at  last  government  was  able  to  pay  in  full  ? Was 
it  equity  to  let  all  the  loss  fall  upon  the  original 
creditor,  and  all  the  gain  go  to  him  who  had  lost 
nothing  originally,  and  had  only  assumed  at  small 
cost  the  risk  of  a profitable  speculation?  More- 
over it  was  charged,  and  not  denied,  that  in  some 
of  these  speculations  there  had  been  no  risk  what- 
ever ; and  that  so  soon  as  the  tenor  of  the  report 
was  known  fast-sailing  vessels  were  dispatched 
from  New  York  to  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia  to 
buy  up  public  securities  held  by  persons  ignorant 
of  their  recent  rapid  rise  in  value.  As  hitherto 
they  had  been  worth  only  about  fifteen  cents  on 
the  dollar  ; as  upon  the  publication  of  the  Secre- 
tary’s report  they  had  risen  to  fifty  cents  on  the 
dollar ; and  as,  if  the  Secretary’s  advice  should  be 
taken,  they  would  rise  to  a hundred  cents  on  the 
dollar ; it  would  be  securing,  what  in  the  slang  of 
the  modern  stock -exchange  is  called  “a  good 
thing,”  to  send  agents  into  the  rural  districts  in 
advance  of  the  news  to  buy  up  government  paper. 
“ My  soul  rises  indignant,”  exclaimed  a member, 
“ at  the  avaricious  and  moral  turpitude  which  so 
vile  a conduct  displays.”  Nor  on  that  point  did 
anybody  venture  then  to  disagree  with  him 
openly. 

But  besides  the  question  as  to  who  were  in  real- 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.— SLAVERY.  153 

ity  the  public  creditors,  a doubt  was  also  raised 
whether  the  debt  ought  to  be  paid  in  full  to  any- 
body. Every  dollar  of  the  foreign  debt  was  for 
an  actual  dollar  borrowed.  But  the  domestic  debt 
was  not  incurred  to  any  large  amount  for  money 
borrowed,  but  in  payment  for  services,  or  for  pro- 
visions and  goods  purchased,  for  which  double,  or 
moi'e  than  double,  prices  had  been  exacted  by 
those  who  exchanged  them  for  government  paper. 
If  the  exigencies  of  war  had  compelled  the  govern- 
ment to  promise  to  pay  for  fifty  bushels  of  wheat 
the  price  of  a hundred  bushels,  the  creditor,  now 
that  the  government  was  in  a condition  to  redeem 
its  promise,  was  not  entitled  in  equity  to  receive 
more  than  the  actual  value  of  the  fifty  bushels  at 
the  time  of  the  purchase.  Moreover,  it  was  con- 
tended, there  was  no  injustice  in  such  a settle- 
ment of  the  debt,  for  the  war  had  been  carried 
on  and  brought  to  a successful  end,  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  creditor  as  well  as  of  everybody  else. 
The  argument  was  analogous  in  a measure  to  that 
used  by  a certain  class  of  politicians  in  our  time, 
who  maintained  that  the  bonds  of  the  United 
States,  bought  at  a discount  for  “greenbacks,” 
during  the  late  rebellion,  should  not  be  redeemed 
in  gold  when  the  war  was  over. 

The  answer  to  all  this  was  obvious.  The  na- 
tion must  first  be  just  by  paying  its  debts  to  those 
who  could  present  the  evidence  that  they  were  its 
creditors.  If,  when  that  was  done,  it  could  afford 


154 


JAMES  MADISON. 


to  be  generous,  it  might,  if  so  disposed,  reimburse 
those  who  had  lost  by  parting  with  the  certificates 
of  debt  at  a discount.  The  government  could  not 
in  honor  go  behind  its  own  contracts.  The  Con- 
stitution provided  that  “ all  debts  and  engage- 
ments, entered  into  before  the  adoption  of  this 
Constitution,  shall  be  as  valid  against  the  United 
States  under  this  Constitution  as  under  the  Con- 
federation.” Here  was  a debt  which  the  Confed- 
eration had  contracted,  and  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment had  no  more  right  “ to  impair  the  obligation 
of  contracts  ” for  its  own  benefit,  than  the  sepa- 
rate States  had ; and  that  they  were  expressly 
forbidden  by  the  Constitution  to  do. 

Madison  listened  quietly  day  after  day  to  the 
long  and  earnest  debates  upon  the  subject,  and 
then  advanced  an  entirely  new  proposition.  He 
agreed  with  one  party  in  maintaining  the  inviola- 
bility of  contracts.  The  Confederacy  had  incurred 
a debt  to  its  own  citizens,  which  the  new  govern- 
ment had  agreed  to  assume.  But  he  also  agreed 
with  the  other  party  that  there  was  a question  as 
to  whom  that  debt  was  due.  W ere  those  who  now 
held  the  certificates  entitled  to  the  payment  of 
their  face  value,  dollar  for  dollar,  although  the 
cost  to  them  was  only  somewhere  from  fifteen  to 
fifty  cents  on  the  dollar?  It  was  true  that  the 
original  contract  was  transferable,  and  these 
present  creditors  held  the  evidence  of  the  trans- 
fer. But  did  that  transfer  entitle  the  holder  to 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLA  VERY.  155 

the  full  value  without  regard  to  the  price  paid  for 
it?  Was  there  not  in  equity  a reserved  right  in 
the  original  holder,  who,  having  given  a full 
equivalent  for  the  debt,  had  only  parted  with  the 
evidences  of  it,  under  the  compulsion  of  his  own 
poverty,  and  the  inability  of  the  government  at 
that  time  to  meet  its  obligations?  Was  not  this 
specially  true  in  the  case  of  the  soldiers  of  the 
late  war,  to  whose  devotion  and  sacrifices  the  na- 
tion owed  its  existence  ? 

Mr.  Madison  thought  that  an  affirmative  reply 
to  the  last  two  queries  would  present  the  true  view 
of  the  case,  and  he  proposed,  therefore,  to  pay  both 
classes  of  creditors  — those  who  now  held  the  evi- 
dence of  indebtedness,  acquired  by  purchase  at 
no  matter  what  price ; and  those  who  had  parted 
with  that  evidence  without  receiving  the  amount 
which  the  government  had  promised  to  pay  for 
services  rendered.  It  was  not,  however,  to  be  ex- 
pected that  the  entire  debt  should  be  paid  in  full 
to  both  classes.  That  was  beyond  the  ability  of 
the  government.  But  it  would  be  an  equitable 
settlement,  he  contended,  to  pay  the  present  hold- 
ers the  highest  price  the  certificates  had  ever 
reached,  and  to  award  the  remainder  to  those  who 
were  the  original  creditors. 

This  proposition  received  only  thirteen  votes  out 
of  forty-nine.  Many  of  those  opposed  to  it  were 
quite  ready  to  grant  that  it  was  hard  upon  the  vet- 
erans of  the  war  that  they,  who  had  received  so 


156 


JAMES  MADISON. 


little  and  who  had  borne  so  much,  should  not  now 
be  recognized  as  creditors  when  at  last  the  govern- 
ment was  able  to  pay  its  debts.  But  the  House 
could  not  indulge  in  sentimental  legislation.  That 
would  be  to  launch  the  ship  of  state  upon  another 
sea  of  bankruptcy.  There  were  in  the  hands  of 
the  people  tens  of  millions  of  paper  money  not 
worth  at  the  current  rate  a cent  on  the  dollar.  If 
everybody  who  had  lost  was  to  be  paid,  the  point 
would  soon  be  reached  where  nobody  would  be 
paid  at  all.  A limit  must  be  fixed  somewhere  ; 
let  it  be  at  these  certificates  of  debt  which  were 
the  evidence  of  a contract  made  between  the  gov- 
ernment and  its  creditors.  These  could  be  paid, 
and  they  should  be  paid  to  those  who  were  in  law- 
ful possession  of  them.  The  law,  if  not  the  equity, 
of  the  case  was  clearly  against  Madison.  That 
the  government  should  be  absolutely  just  to 
everybody  who  had  ever  trusted  to  it,  and  lost  by 
it,  was  impossible.  It  was  a bankrupt  compelled 
to  name  its  preferred  creditors,  and  it  named  those 
whom  it  was  in  honor  and  law  bound  to  take  care 
of,  and  over  whose  claims  there  was,  on  the  whole, 
the  least  shadow  of  doubt.  That  the  loss  should 
remain  chiefly  with  the  soldiers  of  the  Revolution, 
and  the  gain  fall  chiefly  to  those  who  were  shrewd 
enough,  or  had  the  means  to  speculate  in  the  pub- 
lic funds,  was  a lamentable  fact ; but  to  discrim- 
inate between  them  was  not  within  the  right  of 
the  government.  That  he  would  have  had  it  dis- 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLAVERY.  157 

criminate  was  creditable  to  Madison’s  heart ; it 
was  rather  less  creditable  to  his  head. 

Of  course,  underneath  all  this  debate  there  lay 
other  considerations  than  those  merely  of  debtor 
and  creditor,  of  moral  and  legal  obligation,  of  pity 
for  the  soldiers,  and  of  strict  regard  for  the  letter 
of  a contract.  Mr.  Hamilton  and  his  friends, 
it  was  said,  were  anxious  to  establish  the  public 
credit,  not  so  much  because  they  wished  to  keep 
faith  with  creditors,  as  because  they  wished  to 
strengthen  the  government  and  build  up  their 
own  party.  The  reply  to  these  accusations  was, 
that  the  other  side,  under  pretense  of  considei’ation 
for  the  soldiers  and  others  on  whom  the  burden  of 
the  war  had  borne  most  heavity,  concealed  hostil- 
ity to  the  Constitution  and  a consolidated  govern- 
ment. These  were  not  reflections  to  be  spoken  of 
in  debate,  but  they  were  not  the  less  cherished, 
and  gave  to  it  piquancy  and  spirit.  There  was 
truth  on  both  sides,  without  doubt. 

Though  defeated  in  this  measure  Madison  was 
not  less  determined  in  his  opposition  to  the  as- 
sumption of  the  debts  of  the  States.  Of  these 
debts  some  States  had  discharged  more  than 
others  ; and  he  complained,  not  without  reason,  of 
the  injustice  of  compelling  those  which  had  borne 
their  own  burdens  unaided  to  share  in  the  obliga- 
tions which  others  had  neglected.  He  was  un- 
fortunate, however,  in  assuming  a superiority  for 
Virginia  over  some  of  the  Eastern  States,  and 


158 


JAMES  MADISON. 


especially  over  Massachusetts,  in  services  rendered 
in  the  struggle  for  independence.  The  compai'i- 
son  provoked  a call  for  official  inquiry ; and  that 
proved  that  Massachusetts  alone  had  sent  more 
men  into  the  field  during  the  war  than  all  the 
Southern  States  together.  It  was  not  much  to  be 
wondered  at,  when  this  fact  was  considered,  that 
the  debt  of  Massachusetts  should  be  larger  than 
that  of  Virginia  by  $800,000.  The  difference  be- 
tween Virginia  and  South  Carolina  was  the  same, 
the  truth  being  that  the  war  had  cost  Massachu- 
setts more  money  to  pay  her  soldiers  for  the  gen- 
eral service,  and  South  Carolina  more  to  repel  the 
enemy  upon  her  own  soil,  than  it  had  cost  Virginia 
for  either  purpose.  Massachusetts  and  South  Car- 
olina were  again  found  acting  together,  simply  be- 
cause each  of  them  had  a debt  — $4,000,000  — 
larger  than  that  of  any  other  State.  The  total 
debt  of  all  the  States  was  about  $21,000,000  ; and 
as  that  of  North  Carolina,  Pennsylvania,  or  Con- 
necticut, when  added  to  the  $8,000,000  of  Mas- 
sachusetts and  South  Carolina,  amounted  to  half, 
or  more,  of  the  whole  sum,  there  was  no  difficulty 
in  forming  a strong  combination  in  favor  of  as- 
sumption. No  combination,  however,  was  strong 
enough  to  carry  the  measure  on  its  own  merits, 
notwithstanding  its  advocates  attempted  to  defeat 
the  funding  of  the  domestic  debt  of  the  Federal 
Union  unless  the  debts  of  the  several  States  were 
assumed  at  the  same  time. 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLAVERY.  159 

The  domestic  debt,  however,  was  at  length  pro- 
vided for,  and  the  assumption  of  the  debts  of  the 
States  was  rejected  till  that  bargain,  referred  to 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  which  gave  to  the  South- 
ern States  the  permanent  seat  of  government,  was 
concluded.  It  would  not  have  been  difficult,  prob- 
ably, to  defeat  that  piece  of  political  jobbery  by 
a public  exposure  of  its  terms.  Why  Madison 
did  not  resort  to  it,  if,  as  seems  certain,  he  knew 
that  such  a bargain  had  been  privately  made,  can 
only  be  conjectured.  Perhaps  he  saw  that  Ham- 
ilton, who  was  applauded  by  his  friends  and  de- 
nounced by  his  enemies  for  his  clever  manage- 
ment, had,  after  all,  only  made  a temporary  gain  ; 
and  that  Jefferson,  whose  defense  was  that  Ham- 
ilton had  taken  advantage  of  his  ignorance  and 
innocence,  would  not,  had  he  not  been  short- 
sighted, have  made  any  defense  at  all.  For  the 
assumption  of  the  state  debts  by  the  general  gov- 
ernment was  only  a distribution  of  a single  local 
burden  ; and  this  was  a small  price  for  Virginia 
and  the  other  Southern  States  to  pay  for  the  per- 
manent possession  of  the  federal  capital. 

While  these  questions  were  pending  another  was 
thrown  into  the  House,  which  was  not  disposed 
of  for  nearly  two  months.  The  debates  upon  it, 
Madison  said  in  one  of  his  letters,  “ were  shame- 
fully indecent,”  though  he  thought  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  subject  into  Congress  injudicious.  The 
Yearly  Meeting  of  Friends  in  New  York  and  in 


160 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Pennsylvania  sent  a memorial  against  the  com 
tinned  toleration  of  the  slave-trade;  and  this  was 
followed  the  next  day  by  a petition  from  the  Penn- 
sylvania Society  for  the  Promotion  of  the  Aboli- 
tion of  Slavery,  signed  by  Benjamin  Franklin  as 
president,  asking  for  a more  radical  measure. 

“ They  earnestly  entreat,”  they  said,  “ your  serious 
attention  to  the  subject  of  slavery  ; that  you  will  be 
pleased  to  countenance  the  restoration  of  liberty  to  these 
unhappy  men,  who  alone  in  this  land  of  freedom  are  de- 
graded into  perpetual  bondage,  and  who,  amidst  the  gen- 
eral joy  of  surrounding  freemen,  are  groaning  in  servile 
subjection  ; that  you  will  devise  means  for  removing 
this  inconsistencj"  from  the  character  of  the  American 
people  ; that  you  will  promote  mercy  and  justice  to- 
wards this  distressed  race  ; and  that  you  will  step  to  the 
very  verge  of  the  power  vested  in  you  for  discouraging 
every  species  of  traffic  in  the  persons  of  our  fellow-men.” 

The  words  were  probably  Franklin’s  own,  and 
as  he  died  a few  weeks  after  they  were  written, 
they  may  be  considered  as  his  dying  words  to  his 
countrymen,  — counsel  wise  and  merciful  as  his 
always  was. 

A memorable  debate  followed  the  presentation 
of  these  memorials.  Even  in  the  imperfect  re- 
port of  it  that  has  come  down  to  us,  the  “ shame- 
ful indecency  ” of  which  Madison  speaks  is  visible 
enough.  Franklin,  venerable  in  years,  exalted 
in  character,  and  eminent  above  almost  all  the 
men  of  the  time  for  services  to  his  country,  was 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLAVERY.  161 

sneered  at  for  senility  and  denounced  as  disre- 
garding the  obligations  of  the  Constitution.  But 
the  wrath  of  the  pro-slavery  extremists  was  spe- 
cially aroused  against  the  Society  of  Friends,  and 
was  unrestrained  by  any  considerations  of  either 
decency  or  truth.  In  this  respect  the  debate  was 
the  precursor  of  every  contest  in  Congress  upon 
the  subject  that  was  to  follow  for  the  coming 
seventy  years.  The  Quakers  were  the  represen- 
tative abolitionists  of  that  day,  and  the  measure 
of  bitter  and  angry  denunciation  that  was  meted 
out  to  them  was  the  same  measure  which,  heaped 
up  and  overflowing,  was  poured  out  upon  those 
who,  in  later  times,  took  upon  themselves  the  bur- 
den of  the  cause  of  the  slave.  The  line  of  argu- 
ment, the  appeals  to  prejudice,  the  disregard  of 
facts  and  the  false  conclusions,  the  misrepresenta- 
tion of  past  history  and  the  misapprehension  of 
the  future,  the  contempt  of  reason,  of  common 
sense,  and  common  humanity,  then  laboriously  and 
unscrupulously  arrayed  in  defense  of  slavery,  left 
nothing  for  the  exercise  of  the  ingenuity  of  mod- 
ern orators.  A single  difference  only  between 
the  earlier  and  the  later  time  is  conspicuous  ; the 
“ plantation  manners,”  as  they  were  called  five 
and  twenty  years  ago,  which  the  Wises,  the 
Brookses,  the  Barksdales,  and  the  Priors  of  the 
modern  South  relied  upon  as  potent  weapons  of 
defense  and  assault,  were  unknown  in  the  earlier 
Congresses. 


n 


162 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Mr.  Madison  and  some  other  members  from  the 
South,  particularly  those  from  Virginia,  opposed 
the  majority  of  their  colleagues,  who  were  unwill- 
ing that  these  memorials  should  be  referred  to  a 
committee.  “ The  true  policy  of  the  Southern 
members,”  Madison  wrote  to  a friend,  “ was  to 
have  let  the  affair  proceed  with  as  little  noise  as 
possible,  and  to  have  made  use  of  the  occasion  to 
obtain,  along  with  an  assertion  of  the  powers  of 
Congress,  a recognition  of  the  restraints  imposed 
by  the  Constitution.”  This  in  effect  was  done  in 
the  end,  but  not  till  near  two  months  had  passed, 
within  which  time  the  more  violent  of  the  South- 
ern members  had  ample  opportunity  to  free  their 
minds  and  exhaust  the  subject.  The  more  these 
people  talked  the  worse  it  was,  of  course,  for  their 
cause.  Had  Madison’s  moderate  advice  been  ac- 
cepted then,  and  had  that  example  been  followed 
for  the  next  sixty  or  seventy  years,  it  is  quite 
likely  that  the  colored  race  would  still  be  in  bond- 
age in  at  least  one  half  of  the  States.  But  there 
was  never  a more  notable  example  of  manifest 
destiny  than  the  gradual  but  certain  progress  of 
the  opposition  to  slavery ; for  there  never  was  a 
system,  any  attempt  to  defend  which  showed  how 
utterly  indefensible  such  a system  must  needs  be. 
Every  argument  advanced  in  its  favor  was  so 
manifestly  absurd,  or  so  shocking  to  the  ordinary 
sense  of  mankind,  that  the  more  it  was  discussed 
the  more  widespread  and  earnest  became  the  op 


NA  TIONAL  FINANCES.  — S LA  VER  Y. 


163 


position.  Had  the  slave-holders  been  wise  they 
would  never  have  opened  their  mouths  upon  the 
subject.  But  like  the  man  possessed  of  the  devil, 
they  never  ceased  to  cry,  “ Let  me  alone  ! ” And 
the  more  they  cried  the  more  there  were  who  un- 
derstood where  that  cry  came  from. 

In  one  respect  Mr.  Madison  declared  that  the 
memorial  of  the  Friends  demanded  attention.  If 
the  American  flag  was  used  to  protect  foreigners 
in  carrying  on  the  slave-trade  in  other  countries, 
that  was  a proper  subject  for  the  consideration  of 
Congress.  “ If  this  is  the  case,”  he  said,  “ is 
there  any  person  of  humanity  that  would  not 
wish  to  prevent  them  ? ” 1 But  he  recognized  the 
limitations  of  the  Constitution  in  relation  to  the 
importation  of  slaves  into  the  United  States,  and 
the  want  of  any  authority  in  the  letter  of  the 
Constitution,  or  of  any  wish  on  the  part  of  Con- 
gress, to  interfere  with  slavery  in  the  States.  On 
these  points  he  would  have  a decisive  declaration, 
without  agitation,  and  with  as  little  discussion  as 

1 The  most  serious  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  final  suppres- 
sion of  the  African  slave-trade  in  the  present  century  was,  that 
it  could  be  carried  on  without  molestation  in  American  bottoms, 
under  the  American  flag.  The  ruling  power  in  the  United  States, 
from  1787  to  1860,  was  never  willing  that  their  own  cruisers 
should  meddle  with  the  slavers,  and  resented  as  an  insult  to  the 
flag  the  search,  by  the  cruisers  of  other  powers,  of  any  vessel 
under  the  American  flag,  though  if  might  be  absolutely  certain 
that  she  had  come  straight  from  the  coast  of  Africa,  and  that  her 
“ between-decks  ” was  crowded  full  of  negroes  to  be  sold  as  slaves 
in  Cuba. 


164 


JAMES  MADISON. 


possible,  and  there  would  have  dropped  the  sub- 
ject. It  only  needed,  he  evidently  thought,  that 
everybody,  North  and  South,  should  understand 
the  Constitution  to  be  a mutual  agreement  to  let 
slavery  altogether  alone,  when  the  bargain  would 
be  on  both  sides  faithfully  adhered  to. 

This  was  all  very  well  with  the  numerous  per- 
sons who  were  quite  indifferent  to  the  subject,  or 
who  thought  it  very  unreasonable  in  the  blacks 
not  to  be  quite  willing  to  remain  slaves  a few 
hundred  years  longer.  But  there  were  two  other 
classes  to  reckon  with,  and  Mr.  Madison  was  not 
much  inclined  to  be  patient  with  either  of  them. 
To  let  the  subject  alone  was  precisely  what  the 
hot-headed  members  from  the  South  were  incapa- 
ble of  doing  then,  as  they  proved  to  be  incapable 
of  doing  for  the  next  seventy  years.  On  the 
other  hand,  all  the  petitioners  could  really  hope 
for  was  that  there  should  be  discussion.  The  gal- 
leries were  crowded  at  those  earliest  debates,  as 
they  continued  to  be  crowded  on  all  such  occa- 
sions in  subsequent  years.  Many  went  to  learn 
what  could  be  said  on  behalf  of  slavery,  who 
came  away  convinced  that  the  least  said  the  bet- 
ter. Agitation  might  disturb  the  harmony  of  the 
Union,  which  was  Madison’s  dread ; it  might  lead 
to  the  death  of  an  abolitionist,  as  it  sometimes  did 
in  later  times ; but  it  was  sure  in  the  end  to  be 
the  death  of  slavery,  though  its  short-sighted  de- 
fenders could  never  understand  why.  They  could 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLA VER Y.  165 

never  be  made  to  see  that  its  most  dangerous  foes 
were  the  friends  of  its  own  household,  who  could 
not  hold  their  tongues  ; that  for  their  case  all 
wisdom  was  epitomized  in  the  vulgar  caution  u to 
lie  low  and  keep  dark  ; ” that  the  exposure  of  the 
true  character  of  slavery  must  needs  be  its  de- 
struction, and  that  nothing  so  exposed  it  as  any 
attempt  to  defend  it.  Slavery  was  quite  safe 
under  the  Constitution,  as  Mr.  Madison  intimated, 
if  its  friends  would  only  leave  it  there  and  claim 
no  other  protection. 

Advocates  are  never  wanting  in  any  court  who 
believe  that  the  most  effective  line  of  defense  is  to 
abuse  the  plaintiff.  The  Quakers,  it  was  said, 
“ notwithstanding  their  outward  pretenses,”  had 
no  “ more  virtue  or  religion  than  other  people, 
nor  perhaps  so  much.”  They  had  not  made  the 
Constitution,  nor  risked  their  lives  and  fortunes 
by  fighting  for  their  country.  Why  should  they 
“ set  themselves  up  in  such  a particular  manner 
against  slavery  ? ” Did  they  not  know  that  the 
Bible,  not  only  allowed  but  commended  it,  “ from 
Genesis  to  Revelation  ” ? That  the  Saviour  had 
permitted  it?  That  the  Apostles,  in  spreading 
Christianity,  had  never  preached  against  it  ? That 
it  had  been — the  illustration  was  not  altogether  a 
happy  one  — “ no  novel  doctrine  since  the  days  of 
Cain  ? ” The  condition  of  these  American  slaves 
was  said  to  be  one  of  great  happiness  and  com- 
fort ; yet  almost  in  the  same  breath  it  was  asserted 


166 


JAMES  MADISON. 


that  to  excite  in  their  minds  any  hope  of  change 
would  lead  to  the  most  disastrous  consequences, 
and  possibly  to  massacre.  The  memorialists  were 
bidden  to  remember  that,  even  if  slavery  “ were 
an  evil,  it  was  one  for  which  there  was  no  rem- 
edy ; ” for  that  reason  the  North  had  acquiesced 
in  it ; “a  compromise  was  made  on  both  sides  — 
we  took  each  other  with  our  mutual  bad  habits 
and  respective  evils,  for  better,  for  worse ; the 
Northern  States  adopted  us  with  our  slaves,  and 
we  adopted  them  with  their  Quakers.”  With- 
out such  a compromise  there  could  have  been  no 
Union,  and  any  interference  now  with  slavery  by 
the  government  would  end  in  a civil  war.  These 
people  were  meddling  with  what  was  none  of  their 
business,  and  exciting  the  slaves  to  insurrection. 
Yet  how  forbearing  were  the  people  of  the  South- 
ern States  who,  notwithstanding  all  this,  “ had 
not  required  the  assistance  of  Congress  to  exter- 
minate the  Quakers ! ” 

This  was  not  conciliatory.  Those  who  had  been 
disposed  at  the  beginning  to  meet  the  petitions 
with  a quiet  reply  that  the  subject  was  out  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  Congress,  were  now  provoked 
to  give  them  a much  warmer  reception.  They 
could  not  listen  patiently  to  the  abuse  of  the 
Quakers,  and,  though  they  might  acquiesce  in 
the  toleration  of  slavery,  they  were  not  inclined 
to  have  it  crammed  down  their  throats  as  a wise, 
beneficent,  and  consistent  condition  of  society 


NATIONAL  FINANCES.— SLAVERY.  167 

tinder  a republican  government.  Even  Madison, 
who  at  first  was  most  anxious  that  nothing  should 
be  said  or  done  to  arouse  agitation,  while  acknowl- 
edging that  all  citizens  might  rightfully  appeal  to 
Congress  for  a redress  of  what  they  considered 
grievances,  was  moved  at  last  to  say  that  the  me- 
morial of  the  Friends  was  “ well  worthy  of  con- 
sideration.” While  admitting  that  under  the  Con- 
stitution the  slave-trade  could  not  be  prohibited 
for  twenty  years,  “ yet,”  he  declared,  “ there  are 
a variety  of  wrays  by  which  it  [Congress]  could 
countenance  the  abolition,  and  regulations  might 
be  made  in  relation  to  the  introduction  of  [slav- 
ery] into  the  new  States  to  be  formed  out  of  the 
western  territory.” 

Gerry  was  still  more  emphatic  in  the  assertion 
of  the  right  of  interference.  He  boldly  asserted 
that  “ flagrant  acts  of  cruelty  ” were  committed 
in  carrying  on  the  African  slave-trade ; and,  while 
nobody  proposed  to  violate  the  Constitution, 
“that  we  have  a right  to  regulate  this  business  is 
as  clear  as  that  we  have  any  right  whatever  ; nor 
has  the  contrary  been  shown  by  anybody  who  has 
spoken  on  the  occasion.”  Nor  did  he  stop  there. 
He  told  the  slave-holders  that  the  value  of  their 
slaves  in  money  was  only  about  ten  million  dol- 
lars, and  that  Congress  had  the  right  to  propose 
“ to  purchase  the  whole  of  them ; and  their  re- 
sources in  the  western  territory  might  furnish 
them  with  the  means.”  The  Southern  members 


168 


JAMES  MADISON. 


would,  perhaps,  have  been  startled  by  such  a 
proposition  as  this,  had  he  not  immediately  added 
that  “ he  did  not  intend  to  suggest  a measure  of 
this  kind ; he  only  instanced  these  particulars  to 
show  that  Congress  certainly  had  a right  to  inter- 
meddle in  the  “ business.”  It  is  quite  likely,  had 
he  pushed  such  a measure  with  his  well-known 
zeal  and  determination,  that  it  would  have  been 
at  least  received  with  a good  deal  of  favor  ; and, 
as  the  admirers  of  Jefferson  are  tenacious  of  his 
fame  as  the  author  of  the  original  Northwest  Or- 
dinance, so  Gerry,  had  he  seriously  and  earnestly 
urged  the  policy  of  using  the  proceeds  of  the  sales 
of  territorial  lands  to  remunerate  the  owners  of 
slaves  for  their  liberation,  would  have  left  behind 
him  a more  fragrant  memory  than  that  which 
clings  to  him  as  a minister  to  France,  and  as 
the  “ Gerrymandering  ” governor  of  Massachu- 
setts. The  debate,  however,  came  to  an  end  at 
last  with  no  other  result  than  that  which  would 
have  been  reached  at  the  beginning  without  de- 
bate, except,  perhaps,  that  the  vote  in  favor  of 
the  reports  upon  the  memorials  was  smaller  than 
it  might  have  been  had  there  been  no  discussion. 

Within  less  than  two  years,  however,  Warner 
Mifflin  of  Delaware,  an  eminent  member  of  the 
Society  of  Friends,  who  was  one  of  the  first,  if 
not  the  first,  of  that  society  to  manumit  his  own 
slaves,  petitioned  Congress  to  take  some  measure 
for  general  emancipation.  The  petition  was  en 


NA  TIONAL  FINANCES.  — SLA  VER  Y.  169 

tered  upon  the  journal ; but  on  a subsequent  day 
a North  Carolina  member,  Mr.  Steele,  said  that 
“after  what  had  passed  at  New  York  on  this  sub- 
ject, he  had  hoped  the  House  would  have  heard 
no  more  of  it ; ” and  he  moved  that  the  petition 
be  returned  to  Mifflin  and  be  expunged  from  the 
journal.  Fisher  Ames  explained  in  a rather  apol- 
ogetic tone  that  he  had  presented  the  petition  at 
Mr.  Mifflin’s  request,  because  the  member  from 
Delaware  was  absent,  and  because  he  believed  in 
the  right  of  petition,  though  “ he  considered  it  as 
totally  inexpedient  to  interfere  with  the  subject.” 
The  House  agreed  that  the  petition  should  be  re- 
turned, and  Steele  then  withdrew  the  motion  to 
expunge  it  from  the  journal. 

In  the  next  Congress,  eighteen  months  after- 
ward, the  House  took  up  the  subject  of  the  slave- 
trade,  apparently  of  its  own  motion,  and  a bill 
was  passed  prohibiting  the  carrying  on  of  that 
traffic  from  the  ports  of  the  United  States  in  for- 
eign vessels.  The  question  was  as  inexorable  as 
death,  and  the  difference  in  regard  to  it  then  was 
precisely  what  it  was  in  the  final  discussion  of  the 
next  century  which  settled  it  forever.  One  set  of 
men  was  given  over  to  perdition  if  they  dared  so 
much  as  talk  ; the  other  set  talked  all  the  more, 
and  went  to  the  vei'y  verge  of  the  Constitution  in 
act  all  the  more,  because  they  were  bidden  nei- 
ther to  speak  nor  to  move.  Courage  was  not 
one  of  Madison’s  marked  characteristics,  but  he 


170 


JAMES  MADISON. 


never  showed  more  of  it  than  in  his  hostility  to 
slavery. 

At  the  third  session  of  the  First  Congress, 
which  had  adjourned  from  New  York  to  Philadel- 
phia, where  it  met  in  December,  1790,  Madison  led 
his  party  in  opposition  to  the  establishment  of  a 
national  bank,  which  Hamilton  had  recommended ; 
and  again,  as  in  the  adjustment  of  the  domestic 
debt,  he  and  his  party  were  defeated.  He  com- 
pared the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of 
banks,  and  possibly  he  did  not  satisfy  himself,  as 
he  certainly  did  not  the  other  side,  that  the  weight 
of  the  argument  was  against  their  utility.  At  any 
rate,  he  fell  back  upon  the  Constitution  as  his 
strongest  position.  To  incorporate  a bank  was 
not,  he  maintained,  among  the  powers  conferred 
upon  Congress.  The  Federalists,  who  were  be- 
ginning to  recognize  him  as  the  leader  of  the  op- 
position, were  quite  ready  to  accept  that  challenge. 
“Little  doubt  remains,”  said  Fisher  Ames,  in 
rising  to  reply,  “ with  respect  to  the  utility  of 
banks.”  Assuming  that  to  be  settled, — whether 
he  meant,  or  not,  that  such  was  the  conclusion  to 
be  drawn  from  Madison’s  argument  on  that  point, 
. — he  addressed  himself  to  the  constitutional  ques- 
tion. If  the  incorporation  of  a bank  was  forbid- 
den by  the  Constitution  there  was  an  end  of  the 
matter.  If  it  was  not  forbidden,  but  if  Congress 
may  exercise  powers  not  expressly  bestowed  upon 
it,  and  if  by  a bank  some  of  the  things  which  the 


N A T ION AL  FINANCES.  — SLA  VER 7.  171 

Federal  Government  bad  to  do  could  be  best  done, 
it  would  be  not  only  right  but  wise  to  establish 
such  an  agency.  This  was  the  burden  of  the  ar- 
gument of  the  Federalists,  and  Madison  and  his 
friends  had  no  sufficient  answer.  The  bill  was  at 
length  passed  by  a vote  of  thirty-nine  to  twenty. 

But  it  had  still  to  pass  the  ordeal  of  the  cabi- 
net. The  President  was  not  disposed  to  rely  upon 
his  own  judgment  either  one  way  or  the  other. 
He  asked,  therefore,  for  the  written  opinions  of 
the  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury  and  of  State,  Ham- 
ilton and  Jefferson,  and  the  Attorney  General, 
Randolph.  The  same  request  was  made  to  Madi- 
son, probably  more  because  Washington  held  his 
ability  and  knowledge  of  constitutional  law  in 
high  esteem,  than  because  of  the  prominent  part 
he  had  taken  in  the  debate.  Hamilton’s  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  the  bill  was  an  answer  to  the 
papers  of  the  three  other  gentlemen,  and  was  ac- 
cepted as  conclusive  by  the  President. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


FEDERALISTS  AKD  REPUBLICANS. 

Madison  was  a Federalist  until,  unfortunately, 
he  drifted  into  the  opposition.  He  was  swept 
away  partly,  perhaps,  by  the  influence  of  personal 
friends,  particularly  of  Jefferson,  and  partly  by  the 
influence  of  locality  — that  “ go-with-the-State  ” 
doctrine,  which  is  a harmless  kind  of  patriotism 
when  kept  within  proper  limits,  but  dangerous  in 
a mixed  government  like  ours  when  unrestrained. 
Had  he  been  born  in  a free  State  it  seems  more 
than  probable  that  he  would  never  have  been 
President ; but  it  is  quite  possible  that  his  place 
in  the  history  of  his  country  would  have  been 
higher.  The  better  part  of  his  life  was  before  he 
became  a party  leader.  As  his  career  is  followed 
the  presence  of  the  statesman  grows  gradually 
dimmer  in  the  shadow  of  the  successful  politician. 

In  the  course  of  the  three  sessions  of  the  First 
Congress  the  line  was  distinctly  drawn  between 
the  Federal  and  Republican  (or  Democratic)  par- 
ties. The  Federalists,  it  was  evident,  had  suc- 
ceeded in  firmly  uniting  thirteen  separate  States 
into  one  great  nation,  or  into  what,  in  due  time, 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  173 

was  sure  to  become  a great  nation.  It  was  no 
longer  a loose  assemblage  of  thirteen  independent 
bodies,  revolving,  indeed,  around  a central  power, 
but  with  a centrifugal  motion  that  might  at  any 
time  send  them  flying  off  into  space,  or  destroy 
them  by  collisions  at  various  tangents.  Those 
who  opposed  the  Federalists,  however,  had  no  fear 
of  a tendency  to  tangents ; the  danger  was,  as 
they  believed,  of  too  much  centripetal  force,  and 
that  the  circling  planets  might  fall  into  the  central 
sun  and  disappear  altogether.  Even  if  there  were 
no  flying  off  into  space,  and  no  falling  into  the 
sun,  they  had  no  faith  in  this  sort  of  political  as- 
tronomy. They  were  unwilling  to  float  in  fixed 
orbits  obedient  to  a supreme  law  other  than  their 
own. 

There  is  no  need  to  doubt  the  honesty  of  either 
party  then,  whatever  came  to  pass  in  later  years. 
Nor,  however,  is  there  any  more  doubt  now  which 
was  the  wiser.  Before  the  end  of  the  century  the 
administration  of  government  was  wrested  from 
the  hands  of  those  who  had  created  the  Union  ; 
and  within  fifteen  years  more  the  Federal  party, 
under  that  name,  had  disappeared.  It  would  not 
be  quite  just  to  say  that  they  were  opposed  for  no 
better  reason  than  because  they  were  in  power. 
But  it  is  quite  true  that  the  principles  and  the 
policy  of  the  Federalists  survived  the  party  organ- 
ization ,•  and  they  not  only  survived,  but,  so  far 
as  the  opposite  party  was  ever  of  service  to  the 


174 


JAMES  MADISON. 


country,  it  was  when  that  party  adopted  the  Fed- 
eral measures.  It  was  in  accordance  with  the 
early  principles  of  Federalism  that  the  Republic 
was  defended  and  saved  in  the  war  of  1860-65  ; 
as  it  was  the  principles  of  the  Democratic  state- 
rights  party,  administered  by  a slave-holding  oli- 
garchy, that  made  that  war  inevitable. 

Hamilton  said,  in  the  well-known  Carrington 
letter  in  the  spring  of  1792,  that  he  was  thor- 
oughly convinced  by  Madison’s  course  in  the  late 
Congress  that  he,  “ cooperating  with  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son, is  at  the  head  of  a faction  decidedly  hostile  to 
me  and  my  administration,  and  actuated  by  views, 
in  my  judgment,  subversive  of  the  principles  of 
good  government,  and  dangerous  to  the  union, 
peace,  and  happiness  of  the  country.”  At  first  he 
was  disposed  to  believe,  because  of  his  “ previous 
impressions  of  the  fairness  of  Mr.  Madison’s  char- 
acter,” that  there  was  nothing  personal  or  factious 
in  this  hostility.  But  he  soon  changed  his  mind. 
Up  to  the  time  of  the  meeting  of  the  First  Con- 
gress there  had  always  been  perfect  accord  be- 
tween them,  and  Hamilton  accepted  his  seat  in 
the  cabinet  “ under  the  full  persuasion,”  he  said, 
“ that  from  similarity  of  thinking,  conspiring  with 
personal  good-will,  I should  have  the  firm  support 
of  Mr.  Madison  in  the  general  course  of  my  ad- 
minstration.”  But  when  he  found  in  Madison  his 
most  determined  opponent,  either  open  or  covert, 
in  the  most  important  measures  he  urged  upon 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  175 

Congress,  — the  settlement  of  the  domestic  debt, 
the  assumption  of  the  debts  of  the  States,  and  the 
establishment  of  a national  bank,  — he  was  com- 
pelled to  seek  for  other  than  public  motives  for 
this  opposition.  “ It  had  been,”  he  declared, 
“ more  uniform  and  persevering  than  I have  been 
able  to  resolve  into  a sincere  difference  of  opinion. 
I cannot  persuade  myself  that  Mr.  Madison  and  I, 
whose  politics  had  formerly  so  much  the  same 
point  of  departure,  should  now  diverge  so  widely 
in  our  opinions  of  the  measures  which  are  proper 
to  be  pursued.” 

In  the  letter  from  which  these  extracts  are 
made  Jefferson  and  Madison  are  painted  as  almost 
equally  black,  though  the  color  was  laid  the 
thicker  on  Jefferson,  if  there  was  any  difference. 
Hamilton  seemed  to  think  that,  if  Jefferson  was 
the  more  malicious,  Madison  was  the  more  artful. 
He  is  accused  of  an  attempt  to  get  the  better  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  by  a trick  which 
was  dishonorable  in  itself,  and  at  the  same  time 
an  abuse  of  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by 
Washington.  Before  sending  in  his  message  at 
the  opening  of  the  Second  Congress  the  President 
submitted  it  to  Madison,  who,  Hamilton  declares, 
so  altered  it,  by  transposing  a passage  and  by  the 
addition  of  a few  words,  that  the  President  was 
made  to  seem,  unconsciously  to  himself,  to  ap- 
prove of  Jefferson’s  proposal  to  establish  the  same 
unit  for  coins  as  for  weights.  This  would  have 


176 


JAMES  MADISON. 


been  to  disapprove  of  the  proposal  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  that  the  dollar  should  re- 
main the  unit  of  coinage.  The  statement  rests 
on  Hamilton’s  assertion  ; and  as  he  had  forgotten 
the  words  which  made  the  change  he  complained 
of  ; and  as  the  message  was  restored  to  its  original 
form  by  the  President  when  its  possible  interpre- 
tation was  pointed  out  to  him,  it  is  impossible  now 
to  judge  whether  Madison  may  not  have  been 
quite  innocent  of  the  intention  imputed  to  him. 
It  is  plain  enough,  however,  that  Hamilton  was 
sore  and  disappointed  at  Madison’s  conduct,  and 
that  he  was  quick  to  seize  upon  any  incident  that 
justified  him  in  saying,  “ The  opinion  I once  en- 
tertained of  the  candor  and  simplicity  and  fair- 
ness of  Mr.  Madison’s  character  has,  I acknowl- 
edge, given  way  to  a decided  opinion  that  it  is  one 
of  a peculiarly  artificial  and  complicated  kind.” 
To  justify  this  opinion,  and  as  an  evidence  of  how 
bitter  Madison's  political  and  personal  enmity  to- 
ward him  had  become,  he  refers  in  the  same  let- 
ter to  Madison’s  relation  to  Freneau  and  his 
paper,  “The  National  Gazette.”  “As  the  coad- 
jutor of  Jefferson,”  he  wrote,  “in  the  establish- 
ment of  this  paper,  I include  Mr.  Madison  in  the 
consequences  imputable  to  it.” 

The  story  of  Freneau  need  not  be  repeated 
here  at  length,  having  been  already  told  in  an- 
other volume  of  this  series  of  biographies.  If 
there  were  anything  in  that  affair,  however,  for 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  177 

which  Jefferson  could  be  fairly  called  to  account, 
Madison  may  be  held  as  not  less  responsible. 
When  the  charge  was  made  that  he  had  a sinister 
motive  in  procuring  for  Freneau  a clerkship  in  the 
State  Department,  and  in  aiding  him  to  establish 
a newspaper,  Madison  frankly  related  the  facts  in 
a letter  to  Edmund  Randolph.  He  had  nothing 
to  deny  except  to  repel  with  some  indignation  the 
charge  that  he  had  helped  to  establish  the  jour- 
nal in  order  that  it  might  “ sap  the  Constitution,” 
or  that  there  was  the  slightest  expectation  or  in- 
tention on  his  part  of  any  relation  between  the 
State  Department  and  the  newspaper.  Freneau 
was  one  of  his  college  friends,  a deserving  man,  to 
whom  he  was  attached,  and  whom  he  was  glad  to 
help.  There  was  nothing  improper  in  commend- 
ing one  well  qualified  to  discharge  its  duties  for 
the  post  of  translator  in  a government  office,  and 
as  those  duties,  for  which  the  yearly  salary  was 
only  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  were  light, 
there  was  no  good  reason  why  the  clerk  should  not 
find  other  employment  for  leisure  hours. 

If  Mr.  Madison,  having  said  this,  had  stopped 
there,  his  critics  would  have  been  silenced.  But 
when  he  added  that  he  advised  his  friend  with 
another  motive  besides  that  of  helping  him  to 
start  a newspaper,  then,  as  the  expressive  modern 
phrase  is,  he  “ gave  himself  away.”  There  is  a 
feeling,  common  even  in  those  early  and  innocent 
days  when  such  things  were  rare,  that  the  editor, 
12 


178 


JAMES  MADISON. 


whose  daily  bi’ead,  whether  it  be  cake  or  crust, 
comes  from  the  bounty  of  the  man  in  office  or 
other  place  of  power  — that  an  editor  so  fed,  and 
perhaps  fattened,  is  only  a servant  bought  at  a 
price.  Madison  said  that  to  help  a needy  man 
whom  he  held  in  high  esteem  was  his  “ primary 
and  governing  motive.”  But  he  adds : “ That,  as  a 
consequential  one,  I entertained  hopes  that  a free 
paper  . . . would  be  an  antidote  to  the  doctrines 
and  discourses  circulated  in  favor  of  monarchy  and 
aristocracy;  would  be  an  acceptable  vehicle  of  pub- 
lic information  in  many  places  not  sufficiently 
supplied  with  it  — this  also  is  a certain  truth.” 
What  was  this  but  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
essential  truth  of  the  charge  brought  against  Jef- 
ferson and  himself  ? Not  that  he  might  not  de- 
voutly hope  for  an  antidote  to  the  poisonous 
doctrines  of  monarchy  and  aristocracy,  though  in 
very  truth  the  existence  of  any  such  poison  was 
only  one  of  the  maggots  which,  bred  in  the  muck 
of  party  strife,  had  found  a lodgment  in  his  brain ; 
not  that  it  was  not  a commendable  public  spirit  to 
wish  for  a good  newspaper  to  circulate  where  it 
was  most  needed  ; not  that  it  was  not  a most  excel- 
lent thing  in  him  to  hold  out  a helping  hand  to  the 
friend  who  had  been  less  fortunate  than  himself  ; 
but  that  in  helping  his  friend  to  a clerkship  in  a 
department  of  the  government,  his  motive  was  in 
part  that  the  possession  of  a public  office  would 
enable  the  man  to  establish  a party  organ.  That 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  179 

was  pi'ecisely  the  point  of  the  charge  which  he 
seems  to  have  failed  to  apprehend  — that  public 
patronage  was  used  at  his  suggestion  to  further 
party  ends. 

Freneau  had  intended  to  start  a newspaper 
somewhere  in  New  Jersey.  Whether  or  not  that 
known  intention  suggested  that  the  project  could 
be  better  carried  out  in  Philadelphia,  and  a clerk- 
ship in  the  State  Department  would  be  an  aid  to 
it,  the  change  of  plan  was  adopted  and  the  clerk- 
ship bestowed  upon  him.  The  paper  — the  first 
number  of  which  appeared  five  days  after  his  ap- 
pointment — was,  as  it  was  known  that  it  would 
be,  an  earnest  defender  of  Jefferson  and  liis  friends, 
and  a formidable  opponent  of  Hamilton  and  liis 
party.  The  logical  conclusion  was  that  the  man, 
being  put  in  place  for  a purpose,  was  diligent  in 
using  the  opportunities  the  place  afforded  him  to 
fulfill  the  hopes  of  those  to  whom  he  was  indebted. 
Madison  and  Jefferson  both  denied,  with  much 
heat  and  indignation,  that  they  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  editorial  conduct  of  the  paper.  No 
doubt  they  spoke  the  truth.  They  had  to  draw 
the  line  somewhere ; they  drew  it  there ; and  an 
exceedingly  sharp  and  fine  line  it  was.  For  it  is 
plain  that  Freneau  knew  very  well  what  he  was 
about  and  what  was  expected  of  him,  and  his 
powerful  friends  knew  very  well  that  he  knew  it. 
They  could  feel  in  him  the  most  implicit  con- 
fidence as  an  untamed  and  untamable  democi'at, 


180 


JAMES  MADISON. 


and  one,  perhaps,  whose  gratitude  would  be  kept 
alive  by  the  remembrance  of  poverty  and  the 
hope  of  future  favors.  There  was  clearly  no  need 
of  a board  of  directors  for  the  editorial  super- 
vision of  “ The  National  Gazette,”  and  it  was 
quite  safe  to  deny  that  any  existed.  The  fact, 
nevertheless,  remained,  that  a seat  had  been  given 
the  editor  at  Mr.  Jefferson’s  elbow. 

Three  months  before  Madison  heard  that  his 
relation  to  Freneau  was  bringing  him  under  pub- 
lic censure,  he  showed  an  evident  interest  in  the 
“ Gazette  ” hardly  consistent  with  his  subsequent 
avowal  of  having  nothing  to  do  with  its  manage- 
ment. In  a letter  to  Jefferson  he  refers  to  the 
postage  on  newspapers,  established  by  the  bill  for 
the  regulation  of  post-offices,  and  fears  that  it  will 
prove  a grievance  in  the  loss  of  subscribers.  He 
suggests  that  a notice  be  given  that  the  papers 
“ will  not  be  put  into  the  mail,  but  sent  as  hereto- 
fore,”  meaning  by  that,  probably,  that  they  would 
be  sent  under  the  franks  of  members  of  Congress, 
or  by  any  other  chance  that  might  offer.  “ Will 
you,”  he  adds,  “hint  this  to  Freneau  ? His  sub- 
scribers in  this  quarter  seem  pretty  well  satisfied 
with  the  degree  of  regularity  and  safety  with 
which  they  get  the  papers,  and  highly  pleased 
with  the  paper  itself.”  This  was  careful  dry- 
nursing  for  the  bantling  which  had  been  pro- 
vided with  so  comfortable  a cradle  in  the  State 
Department. 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  181 

The  political  casuist  of  our  time  may  wonder  at 
the  importance  which  attached  to  this  Freneau 
affair.  We  are  taught  that  “there  were  giants 
in  those  days ; ” but  we  may  also  remember  that 
in  the  modern  science  of  “ practical  politics  ” they 
were  as  babes  and  sucklings.  Madison  was  making 
good  his  place  as  a leader  of  the  opposition  hardly 
second  to  Jefferson  himself.  As  with  Hamilton, 
so  with  the  Federalists  generally,  he  fell  more 
even  than  Jefferson  fell  in  their  esteem.  He  fell 
more,  because  he  had  farther  to  fall.  No  man 
had  been  more  earnest  than  he  for  a consolidated 
government ; no  one  had  shown  more  activity  to 
bring  about  a convention  to  frame  a Federal  Con- 
stitution ; and  when  at  last  that  work  was  done, 
no  one,  not  even  Hamilton  himself,  was  more 
zealous  to  convince  his  countrymen  that  national 
salvation  depended  upon  union,  and  that  union 
was  hopeless  unless  the  Constitution  should  be 
adopted.  The  disappointment  and  the  sliock  were 
all  the  greater  wlien  he  gradually  drew  off  from 
those  who  had  hitherto  counted  him  as  on  their 
side.  They  could  not  understand  how  he  could 
find  so  much  to  oppose  in  the  legitimate  adminis- 
tration — as  they  believed  it  to  be  — of  a Consti- 
tution he  had  done  so  much  to  create,  and  the 
beneficent  results  of  which  he  had  foreseen  and 
foretold.  Or,  if  they  understood  him,  it  was  on 
the  supposition  that  he  had  thrown  his  convic- 
tions and  his  principles  to  the  winds,  abandoned 


182 


JAMES  MADISON. 


his  old  friends  and  attached  himself  to  new  ones, 
from  motives  of  personal  ambition.  This,  of 
course,  may  not  have  been  absolutely  just.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  he  did  not  deliberately  sur- 
render his  principles,  but  persuaded  himself  that 
he  was  as  true  as  ever  to  the  Constitution.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  certainly  true  that  the  men  with 
whom  he  was  now  acting  were  the  men  who,  hav- 
ing failed  to  prevent  the  adoption  of  the  Consti- 
tution, now  aimed  by  zealous  endeavors  for  an  as- 
sumed strict  construction  to  defeat  the  purpose 
for  which  it  was  framed.1 

Naturally  his  motives  were  suspected,  and  his 
conduct  narrowly  watched.  Jefferson’s  influence 
over  him  was  known  to  be  great,  and  Jefferson  had 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  framing  of  the  Consti- 
tution, had  been  doubtful  at  first  of  its  wisdom, 
and  gave  his  assent  to  it  at  last  with  many  doubts. 
The  Anti-Federal  party  was  growing  gradually 
stronger  in  Virginia  as  in  all  the  Southern  States ; 
most  of  Madison’s  warmest  personal  friends,  as 
well  as  Jefferson,  were  of  that  party.  What 
chance  would  he  have  in  the  public  career  he  had 

1 “ I reverence  the  Constitution,”  said  Fisher  Ames,  in  debate, 
“ and  I readily  admit  that  the  frequent  appeal  to  that  as  a stand- 
ard proceeds  from  a respectful  attachment  to  it.  So  far  it  is  a 
source  of  agreeable  reflection.  But  I feel  very  different  emotions, 
when  I find  it  almost  daily  resorted  to  in  questions  of  little  im- 
portance. When  by  strained  and  fanciful  constructions  it  is  made 
an  instrument  of  casuistry,  it  is  to  be  feared  it  may  lose  something 
in  our  minds  in  point  of  certainty,  and  more  in  point  of  dig- 
nity.” 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  183 

marked  out  for  himself  if  his  path  and  theirs  led 
in  opposite  directions  ? How  much  he  was  influ- 
enced by  these  considerations  it  is  impossible  to 
tell ; perhaps  he  himself  could  not  have  told. 
Perhaps  they  were  not  even  considerations,  but 
only  unconscious  influences,  which  he  would  have 
thrown  behind  him  had  he  recognized  them  as  pos- 
sible motives.  To  others,  however,  whether  justly 
or  not,  they  were  quite  sufficient  to  explain  his 
course,  and,  once  accepted,  no  other  explanation 
was  sought  for.  The  appointment  of  Freneau  to 
office  at  Madison’s  request,  followed  by  the  almost 
immediate  appearance  of  a violent  party  organ, 
edited  by  this  clerk  in  Mr.  Jefferson’s  department, 
was  quite  enough  to  raise  an  outcry  among  the 
Federalists ; and  Madison’s  explanation,  when  it 
came  to  be  known,  of  his  share  in  that  business, 
did  not  add  to  his  reputation  either  for  frankness 
or  political  rectitude.  Perhaps  it  was  at  first  more 
the  seeming  want  of  frankness  that  disgusted  his 
old  friends.  They  could  have  more  readily  for- 
given him  had  he  openly  declared  that  he  had 
gone  over  to  the  enemy,  instead  of  professing  to 
find  in  the  Constitution  sufficient  ground  for  hos- 
tility to  their  measures.  These  constitutional 
scruples  they  sometimes  thought  so  thin  a disguise 
of  other  motives  as  to  be  better  deserving  of  ridi- 
cule than  of  argument. 

All  he  said  and  did  was  watched  with  suspicion. 
In  the  interval  between  the  First  and  Second 


184 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Congresses,  lie  and  Jefferson  made  a tour  through 
some  of  the  Eastern  States,  as  they  said,  for  relax- 
ation and  pleasure.  But  it  was  looked  upon  as  a 
strategic  movement.  Interviews  between  them 
and  Livingston  and  Burr  in  New  York  were  re- 
ported to  Hamilton  as  “a  passionate  courtship.” 
They  visited  Albany,  it  was  said,  “ under  the  pre- 
text of  a botanical  excursion,”  but  in  reality  to 
meet  with  Clinton.  Botany  naturally  suggests 
agriculture,  and  as  they  continued  on  their  jour- 
ney into  New  England  they  were  accused  of  “ sow- 
ing tares,”  as  they  traveled.  Such  treachery 
would  have  been  considered  as  aggravated  by 
hypocrisy  had  it  been  known  then  that  on  his  re- 
turn Mr.  Madison  wrote  to  his  father  from  New 
York  : “ The  tour  I lately  made  with  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son, of  which  I have  given  the  outlines  to  my 
brother,  was  a very  agreeable  one,  and  carried 
us  through  interesting  country,  new  to  us  both.” 
This  was  cool,  if  the  journey  really  was  a political 
reconnoissance. 

Though  Mr.  Madison  may  have  been  for  a time 
a special  target  for  this  kind  of  partisan  rancor, 
it  was  by  no  means  confined  to  him.  Jefferson 
had  a very  pretty  talent  for  exasperating  his 
enemies,  and  nobody  could  long  divide  with  him 
the  distinction  of  being  the  best  hated  man  in 
the  country.  A curious  instance  of  it  was  given 
when  the  question  was  discussed,  both  in  the 
First  and  Second  Congresses,  as  to  the  successor 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  185 

to  tlie  presidency  in  case  the  office  should  become 
vacant  by  the  deaths  of  both  President  and  Vice- 
President.  A bill  was  sent  down  from  the  Sen- 
ate to  the  House,  providing,  in  case  such  a thing 
should  ever  happen,  that  the  President  pro  tem- 
pore of  the  Senate,  or,  should  the  Senate  have  no 
temporary  President,  the  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  should  succeed  to  the  vacant 
office.  The  House  sent  back  the  bill  with  an 
amendment  substituting  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  succession  in  the  possible  vacancy  instead 
of  the  presiding  officers  of  the  two  Houses  of  Con- 
gress. Madison  was  very  earnest  for  this  amend- 
ment, but  the  Senate  injected  it  and  the  House 
finally  assented  to  the  original  bill,  which  is  the 
law  to-day.  It  was  shown  in  the  course  of  the 
debate,  that  according  to  the  doctrine  of  chances 
the  office  of  president  would  not  devolve,  through 
the  accident  of  death,  upon  a third  person  oftener 
than  once  in  about  eight  hundred  and  forty  years. 
The  rejection  of  the  amendment  naming  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  as  the  proper  person  to  succeed  to 
the  presidency,  in  the  improbable  event  supposed, 
was  nevertheless  resented  by  the  Republicans  as  a 
direct  reflection  upon  Mr.  Jefferson.  Nor  did  the 
Federalists  deny  it.  With  grim  humor  they  seized 
upon  the  opportunity,  apparently,  to  announce, 
that  not  with  their  consent  should  he  ever  be 
president  even  by  accident,  though  he  should 
wait  literally  eight  hundred  and  forty  years.  It 


186 


JAMES  MADISON. 


was  a long  range  shot,  but  there  could  not  have 
been  one  better  aimed. 

If  before  there  had  been  some  room  for  hope, 
Madison’s  course  in  the  Second  Congress  left  no 
doubt  as  to  which  party  he  had  cast  his  lot  with. 
His  hostility  to  the  establishment  of  a bank  was, 
he  thought,  justified  by  what  he  saw  at  the  open- 
ing of  the  subscription  books  in  New  York.  The 
anxiety  to  get  possession  of  the  stock  was  not  to 
him  an  evidence  of  public  confidence,  and  an  argu- 
ment, therefore,  in  favor  of  such  an  institution ; 
but  “ a mere  scramble  for  so  much  public  plun- 
der.” He  could  only  see  that  “ stock-jobbing 
drowns  every  other  subject.  The  coffee-house  is 
in  an  eternal  buzz  with  the  gamblers.”  “ It  pretty 
clearly  appears  also,”  he  said,  “ in  what  propor- 
tions the  public  debt  lies  in  the  country  ; what 
sort  of  hands  holding  it ; and  by  whom  the  people 
of  the  United  States  are  to  be  governed.”  Here, 
perhaps,  was  one  cause  of  his  hostility  to  Hamil- 
ton’s financial  policy.  Its  immediate  benefit  was 
for  that  class  whose  pecuniary  stake  in  the  stabil- 
ity of  the  government  was  the  largest.  This  class 
was  chiefly  in  the  Northern  States  where  capital 
was  in  money  and  was  always  on  the  lookout  for 
safe  and  profitable  investment.  At  the  South, 
capital  was  in  slaves  and  land,  and  could  not  be 
easily  changed.  If  the  Bank  and  the  bond-hold- 
ers were  to  exercise  — as  he  feared  they  would, 
and  as  he  believed  that  the  Federalists  meant  they 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  187 

should  — a controlling  influence  over  tlie  govern- 
ment, it  was  certainly  pretty  apparent  “ by  whom 
the  people  of  the  United  States  were  to  be  gov- 
erned.” It  would  be  the  North,  not  the  South  ; 
and  he  was  a Virginian  before  he  was  a Unionist. 

Perhaps  he  was  influenced  by  this  consideration 
when  he  proposed  that  the  payment  of  the  domes- 
tic debt  should  be  divided  between  those  who  had 
originally  held,  and  those  who  had  acquired  by 
purchase,  the  certificates  of  indebtedness.  The 
public  creditors  would,  in  that  case  have  been 
more  widely  distributed  in  different  sections  of 
the  country  and  among  different  classes.  The 
thought,  at  any  rate,  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
a new  one  when  he  saw  and  reported  the  eager- 
ness with  which  the  bank  stock  was  sought  for, 
denounced  it  as  stock-jobbing  and  gambling,  and 
indignantly  reflected  that  in  these  men  he  saw  the 
future  governors  of  the  country,  and  particularly 
of  his  own  people.  No  doubt  there  was  a good 
deal  of  speculation  ; and,  as  at  all  such  times, 
there  were  a few  who  made  fortunes,  while  many 
who  had,  at  first,  much  money  and  no  stock,  next 
much  stock  and  no  money,  had  at  last  neither 
stock  nor  money.  But  Mr.  Madison’s  indignation 
was  quite  wasted,  and  his  fears  quite  unfounded. 
Neither  the  stock-jobbers,  the  Bank,  nor  the  bond- 
holders ever  usurped  the  government,  whatever 
may  have  been  Hamilton’s  hopes  or  schemes,  if  he 
had.  any  other  than  to  serve  his  country.  The 


188 


JAMES  MADISON. 


inoney-power  of  the  North  built  cities  and  ships, 
factories  and  towns,  and  stretched  out  its  hands 
to  the  great  lakes  and  over  the  broad  prairies,  to 
add  to  its  dominion,  to  extend  its  civilization,  and 
to  give  to  labor  and  industry  their  due  reward.  It 
was  the  South  that  devoted  itself  to  the  business 
of  politics,  and,  united  by  stronger  bonds  than  can 
ever  be  forged  of  gold  alone,  soon  entered  into 
possession  of  the  government,  which  it  retained 
and  used  for  its  own  interests,  without  regard  to 
the  interests  or  the  rights  of  the  North,  for  nearly 
three  quarters  of  a century.  Mr.  Madison  had  no 
prescience  of  any  such  future  in  the  history  of  the 
country,  nor,  indeed,  then  had  anybody  else.  He 
may  have  really  believed  that  the  holders  of  a 
large  public  debt  and  the  owners  of  a great  na- 
tional bank,  through  which  the  monetary  affairs 
of  the  country  could  be  controlled,  were  aiming 
to  lay  hold  of  the  government.  If  all  this  were 
true,  imminent  peril  was  impending  over  repub- 
lican institutions.  The  inconsistency  of  which 
Hamilton  accused  Madison  was  therefore  not  nec- 
essarily a crime.  It  might  even  be  a virtue,  and 
Madison  be  applauded  for  his  courage  in  avowing 
a change  of  opinion,  if  he  saw  in  the  practical 
application  of  Hamilton’s  principles  dangers  that 
had  not  occurred  to  him  when  looking  at  them 
only  as  abstract  theories.  But  the  Federalists  be- 
lieved that  Madison,  governed  by  these  purely 
selfish  motives,  sacrificed  his  convictions  of  what 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  189 

was  best  for  the  country  that  he  might  secure  for 
himself  a position  on  what  he  foresaw  was  the 
winning  side.  It  is  quite  likely  that  the  more 
pronounced  enmity  he  showed  towards  Hamilton 
during  the  second  session  of  Congress  was  due,  in 
some  measure,  to  his  knowledge  of  this  feeling  to- 
wards himself  among  the  Federalists.  He  seemed, 
at  any  rate,  to  be  animated  by  something  more 
than  the  proverbial  zeal  of  the  new  convert.  If 
it  was  not  always  shown  in  debate,  it  lurked  in 
his  letters.  Anything  that  came  from  the  Sec- 
retary, or  anything  that  favored  the  Secretary’s 
measures,  was  sure  to  be  opposed  by  him.  He 
was  not,  of  course,  always  in  the  wrong,  and  some- 
times he  was  very  right.  There  was  a manifest 
disposition  on  the  part  of  the  Federalists  in  the 
House  to  defer  to  the  Secretary  in  a way  to  pro- 
voke opposition  from  those  who  did  not  share  in 
their  estimate  of  his  great  ability.  There  was 
some  resentment,  for  example,  when  it  was  pro- 
posed that  Congress  should  submit  to  the  Secre- 
tary the  question  of  ways  and  means  to  carry  on 
the  Indian  war  at  the  West,  after  St.  Clair’s  dis- 
astrous defeat ; and  when,  a few  days  later,  it  was 
suggested  that  lie  should  be  called  upon  to  report 
a plan  for  the  reduction  of  the  public  debt.  Mem- 
bers, chief  among  them  Madison,  thought  that 
they  were  quite  capable  of  discharging  the  duties 
belonging  to  their  branch  of  the  government  with- 
out instructions  from  a head  of  department  whom 


190 


JAMES  MADISON. 


many  of  them  looked  upon  as  only  an  official  sub- 
ordinate of  Congress.  For  the  same  reason  they 
refused  with  prompt  decision  to  permit  the  Secre- 
tary to  appear  upon  the  floor  of  the  House  to  ex- 
plain some  proposed  measure.  In  the  Carrington 
letter  Hamilton  said  that  he  had  “ openly  de- 
clared” a “determination  to  treat  him  [Madison] 
as  a political  enemy.”  He  probably  took  care 
that  Madison  should  hear  of  it,  for  he  was  not  a 
man  who  made  idle  threats.  He  was  sometimes 
arrogant  and  overbearing  in  manner',  was  always 
ready  for  a fight,  which  he  rather  preferred  to 
quietude,  and  had  little  disposition  to  spare  an  en- 
emy. These  were  not  conciliating  qualities  likely 
to  temper  the  asperities  of  political  warfare,  and 
they  may  have  provoked  even  Madison,  mild-man- 
nered and  almost  timid  as  he  was,  to  unusual  heat. 

All  this,  of  course,  is  aside  from  the  question 
whether  the  party,  to  which  Mr.  Madison  had 
given  his  allegiance,  was  right  or  wrong.  On  that 
point  there  may  be  an  honest  difference  of  opin- 
ion. It  is  apart  also  from  the  question  whether 
a man  may  not  honestly  change  sides  in  politics, 
notwithstanding  the  suspicion  that  always  follows 
him  who  runs  from  one  side  to  the  other,  when  in 
neither  has  there  been  any  change  in  principles 
or  measures.  It  is  cpiite  possible  that  he  may  be 
governed  by  the  most  sincere  convictions ; and  if 
he  obeys  them  and  abandons  old  friends  for  new 
ones,  or  consents  to  be  friendless,  it  is  the  strong- 


FEDERALISTS  AND  REPUBLICANS.  191 

est  proof  the  statesman  or  politician  can  give  of  a 
moral  courage  which  ought  to  gain  for  him  all 
the  more  respect.  But  whether  that  respect  must 
be  denied  to  Mr.  Madison,  because  he  was  gov- 
erned by  other  and  lower  motives,  is  the  question. 
There  had  been  no  change  of  political  principles 
either  in  the  party  he  had  left  or  the  party  he 
had  joined;  but  each  was  striving  with  all  its 
might  to  adapt  the  old  doctrines  to  the  altered 
condition  of  affairs  under  the  new  Union.  The 
change  was  wholly  in  Mr.  Madison.  That  which 
had  been  white  to  him  was  now  black ; that 
which  had  been  black  was  now  as  the  driven 
snow.  Why  was  this  ? Had  he  come  to  see  that 
in  all  those  years  he  had  been  wrong  ? Or  had 
he  suddenly  learned,  not  that  he  was  wrong,  but 
that  he  had  mistaken  a straight  and  narrow  path 
for  the  broad  road  which  would  lead  to  the  goal 
he  was  seeking?  These  are  not  pleasant  ques- 
tions. He  had  served  his  country  well ; one  does 
not  like  to  doubt  whether  it  was  with  a selfish 
rather  than  a noble  purpose.  But  of  any  public 
man  who  changed  front  as  he  changed,  the  ques- 
tion always  will  be  — what  moved  him?  Not  to 
ask  it  in  regard  to  Madison  is  to  drop  out  of  sight 
the  turning-point  of  his  career ; not  to  consider  it 
is  to  leave  unheeded  essential  light  upon  one  side 
of  his  character.  For  his  own  fortunes  the  choice 
he  made  was  judicious,  if  to  “gain  the  whole 
world  ” is  always  the  wisest  and  best  thing  to  do. 


192 


JAMES  MADISON. 


He  gained  his  world,  and  was  wise  and  virtuous 
in  his  generation  according  to  the  vote  of  a large 
majority.  Whether  that  decision  still  holds  good 
it  is  not  so  easy  to  say  ; probably  it  does,  however; 
for  the  popular  estimate  of  men  often  remains  un- 
changed long  after  the  judgment  upon  the  events 
which  gave  them  celebrity  is  completely  reversed. 
But  history,  in  the  long  run,  weighs  with  even 
scales ; and  the  verdict  on  Madison’s  character 
usually  comes  with  that  pitiful  recommendation  to 
mercy  from  a jury  loath  to  condemn.  Admiration 
for  his  great  services  in  the  Constitutional  Con- 
vention and  after  it,  when  its  work  was  presented 
to  the  people  for  their  approval,  has  never  been 
withheld ; upon  his  official  integrity  and  his  high 
sense  of  honor  in  all  his  personal  relations,  except 
when  obligation  to  party  may  have  overshadowed 
it,  there  rests  no  cloud;  and  his  intellectual  power 
is  never  questioned.  One  having  these  recognized 
qualities,  and  who  for  five  and  twenty  yeai’s  was 
genei’ally  high  in  office,  must  needs  be  held  in 
high  estimation  especially  in  a new  country  where 
fame,  like  everything  else,  is  cheap.  Nevertheless, 
impartial  historians,  who  venture  to  believe  that 
nature  admits  of  imperfections  in  a native  of  Vir- 
ginia, declare  their  conviction  that  Mr.  Madison 
either  wanted  the  strength  and  courage  to  resist 
the  influence  of  those  about  him,  or  that  the  am- 
bition of  the  politician  was  strong  enough  to  over- 
come any  consideration  of  principles  that  might 
stand  in  his  way. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 

If  any  proof  were  wanting  of  how  completely 
Madison  had  gone  over  to  the  opposition,  he  gave 
it  in  the  memorable  attack  upon  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  in  the  spring  of  1793,  within  four 
days  of  the  close  of  the  second  session  of  the  Sec- 
ond Congress.  It  was  hoped  by  that  proceeding 
to  overwhelm  Hamilton  with  disgrace,  and  that 
the  President  would  feel  himself  obliged  to  expel 
him  from  the  cabinet.  When  the  resolutions 
with  this  aim  were  offered,  a member  said  that 
delicacy,  decency,  and  every  rule  of  justice  had. 
been  violated ; “ a more  unhandsome  proceeding 
he  had  never  seen  in  Congress;”  he  might  have 
remained  a member  to  this  day,  and,  save  for  the 
attempts  in  our  time  to  expel  John  Quincy  Ad- 
ams and  Joshua  R.  Giddings,  not  have  changed 
his  opinion. 

In  the  course  of  the  preceding  year  Hamilton, 
under  various  signatures,  had  met  his  opponents 
in  the  newspapers.  But  it  was  a veil,  not  a visor, 
behind  which  he  fought ; for  everybody  knew 

from  whom  came  the  vigorous  blows  that  he  dealt 
13 


194 


JAMES  MADISON. 


about  him  right  and  left.  It  was  a boast  always 
of  Jefferson  that  he  never  condescended  to  news- 
paper controversy;  but  it  was  pretty  well  under- 
stood that  he  himself  did  not  enter  upon  that 
rather  unsatisfactory  mode  of  warfare,  because  he 
preferred  the  safer  method  of  fighting  by  proxy. 
Hamilton  never  was  in  doubt  as  to  who  was  his 
real  antagonist,  and  he  aimed  his  blows  over  the 
heads  of  his  petty  assailants  to  where  he  knew 
they  would  hit  home.  They  left  bad  bruises 
upon  his  colleague  in  the  cabinet.  Among  other 
papers  of  the  time,  though  not  a newspaper  arti- 
cle, was  an  official  letter  to  the  President,  in 
which  Hamilton  defended  his  principles  and  his 
measures.  Early  in  1792,  the  President,  longing 
to  escape  the  toils  of  public  life  and  to  spend 
the  rest  of  his  days  in  tranquillity,  had  consulted 
Madison  and  his  two  Secretaries,  Jefferson  and 
Hamilton,  upon  the  propriety  of  his  declining  a 
reelection.  He  soon  changed  his  mind,  influenced, 
perhaps,  as  much  by  the  dissensions,  so  evident  in 
the  expostulations  of  his  friends,  as  by  the  expos- 
tulations themselves.  He  deprecated  this  open 
feud  between  his  Secretaries  as  a public  misfor- 
tune, and  sought,  if  he  could  not  reconcile  them, 
to  silence  it.  That  the  Federalists  were  monarch- 
ists, as  Jefferson  and  Madison  never  ceased  assert- 
ing, he  knew  was  not  true,  without  the  emphatic 
and  indignant  declarations  of  Hamilton,  Adams, 
and  other  leading  men  of  that  party,  when  they  con 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


195 


descended  to  notice  a charge  which  they  deemed 
so  absurd  that  it  was  difficult  to  believe  that  any- 
body could  make  it  in  earnest.  But,  while  he 
knew  there  was  no  real  danger  from  that  quarter, 
he  could  not  fail  to  see  that  the  reverence  and  love 
in  which  he  was  held  constituted  a bond  of  unity, 
so  long  as  he  remained  chief  magistrate;  and  he 
may  have  felt  that,  should  he  retire,  there  was  no 
other  common  tie  strong  enough  at  that  moment 
to  hold  together  a Union,  the  possible  dissolution 
of  which  was,  both  at  the  North  and  at  the  South, 
considered  with  calmness,  sometimes  with  compla- 
cency, and,  when  party  passion  was  at  a red  heat, 
even  as  a thing  to  be  prayed  for.  At  any  rate 
the  President  consented  to  take  the  advice  of  the 
counselors  whom  he  had  consulted  ; but  in  ask- 
ing that  advice  he  unwittingly  aggravated  the 
quarrel  among  them  which  caused  him  so  much 
uneasiness. 

Jefferson,  in  the  arguments  he  set  forth  both  in 
conversation  and  by  letter  to  influence  Washing- 
ton’s decision,  dwelt  upon  the  unhappy  condition 
of  public  affairs.  It  was  a storm  which  he  himself 
meant  to  get  out  of  by  retiring  to  Monticello, 
though  he  thought  it  was  Washington’s  duty  to 
remain  at  the  helm  and  keep  an  eye  to  windward. 
This  unhappy  condition  of  affairs,  he  said,  had  all 
come  from  the  course  pursued  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  and  was  the  natural  consequence  of 
the  acts  of  Congress  in  relation  to  the  public  debt, 


196 


JAMES  MADISON. 


the  Bank,  excise,  currency,  and  other  important 
measures  passed  in  accordance  with  the  Secre- 
tary’s policy.  Whether  this  policy  was  meant  to 
destroy  the  Union,  subvert  the  Republic,  and  es- 
tablish a monarchy  upon  its  ruins ; at  any  rate 
such  must  be  the  inevitable  result  of  those  mis- 
chievous measures.  He  urged  this  view  of  the 
subject  with  such  pertinacity,  that  Washington, 
either  because  he  was  impressed  by  so  much  ear- 
nestness, or  because  he  was  curious  to  know  how 
the  assertions  could  best  be  answered,  sent  them 
to  Hamilton,  with  other  objections  of  a similar 
character  from  other  persons,  and  asked  for  a re- 
ply. No  names  were  given ; but  it  is  not  likely 
that  Hamilton  was  at  any  loss  in  guessing  where 
such  strictures  upon  his  administration  of  affairs 
came  from.  “ I have  not  fortitude  enough,”  he 
said  in  his  answer,  “ always  to  hear  with  calmness 
calumnies  which  necessarily  include  me  as  a prin- 
cipal object  in  the  measures  censured,  of  the  false- 
hood of  which  I have  the  most  unqualified  con- 
sciousness. ...  I acknowledge  that  I cannot  be 
entirely  patient  under  charges  which  impeach  the 
integrity  of  my  public  motives  or  conduct.  I feel 
that  I merit  them  in  no  degree,  and  expressions  of 
indignation  sometimes  escape  me  in  spite  of  every 
effort  to  suppress  them.”  There  were  only  two 
men  in  the  country  whom  he  could  have  had  in 
mind  when  he  wrote  such  words  as  these.  In  all 
Washington’s  career  there  is  nowhere  a stronger 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


197 


proof  of  his  strong  will,  self-reliance,  and  passion- 
less impartiality,  than  that  he  could  stand  be- 
tween two  such  furnaces  as  Hamilton  on  one  side, 
and  Jefferson  and  Madison  on  the  other,  both 
glowing  at  the  intensest  white  heat,  while  he  re- 
mained usually  as  calm  and  as  unmoved  as  if 
breathing  the  softest,  balmiest,  and  gentlest  airs 
of  a day  in  June.  But  all  this  personal  contro- 
versy in  the  public  prints,  and  in  the  official  in- 
tercourse of  the  cabinet,  left  on  both  sides  an  in- 
tense exasperation,  which  could  not  fail  to  have 
a controlling  influence  in  the  conduct  of  political 
parties.  Whether  Jefferson  was  conscious  or  not 
• — and  whatever  his  feeling  was,  Madison  shared 
it  with  him  — that  in  this  paper  warfare  he  was 
signally  defeated,  the  attempt  to  ruin  Hamilton 
by  an  attack  upon  him  in  Congress  followed,  if  it 
was  not  the  consequence  of,  the  mortification  of 
defeat. 

In  February,  1793,  Mr.  Giles,  a representative 
from  Virginia,  offered  a series  of  resolutions  call- 
ing upon  the  President  for  certain  information  re- 
lating to  the  finances.  They  were  a bold  attack 
upon  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and,  should 
it  prove  that  they  could  not  be  satisfactorily  an- 
swered, would  convict  him  of  mismanagement  of 
the  financial  affairs  of  the  government,  of  a disre- 
gard of  law,  of  usurpation  of  power,  and  even  of 
embezzlement  of  the  public  funds.  Any  reasona- 
ble ground  for  believing  such  charges  to  be  well- 


198 


JAMES  MADISON. 


founded  would  be  quite  sufficient  to  bring  the 
Secretary  to  trial  by  impeachment.  There  was 
probably  little  doubt  at  the  moment  as  to  whence 
this  blow  came ; for,  though  the  hand  might  seem 
the  hand  of  Esau,  the  voice  was  the  voice  of  Jacob. 
Behind  Giles  was  Madison ; and  behind  Madison, 
of  course,  was  Jefferson.  Mr.  John  C.  Hamilton, 
in  his  “ History  of  the  Republic,”  asserts  that  the 
resolutions  were  still  — when  he  wrote,  twenty- 
five  years  ago  — in  the  archives  of  the  State  De- 
partment at  Washington,  in  Madison’s  handwrit- 
ing ; and  he  further  declares  that  Giles  assured 
Rufus  King  that  Madison  was  their  author. 

Hamilton’s  reply,  so  far  as  any  intentional 
wrong-doing  was  imputed  to  him,  was  conclusive. 
There  had  been  technical  violations  of  acts  of 
Congress  in  one  instance,  but  it  was  only  to  carry 
out  the  acts  themselves.  Congress  had,  three 
years  before,  passed  two  acts  authorizing  the  ne- 
gotiation of  two  loans,  one  for  twelve  million  dol- 
lars for  the  discharge  of  the  foreign  debt,  and 
another  for  two  million  dollars  to  be  used  at  home. 
It  had  been  convenient,  and  had  conduced  to  the 
success  of  the  negotiation,  to  offer  in  Holland  to 
contract  a loan  for  fourteen  million  dollars,  with- 
out the  unnecessary,  and  to  foreigners  probably 
the  confusing,  statement  that  the  authority  for 
borrowing  that  amount  was  derived  from  two  sep- 
arate acts  of  Congress.  It  was  only  in  this  bor- 
rowing of  the  money  that  there  was  any  seeming 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


199 


disregard  of  the  letter  of  the  law.  The  loans  and 
their  purposes  were  kept  entirely  distinct  in  the 
accounts  *of  the  department.  Other  questions 
touching  the  management  of  these  loans  were  so 
clearly  and  frankly  explained  that  nothing  but 
the  captiousness  of  party  could  refuse  to  be  satis- 
fied. On  one  point  — the  charge  of  an  alleged 
deficit  — the  opposition  was  absolutely  silenced. 
The  Secretary  indignantly  explained,  that  the  sum 
— as  anybody  could  have  known  for  the  asking 
from  any  officer  in  the  Treasury  Department  — 
which  was  made  to  appear  as  missing  was  in 
credits  for  customs  bonds  not  yet  due,  and  bills 
of  exchange  on  Europe,  sold  but  not  yet  paid  for. 

Though  there  was  enough  of  decency,  or  of 
prudence  which  took  the  place  of  decency,  to  drop 
the  insinuation  that  the  Secretary  had  stolen  what 
had  never  been  in  his  possession,  it  was  not  so 
with  the  rest  of  the  accusations.  Only  four  days 
before  Congress  was  to  adjourn,  Giles  offered  an- 
other set  of  resolutions.  These  assumed  that  the 
defiance  of  law  and  unwarranted  assumption  of 
power,  which,  at  first,  were  only  suggested  by  the 
inquiries,  were  now  proved  to  be  true  by  the  ex- 
planations that  had  been  given.  The  indictment, 
therefore,  was  made  to  include  the  verdict  and  the 
sentence ; the  criminal  was  accused,  was  to  be 
found  guilty,  and  condemned  to  capital  punish- 
ment in  one  proceeding,  without  the  privilege  of 
trial,  or  a recognition  of  the  right  to  be  heard. 


200 


JAMES  MADISON. 


The  argument  of  the  resolutions  was,  that  certain 
acts  were  a violation  of  law ; that  the  Secretary 
had  committed  all  those  acts ; and  therefore  it 
was  the  will  of  the  House  that  the  facts  be  re- 
ported to  the  President.  The  presumption  ob- 
viously was  that  the  President  would  immediately 
dismiss  from  office  a disgraced  and  faithless  public 
servant.  But  the  prosecution  was  an  utter  fail- 
ure. The  largest  vote  received  for  any  of  the  res- 
olutions was  only  fifteen ; that  on  the  others  was 
from  seven  to  twelve,  in  a quorum  of  from  fifty  to 
sixty  members.  In  the  course  of  the  debate  Mr. 
Madison  had  said  that  “ his  colleague  [Giles]  had 
rendered  a service  highly  valuable  to  the  legisla- 
ture, and  no  less  important  and  acceptable  to  the 
public.”  The  House  showed  by  its  votes  how 
very  far  it  was  from  agreeing  with  him.  But 
Fisher  Ames  wrote,  about  that  time,  — “ Madison 
is  become  a desperate  party  leader,  and  I am  not 
sure  of  his  stopping  at  any  ordinary  point  of  ex- 
tremity.” If  it  be  really  true  that  he  instigated 
this  attack  upon  Hamilton,  and  was  the  author 
of  the  resolutions,  using  Giles  as  his  tool  to  get 
them  before  the  House,  Ames’s  reflection  was  not 
uncharitable. 

It  would  not  be  just,  however,  to  leave  the  im- 
pression that  the  hostility  shown  in  this  affair  was 
purely  personal.  Both  Jefferson  and  Madison  had 
a hearty  hatred  for  Hamilton  which  would  have 
been  greatly  gratified  could  they  have  made  it  the 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


201 


plain  duty  of  the  President  to  put  him  out  of  the 
Treasury  Department,  a dishonored  and  ruined 
man.  But  this  particular  outbreak  of  their  en- 
mity was  intensified  by  their  sincere  and  earnest 
enthusiasm  for  France.  They  were  quite  willing 
to  bring  Hamilton  to  grief  at  any  time,  because 
he  was  Hamilton  ; they  were  more  than  ordina- 
rily exasperated  against  him  just  now  because  in 
recent  newspaper  and  other  controversies  he  had 
altogether  got  the  better  of  them  ; but  in  this  par- 
ticular instance  they  wanted  to  punish  him  be- 
cause of  delay  of  payments  in  discharge  of  the  in- 
debtedness of  the  United  States  to  France.  This 
was  the  essential  delinquency  at  which  the  Giles 
resolutions  were  pointed.  The  difficulty  was,  not 
that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  not  care- 
ful enough  of  the  public  money,  but  that  he  was 
too  careful.  He  insisted  upon  being  quite  certain, 
when  paying  off  a public  debt,  that  he  was  paying 
it  to  the  right  persons,  and  that  no  risk  should  be 
incurred  of  its  being  demanded  a second  time. 
He  felt  there  was  no  such  certainty  about  pa}'- 
ments  to  France.  The  King  was  dethroned  ; but 
it  was  not  wise,  the  Secretary  thought,  to  be  hasty 
in  recognizing  I’evolutionary  governments.  It  was 
a republic  to-day ; it  might  be  a regency  to-moi’- 
row ; a monarchy  again  the  third  day.  It  was 
more  prudent  to  await  a reasonable  period  for  the 
evidence  of  permanency  on  one  side  or  the  other. 
Those  old  enough  to  remember  the  late  war  of  the 


202 


JAMES  MADISOE. 


rebellion  know  how  important  the  maintenance  of 
this  doctrine  was  in  regard  to  the  recognition  of 
the  rebel  confederacy  by  England  and  France. 

But  to  all  this  Jefferson  did  not  in  the  least 
agree  ; neither  did  Madison.  They  were  in  full, 
even  passionate,  sympathy  with  the  men  who 
brought  Louis  XVI.  to  the  guillotine.  Money, 
they  knew,  was  needed,  and  it  was  a crime 
against  liberty  to  delay  payment,  when  payment 
was  due  to  the  French  government.  With  Ham- 
ilton the  question  was,  not  whether  the  revolu- 
tionists ought  to  be,  but  whether  they  were, 
France.  With  Jefferson  and  Madison  they  were 
France,  because  they  ought  to  be.  Hesitation  to 
acknowledge  that  the  revolution  was  the  nation, 
they  thought,  could  only  come  from  an  “Anglican 
party,”  the  “ enemies  of  France  and  of  Liberty,” 
who  would  lead  the  American  people  “ into  the 
arms,  and  ultimately  into  the  government  of 
Great  Britain  ” — to  use  the  terms  in  which  Mad- 
ison spoke,  a little  later,  of  the  Federalists. 
Which  of  these  men,  in  this  regard  at  least,  were 
the  thoughtful  and  prudent  statesmen,  and  which 
were  doctrinaires , nobody  now,  probably,  ques- 
tions. The  larger  proportion  of  the  people,  how- 
ever, were  then  carried  away  by  the  enthusiasm 
for  the  French  revolutionists.  It  was  so,  no 
doubt,  at  first  without  much  distinction  of  party ; 
but  it  was  inevitable,  when  the  government  should 
be  called  upon  to  take  some  decisive  stand  in  rela^ 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


203 


Lion  to  European  politics,  that  the  country  should 
divide  into  two  hostile  camps  ; or,  rather,  that  the 
two  camps  already  existing  should  become  more 
hostile  to  each  other  than  ever.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  assume  that  the  mass  of  the  people  gave 
themselves  up  to  any  very  hard  thinking  about 
the  matter.  For  the  most  part  they  followed,  as 
the  way  is  with  parties,  the  political  leaders  to 
whom  they  were  already  accustomed,  never  doubt- 
ing that  not  to  do  so  would  be  treacherous  to  the 
gratitude  America  owed  to  France,  and  to  the 
cause  of  liberty  and  democracy,  which,  in  the 
hands  of  the  Frenchmen,  was  hurling  monarchs 
from  their  thrones  — at  least  one  monarch  from 
his,  and  more,  it  was  hoped,  would  follow.  But 
when  the  revolution  ran  into  the  terrible  excesses 
of  a later  stage,  if  any  Federalists  had  wavered  in 
their  allegiance  to  their  chiefs  they  soon  returned, 
persuaded  that  the  wild  and  bloody  anarchy  of 
Paris  was  not  the  road  that  led  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a wise  and  safe  popular  government. 

There  was  no  need  now  of  pretexts  for  quarrel- 
ing ; real  causes  came  fast  enough.  France  de- 
clared war  against  England,  and  the  United 
States  had  its  part  to  play  in  this  strife  of  giants. 
Its  real  interest  was  to  keep  out  of  trouble ; and, 
if  all  were  agreed  on  that  point,  it  does  not  seem 
that  there  should  have  been  much  difficulty  in 
saying  so.  “ It  behooves  the  government  of  this 
country,”  wrote  Washington  to  Hamilton,  “to 


204 


JAMES  MADISON. 


use  every  means  in  its  power  to  prevent  the  cit- 
izens thereof  from  embroiling  us  with  either  of 
those  powers,  by  endeavoring  to  maintain  a strict 
neutrality.”  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a man 
being  sincerely  desirous  of  helping  neither  one 
side  nor  the  other  ; of  injuring  neither  one  side 
nor  the  other ; of  maintaining,  so  far  as  help  or 
harm  could  go,  an  attitude  of  absolute  impar- 
tiality towards  both  — it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of 
such  a man  quarreling  with  the  word  “ neutral- 
ity ” as  applied  to  his  position.  But  Jefferson, 
nevertheless,  quarreled  with  it ; not  frankly  and 
directly  as  a thing  he  did  not  want,  but  captiously 
and  hypercritically  objecting  to  the  word  to  cover 
his  dislike  to  the  thing  itself.  “A  declaration  of 
neutrality,”  he  said,  “ was  a declaration  that  there 
should  be  no  war,  to  which  the  Executive  was  not 
competent.” 

It  was  true  that  the  Executive  was  not  compe- 
tent to  declare  that  there  should  be  no  war  ; it 
was  not  true  that  the  use  of  the  word  “ neutral- 
ity ” could  have  any  such  application  to  the  future 
as  to  prevent  Congress,  when  it  should  assemble, 
from  declaring  war  should  it  see  fit  to  do  so.  But 
meanwhile,  Congress  not  being  in  session,  and  no 
exigency  having  arisen  that  made  it  desirable  in 
the  President’s  judgment  to  call  an  extra  session, 
he,  with  the  assent  of  the  cabinet,  — for  Jefferson 
did  not  venture  upon  direct  opposition,  — issued  a 
proclamation  “ to  exhort  and  warn  the  citizens  of 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


205 


the  United  States  cai'efully  to  avoid  all  acts  and 
proceedings  whatsoever  ” that  might  interfere  with 
“ the  dut}7  and  interest  of  the  United  States  ” to 
“ adopt  and  pursue  a conduct  friendly  and  im- 
partial towards  the  belligerent  powers.”  The  ob- 
jectionable word  was  left  out  in  deference  to  Mr. 
Jefferson,  who,  really  preferring  that  there  should 
be  no  proclamation  at  all,  hoped  to  take  the  sting 
out  of  it  by  the  omission  of  a phrase.  It  was  the 
thing  said,  not  the  way  of  saying  it,  that  the  Pres- 
ident insisted  upon,  as  it  was  his  duty  to  preserve 
the  peace  till  the  legislature  should  declare  for 
war,  and  his  inclination  to  preserve  it  altogether. 

It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  Jefferson  and  his 
friends  saw  as  plainly  as  the  other  party  saw  how 
perilous  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  a 
foreign  war  would  probably  be.  But  while  pro- 
fessing a desire  to  avoid  it,  they  were  far  more 
anxious,  apparently,  to  give  aid,  moral  as  well  as 
material,  to  France,  with  whose  revolutionary 
struggles  they  sympathized  so  deeply,  than  they 
were  to  avoid  offense  to  England,  whom  they 
hated  and  would  gladly  see  crippled.  Not  to  be  an 
enemy  of  England  they  held  was  to  be  an  enemy 
of  France;  and  not  of  France  merely,  but  of  the 
“rights  of  man.”  They  could  not  or  would  not 
comprehend  any  wisdom  in  moderation,  any  pru- 
dence in  delay.  It  is  curious  to  see  how  party  ani- 
mosity blinded  even  the  best  of  them.  The  objec- 
tion to  the  word  “neutrality”  was  a mere  quib- 


206 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ble  ; for  tlie  proclamation  called  upon  all  good  cit- 
izens to  maintain  at  their  peril  that  state  which,  in 
all  dictionaries,  neutrality  is  defined  to  be.  Mr. 
Jefferson,  in  instructing  as  Secretary  of  State  the 
American  ministers  abroad  as  to  the  attitude  as- 
sumed by  the  government,  could  find  no  better 
term  than  “ a fair  neutrality.”  The  fact  was,  the 
Republican  leaders  wished  to  avoid  taking  any 
positive  stand,  partly  because  delay  might  be  a 
help  to  France,  and  partly  in  obedience  to  the  law 
of  party  politics,  in  opposition  to  the  other  side. 
They  were  not  at  first  quite  sure  of  their  ground, 
and  wanted  to  gain  time.  Mr.  Madison  seems  to 
have  waited  about  six  weeks  before  he  could  ven- 
ture upon  a positive  opinion  as  to  the  proclama- 
tion. The  newspapers  helped  him  to  a knowledge 
of  party  opinion,  and  party  opinion  helped  him  to 
make  up  his  own.  “ Every  ‘ Gazette  ’ I see,”  — 
he  wrote  in  June,  about  eight  weeks  after  the 
proclamation  was  published,  — “ every  ‘ Gazette  ’ 
I see  (except  that  of  the  United  States  [Federal- 
ist]), exhibits  a spirit  of  cr-iticism  on  the  Anglified 
complexion  charged  on  the  Executive  politics.  . . . 
The  proclamation  was,  in  truth,  a most  unfortu- 
nate error.”  A week  before  he  had  been  seem- 
ingly cautious  even  in  writing  to  Jefferson.  Then 
he  had  observed  that  newspaper  criticisms  aroused 
attention,  and  he  had  heard  expressions  of  surprise 
“ that  the  President  should  have  declared  the 
United  States  to  be  neutral  in  the  unqualified 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


207 


terms  used,  when  we  were  so  notoriously  and  un- 
equivocally under  eventual  engagements  to  de- 
fend the  American  possessions  of  France.  I have 
heard  it  remarked,  also,  that  the  impartiality  en- 
joined on  the  people  was  as  little  reconcilable  with 
their  moral  obligations  as  the  unconditional  neu- 
trality proclaimed  by  the  government  is  with  the 
express  articles  of  the  treaty.”  He  adds,  “ I have 
been  mortified  that  on  these  points  I could  offer 
no  bond  fide  explanations  that  might  be  satisfac- 
tory.” He  was  not  in  doubt  long,  however.  Mr. 
Jefferson  sent  him  within  two  or  three  weeks  a 
series  of  papers  by  Hamilton,  under  the  signature 
of  “ Pacificus,”  in  defense  of  the  proclamation, 
and  urged  him  to  reply.  This  Madison  undertook 
to  do  at  once,  and  in  five  papers,  under  the  signa- 
ture of  “ Helvidius,”  he  took  up  all  the  points  in 
dispute. 

The  question  relating  to  treaty  obligations  was 
the  more  serious.  By  the  treaty  of  1778  the 
United  States  had  guarantied  “ to  his  Most  Chris- 
tian Majesty,  the  present  possessions  of  the  Ci'own 
of  France  in  America.”  An  attempt  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  to  take  any  of  the  French  West 
India  Islands  would  involve  the  United  States  in 
the  war.  How,  then,  Mr.  Madison’s  friends  might 
well  ask,  as,  in  the  letter  just  quoted  he  said  they 
did,  could  “ the  President  declare  the  United 
States  to  be  neutral  in  the  unqualified  terms  used, 
when  we  were  so  notoriously  and  unequivocally 


208 


JAMES  MADISON. 


under  eventual  engagements  to  defend  the  Amer- 
ican possessions  of  France  ” ? Hamilton’s  ground 
was  that  the  treaty,  by  its  terms,  was  “ a defen- 
sive alliance,”  and  therefore  not  binding  in  this 
case,  inasmuch  as  the  present  war  against  England 
was  offensive  ; and  that,  besides,  the  treaty  was 
in  suspension,  as  France  herself  was,  in  a sense,  in 
suspension,  having  only  a provisional  government, 
the  permanent  and  legitimate  successor  to  which 
was  uncertain.  But  an  important  point  was 
gained,  it  was  thought,  in  the  decision  to  receive 
Genet  as  the  French  minister.  Hamilton,  still 
acting  in  accordance  with  that  cautious  policy 
which  he  thought  to  be,  in  such  a crisis,  the  most 
judicious,  questioned  whether  a minister  from  the 
provisional  government  in  Paris  should  be  recog- 
nized without  reservations.  Such  an  ambassador 
might  be  followed  presently  by  another  accredited 
by  a new  power  in  the  revolutionary  progress. 
This  would,  at  the  least,  be  an  awkward  dilemma 
not  to  be  recovered  from  without  the  loss  of  some 
dignity  by  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
But  this  point  also  was  yielded  in  deference  to 
Jefferson,  and  much  to  his  mortification  the  con- 
cession turned  out  to  be  before  he  was  many  weeks 
older. 

“ I anxiously  wish,”  Madison  wrote  to  Jeffer- 
son, “ that  the  reception  of  Genet  may  testify 
what  I believe  to  be  the  real  affections  of  the  peo- 
ple.” He  was  amply  gratified.  From  Charles- 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


209 


ton,  where  he  landed,  to  Philadelphia,  Genet  was 
received  with  the  warmest  enthusiasm  by  all  who 
sympathized  with  France,  and  by  that  larger 
number  among  Americans  who  are  always  ready 
to  hurrah  for  anything  or  anybody  that  has 
caught  the  popular  fancy.  Madison  watched  his 
progress  with  great  interest,  and  apparently  with 
some  misgivings.  Writing  again  a few  days  later, 
to  Jefferson,  he  says  that  “ the  fiscal  party  in 
Alexandria  was  an  overmatch  for  those  who 
wished  to  testify  the  American  sentiment.”  In- 
deed, he  thinks  it  certain,  he  says  in  the  same  let- 
ter, “ that  Genet  will  be  misled  if  he  takes  either 
the  fashionable  cant  of  the  cities  or  the  cold  cau- 
tion of  the  government  for  the  sense  of  the  pub- 
lic ” — falling  himself,  before  he  reaches  the  end 
of  the  sentence,  into  the  cant  of  assuming  neutral- 
ity in  the  government  to  be  only  a “ mask  ” be- 
hind which  to  hide  its  “secret  Anglomany.”  But 
he  was  quite  mistaken  in  supposing  that  Genet 
was  likely  to  be  misled,  or  led  at  all,  by  anybody. 
He  was  almost  capable,  as  General  Knox  said,  of 
declaring  the  United  States  a department  of 
France  and  of  levying  troops  here  to  reduce  the 
Americans  to  obedience.  The  man’s  conduct,  if 
it  had  not  been  so  outrageous,  would  have  been 
ludicrous  in  its  assumption  of  power,  its  disregard 
of  the  laws  of  the  country,  and  its  defiance  of  the 
government.  Within  thi'ee  months  of  his  arrival 
Jefferson  himself  was  constrained  to  acknowledge 
14 


210 


JAMES  MADISON. 


that  he  had  developed  “ a character  and  conduct 
so  unexpected  and  so  extraordinary,  as  to  place  us 
in  the  most  distressing  dilemma,  between  our  re- 
gard for  his  nation,  which  is  constant  and  sincere, 
and  a regard  for  our  laws,  the  authority  of  which 
must  be  maintained ; for  the  peace  of  our  country, 
which  the  executive  magistrate  is  charged  to  pre- 
serve ; for  its  honor,  offended  in  the  person  of 
that  magistrate  ; and  for  its  character,  grossly 
traduced  in  the  conversations  and  letters  of  this 
gentleman.”  Though  this  was  in  an  official  letter 
it  gave,  no  doubt,  Jefferson’s  real  opinion;  for  no 
man  had  more  reason  than  he  for  resenting  the 
conduct  of  the  irrepressible  Frenchman.  Jeffer- 
son has  been  accused  of  too  much  familiarity  with 
the  French  minister  in  private,  and  of  tardiness 
in  the  discharge  of  his  own  duty  as  Secretary 
where  it  was  likely  to  clash  with  the  other’s 
schemes.  Genet  himself  complained  that  he  was 
thrown  over  by  Jefferson  after  receiving  from  him 
every  encouragement.  This  is,  of  course,  true, 
but  not  in  the  least  discreditable  to  Jefferson. 
When  Genet  arrived  in  Philadelphia,  he  was,  al- 
though he  had  already  committed  some  illegal 
acts  in  Charleston,  profuse  in  his  promises  of  good 
behavior.  The  Secretary  of  State  had  welcomed 
him  as  the  representative  of  France  and  the  Rev- 
olution, and  naturally  he  meant  to  make  the  most 
he  could  out  of  him,  for  the  sake  of  the  Republi- 
can party,  as  well  as  for  the  sake  of  the  sacred 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


211 


cause  of  “liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity.”  But 
be  soon  saw  that  be  was  dealing  with  one  wbo 
was  a cross  between  a mountebank  and  a mad- 
man, as  we  learn  from  a letter  of  Madison  to  Jef- 
ferson, written  witbin  two  months  of  Jefferson’s 
first  interview  with  Genet.  . “ Your  account  of 
Genet,”  says  tbe  letter,  “ is  dreadful.  He  must 
be  brought  right  if  possible.  His  folly  will  other- 
wise do  mischief  which  no  wisdom  can  repair.” 

The  mischief  dreaded  was,  that  the  administra- 
tion party  would  take  advantage  of  the  insolent 
and  outrageous  conduct  of  the  French  minister  to 
show  the  folly  of  precipitancy,  and  to  gain  popu- 
larity and  strength  for  itself.  Madison  soon 
writes  to  Jefferson  to  acquaint  him  with  the  re- 
action taking  place  in  Virginia,  “ in  the  surprise 
and  disgust  of  those  who  are  attached  to  the 
French  cause,  and  who  viewed  this  minister  as 
the  instrument  for  cementing,  instead  of  alien- 
ating the  two  Republics.”  He  asserts  that  “ the 
Anglican  party  is  busy,  as  you  may  suppose,  in 
making  the  worst  of  everything,  and  in  turning 
the  public  feelings  against  France  and  thence  in 
favor  of  England.”  In  a sense  this  must  have 
been  true.  The  “fiscals,”  the  “ Anglomanys,” 
the  “ Anglican  party,”  the  “ monarchists  ” — 
which  were  Mr.  Madison’s  pet  names  for  his  old 
friends  — were  good  enough  politicians  to  take 
great  satisfaction  in  keeping  well  stirred  and  in 
lively  use  the  muddy  waters  into  which  their  op- 


212 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ponents  had  floundered.  They  were  not,  proba- 
bly, careful  always  to  remember  that  France  was 
neither  the  better  nor  worse,  neither  the  wiser  nor 
the  less  wise,  because  one  of  the  mad  fanatics, 
bred  of  the  Revolution,  had  found  his  way,  unfor- 
tunately, to  the  United  States  as  a minister  plen- 
ipotentiary. But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  not 
true  that  there  was  any  “ Anglican  party,”  in  the 
sense  in  which  Madison  used  the  term  ; — a party 
led  by  men  who  were  “ the  enemies  of  France 
and  of  liberty,  at  work  to  lead  the  well-meaning 
from  their  honorable  connection  with  those  [the 
French  people]  into  the  arms  and  ultimately  into 
the  government  of  Great  Britain.”  Washington 
said  that  he  did  not  believe  there  were  ten  men 
in  the  United  States,  whose  opinions  deserved  any 
respect,  who  would  change  the  form  of  govern- 
ment to  a monarchy.  But  if  there  were  only  ten 
men  in  the  country  whose  opinions,  in  the  esti- 
mate of  Jefferson  and  Madison,  were  not  worth 
much,  Washington  was  among  them.  The  affec- 
tion and  reverence,  with  which  he  was  regarded 
by  the  people,  they  would  have  been  glad  to  ap- 
peal to  on  behalf  of  their  own  party ; but  it  is 
easy  to  read  between  the  lines  in  Jefferson’s 
“Ana,”  and  in  his  and  Madison’s  correspondence, 
that  they  looked  upon  the  President  as  the  dupe 
of  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Not  that  they 
were  ever  wanting  in  terms  of  respect  and  even 
of  veneration  for  the  President,  but  the  tone  was 


FRENCH  POLITICS.  213 

often  one  of  pitiful  regret  almost  akin  to  con- 
tempt. 

“ I am  extremely  afraid,”  Madison  wrote  to 
Jefferson,  “ that  the  President  may  not  be  suffi- 
ciently aware  of  the  snares  that  may  be  laid  for 
his  good  intentions  by  men  whose  politics  at  bot- 
tom are  very  different  from  his  own.”  Again  he 
says,  a few  days  later,  “ I regret  extremely  the 
position  into  which  tlie  President  has  been  thrown. 
The  unpopular  cause  of  Anglomany  is  openly  lay- 
ing claim  to  him.  His  enemies,  masking  them- 
selves under  the  popular  cause  of  France,  are  play- 
ing off  the  most  tremendous  batteries  on  him.  . . . 
It  is  mortifying  to  the  real  friends  of  the  Presi- 
dent that  his  fame  and  his  influence  should  have 
anything  to  apprehend  from  the  success  of  liberty 
in  another  country,  since  he  owes  his  preeminence 
to  the  success  of  it  in  his  own.  If  France  tri- 
umphs, the  ill-fated  proclamation  will  be  a mill- 
stone, which  would  sink  any  other  character  and 
will  force  a struggle  even  on  his.”  Yet  it  is  cer- 
tain that  Washington  was  not  in  the  least  doubt  as 
to  his  own  political  principles  ; that  he  was  never 
in  danger  of  being  inveigled  into  the  betrayal  of 
those  principles,  whatever  they  might  be,  and  that 
he  was  quite  capable  of  due  care  for  his  own  rep- 
utation. 

If  Madison  did  not  know  that  these  tears  over 
Washington,  if  sincere,  were  quite  uncalled  for, 
Jefferson  was  not  in  the  least  deceived.  He  re- 


214  JAMES  MADISON. 

cords  in  his  “ Ana  ” that  the  President,  referring 
to  certain  articles  that  had  recently  appeared  in 
Freneau’s  “Gazette,”  said  that  “he  considered 
those  papers  as  attacking  him  [Washington]  di- 
rectly ; for  he  must  be  a fool  indeed  to  swallow 
the  little  sugar-plums  here  and  there  thrown  out 
to  him.  That  in  condemning  the  administration 
of  the  government  they  condemned  him,  for  if  they 
thought  there  were  measures  pursued  contrary 
to  his  sentiments,  they  must  conceive  him  too 
careless  to  attend  to  them,  or  too  stupid  to  under- 
stand them.”  Again,  some  months  later,  the  Pres- 
ident, alluding  to  another  article  in  Freneau’s  pa- 
per,— that  “ rascal  Freneau,”  as  he  called  him, — 
said,  “ that  he  despised  all  their  attacks  on  him 
personally,  but  there  never  had  been  an  act  of  the 
government  — not  meaning  in  the  executive  line 
only,  but  in  any  line  — which  that  paper  had  not 
abused.  He  was  evidently  sore  and  warm,”  con- 
tinues the  candid  Secretary,  “ and  I took  his  in- 
tention to  be,  that  I should  interpose  in  some  way 
with  Freneau,  perhaps  withdraw  his  appointment 
of  translating  clerk  in  my  office.  But  I will  not 
do  it.” 

These  frank  and  indignant  avowals  of  feeling 
and  opinion  were  not,  if  we  may  believe  Jeffer- 
son, unusual  with  Washington,  even  in  cabinet 
meetings  ; and  it  seems  hardly  likely  that  Madi- 
son, who  was  on  the  most  friendly  and  intimate 
terms  with  the  President,  could  have  been  so  ignoe 


FRENCH  POLITICS. 


215 


rant  of  how  lie  felt  and  thought,  as  to  suppose  him 
the  mere  dupe  of  designing  men.  The  truth  is, 
probably,  that  Madison  did  not,  any  more  than 
Jefferson,  believe  this.  It  was  only  a bit  of  party 
tactics  to  assume,  lest  the  President  should  have 
too  much  influence  over  the  minds  of  the  people, 
that,  in  the  hands  of  the  wicked  “ Anglicists,”  he 
was  as  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  potter.  The  two 
friends,  whether  in  writing  or  by  speech  they  la- 
mented and  excused  the  unhappy  position,  as  they 
were  pleased  to  call  it,  of  the  President,  must 
have  appeared  to  each  other  like  the  Roman  au- 
gurs in  G^rome’s  picture. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS. 

Genet  was  at  last  got  rid  of,  but  the  evil  that 
he  did  lived  after  him.  His  presence  had  pro- 
voked an  outbreak,  to  some  degree,  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  French  Revolution,  which,  however 
significant  they  might  be  in  the  upheaval  of  an 
old  monarchical  despotism,  were  an  unwholesome 
growth  among  a simple  people,  where  one  man 
was  as  good  as  another  before  the  law ; where, 
from  the  first  settlement  of  the  country,  all  had 
largely  possessed  the  advantages  of  a popular  gov- 
ernment ; and  where  any  other  than  a republican 
government  for  the  future  was  well-nigh  impos- 
sible. For  men  to  address  each  other  as  “citi- 
zen,” as  if  the  word  had  the  new  significance  in 
America  that  it  had  just  gained  in  France  ; to 
swear  eternal  fidelity  to  liberty,  equality,  and  fra- 
ternity, as  if  these  were  lately  discovered  rights, 
which  had  been  denied  the  common  people  for 
centuries  by  kings  and  nobles,  who  had  always 
lived  in  the  next  street  in  inconceivable  luxury 
wrung  from  the  blood  and  sweat  of  the  poor ; to 
form  Jacobin  Clubs  pledged  to  the  suppression  of 


EIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  217 

the  tyranny  of  aristocrats  in  a country  where,  as 
Samuel  Dexter  said  of  New  England,  there  was 
hardly  a man  rich  enough  to  own  a carriage,  and 
few  so  poor  as  not  to  own  a horse  ; for  men  thus 
to  ape  those  revolutionary  ways,  which  meant  so 
much  in  Paris,  may  have  seemed  at  the  moment, 
to  sober-minded  people,  more  fantastic  than  harm- 
ful. It  was  harmful,  however,  insomuch  as  it  sub- 
stituted sentiment  for  common  sense,  and  made 
enthusiasm,  not  reason,  the  guide  of  conduct.  A 
character  was  given  to  political  conflict  which  ob- 
tained for  years  to  come.  There  was,  it  is  true,  a 
certain  manliness  about  it  in  remarkable  contrast 
with  that  maudlin  sentimentality  of  our  time, 
which  is  rather  inclined  to  ask  pardon  of  the  reb- 
els of  the  late  civil  war  for  having  put  them  to 
the  trouble  of  getting  up  a rebellion.  It  was  a 
conflict,  nevertheless,  more  of  party  passion  than 
of  principle,  whei’ein  it  is  impossible  to  see  that 
either  party  was  absolutely  right,  or  either  abso- 
lutely wrong.  The  Fran  comania  phase  of  it  dis- 
appeared for  a time  in  John  Adams’s  administra- 
tion ; but  it  revived  again,  and  gave  intensity  and 
virulence  to  the  political  struggles,  in  the  first  de- 
cade of  this  century.  Then  it  was  that  men  went 
about  their  daily  affairs  with  cockades  on  their 
hats  as  distinctive  party  badges.  In  their  social 
as  well  as  in  their  business  relations  they  were 
governed  by  party  affinities.  Neighbors  differing 
in  politics  would  hardly  speak  to  each  other,  and 


218 


JAMES  MADISON. 


each  was  always  ready  to  accept  the  other’s  polit- 
ical crookedness  as  the  measure  of  his  possible  de- 
pravity in  everything  else.  They  would  hardly 
walk  on  the  same  side  of  the  street ; or  sail  in  the 
same  packet ; or  ride  in  the  same  stage-coach ; or 
buy  their  groceries  at  the  same  shop  ; or  listen  to 
the  preaching  of  the  gospel  from  the  same  pulpit ; 
indeed,  if  the  preacher  was  known  to  have  pro- 
nounced political  opinions,  he  was  held,  by  those 
who  did  not  agree  with  him,  as  one  from  whose 
shoulders  the  clerical  gown  should  be  torn. 

Gratitude  to  France  had  not  yet  even  become 
traditional,  and  it  was  intensified  by  the  deepest 
sympathy  for  a people  struggling  for  what,  by 
their  aid,  Americans  had  so  recently  gained. 
Added  to  this  was  the  old  hatred  to  England,  which 
England  as  carefully  nursed  as  if  it  were  her  set- 
tled policy,  by  exciting  Indian  hostilities  on  the 
borders,  by  outrages  on  the  high  seas,  and  by  an 
interference  with  American  commerce,  exercised 
with  as  little  consideration  of  the  rights  of  an  inde- 
pendent nation  as  if  the  States  were  still  colonies 
in  revolt.  Never  did  a party  find,  ready-made  and 
close  at  hand,  so  many  elements  of  popularity  ; and 
these  being  appealed  to  as  Genet  appealed  to  them, 
it  was  easy  to  set  the  country  in  a blaze.  When 
the  Administration  was  determined  that  he  should 
be  recalled,  and  the  Republican  leaders  were  anx- 
ious to  get  rid  of  him,  as  they  could  not  restrain 
him,  Jefferson  opposed,  in  a meeting  of  the  cabinet, 


HIS  LATEST  TEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  219 

the  proposition  to  ask  for  his  recall,  lest  such  pop- 
ular indignation  should  be  aroused  as  would  en- 
able the  French  minister  to  defy  the  Govei’nment 
itself.  The  seed  sowed  by  such  a man,  on  such  a 
soil,  bore  fruit  a thousand-fold  for  almost  a gener- 
ation. It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  Fed- 
eralists could  not  long  hold  their  own  against  a 
party  that  did  not  ask  the  people  to  think,  but 
bade  them  only  to  remember,  — much,  indeed, 
that  ought  to  be  remembered,  — and  to  feel. 
That  is  always  so  much  easier  to  do  than  the  other, 
and  it  is  always  so  much  easier  to  appeal  effectu- 
ally to  sentiment  than  to  reflection,  that  the  won- 
der rather  is  that  the  Federalists  could  hold  their 
own  so  long  as  they  did.  All  things  were  against 
them  but  one.  Washington,  though  altogether 
above  any  partisan  bias,  as  he  believed  to  be  the 
imperative  duty  of  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  na- 
tion, conducted  his  administration  by  the  princi- 
ples which  distinguished  the  Federalists.  He  was 
neither,  as  he  intimated  to  Jefferson,  so  careless 
as  not  to  know  what  was  done,  nor  such  a fool 
as  not  to  understand  why  it  was  done  ; and  so 
greatly  was  he  revered  for  his  exalted  character, 
so  universal  was  the  confidence  in  his  integrity, 
sagacity,  and  sound  judgment,  that,  so  long  as  he 
remained  President,  the  party  that  surrounded  him 
was  immovable  as  a mountain.  His  policy  was 
to  stave  off  a rupture  with  England,  and,  if  pos- 
sible, to  bring  that  power  into  pacific  and  rational 


220 


JAMES  MADISON. 


relations  with  the  United  States.  The  govern- 
ment aimed  to  keep  itself  clear  of  entanglement 
with  all  foreign  politics  ; to  maintain  that  perfect 
neutrality  which  should  violate  no  treaties,  offend 
no  national  friendships,  provoke  no  jealousies,  and 
leave  England  and  France  to  fight  their  own  bat- 
tles, content  that  the  United  States  should  be  an 
impartial  spectator.  Thirty  years  afterward,  when 
the  Federal  party  had  ceased  to  exist  under  that 
title,  this  was  announced  as  the  true  American 
policy,  and  was  thenceforth  known  as  “ The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,”  though  the  merit,  even  of  re-dis- 
covery, did  not  belong  to  President  Monroe. 

In  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  perhaps  in  ninety-nine 
out  of  a hundred,  the  wisest  statesmanship  is  the 
knowledge  when  and  how  to  compromise.  Cer- 
tainly that  was  all  John  Jay,  whom  the  President 
sent  to  England  to  make  a treaty,  could  do.  The 
treaty  was  a bad  one  ; that  is,  it  was  not  such  an 
one  as  any  President  and  Senate  would  have  dared 
to  consent  to  for  the  last  sixty  years  ; it  was  not 
so  good  an  one  as  that  which  Monroe  and  Pinkney 
negotiated  ten  years  later,  and  which  President 
Jefferson,  lest  it  should  help  England  and  hurt 
France,  then  quietly  locked  up  in  his  desk  with- 
out permitting  the  Senate  even  to  know  of  its  ex- 
istence ; nor  was  it  so  bad  as  the  treaty  of  peace 
made  with  England  in  1814.  But  it  was  undoubt- 
edly the  best  that  could  be  done  at  the  time.  The 
question  was  between  it  and  nothing ; and  the 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS  221 

best  its  warmest  defenders  could  say  was,  that  it 
was  better  than  nothing.  No  treaty  meant  war ; 
and  war  at  that  moment  with  England  meant 
ruin.  At  least  so  the  Federalists  thought,  and,  so 
far  as  human  foresight  could  go,  they  were  prob- 
ably right. 

But  never  was  a treaty  more  unpopular  than 
this,  when  its  provisions  came  to  be  understood. 
The  government,  in  delaying  to  make  it  public, 
seemed  to  fear  for  its  reception,  and  by  that  hesi- 
tation helped  to  raise  the  very  doubts  it  was  afraid 
of.  But  when  it  was  published  the  whole  South 
was  aroused,  as  one  man,  on  finding  that  the  pay- 
ment for  fugitive  slaves,  who  during  the  war  of 
the  Revolution  had  sought  refuge  with  the  Brit- 
ish army,  was  not  provided  for.  Other  concessions 
made  to  England  were,  in  other  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, deemed  not  less  humiliating  and  injurious  to 
the  national  honor  than  this  refusal  to  pay  for 
runaway  negroes.  Also,  there  was  a one-sided 
stipulation  relating  to  commerce  in  the  West  In- 
dies, so  injurious  to  American  interests  that  the 
President  and  Senate,  rather  than  ratify  it,  de- 
termined to  reject  the  whole  treaty  and  take  the 
consequences.  There  was  hardly  a town  of  any 
note  that  did  not  hold  its  indignation  meeting. 
Jay  was  burned  in  effigy,  or  the  attempt  was  made 
so  to  express  the  public  disapprobation,  in  more 
than  one  of  the  larger  towns.  Hamilton,  when 
at  a public  meeting  in  New  York  he  tried  to 


222 


JAMES  MADISON. 


explain  and  defend  the  treaty,  was  stoned  and 
compelled  to  retire.  If  the  more  violent  oppo- 
nents of  the  Administratkm  were  to  be  believed,  its 
members,  from  the  President  down,  and  all  the 
leading  men  of  the  party  supporting  it,  were 
bought  by  “ British  gold,”  or  were  ready  without 
being  bought,  but  from  pure  original  depravity, 
to  betray  their  own  country  and  help  to  destroy 
France.  The  name  of  the  ingenious  inventor  of 
the  argument  of  “British  gold,”  then  used  for  the 
first  time,  has  unfortunately  been  lost ; but  it 
has  stood  the  test  of  a hundred  years’  usage,  and 
is  as  startling  and  conclusive  to-day  as  it  was  a 
century  ago. 

There  soon  came,  however,  the  sober  second 
thought  which  took  into  consideration  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  treaty  was  made,  the  pos- 
sible, and  even  probable,  consequences  of  its  rejec- 
tion, as  well  as  the  objections  to  the  treaty  itself. 
After  the  first  excitement  had  passed  away,  many 
thought  it  worth  while  to  read  for  themselves 
what  hitherto  they  had  only  reviled  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  others,  or  from  sympathy  with  the  popular 
clamor.  The  commercial  community,  the  New 
York  Chamber  of  Commerce  leading  the  way, 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  their  rights  and  in- 
terests were  reasonably  protected;  that  to  be  rec- 
ognized as  a neutral  between  two  such  belligerent 
powers  as  England  and  France  was  a great  point 
gained ; that  partial  indemnity  was  better  than 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  228 

total  loss  ; and  that  the  chance  of  a fairly  profita- 
ble trade  in  the  future  was  preferable  to  the  ruin 
of  all  foreign  commerce.  It  was  universally 
agreed  that  peace  was  better  than  war ; but  there 
was  this  difference  between  the  two  parties  : 
while  one  maintained  that  war  was  not  a neces- 
sary consequence  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  the 
other  declared  it  must  be  inevitable,  where  there 
were  so  many  points  of  collision  which  could  only 
be  escaped  by  mutual  agreement.  This  was  espe- 
cially true  on  the  frontier,  where  Indian  hostilities 
were  sure  to  follow,  and  lead  to  general  war,  if  the 
military  posts,  which  should  have  been  given  up  at 
the  close  of  the  Revolution,  should  remain  longer 
in  the  hands  of  the  English. 

But,  after  all,  the  real  question  with  the  Repub- 
licans was  the  influence  which  a treaty  with  Eng- 
land might  have  upon  the  relations  of  France  and 
the  United  States.  They  detested  England  for  her 
own  sake ; they  detested  her  still  more  for  the 
sake  of  France.  If  there  had  been  no  question  of 
France  in  the  way  they  would,  perhaps,  have  been 
willing,  like  the  Federalists,  to  consider  the  rela- 
tions of  England  and  the  United  States  on  their 
merits ; — to  remember  that  the  commerce  be- 
tween them  was  greater  than  that  which  the 
United  States  had  with  any  other  country,  the 
loss  of  which  might  be  a disastrous  check  to  her 
prosperity ; that  the  peoples  of  the  two  countries 
were,  after  all,  of  one  blood,  and  that  theirs  was 


224 


JAMES  MADISON. 


a common  heritage  in  the  institutions,  laws,  lan- 
guage, and  character  that  distinguished  the  race  ; 
that  the  quarrel  between  them  was  — though  it 
might  be  the  more  bitter  on  that  account  — a 
family  quarrel,  and  ought,  for  that  reason,  to  he 
the  more  speedily  settled.  But,  if  England  would 
not  remember  these  things  — as  she  never  has  to 
this  day  — if,  on  the  contrary,  she  chose  to  be 
overbearing,  contemptuous,  insolent,  quite  regard- 
less  of  American  rights  — as  she  always  has  been 
when  she  could  be  so  safely  — then  it  behooved 
the  United  States,  inasmuch  as  she  was  a young 
and  as  yet  a feeble  nation,  to  conciliate  this  pow- 
erful enemy  whenever  she  could  do  so  consist- 
ently with  her  self-respect,  to  avoid  giving  un- 
necessary offense  or  pi’ovoking  fresh  injuries,  and, 
in  the  meanwhile,  to  nurture  and  husband  her 
strength,  to  keep  an  accurate  account  of  all  the 
wrongs  that  in  her  weakness  she  should  be  com- 
pelled to  submit  to,  and  to  bide  her  time.  These 
were  the  principles  of  the  Federalists.  Their  aim 
was  not  the  good  of  England,  but  the  good  of  the 
United  States.  They  were  an  American  pai'ty  ; 
to  them  foreign  relations  were  of  importance 
mainly  for  the  influence  these  might  have  upon 
the  prosperity,  happiness,  and  power  of  their  own 
country.  They  did  not  forget  the  gratitude  due 
to  France  for  the  aid  she  had  given  to  the  strug- 
gling colonies,  though  that  aid  was  given  not  so 
much  for  love  of  America  as  for  hatred  of  Eng- 


EIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  225 

land.  The  pacific  and  friendly  relations  already 
established  with  France  they  held  in  due  esti- 
mation ; and  their  sympathies  went  out  to  her 
people  in  full  measure  in  their  struggle  for  a pop- 
ular government,  so  long  as  that  struggle  was 
kept  within  the  bounds  of  reason  and  humanity. 
But  sympathy  with,  and  gratitude  to  France  did 
not  blind  them  to  the  wisdom  and  expediency  of 
pacific  and  friendly  relations  with  England,  pro- 
vided such  could  be  established  without  the  sacri- 
fice of  their  own  prosperity,  independence,  and 
national  pride.  It  was  only  to  add  to  that  pros- 
perity, to  gain  new  security  for  that  independence, 
and  to  build  up  a nation  of  which  they  and  their 
children,  to  the  latest  generation,  might  well  be 
proud,  that  they  ought  to  be  on  good  terms  with 
that  powerful  state  with  whom  they  were  co-heirs 
in  all  the  ideas  and  institutions  constituting  the 
civilization  that  made  her  great.  They  hoped  to 
build  up,  west  of  the  Alantic  Ocean,  “ an  Inglishe 
Nation”  in  its  broadest  sense,  of  which  Walter 
Raleigh  had  hoped  that  he  might  live  to  see  the 
beginning,  and  which  the  latest  historical  writers 
in  England  are  just  now  recognizing  as  the  most 
important  part  of  the  modern  empire  of  the  Eng- 
lish race. 

The  House  of  Representatives  was  not  in  ses- 
sion when  the  Jay  treaty  was  ratified  by  the 
President  and  Senate  ; but  Mr.  Madison’s  letters 
show  that  he  could  see  in  it  nothing  but  evil.  In 
15 


226 


JAMES  MADISON. 


February,  1796,  the  ratification  by  both  govern- 
ments was  announced  to  both  Houses  of  Congress, 
and  measures  were  at  once  taken  by  the  Repub- 
licans in  the  lower  House  to  render  the  treaty,  if 
possible,  null  and  void.  A resolution,  warmly 
supported  by  Mr.  Madison,  was  offered,  calling 
upon  the  President  for  copies  of  the  instructions 
under  which  Mr.  Jay  acted,  with  the  correspond- 
ence and  any  other  papers,  proper  to  be  made 
public,  relating  to  the  negotiation.  The  resolution 
was  subjected  to  a debate  of  three  weeks,  but  was 
finally  passed.  The  request  was  refused  by  the 
President  on  the  ground  that  the  treaty -making 
power  was,  by  the  Constitution,  confided  to  the 
President  and  Senate.  It  was  on  this  point 
mainly  that  the  debate  had  turned  ; and  the  Pres- 
ident in  support  of  his  opinion,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  Federalists  generally,  referred  to  his  recollec- 
tion of  the  plain  intention  of  the  Constitutional 
Convention  ; and  to  the  fact  that  a proposition, 
“ that  no  treaty  should  be  binding  on  the  United 
States  which  was  not  ratified  by  law,”  was  “ ex- 
plicitly rejected.”  Mr.  Madison  said,  a day  or 
two  after,  that,  while  he  did  not  doubt  “ the  case 
to  be  as  stated,  he  had  no  recollection  of  it.”  Of 
the  message  itself  he  said,  that  it  was  “ as  unex- 
pected as  its  tone  and  tenor  are  improper  and  in- 
delicate.” But  Hamilton,  he  thought,  wrote  it, 
and  the  President  was,  as  usual,  lamented  over  for 
having  been  taken  in.  A resolution,  however,  was 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS. 


227 


finally  passed  in  favor  of  the  treaty,  though  by  a 
majority  of  three  only.  The  debate  upon  it  was 
earnest  and  long,  Mr.  Madison  leading  the  oppo- 
sition. His  disappointment  was  bitter.  “ The 
progress  of  this  business  throughout,”  he  wrote  to 
Jefferson,  “ has  been  to  me  the  most  worrying 
and  vexatious  that  I ever  encountered ; and  the 
more  so,  as  the  causes  lay  in  the  unsteadiness,  the 
follies,  the  perverseness,  and  the  defections  among 
our  friends,  more  than  in  the  strength,  or  dexter- 
ity, or  malice  of  our  opponents.” 

Though  the  Jay  treaty  was  not  — as  was  said 
on  a previous  page  — such  an  one  as  the  United 
States  would  nave  acceded  to  in  latter  times,  the 
result  proved  it  to  be  a wise  and  timely  measure. 
Notwithstanding  the  disturbed  condition  of  affairs 
in  Europe,  its  influence  upon  the  United  States, 
and  the  increasing  violence  of  faction  here,  the  in- 
crease for  the  next  ten  or  twelve  years  of  the  com- 
merce, and  the  consequent  growth  and  prosperity 
of  the  country,  were  greater  than  the  most  sanguine 
supporters  of  the  treaty  had  dared  to  hope  for. 
Their  immediate  expectations  that  it  might  be 
possible  to  establish  better  relations  with  England, 
without  disturbing  essentially  those  existing  with 
France,  were,  however,  signally  disappointed. 
Their  opponents  were  wiser ; for  they  not  only 
measured  accurately  the  indignation  of  the  French 
by  their  own,  but  they  took  good  care  that  it 
should  not  languish  for  want  of  encouragement. 


228 


JAMES  MADISON. 


The  French  Directory  might  have  Been  reconciled 
to  the  situation  had  it  been  plain  to  them  that 
there  was  neither  an  “ Anglicized  ” party  nor  a 
French  party  in  the  United  States,  but  that  the 
people  were  united  in  the  determination  to  main- 
tain, for  their  own  protection,  whatever  their  per- 
sonal sympathies  might  be,  an  absolute  neutrality 
between  the  belligerent  powers.  But  as  they 
were  assured  that  their  friends  in  America  meant 
also  to  be  their  effectual  allies,  so  they  believed 
that  those  who  professed  neutrality  used  it  only 
as  a mask  for  friendship  to  England. 

James  Monroe  had  been  received  in  Paris  as 
American  minister,  literally  as  well  as  morally, 
with  open  arms,  in  that  memorable  scene  when,  in 
the  presence  and  amid  the  cheers  of  the  National 
Convention,  the  President,  Merlin  de  Douai,  im- 
printed upon  his  cheeks,  in  the  name  of  France, 
the  kiss  of  fraternity.  Till  he  was  recalled  in  the 
latter  days  of  Washington’s  administration,  Mon- 
roe was  the  representative,  not  so  much  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  which  he  owed  allegiance,  as  of  the 
faction  to  which  he  belonged  at  home.  He  was 
not,  it  is  true,  unmindful  of  the  hundreds  of  out- 
rages perpetrated  by  French  naval  vessels  and  pri- 
vateers upon  American  merchantmen  ; that  their 
crews  were  thrown  into  French  prisons,  and  that 
the  detention  of  their  cargoes  had  brought  ruin 
upon  many  American  citizens  ; nor  did  he  neglect 
to  demand  redress.  But  he  seemed  absolutely  in- 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  229 

capable  of  understanding  that  if  there  were  any- 
thing to  choose  between  the  insults  and  wrongs 
which  America  was  compelled  to  submit  to  from 
England  and  France,  it  was  only  in  the  greater 
ability  of  England  to  inflict  them.  English  ships 
swept  the  ocean,  and  pretexts  were  never  wanting 
for  overhauling  American  vessels,  stripping  them 
of  some  of  their  men,  or  confiscating  both  ships  and 
cargoes.  France  had  as  many  pretexts  and  quite 
as  good  a will  to  enforce  them  ; but  she  had  fewer 
ships,  and  for  that  reason,  and  that  only,  did  rather 
less  damage. 

But  however  earnest  Monroe  was  in  insisting 
upon  the  rights  of  neutrals,  in  urging  upon  the 
French  ministry  the  strict  observance  of  treaty 
obligations,  and  in  complaining  of  the  constant 
injuries  done  in  their  despite,  there  was  another 
thing  about  which  he  was  far  more  earnest.  He 
was  as  anxious  to  aid  the  French  to  baffle,  if  pos- 
sible, Jay’s  negotiations  in  London  as  if  he  were 
uncovering  a plot  against  his  own  government. 
When  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  was  made 
known  in  Paris,  the  indignation  of  the  Directoi'y 
was  hardly  kept  within  bounds.  The  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  notified  Monroe  that  the  Directory 
considered  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1778 
as  altered  and  suspended  in  their  most  essential 
parts  by  this  treaty  with  England.  Under  any 
circumstances  the  French  would,  no  doubt,  have 
resented  the  establishment  of  friendly  relations  be- 


230 


JAMES  MADISON. 


tween  the  United  States  and  the  old  enemy  of 
France,  with  whom  she,  at  that  moment,  was  en- 
gaged in  a war  arousing  more  than  the  bitter  in- 
herited enmity  of  the  two  peoples.  But  the  course 
Monroe  had  seen  fit  to  pursue  had  done  much  to 
assure  the  French  that  the  strong  party  in  the 
United  States,  which  he  represented,  would  never 
permit  the  virgin  Republic  to  be  delivered,  as  it 
was  assumed  the  treaty  did  deliver  her,  bound  and 
gagged  into  the  hands  of  the  power  which  Jeffer- 
son loved  to  call  “ the  harlot  England.”  The  first 
enthusiasm  of  the  Revolution  was  fast  growing 
into  cant  in  both  countries,  and  the  language  of 
devotion  to  liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity  was 
beginning  to  lose  all  meaning.  But  it  was  easy 
to  be  deceived  by  the  assurances,  more  significant 
in  actions  than  in  words,  of  an  official  representa- 
tive, that  the  American  people,  save  an  Anglicized 
and  decreasing  minority,  were  the  friends,  and 
meant  to  be  the  allies,  of  France.  Of  course  the 
French  were  all  the  more  exasperated  because 
they  had  permitted  themselves  to  be  deluded. 
Monroe  was  first  rebuked  by  his  own  government 
for  neglecting  to  do  all  that  might  have  been  done 
to  reconcile  the  Directory  to  a treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  ; and  soon  after, 
his  conduct  continuing  unsatisfactory,  he  was  re- 
called. 

It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  the  French  Direc- 
tory were  not  misled ; that  nothing  would  have 


HIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  231 

reconciled  them  to  the  British  treaty;  and  that 
their  subsequent  course  would  have  been  the 
same,  had  they  believed  the  American  people 
were  desirous  to  be  on  good  terms  with  England 
solely  for  their  own  tranquillity  and  interest,  and 
not  at  all  because  any  large  portion  of  them  were 
at  enmity  with  France.  This,  however,  would  not 
be  a valid  excuse  for  Monroe’s  course  as  a repre- 
sentative of  his  government.  The  only  defense 
for  him  is,  that  he  was  deceived  by  his  friends  at 
home  ; they  must  share,  therefore,  the  responsibil- 
ity for  his  conduct,  inasmuch  as  they  encouraged 
a man,  not  over  strong  in  mind  or  character  and 
more  likely  to  be  governed  by  impulse  than  by 
good  judgment,  to  abuse  the  confidence  placed  in 
him  by  the  Administration. 

From  any  share  in  this  responsibility,  however, 
Madison  must  be  relieved.  He  was  in  very  con- 
stant correspondence  with  Monroe,  and  kept  him 
carefully  advised  as  to  the  progress  of  the  treaty. 
No  man  desired  its  defeat  more  earnestly  than  he, 
and  he  believed  that  a majority  of  the  people 
were  opposed  to  it.  But  he  evidently  doubted  its 
rejection  from  the  first,  and  his  discussion  of  pos- 
sibilities in  his  letters  to  Monroe  was  always  frank 
and  discriminating.  In  the  end  he  accounted  for 
the  vote  in  its  favor  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives by  the  activity  and  influence  of  its  friends, 
which  its  opponents  wanted  the  ability  or  the 
time  to  overcome.  It  is  probable  that  his  col- 


232 


JAMES  MADISON. 


leagues  of  his  own  party  in  the  House  did  not 
agree  with  him  that  public  opinion  was  against 
the  treaty,  as  it  was  by  votes  from  their  side  that 
its  acceptance  was  carried. 

With  the  ensuing  session  of  Congress,  at  the 
close  of  Washington's  administration,  Madison’s 
congressional  service  ended.  The  leadership  of 
the  opposition,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  its 
influence  upon  the  welfare  of  the  country,  or  of 
the  personal  motives  by  which  he  may  have  been 
governed,  had  devolved  upon  him,  almost  from  the 
beginning,  by  natural  selection  of  the  fittest  for 
that  position.  It  was  not  an  easy  place  to  take, 
either  by  one's  own  choice  or  by  the  suffrages  of 
others ; for  at  the  head  of  the  administration  to 
be  opposed  stood  the  man  most  revered  by  a 
grateful  country,  surrounded  by  men  among  those, 
at  least,  who  were  best  known  for  their  past  ser- 
vices and  most  esteemed  for  their  ability  and  char- 
acter. It  was  the  more  difficult  for  one  whose 
personal  relation  to  the  President  was  that  of  the 
warmest  friendship ; to  whom  the  President  was 
accustomed  to  turn  for  counsel  and  even  for  guid- 
ance ; and  who,  being  among  those  eminent  men 
to  whom  the  people  owed  their  new  Constitution, 
was  counted  upon  to  strengthen  the  union  of  the 
States  and  build  up  a strong  and  stable  govern- 
ment. He  played  his  difficult  part,  nevertheless, 
with  dignity;  if  not  brilliant,  he  was  always 
ready  with  the  best  reasons  that  could  be  given 


EIS  LATEST  YEARS  IN  CONGRESS.  233 

for  the  measures  he  supported  ; and  his  zeal  was 
invariably  tempered  with  a wise  moderation  and 
a courtesy  toward  opponents,  which  made  him  al- 
ways respected,  and  sometimes  feared  for  reserved 
force,  in  debate. 

Somewhat  more  than  a year  before  his  retire- 
ment from  Congress  Mr.  Madison  had  married, 
and  it  is  quite  possible  that  this  may  in  part  have 
moved  him  to  seek  rest  in  the  tranquillity  of  a 
country  life.  Tradition  says  that  Mrs.  Madison 
was  a beautiful  woman.  She  has  in  our  time  been 
a marked  figure  in  the  society  of  Washington,  and 
many  remember  her  for  her  fine  presence,  her 
powers  of  conversation,  and  that  beauty  which 
sometimes  belongs  to  the  aged,  though  it  may  not 
have  been  preceded  by  youthful  comeliness.  Her 
maiden  name  was  Dolly  Payne,  and  her  parents 
were  members  of  the  Society  of  Friends.  When 
Madison  married  her  she  was  Mrs.  Todd,  the 
widow  of  John  Todd,  a lawyer  of  Philadelphia. 
Her  age  at  this  time  was  twenty-six  years,  Mr. 
Madison  being  forty-three,  and  she  survived  him 
thirteen  )rears,  dying  in  1849.  On  her  tombstone 
she  is  called  “ Dolley;”  but  Mr.  Rives,  in  his  life 
of  her  husband,  ever  mindful  of  the  proprieties, 
calls  her  “ Dorothea,”  or  rather,  Mrs.  Dorothea 
Payne  Madison  ; for,  like  the  Vicar  of  Wakefield, 
he  loved  to  give  the  whole  name. 


CHAPTER  XV. 


AT  HOME.  — “RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99.” 

Mr.  Madison,  in  retiring  for  a time  from  pub- 
lic office,  did  not  lose  his  interest  in  public  affairs. 
Of  few  Americans  can  it  be  said* with  more  truth, 
that  he  had  a genius  for  politics,  and  the  sub- 
ject, wherever  he  might  be,  was  never  out  of  his 
mind.  There  is  not  much  else  in  the  volumes 
of  his  published  letters,  while  there  is  just  enough 
else  to  show  that  in  these  he  said  all  he  had  to 
say  about  anything.  His  more  ambitious  writ- 
ings, the  papers  in  “The  Federalist,”  the  essay 
on  The  British  Doctrine  of  Neutral  Trade,  his  con- 
troversial articles  in  the  newspapers  under  various 
pseudonyms,  are  all  political,  all  able,  and  all  of 
great  value  as  a part  of  the  history  of  the  times. 
Those  which  are  controversial,  however,  must  be 
taken,  like  his  letters,  as  aids  to  knowledge  rather 
than  as  definite  conclusions  to  be  accejMed  with- 
out question.  It  does  not  detract  from  the  value 
of  these  letters,  however,  that  they  are  written 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a party  leader.  Affairs 
of  only  tempoi-ary  importance  sometimes  loom  up 
before  him  merely  because  of  their  influence  upon 


AT  HOME. 


235 


some  immediate  party  movement ; and  others  of 
far-reaching  consequences,  which  have  no  such 
bearing,  escape  his  notice  altogether ; but  the 
reader  soon  learns  that  he  may,  at  any  rate,  con- 
fide in  the  sincerity  of  the  writer,  and  accept  as 
freely  the  reasons  given  for  his  course  as  they  are 
frankly  stated. 

Of  the  literary  value  of  his  writings,  aside  from 
their  historical  interest,  there  is  not  much  to  be 
said,  though  Mr.  Madison  always  wrote,  even  in 
his  letters,  as  if  writing  for  posterity.  He  was 
not  felicitous  in  the  use  of  language ; the  style  is 
turgid,  heavy  with  resounding  words  of  many  syl- 
lables, unillumined  by  any  ray  of  imagination, 
any  flash  of  wit  or  of  humor  ; and  the  sentences 
are  often  involved  and  badly  put  together.  But 
there  is  a genuineness,  an  evident  sincerity  of  pur- 
pose, in  all  he  wrote,  and  occasionally  an  expres- 
sion of  deep  feeling,  which  are  always  impressive. 
We  search  for  glimpses  of  his  private  life  and 
character  in  such  letters,  for  they  are  not  easily 
apparent.  In  one  sense  he  had  no  private  life,  or, 
at  least,  none  that  was  not  so  subordinate  to  his 
public  career  that  there  was  little  in  it  either  sig- 
nificant or  attractive.  There  is,  in  this  respect, 
a marked  contrast  between  his  correspondence 
and  that  of  Jefferson.  There  was,  possibly,  a lit- 
tle affectation  in  Jefferson’s  frequent  assertions  of 
his  intense  desire  for  the  quiet  of  the  country  and 
the  tranquillity  of  home,  and  of  his  distaste  for  the 


236 


JAMES  MADISON. 


turmoils  and  anxieties  of  public  office.  But  he 
■was  certainly  fond  of  country-life  with  the  leisure 
to  potter  about  among  his  sheep  and  his  trees ; to 
watch  the  growth  of  his  wheat  and  his  clover ; to 
contrive  new  coulters  for  his  plows  ; to  talk  of  phi- 
losophy, of  the  Social  Contract,  of  mechanics,  and 
of  natural  history ; if  he  was  averse  to  public 
life  it  was  not  because  political  power  and  distinc- 
tion were  a burden  to  him,  except  as  they  brought 
with  them  strife  and  unpopularity  which  truly  his 
soul  loathed  for  himself,  though  he  rather  liked 
to  set  other  people  by  the  ears.  His  private  life 
was  unquestionably  as  full  of  interest  to  himself 
as  it  is  entertaining  to  look  upon  in  the  uncon- 
scious revelation  of  his  own  letters. 

But  with  Madison  it  was  apparently  quite 
otherwise.  He  unbent  with  difficulty.  Always 
solemn  and  dignified,  it  was  rather  painful  than 
pleasant  to  him  to  stoop  to  the  petty  matters  of 
every-day  existence.  He  had  no  small  affecta- 
tions, and  was  not  forever  asserting  that  he  was 
without  ambition ; as  if  that,  without  which  no- 
body is  of  much  use  in  the  world  either  to  him- 
self or  to  others,  were  a weakness  akin  to  deprav- 
ity. With  brief  intervals,  covering  only  a few 
months  altogether,  he  was  where  he  best  liked  to 
be,  from  his  entrance  upon  public  life  in  1775  till 
he  stepped  down  in  1817  from  that  political  ele- 
vation beyond  which  there  are  no  ascending  steps. 
During  these  forty-two  years  he  found  a certain 


AT  HOME. 


237 


enjoyment  m a country  home  for  a little  while  at 
a time,  but  it  was  chiefly  the  enjoyment  of  needed 
rest  from,  official  labor.  The  price  of  tobacco  and 
the  promise  of  the  wheat  crop  interested  him 
then,  but  only  as  they  interested  him  always  as  a 
source  of  his  own  income,  and  as  the  index  to  the 
general  prosperity.  At  the  end  of  a letter  upon 
political  matters,  he  announces  with  satisfaction 
that  his  Merino  ewe  has  dropped  a lamb  and  both 
mother  and  offspi’ing  are  as  well  as  could  be  ex- 
pected ; but  it  was  probably  Mr.  Jefferson’s  grati- 
fication rather  than  his  own  that  he  had  in  mind, 
for  it  was  Mr.  Jefferson  who  had  imported  the 
sheep.  Again,  in  a similar  letter,  he  takes  a lit- 
tle remaining  space  to  express  a hope  that  Mr. 
Jefferson  may  permit  the  use  of  the  rams  of  that 
flock  to  improve  the  breed  of  the  native  stock ; 
not,  apparently,  that  he  cared  so  much  about 
wool,  as  that  he  wished  to  show  a courteous  and 
friendly  interest  in  one  of  Mr.  Jefferson’s  many 
projects  for  the  improvement  of  things  generally. 

It  was  during  the  year  of  comparative  leisure 
after  he  left  Congress  that  Mr.  Madison  probably 
built  his  house  at  Montpellier,  about  which  some 
question  has  been  started  recently.  A house  at 
that  time  he  certainly  was  building,  and  it  is  not 
likely  that  he  ever  employed  himself  in  that  way 
more  than  once.  Scattered  among  discussions  of 
Alien  and  Sedition  Laws,  the  war  in  Europe,  free 
goods  in  neutral  ships,  and  other  public  topics,  are 


238 


JAMES  MADISON. 


brief  allusions  to  lathing  nails  which  he  depended 
upon  Mr.  Jefferson  to  supply;  that  gentleman 
haying  recently  set  up  a machine  for  their  manu- 
facture, which,  however,  like  a good  many  other 
of  his  contrivances,  seems  to  have  had  a hitch  in 
it.  So  also  he  asks  the  Vice-President  to  see  to 
it,  that,  when  the  window-glass  and. the  pullies 
are  forwarded,  the  “ chord  ” for  the  latter  shall 
not  be  forgotten  ; and  orders  for  other  articles, 
only  to  be  found  in  Philadelphia,  are  sent  to  his 
obliging  friend.  Mr.  Jefferson,  it  is  easy  to  be- 
lieve, found  them  rather  the  most  interesting  part 
of  the  political  letters  to  which  they  were  ap- 
pended ; and  he  was  quite  willing,  no  doubt,  to 
relieve  the  tedium  of  presiding  over  the  Senate  by 
searching  through  the  Market  Street  shops  for  the 
latest  improvements  in  builders’  hardware.  To 
Mr.  Monroe,  Madison  wrote  that,  as  he  is  sending 
off  a wagon  to  fetch  nails  for  his  carpenters,  “ it 
will  receive  the  few  articles  which  you  have  been 
so  good  as  to  offer  from  the  superfluities  of  your 
stock,  and  which  circumstances  will  permit  me 
now  to  lay  in.”  Evidently  he  was  getting  ready 
to  go  to  housekeeping  with  his  young  wife.  Mon- 
roe’s stock  of  household  goods  had  been  replen- 
ished, perhaps  by  importations  from  France  on 
his  recent  return,  and  he  was  disposing  of  his  old 
supplies,  by  gift  or  sale,  among  his  neighbors. 
Madison,  at  any  rate,  sends  this  modest  list  of 
what  he  would  like  to  have  : “ To  wit,  two  table* 


AT  HOME. 


239 


cloths  for  a dining-room  of  about  eighteen  feet ; 
two,  three,  or  four,  as  may  be  convenient,  for  a 
more  limited  scale ; four  dozen  napkins,  which 
will  not  in  the  least  be  objectionable  for  having 
been  used ; and  two  mattresses.”  It  was  not  an 
extravagant  outfit,  even  though  it  had  not  been 
meant  for  one  of  those  lordly  Virginia  homes  of 
which  some  modern  historians  give  us  such 
charming  pictures.  “ We  are  so  little  acquaint- 
ed,”— Mr.  Madison  continues  in  that  stately  way, 
which  nothing  ever  surprised  him  into  forgetting, 
— “ we  are  so  little  acquainted  with  the  culinary 
utensils  in  detail  that  it  is  difficult  to  refer  to  such 
by  name  or  description  as  would  be  within  our 
wants.” 

But  pots  and  kettles,  — though  that  may  not  be 
the  name  they  were  known  by  in  Virginia,  — ta- 
ble-cloths and  mattresses,  however  moderate  in 
number,  are  sure  indications  that  the  house,  which 
was  to  be  his  residence  when  he  should  be  content 
to  retire  from  public  service,  was  finished  early  in 
1798.  He  had  rested  long  enough,  and  was  busy 
that  year  in  attendance  upon  the  State  Assembly 
at  Richmond,  to  which  he  consented  the  next  year 
to  be  returned  as  a member.  Perhaps  it  was  be- 
cause he  could  not  keep  longer  out  of  the  fray. 
Perhaps  he  felt  called  to  a special  duty.  Affairs, 
foreign  and  domestic,  were  in  a critical  condition. 
France,  in  her  resentment  at  the  Jay  treaty,  had 
committed  so  many  fresh  outrages  upon  American 


240 


JAMES  MADISON. 


commerce ; had  so  exasperated  the  American  peo- 
ple by  these  outrages ; and  by  refusing  to  receive 
the  ministers  from  the  United  States,  had  so  in- 
sulted them  and  the  government  they  represented 
in  the  proposed  arrangements,  — disclosed  in  the 
X.  Y.  Z.  correspondence,  — that  all  friendly  rela- 
tions between  the  two  countries  had  ceased,  and  it 
had  seemed  impossible  that  war  could  be  avoided. 

For  a while  the  popular  sympathy  was  entirely 
with  Mr.  Adams’s  administration,  and  the  prom- 
ise could  hardly  be  fairer  that  the  Federalists,  if 
they  managed  wisely,  might  remain  in  power  and 
be  sustained  by  the  whole  country.  But  in  some 
respects  they  were  as  unwise  as  in  others  they 
were  unfortunate.  President  Adams,  though  pos- 
sessing many  great  qualities,  was  of  too  irascible 
and  jealous  a temper  to  be  a successful  leader  or 
a good  ruler.  But  there  were  other  men  of  dis- 
tinction among  the  Federalists  who  were  hardly 
less  fond  of  having  their  own  way  than  the  Presi- 
dent was  of  having  his.  The  incompatibility  of 
temper  was-  not  altogether  on  one  side  in  that 
family  quarrel.  But  all  were  equally  responsible 
for  such  a blunder  as  the  enactment  of  the  Alien 
and  Sedition  Laws.  The  provocation,  it  is  true, 
was  unquestionably  great.  Refugees  from  abroad 
had  crowded  to  the  United  States,  many  of  whom 
were  professional  agitators,  and  some  were  very 
sorry  vagabonds.  Whatever  reason  they  might 
have  had  for  fomenting  discontent  with  govern 


“ RESOLUTIONS  OF  '98  AND  ’99.”  241 

ment  in  England  or  in  France,  there  was  nothing 
to  justify  any  such  violent  measures  in  this  coun- 
try. But  from  their  conduct  as  political  partisans, 
particularly  as  newspaper  editors,  they  soon  came 
to  be  looked  upon  by  the  Federalists  — for  they 
all  joined  the  other  party  — as  a dangerous  class. 
There  grew  up  a feeling  that  it  would  be  wiser 
for  civil  affairs  to  remain,  in  city,  state,  and  na- 
tion, in  the  hands  of  those  who  were  born  and  ed- 
ucated under  republican  institutions,  and  not  to  fall 
altogether  under  control  of  those  who  were  alien 
in  blood  and  religion,  and  who  were  inclined  to 
look  upon  politics,  not  in  the  light  of  the  citizen’s 
duty  to  the  common  weal,  but  as  an  easy  and 
profitable  calling  where  the  least  scrupulous  scoun- 
drel could  gather  the  largest  share  of  spoils.  It 
may  be  that  the  authors  of  those  laws  were  so  de- 
termined to  forestall  the  apprehended  evils  of  such 
a dispensation  because  use  had  not  accustomed 
them,  as  it  has  later  generations  of  American  citi- 
zens, to  live  under  it  in  humility  if  not  content. 
Or,  perhaps,  they  wanted  that  profound,  faith  of 
our  time  that  the  longer  this  subversion  of  gov- 
ernment is  submitted  to,  the  easier  it  will  be  to 
get  back  to  the  rule  of  the  honest  and  wise. 

But,  at  any  rate,  whatever  their  reasons,  they 
meant  by  these  laws  relating  to  aliens  to  put  the 
acquirement  of  citizenship  under  more  stringent 
regulations  and  to  check  the  growth  and  promul- 
gation of  seditious  doctrines.  If  it  be  true,  as  is 
16 


242 


JAMES  MADISON. 


sometimes  maintained  with  some  plausibility,  that 
citizens,  to  be  intrusted  with  self  - government, 
should  be  endowed  with  a certain  degree  of  intelli- 
gence and  virtue,  then  the  aim  of  the  framers  of 
the  laws,  in  the  first  case,  was  a good  one  ; and  in 
the  second  case,  the  country  has  had  some  experi- 
ence in  later  times  which  tends  to  show  that  they 
were  not  altogether  wrong  in  believing  that  doc- 
trines and  practices  which  may  lead  to  insurrection 
and  civil  war  might  best  be  met,  so  far  as  is  pos- 
sible, at  the  outset.  Nevertheless,  the  laws,  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  time,  were  ill-considered 
and  injudicious.  For  one  reason,  they  put  an  effi- 
cient weapon  into  the  hands  of  the  opposition  at  a 
moment  when  it  was  at  a loss  where  to  turn  for 
one.  “Anglicism”  and  “British  Gold”  were  blun- 
derbusses which,  in  the  present  popular  irritation 
against  France,  had,  for  a time,  lost  their  useful- 
ness, and  were  apt  to  miss  fire.  But  an  appeal  to 
a generous  and  impulsive  people  on  behalf  of  the 
unfortunate  refugees,  who  had  fled  from  the  tyr- 
anny of  the  old  world  to  find  liberty  and  a home 
in  the  new,  was  sure  to  be  listened  to.  A good 
many,  besides  those  who  assumed  that  republi- 
canism and  the  rights  of  man  were  in  their  spe- 
cial keeping,  believed  that  an  unfortunate  class 
had  been  dealt  with  hastily,  and  even  cruelly. 
The  clamor,  once  begun,  told  heavily  against  the 
Federalists.  They  could  be  denounced  now,  not 
only  as  the  enemies  of  liberty  in  France,  but  as 


“ RESOLUTIONS  OF  '98  AND  '99."  243 

refusing  it  to  men  of  any  nation  or  any  race  who 
should  seek  it  in  the  United  States,  — it  being,  of 
course,  understood  that  races  of  black  or  yellow 
complexion  need  not  apply.  It  was,  indeed,  ad- 
vanced as  an  argument  against  one  of  the  acts, — 
which  gave  the  President  power  to  order  out  of 
the  country  all  aliens  whose  presence  he  thought 
dangerous,  — that  it  might  be  used  to  prevent  the 
importation  of  persons  from  Africa.  On  this 
point  Mr.  Gallatin,  a native  of  Switzerland,  was 
exceedingly  anxious  lest  there  be  a violation  of 
the  Constitution.  But  the  outrage  upon  the 
rights  of  man  here  apprehended  was  the  right  of 
white  men  to  make  black  men  slaves. 

Against  the  enactment  of  these  laws  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son did  nothing  as  Vice-President.  But  whatever 
was  his  motive  for  official  inaction,  it  was  not  be- 
cause he  approved  them.  He  wrote  the  Kentucky 
“ Resolutions  of  ’98,”  — the  strongest  protest  that 
could  be  made  against  them,  and  to  be  thence- 
forth held  by  nullifiers  and  secessionists  as  their 
covenant  of  faith.  But  he  acted  secretly,  taking 
counsel  only  with  George  Nicholas  of  Kentucky 
and  William  C.  Nicholas  of  Virginia  (brothers), 
and,  Hildreth  says,  “ probably  with  Madison.” 
The  resolutions  were  to  be  offered  in  the  Ken- 
tucky legislature  by  George  Nicholas,  and,  with 
some  modifications,  were  passed  by  that  body  in 
Novembei’.  A year  afterward  other  resolutions 
were  passed  to  reassert  the  opinions  of  the  pre- 


244 


JAMES  MADISON. 


vious  session  and  to  record  against  the  laws  the 
“solemn  protest”  of  the  legislature;  and  further 
declaring  “ that  a nullification  by  those  sovereign- 
ties [the  States]  of  all  unauthorized  acts  done  un- 
der color  of  that  instrument  [the  Constitution]  is 
the  rightful  remedy.”  In  the  resolutions  which 
Mr.  Jefferson  had  prepared  for  Nicholas  the  year 
before  this  essential  doctrine  is  found  in  that  por- 
tion which  Nicholas  had  omitted,  in  these  words  — 
“ where  powers  are  assumed  which  have  not  been 
delegated,  a nullification  of  the  act  is  the  rightful 
remedy.”  As  originally  prepared  the  resolutions 
were  found  in  Jefferson’s  handwriting  after  his 
death.  HikKeth’s  conjecture  that  Madison,  as 
well  as  the  brothers  Nicholas,  was  consulted  in 
the  preparation  of  these  resolutions,  rests  only  on 
circumstantial  evidence.  The  Kentucky  Resolu- 
tions were  passed  in  November;  those  of  Virginia 
in  December;  the  former  were  written  by  Jeffer- 
son, the  latter  by  Madison  ; and  the  doctrines  in 
each  are  essentially  the  same.  It  would  have 
been  a perfectly  natural  thing  for  the  two  friends 
to  consult  together  upon  a measure  of  so  much 
importance ; there  is  no  reason  why  they  should 
not  have  done  so ; and  these  coincidences  suggest 
that  they  probably  did.  Jefferson  clearly  shirked 
the  responsibility  of  an  act  which  he  knew  would 
endanger  the  Union  ; but  Madison  made  no  se- 
cret, so  far  as  can  be  seen  now,  of  his  going  to 
Richmond,  though  not  a member  of  the  Assern 


“ RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’98  AND  ’99." 


245 


bly,  apparently  for  the  express  purpose  of  writing 
these  resolutions  and  urging  their  adoption.  But 
Jefferson  was  not  a man  of  courage  even  in  doing 
that  wdiieh  he  believed  to  be  wise.  In  Madison, 
it  was  only  the  conscience  that  was  timid  ; and 
having  once  convinced  himself  that  the  thing  he 
proposed  to  do  was  right  he  was  always  ready  to 
face  the  consequences.  It  may  be  that  neither  of 
them  foresaw  that  the  real  importance  of  this  par- 
ticular act  was  rather  prospective  than  imme- 
diate ; and  if  so  their  conduct  is  to  be  measured 
by  its  instant  purpose.  If  Jefferson  meant  then 
and  there  to  dissolve  the  Union,  or  even  to  weaken 
the  constitutional  bond  that  held  it  together,  he 
was  not  over-cautious  in  keeping  out  of  sight. 
But  if  Madison’s  intention  was  to  strengthen  the 
Union  by  withstanding  what  he  believed  to  be  a 
perilous  violation  of  the  Constitution,  then  his 
courage,  though  it  is  to  be  commended,  is  not  to 
be  wondered  at.  That,  he  said,  was  his  motive, 
and  to  defend  the  resolutions  and  his  own  part  in 
regard  to  them  was  the  chief  interest  and  serious 
labor  of  the  latter  years  of  his  life.  He  was 
elected  a member  of  the  Assembly  for  the  session 
of  1799-1800,  probably  because  he  and  his  friends 
thought  his  official  presence  desirable  when  the 
subject  should  again  come  up  for  consideration  at 
the  reading  of  the  replies  from  other  States,  to  all 
which  the  resolutions  had  been  sent.  The  report 
on  those  replies  was  also  written  by  him,  and  the 


245 


JAM£S  MADISON. 


position  taken  the  year  before  was  therein  reaf- 
firmed. explained,  and  elaborated  at  length. 

In  1527-25  the  doctrines  of  nullification  and  of 
secession  were  assumed  to  be  the  legitimate  co- 
rollary of  the  Kentucky  and  Virginia  Resolutions 
of  179S  and  1799.  Jefferson  was  dead:  but 
Madison  felt  called  upon  to  deny,  in  his  own  de- 
fense and  in  defense  of  the  memory  of  his  friend, 
that  there  was  any  similarity  between  them. 
From  1830  to  1836  his  mind  seems  to  have  been 
chiefly  occupied  with  this  subject,  upon  which  he 
wrote  many  letters,  and  a paper  of  thirty  pages, 
entitled  " On  Nullification."  which  bears  the  date 
of  1835-36,  the  latter  year  being  the  last  of  his 
life.  He  resents  the  charge  of  any  political  in- 
consistency in  the  course  of  his  long  career,  and 
most  of  all  such  an  inconsistency  as  would  im- 
pugn his  attachment  to  the  Constitution  and  the 
Union.  The  Resolutions  of  1798,  he  maintains, 
do  not  and  were  not  meant  to  assert  a right  in 
any  one  State  to  arrest  or  annul  an  act  of  the 
General  Government,  as  that  is  a right  that  can 
only  belong  to  them  collectively.  Nullification 
and  Secession  he  denounces  as  “ twin  heresies,” 
that  “ought  to  be  buried  in  the  same  grave.” 
“ A political  system,”  he  declares,  “ which  does 
not  contain  an  effective  provision  for  a peaceable 
decision  of  all  controversies  arising  within  itself, 
would  be  a government  in  name  only.  He  as- 
serts that  “ the  essential  difference  between  a free 


“ RESOLUTIONS  OF  ’93  AND  ’99.”  247 

government  and  governments  not  free,  is  that  the 
former  is  founded  in  compact,  the  parties  to  which 
are  mutnallv  and  equally  bound  by  it.  Xeither  of 
them,  therefore,  can  have  a greater  right  to  break 
off  from  the  bargain,  than,  the  other  or  others 
have  to  hold  them  to  it.  . . . It  is  high  time  that 
the  claim  to  secede  at  will  should  be  put  down  by 
the  public  opinion.”  What.  — he  writes  to  another 
friend,  — what  can  be  more  preposterous  than  to 
say  that  the  States,  as  united,  are  in  no  respect  or 
degree  a nation,  which  implies  sovereignty ; . . . 
and  on  the  other  hand,  and  at  the  same  time,  to 
say  that  the  States  separately  are  completely  na- 
tions and  sovereigns?  . . . The  words  of  the  Con- 
stitution are  explicit,  that  the  Constitution  and 
laws  of  the  United  States  shall  be  supreme  over 
the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  several  States  ; 
supreme  in  their  exposition  and  execution,  as  well 
as  in  their  authority.  Without  a supremacy  in 
these  respects,  it  would  be  like  a scabbard,  in  the 
hand  of  a soldier,  without  a sword  in  it.”  Abra- 
ham Lincoln  micrht  have  said  this  twentv-eieht 
years  later  when  he  determined  that  his  first  duty 
as  President  was  to  suppress  insurrection. 

Such  is  the  drift  of  the  many  pages  Mr.  Madi- 
son wrote  upon  the  subject  during  the  last  five  or 
six  years  of  his  life.  He  looked  then,  whatever 
he  mav  have  thought  in  the  closing;  years  of  the 
preceding  century,  upon  the  United  States  as  a 
nation,  and  not  as  a confederacy  having  its  parts 


248 


JAMES  MADISON. 


held  together  only  by  “ a treaty  or  league  ” called 
a constitution.  But  his  object  is  to  show  that 
there  is  nothing  inconsistent  in  the  resolutions  of 
1798  with  these  opinions  upon  the  sovereignty 
of  the  United  States;  that  he  held  them  just  as 
strongly  then  as  he  held  them  now ; and  that 
they,  and  he  as  their  author,  looked  to  the  States 
as  a whole,  not  to  a single  State,  to  find  and  ap- 
ply a remedy  in  a constitutional  way,  for  an  un- 
constitutional measure  of  which  an  administra- 
tion of  the  government  might  be  guilty.  His 
position  is  maintained  with  all  the  acuteness,  in- 
genuity, and  logical  skill  which  mark  his  earlier 
writings.  There  is  no  sign  of  failure  of  mental 
power,  of  which  those  accused  him  who  could  not 
answer  him.  Such  an  imputation  he  resented 
with  as  much  indignation  as  he  did  a charge  of 
inconsistency,  which  here  could  only  mean  false- 
hood. There  is  no  possibility,  then,  of  misunder- 
standing his  opinions  during  the  last  six  years  of 
his  life ; and  the  world  has  no  right  to  doubt  his 
repeated  and  earnest  assurances  that  these  were 
his  opinions  when  he  wrote  the  resolutions  of 
1798.  It  can  only  be  said  that  the  construction 
he  gave  them,  thirty  years  afterward,  is  opposed 
to  the  universal  understanding  of  them  at  the 
time  they  were  written. 

But  if  his  defense  of  himself  be  considered  com- 
plete, it  is  not  even  specious  when  presented  on 
behalf  of  Jefferson.  Mr.  Madison  wrote  in  1830  : 


“ RESOLUTIONS  OF  '98  AND  '99'-  249 

“ That  the  term  ‘ nullification  ’ in  the  Kentucky 
Resolutions  belongs  to  those  of  1799,  with  which 
Mr.  Jefferson  had  nothing  to  do.  . . . The  resolu- 
tions of  1798,  drawn  by  him,  contain  neither  that 
nor  any  equivalent  term.”  It  was  not  then  gen- 
erally known,  whether  Mr.  Madison  knew  it  or 
not,  that  one  of  the  resolutions  and  part  of  an- 
other which  Jefferson  wrote  to  be  offei’ed  in  the 
Kentucky  legislature  in  1798  were  omitted  by 
Mr.  Nicholas,  and  that  therein  was  the  assertion 
already  quoted  — “ where  powers  are  assumed 
which  have  not  been  delegated,  a nullification  of 
the  act  is  the  rightful  remedy.”  The  next  year, 
when  additional  resolutions  were  offered  by  Mr. 
Breckenridge,  this  idea  in  similar,  though  not  in 
precisely  the  same  language,  was  presented  in  the 
words  — “ that  a nullification  by  those  sovereign- 
ties [the  States]  of  all  unauthorized  acts,  done 
under  color  of  that  instrument,  is  the  rightful 
remedy.”  In  1832,  this  fact,  on  the  authority  of 
Jefferson’s  grandson  and  executor,  was  made  pub- 
lic ; and  further,  that  another  declaration  of  Mr. 
Jefferson's  in  the  resolution  not  used  was  an  ex- 
hortation to  the  co-States,  “ that  each  will  take 
measures  of  its  own  for  providing  that  neither 
these  acts  nor  any  others  of  the  general  govern- 
ment, not  plainly  and  intentionally  authorized  by 
the  Constitution,  shall  be  exercised  within  their 
respective  territories.”  All  this  must  have  been 
known  to  Mr.  Madison  then,  if  not  before.  Yet 


250 


JAMES  MADISON. 


three  years  later,  in  his  paper  “ On  Nullification,” 
under  the  date  of  1835-36,  he  wrote : “ The  amount 
of  this  modified  right  of  nullification  is,  that  a 
single  State  may  arrest  the  operation  of  a law 
of  the  United  States.  . . . And  this  new-fangled 
theory  is  attempted  to  be  fathered  on  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son, the  apostle  of  republicanism.”  It  would  be 
charitable  here  to  believe  that  there  was  some 
lapse  of  memory  in  these  latter  days,  and  that  he 
had  forgotten  that  Jefferson  was,  above  all  things, 
his  own  words  being  witness,  the  apostle  of  nul- 
lification. 

The  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws — of  which  the 
more  obnoxious  of  the  former  was  never  enforced, 
and  the  latter  expired  by  limitation  in  two  years 
— had  their  influence  in  the  presidential  election 
of  1800.  But  it  was  due  more  to  differences  be- 
tween the  President  and  some  of  the  leaders  of 
the  Federal  party  that  that  party  lost  its  hold  upon 
power,  never  to  be  l’egained.  With  the  election 
of  Jefferson,  Madison  entered  upon  another  sphere 
of  duty,  which  was  politically  a promotion,  but 
where  his  influence,  if  it  was  so  large,  was  not  so 
evident  as  when  an  active  leader  of  his  party.  It 
was  at  Mr.  Jefferson’s  “pressing  desire,”  Mr. 
Madison  himself  says,  in  a letter  written  many 
years  afterward,  that  he  took  the  office  of  Secre- 
tary of  State.  In  the  same  letter  he  explains 
that  he  had  declined  an  executive  appointment 
under  Washington,  because,  in  taking  a seat  in 


“RESOLUTIONS  OF  '98  AND  '99V  251 

the  House  of  Repi-esentatives,  he  would  be  less  ex- 
posed to  the  imputation  of  selfish  views  in  the 
part  he  had  taken  in  “ the  origin  and  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  ; ” because  there,  if  anywhere, 
he  could  be  of  service  in  sustaining  it  against  its 
adversaries,  especially  as  it  was,  “ in  its  progress, 
encountering  trials  of  a new  sort  in  the  formation 
of  new  parties  attaching  advei’se  constructions  to 
it.”  The  latter  reason  seems  to  be  one  of  those 
happy  after-thoughts  which  public  men  not  un- 
frequently  flatter  themselves  will  anticipate  a 
question  they  would  prefer  should  not  be  asked. 
Mr.  Madison  was  a member  of  the  First  Congress 
from  the  first  day  it  met,  before  the  new  Constitu- 
tion had  encountered  new  trials  from  new  parties 
by  any  constructions  either  one  way  or  the  other. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 

On  the  morning  of  March  4, 1801,  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son tied  his  horse  to  the  fence  and  walked  alone 
into  the  Capitol  to  take  the  oath  of  office  as  Presi- 
dent. Mr.  Madison  was  not  present  at  that  per- 
functory ceremony,  the  death  of  his  aged  father 
detaining  him  at  home.  He  soon  after,  however, 
assumed  the  duties  of  the  station  to  which  Mr. 
Jefferson  had  called  him,  and  there  he  remained 
till  he  took  the  presidential  office,  in  his  turn,  eight 
years  afterward. 

The  new  dynasty  entered  upon  its  course  under 
happy  circumstances.  There  was,  of  course,  much 
to  fear  from  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Europe; 
for  the  United  States  must  needs  be  in  a perilous 
position  so  long  as  the  struggle  for  supremacy 
continued  between  France  and  England,  and  that 
would  be  while  Napoleon  could  command  an 
army.  But  the  danger  of  war  with  France  was  no 
longer  imminent,  since  Mr.  Adams  had  wisely  re- 
established friendly  relations,  though  many  of  the 
leading  Federalists  believed  it  was  at  the  cost  of 
ruin  to  his  own  party.  English  aggressions  upon 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 


253 


American  commerce  had  for  the  moment  ceased; 
as  fourteen  years  afterward  they  ceased  altogether, 
when  the  provocation  disappeared  with  the  per- 
manent establishment  of  peace  in  Europe.  In  the 
temporary  lull  of  the  tempest  the  sun  shone  out 
of  a serene  sky,  and  the  land  was  blessed  with 
quiet  and  prosperity.  “Peace,  commerce  and 
honest  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling  alli- 
ances with  none,”  the  President  said  in  his  inaugu- 
ral address,  were  among  “ the  essential  principles 
of  our  government,  and  consequently  those  which 
ought  to  shape  its  administration.”  The  condi- 
tion of  the  country  was  in  accord  with  the  thought 
and  may  even  have  suggested  it.  “ We  are  all 
Republicans;  we  are  all  Federalists,”  said  Jeffer- 
son in  his  inaugural ; it  was  meant,  however,  as 
an  avowal  of  a tolerant  belief  in  the  patriotism  of 
both  parties,  rather  than,  as  has  sometimes  been 
supposed,  an  assertion  that  party  lines,  so  clearly 
drawn  in  the  election,  were  at  length  obliterated. 
But  hardly  a year  had  passed  before  this  seemed 
to  be  almost  literally  true.  One  after  another 
States  hitherto  Federal,  both  at  the  North  and  at 
the  South,  went  over  in  their  state  elections  to  the 
Republican  or  Democratic  party ; till,  with  the 
exception  of  Delaware,  there  was  not  a single 
Federal  State  outside  of  New  England  ; and  even 
in  that  stronghold  one  State,  Rhode  Island,  had 
marched  off  with  the  majority.  “Everywhere,” 
wrote  Madison  in  October,  “ the  progress  of  the 


254 


JAMES  MADISON. 


public  sentiment  mocks  the  cavils  and  clamors  of 
the  malignant  adversaries  of  the  Administration.” 

If  it  may  not  be  asserted  that  this  overthrow  of 
the  Federal  rule  was  fortunate  at  that  juncture,  — 
as  nothing  is  more  idle  in  history  than  speculation 
upon  what  might  have  been,  — it  may  at  least 
be  said  that  Jefferson’s  administration  for  his 
first  four  years  was  a happy  one  for  his  country 
and  acceptable  to.  his  countrymen.  None  since 
Washington’s  has  ever  been  so  popular ; and  no 
other,  except  Lincoln’s,  has  ever  been  so  success- 
ful. Nor  can  it  be  said  of  it  that  it  was  a happy 
period  because  it  is  without  a history  ; for  it  in- 
cluded acts  of  moment,  accepted  then  with  an  ap- 
probation and  enthusiasm  which  time  has  justified. 
Not  less  shallow  is  that  view  of  his  character 
and  of  those  years  of  his  administration,  taken 
by  many  of  his  contemporaries,  who  neither  loved 
nor  respected  him,  and  who  attributed  his  suc- 
cess and  his  popularity  to  his  good  fortune.  This 
was  a favorite  and  easy  way,  among  his  political 
opponents,  of  explaining  a disagreeable  fact.  Par- 
ton  notes  in  his  Life,  that  C.  C.  Pinckney  could 
only  understand  Jefferson’s  hold  upon  public  con- 
fidence as  “ the  infatuation  of  the  people.”  John 
Quincy  Adams  said : “ Fortune  has  taken  a pleas- 
ure in  making  Jefferson’s  greatest  weaknesses  and 
follies  issue  more  successfully  than  if  he  had  been 
inspired  with  the  profoundest  wisdom.”  “ When 
the  people,”  said  Gouverneur  Morris,  “ have  been 


SECRETARY  OF  ST  A TE. 


255 


long  enough  drunk,  they  will  get  sober,  but  while 
the  frolic  lasts,  to  reason  with  them  is  useless.” 
There  has  been  more  than  one  occasion  of  late 
years,  and  in  more  than  one  place,  where  this  may 
be  truly  said  of  popular  political  enthusiasm  ; but 
it  was  not  true  of  that  which  prevailed  for  the 
first  four  years  of  this  century ; and  Mr.  Adams’s 
sarcasm  can  hardly  fail  to  recall  the  fact,  that 
when  Mr.  Jefferson,  in  his  second  term,  was  really 
guilty  of  a great  folly  in  adhering  to  a prolonged 
embargo,  it  was  Mr.  Adams  who  committed  one  of 
the  few  follies  of  his  own  life  in  abandoning  his 
party  to  give  his  support  to  the  President’s  blun- 
der. 

Though  there  were  many  changes  in  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son's cabinet  in  the  course  of  eight  years,  they 
were  not  the  result  of  dissensions.  Yet  he  was, 
perhaps,  more  an  absolute  President  than  any 
other  man  who  has  ever  held  that  position.  He 
sought  and  listened  to  counsel,  no  doubt ; but 
taking  it  was  another  matter.  He  certainly  did 
not  take  it  if  it  did  not  suit  him ; and  if  it  was 
not  likely  to  suit  him,  he  was  in  no  hurry  to  ask 
for  it.  It  was  in  his  own  fertile  brain,  not  in  the 
suggestions  of  others,  that  important  measures 
had  their  birth.  That  trait  in  his  character,  which 
phrenologists  have  named  secretiveness,  largely 
governed  his  actions.  Ic  was  natural  for  him  to 
bring  things  about  quietly  and  skillfully  by  set- 
ting others  to  do  what  he  wanted  done,  without 


256 


JAMES  MADISON. 


himself  being  seen  ; though  sometimes  there  was 
no  other  motive  than  the  mere  gratification  of  se- 
cretiveness. He  preferred  often  to  suggest  meas- 
ures quietly  to  congressmen  rather  than  to  Con- 
gress, though  the  result  in  either  case  might  be 
the  same.  At  other  times,  where  the  end  to  be 
attained  was  of  great  importance  and  he  was  ab- 
solutely sure  only  of  himself,  he  boldly  took  the 
responsibility,  as  he  did  in  the  purchase  of  Louisi- 
ana, and  in  the  suppression  of  the  Monroe-Pinck- 
ney  treaty  with  England  in  his  second  term.  It 
is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  Madison’s  part, 
during  the  eight  years  of  Jefferson’s  presidency, 
is  found  to  be  more  a secondary  one  than  is  usual 
with  a Secretary  of  State,  or  than  was  usual  with 
him.  He  was  in  perfect  accord  with  his  chief, 
who  held  always  in  the  highest  esteem  his  knowl- 
edge and  judgment,  and  sought,  no  doubt,  his 
sound  and  moderate  advice  when  he  thought  he 
needed  advice  from  anybody.  But  Madison’s  in- 
fluence is  less  visible  in  Jefferson’s  administration 
than  in  Washington’s,  when  he  was  in  the  oppo- 
sition. Washington,  where  he  doubted  his  own 
ability  to  decide  a question  and  felt  the  need  of 
enlightenment,  was  accustomed  to  call  in  Madi- 
son, though  he  did  not  always  accept  his  friend’s 
conclusions.  It  was  rarely  that  Jefferson  was 
troubled  with  any  doubt  of  his  own  judgment  in 
the  discussion  or  decision  of  any  question  that 
might  come  before  him. 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE.  257 

The  most  important  measure  of  his  administra- 
tion was  peculiarly  his  own,  and  when  once  de- 
termined upon  it  was  pushed  to  a conclusion  with 
vigor  and  courage.  Nobody  doubts  now,  or  has 
doubted  since  the  abolition  of  slavery,  that  the 
purchase  of  Louisiana  was  an  act  of  sound  states- 
manship. Jefferson  did  not  foresee  that  the  ac- 
quisition of  that  fertile  territory  would  stimulate 
a domestic  trade  in  slaves,  as  profitable  to  the 
slave-breeding  as  to  the  slave-consuming  States ; 
or  that,  as  slavery  increased  and  brought  prosper- 
ity and  power  to  a class,  there  would  grow  up  an 
oligarchy,  resting  on  ownership  in  negroes,  which, 
within  sixty  years,  would  have  to  be  uprooted  at 
an  enormous  cost.  But  his  aim  was  to  secure  the 
peaceful  possession  of  the  Mississippi  territory  on 
both  its  banks,  as  a permanent  settlement  of  a 
question  which,  so  long  as  it  remained  open,  was 
a perpetual  menace  of  war  with  one  or  another 
European  power.  That  danger  would  always  in- 
volve the  possibility  of  the  Appalachian  range 
becoming  the  western  boundary  of  the  United 
States ; in  which  case  the  valley  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  the  vast  region  west  of  it,  would  fall 
into  the  power  of  an  alien  people.  So  far  was 
plain  to  Mr.  Jefferson;  but  the  result  of  the  re- 
bellion of  1861  proves  that  he  was  wiser  than  he 
knew  when  he  acquired  the  territory  stretching 
to  the  Sabine  and  the  foot  of  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains, for  the  occupation  of  a free  people. 

17 


258 


JAMES  MADISON. 


It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  here  the  story  of 
the  purchase.  The  news  of  it  reached  Washing- 
ton in  July  and  was  received  with  enthusiasm. 
That  there  was  no  warrant  in  the  Constitution 
for  an  acquisition  of  territory  by  purchase  was 
manifest ; and  Mr.  Jefferson’s  opponents  were  not 
^ in  the  least  backward  in  heaping  reproaches  and 
ridicule  upon  the  great  champion  of  strict  con- 
struction, who  had  no  hesitation  in  violating  the 
Constitution  when  it  seemed  to  him  wise  to  do 
so.  Both  the  President  and  his  Seci’etary  frankly 
met  the  accusation  by  acknowledging  its  entire 
justice ; but  at  the  same  time  they  put  in,  as  a 
sufficient  defense,  the  plea  of  the  genei-al  welfare. 
This  did  not  abate  the  ridicule,  though  the  argu- 
ment was  a hard  one  for  the  Federalists  to  with- 
stand ; for  it  could  not  be  forgotten  that  it  was 
on  this  ground  that  Hamilton,  as  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  had  justified  the  imposition  of  certain 
taxes,  and  the  Republicans  had  maintained  that 
the  plain  limitations  of  the  Constitution  could  not 
be  overstepped  on  such  a plea,  even  for  the  gen- 
eral good.  Jefferson  was  so  sensitive  to  this  con- 
stitutional objection  that  he  proposed  to  meet  it 
by  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution ; but  it  was 
soon  evident  that  the  unwritten  law  of  manifest 
destiny  did  not  need  the  appeal  to  the  ballot-box. 
“ The  grumblers,”  Jefferson  wrote  to  a friend 
soon  after  the  news  of  the  treaty  was  received, 
“ gave  all  the  credit  of  the  acquisition  to  the  ao 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 


259 


cident  of  war.”  “ They  would  see,”  he  added,  in 
records  on  file  “ that  though  we  could  not  say 
when  war  would  arise,  yet  we  said  with  energy 
what  would  take  place  when  it  should  arise.” 
He  only  meant  by  this,  probably,  that  from  the 
beginning  of  his  administration  he  had  been  pre- 
pared to  take  advantage  of  circumstances  when 
war  should  break  out  again  between  England  and 
France,  as  it  was  evident  enough  to  the  whole 
world  that  it  must  break  out  sooner  or  later. 
That  the  particular  conjunction  of  circumstances, 
however,  would  occur  that  did  occur,  could  not 
have  been  foreseen.  Jefferson  could  have  had  no 
prescience  that  Spain  would  reconvey  Louisiana 
to  France;  that  Napoleon  would  enter  at  once 
upon  extensive  preparations  for  colonization  on 
the  banks  of  the  Mississippi ; and  that  he  would 
be  willing  to  relincpiish  this  important  step  in  his 
great  scheme  of  a universal  Latin  Empire,  that 
he  might  devote  himself  to  the  necessary  prelimi- 
nary work  of  subduing  his  most  formidable  enemy 
of  the  rival  race.  But  it  is  Jefferson’s  best  title 
to  fame  that  he  was  ready  to  take  advantage  of 
this  conjunction  of  incidents  at  exactly  the  right 
moment.  Doubtless,  the  progress  of  civilization 
would  have  been  essentially  the  same  had  he 
never  been  born.  But  having  been  bom  it  fell  to 
him  to  contribute  largely  to  the  events  that  have 
distributed  the  race  speaking  the  English  tongue 
the  most  widely  over  the  globe,  and  to  exercise  a 


260 


JAMES  MADISON. 


powerful  influence  upon  the  age.  It  does  not  de- 
tract from  the  merit  of  his  act,  however,  that  he 
by  no  means  saw  all  its  importance  nor  even 
dreamed  of  its  consequences.  The  region  beyond 
the  Mississippi,  he  thought,  might  be  made  useful 
as  a refuge  for  Indian  tribes  of  the  East ; but  he 
neither  saw,  nor  could  see,  then  that  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana  was  the  essential,  though  only  the 
preliminary,  step  toward  the  occupation  of  the 
continent  to  the  Pacific  by  the  English  race. 
The  expedition  of  Lewis  and  Clarke,  which  he 
sent  out  the  next  year,  was  in  the  interest  of  sci- 
ence, and  especially  of  geograph}',  rather  than  of 
any  possible  settlement  of  that  distant  region. 
Indeed,  he  said  that  if  the  new  acquisition  of  ter- 
ritory were  wisely  managed,  so  as  to  induce  the 
eastern  Indians  to  cross  the  great  river,  the  result 
would  be  the  “ condensing,  instead  of  scattering, 
our  population.”  But  “ man  proposes  and  God 
disposes.” 

The  immediate  consequences,  however,  of  the 
acquisition  of  Louisiana  were  enough  to  bring  al- 
most universal  popularity  to  the  President,  es- 
pecially at  the  South  and  West,  without  any  rev- 
elation of  the  future.  Nor  was  the  act  the  less 
popular  because  it  was  an  immediate  stimulus  to 
the  foreign  slave-trade,  partly  because  at  the 
North  that  excited  but  little  interest,  and  partly 
because  at  the  South  it  excited  a great  deal.  The 
abolition  societies,  it  is  true,  asked  that  the  impor- 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 


261 


tation  of  slaves  from  Africa  into  the  annexed  ter- 
ritory should  be  forbidden  ; and  an  act  was  passed 
prohibiting  their  introduction,  except  by  those 
persons  from  other  parts  of  the  United  States  who 
intended  to  be  actual  settlers,  and  were,  therefore, 
permitted  to  bring  slaves  imported  previous  to 
1798.  But  the  law  might  properly  have  been 
entitled  an  Act  for  the  Encouragement  of  the 
Trade  in  Negroes ; and  so  it  seems  to  have  been 
regarded  by  the  older  slave  States.  South  Caro- 
lina reopened  the  trade  to  Africa,  and  as  Con- 
gress failed  to  levy  the  constitutional  tax  of  ten 
dollars  a head,  the  raw  material,  so  to  speak, 
came  in  free.  The  rest  could  be  safely  left  to  the 
law  of  supply  and  demand.  Neither  South  Caro- 
lina, nor  any  other  State,  had  imported  slaves 
since  1798.  The  whole  slave  population,  there- 
fore, could  be  legally  taken  into  Louisiana  by  act- 
ual settlers,  and  its  place  supplied  in  the  old 
States  by  new  importations.  The  demand  regu- 
lated the  supply,  and  the  supply  came  from  Af- 
rica as  truly  as  if  the  importation  had  been  direct 
to  New  Orleans.  This  was  the  legal  course  of 
trade  till  1808 ; thenceforward  it  flourished  with- 
out the  protection  of  law  but  in  spite  of  it,  so  long 
as  it  was  profitable  — so  long,  that  is,  as  the  nat- 
ural increase  of  the  eastern  negro  was  insufficient 
to  answer  the  demand  of  the  southwestern  mar- 
ket. 

But  besides  the  peaceful  extension  of  the  na- 


262 


JAMES  MADISON. 


tional  domain  there  was  much  else  in  the  first  foui 
or  five  years  of  Jefferson’s  administration  to  com- 
mend it  to  his  countrymen.  His  party  had  noth- 
ing to  complain  of,  despite  that  genial  and  gener- 
ous assurance  of  the  inaugural  which  could  not  be 
forgotten  — “ we  are  all  Republicans  ; we  are  all 
Federalists;”  and  the  other  party  had  reason  to 
be  thankful  that,  considering,  as  he  said,  “ a Fed- 
eralist seldom  died,  and  never  resigned,”  the  num- 
ber was  not  large  who  were  reminded,  by  their 
removal  from  office,  of  their  unreasonable  delay 
in  doing  either  the  one  thing  or  the  other.  It 
was  only  the  politicians,  however,  a class  much 
smaller  then  than  it  is  now,  who  were  concerned 
in  such  matters ; the  people  at  large  were  influ- 
enced by  other  considerations.  Credit  was  given 
to  the  President  for  things  that  he  did  not  do  as 
well  as  for  things  that  he  did.  It  was  due  to  him 
that  the  administration  was  an  economical  one ; 
but  it  was  through  Mr.  Gallatin’s  skillful  manage- 
ment of  the  finances  that  the  old  public  debt  was 
in  process  of  speedy  extinction.  Occasional  im- 
peachments enlivened  the  proceedings  of  Con- 
gress, which  otherwise  were  as  harmless  as  they 
were  dull.  Jefferson  was  never  so  much  out  of 
his  proper  element  as  in  war,  yet  a successful  one 
was  carried  on,  during  his  first  term,  with  the 
Barbary  States  which  put  an  end  for  many  years 
to  the  exactions  and  outrages  which  had  long  been 
needlessly  submitted  to.  It  was  a war,  however, 


SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 


263 


of  only  a few  naval  vessels  in  the  hands  of  such 
energetic  and  brave  men,  destined  to  become  fa- 
mous in  later  years,  as  Bainbridge,  Decatui’, 
Preble,  and  Barron ; and  to  send  off  the  expedi- 
tion was  about  all  the  government  had  to  do  with 
it.  It  was  easy  to  keep  clear  of  “ entangling  alli- 
ances,” or  entanglements  of  any  sort  with  Eu- 
ropean powers,  so  long  as  they  left  the  commerce 
of  the  United  States  to  pursue  its  peaceful  and 
profitable  course  without  molestation.  This  both 
England  and  France  did  for  several  years,  and 
there  fell,  in  consequence,  an  immense  carrying 
trade  into  the  hands  of  American  merchants 
which  brought  prosperity  to  the  whole  country, 
such  as  was  never  known  before,  and  was  not 
known  again,  after  it  was  lost,  for  near  a quarter 
of  a century.  All  these  things  made  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son acceptable  to  the  people  as  almost  a heaven- 
appointed  President.  If,  as  John  Quincy  Adams 
thought,  fortune  delighted  to  beam  upon  him 
with  her  sunniest  smiles,  he  knew,  at  least,  how 
best  to  take  advantage  of  them.  While  they 
lasted  his  Secretary  of  State  sat  in  their  light  and 
warmth,  quietly  and  contentedly  busy  and  in  the 
diligent  and  faithful  discharge  of  official  duty, 
which  could  not  in  those  years  of  prosperous  tran- 
quillity be  over-burdensome. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


THE  EMBARGO. 

Almost  at  tlie  beginning  of  his  second  term, 
Jefferson  found  himself  in  troubled  waters,  as  the 
United  States  was  drawn  slowly  but  surely  into 
the  vortex  of  European  war.  The  carrying  trade 
at  home  and  abroad  had  fallen  very  much  into 
the  hands  of  Americans,  and  this  became  the  root 
of  bitterness.  The  tonnage  of  their  vessels  em- 
ployed in  foreign  trade  and  entered  at  the  custom- 
houses of  the  United  States  was  equal  to  nearly 
four  fifths  of  the  tonnage  of  British  vessels  en- 
gaged in  the  same  traffic  and  entered  at  home. 
But  there  was  this  difference : the  foreign  com- 
merce of  Great  Britain  was  almost  all  carried  on 
from  her  own  ports,  and  the  returns,  therefore, 
showed  its  full  volume.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
American  ships  were  largely  the  carriers  between 
the  ports  of  the  belligerents  and  of  other  powers 
in  Europe,  and  there  were  no  entries  at  the  Amer- 
ican custom-houses  of  their  employment,  or  that 
they  were  employed  at  all.  As  early  as  1804-05, 
the  aggregate  value  of  this  foreign  trade  in  the 
hands  of  Americans  was  probably  much  larger 


THE  EMBARGO. 


265 


than  that  controlled  by  English  merchants  ; and 
the  former  increased  to  the  time  of  the  promul- 
gation of  the  Berlin  decree  of  1806,  and  the  Brit- 
ish orders  in  council  of  the  next  year.  Nor  was 
it  only  that  wealth  flowed  into' the  country  as  the 
immediate  return  from  this  trade  abroad.  It  stim- 
ulated enterprise  and  industry  at  home  by  the  in- 
crease of  capital  ; and  there  was  not  only  more 
money  to  work  with,  but  more  to  spend.  Conse- 
quently the  increase  in  exports  and  in  imports  grew 
steadily.  In  1805, 1806,  and  1807,  about  one  half 
the  average  total  exports,  something  over  the  value 
of  twenty  million  of  dollars,  went  to  Great  Britain 
alone ; and  the  value  of  the  imports  from  that 
country  for  the  same  period  was  about  sixty  mil- 
lion dollars  a year.  Nor  did  this  disproportion, 
though  increasing  with  the  growing  prosperity, 
represent  a general  balance  of  trade  against  the 
United  States,  as  one  school  of  political  econo- 
mists would  insist  it  must  have  done.  For  the 
imports  were  small  from  other  European  countries 
in  exchange  for  American  products  ; and  the  dif- 
ference, together  with  the  profits  of  the  carrying 
trade  abroad,  was  remitted  in  English  manufac- 
tures. In  other  words,  the  imports  from  England 
represented  the  returns  for  all  exports  to  Europe, 
and  the  returns  also  — available  in  the  first  in- 
stance through  bills  of  exchange  — of  the  trade 
which  had  been  gained  by  Americans  and  lost  by 
those  nations  whose  ships  the  war  had  driven  from 
the  ocean. 


266 


JAMES  MADISON. 


The  British  manufacturer  had  no  reason  for 
discontent  with  this  state  of  things.  The  best 
market  for  his  goods  was  constantly  improving, 
and  he  did  not  much  care  who  took  them  to  Amer- 
ica. But  the  English  government,  and  the  Eng- 
lish merchants  who  owned  ships,  looked  on  with 
neither  pleasure  nor  patience.  It  was  impossible 
not  to  see  that  the  United  States  was  fast  becom- 
ing a great  commercial  rival.  This  in  itself  was 
bad  enough  ; but  it  was  the  harder  to  bear  when  it 
was  remembered  — and  it  could  not  be  forgotten 
— that  the  rivalry  came  from  States  so  lately  in 
revolt  against  England,  and  that  their  President  at 
that  moment  was  one  of  the  most  obnoxious  of 
the  rebels.  Then  what  did  it  avail  that  England 
was  mistress  of  the  seas,  if  her  formidable  enemy 
could  laugh  at  any  effort  of  hers  to  destroy  the 
commerce  of  France,  so  long  as  that  commerce 
could  be  carried  on  in  safety  under  a neutral  flag? 
If  that  flag  must  be  respected,  English  naval  ves- 
sels and  privateers  would  cruise  in  vain  for  prizes, 
for  the  merchant  ships  of  any  belligerent,  not 
strong  enough  to  protect  them,  stayed  in  port.  It 
had  not  yet  come  to  be  the  acknowledged  law  of 
nations  that  free  ships  make  free  goods.  But 
nearly  the  same  purpose  was  answered,  if  the 
property  of  belligerents  could  be  safely  carried  in 
neutral  ships  under  the  pretense  of  being  owned 
by  neutrals.  The  products  of  the  French  colonies, 
for  example,  could  be  loaded  on  board  of  Ameri- 


THE  EMBARGO. 


267 


can  vessels,  taken  to  the  United  States  and  re- 
shipped there  for  France  as  American  property. 
England  looked  upon  this  as  an  evasion  of  the 
recognized  public  law  that  property  of  belligerents 
was  good  prize.  Accordingly  when  she  saw  that 
French  commerce  was  thus  put  out  of  her  reach, 
and  that  the  rival  she  most  dreaded  was  growing 
rich  and  powerful  in  the  possession  of  it,  she  sought 
a remedy  and  was  not  long  in  finding  one. 

It  was  denied  that  neutrals  could  take  advan- 
tage of  a state  of  war  to  enter  upon  a trade  which 
had  not  existed  in  time  of  peace ; and  American 
ships  were  seized  on  the  high  seas,  taken  into  port, 
and  condemned  in  the  Admiralty  Courts  for  car- 
rying enemy’s  goods  in  such  a trade.  The  exer- 
cise of  that  right,  if  it  were  one  by  the  recog- 
nized law  of  nations,  would  be  of  great  injury  to 
American  commerce,  unless  it  could  be  success- 
fully resisted.  To  show  that  it  was  not  good 
law,  Mr.  Madison  wrote  his  “ Examination  of 
the  British  Doctrine  which  Subjects  to  Capture  a 
Neutral  Trade  not  open  in  the  Time  of  Peace.” 
The  essay  was  a careful  and  thorough  discussion 
of  the  whole  question,  and  showed  by  citations 
from  the  most  eminent  writers  on  international 
law,  by  the  terms  of  treaties,  and  by  the  conduct 
of  nations  in  the  past,  that  the  British  doctrine 
was  erroneous  and  would  lead  to  other  infringe- 
ments of  the  rights  of  neutrals.  But  argument, 
however  unanswerable,  has  never  yet  brought  the 


268 


JAMES  MADISON. 


British  government  to  reason,  unless  there  was 
something  behind  it  not  so  easy  to  disregard.  The 
appropriation  for  Mr.  Jefferson's  gunboats  could 
not  get  that  naval  arm  ready  for  effective  service 
much  before  the  year  1815,  even  if  it  could  then 
be  of  use  ; and  there  was,  moi-eover,  this  further 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  its  efficiency  at  the  time, 
— that  as  it  could  not  go  to  the  enemy,  it  must 
wait  for  the  enemy  to  come  to  it ; the  conflagra- 
tion would  have  to  be  brought  to  the  fire-engines. 
A war  with  England  must  be  a naval  war ; and 
the  United  States  not  only  had  no  navy  of  any 
consequence,  but  it  was  a part  of  Mr.  Jefferson’s 
policy,  in  contrast  with  the  policy  of  the  preceding 
administrations,  that  there  should  be  none,  except 
these  gunboats  kept  on  wheels  and  under  cover  in 
readiness  to  repel  an  invasion.  But  there  was  no 
fear  of  invasion,  for  by  that  England  could  gain 
nothing.  “ She  is  renewing,”  Madison  wrote  in 
the  autumn  of  1805,  “ her  depredations  on  our 
commerce  in  the  most  ruinous  shapes,  and  has 
kindled  a more  general  indignation  among  our 
merchants  than  was  ever  before  expressed.” 

These  depredations  were  not  confined  to  the 
seizing  and  confiscating  American  ships  under 
the  pretense  that  their  cargoes  were  contraband. 
Seamen  were  taken  out  of  them  on  the  charge  of 
being  British  subjects  and  deserters,  not  only  on 
the  high  seas  in  larger  numbers  than  ever  before, 
but  within  the  waters  of  the  United  States.  No 


THE  EMBARGO. 


269 


doubt  these  seamen  were  often  British  subjects 
and  their  seizure  was  justifiable,  provided  Eng- 
land could  rightfully  extend  to  all  parts  of  the 
globe  and  to  the  ships  of  all  nations  the  merciless 
system  of  impressment  to  which  her  own  people 
were  compelled  to  submit  at  home.  Monroe,  in  a 
note  to  Madison,  said  that  the  British  minister 
had  informed  him  that  great  abuses  were  com- 
mitted in  granting  protections  ” in  America,  and 
acknowledged  that  “ he  gave  me  some  examples 
which  were  most  shameful.”  But  even  if  it  could 
be  granted  that  English  naval  officers  might  seize 
such  men  without  recourse  to  law,  wherever  they 
should  be  found  and  without  respect  for  the  flag 
of  another  nation,  it  was  a national  insult  and  out- 
rage, calling  for  resentment  and  resistance,  to  im- 
press American  citizens  under  the  pretense  that 
they  were  British  subjects.  But  what  was  the 
remedy  ? As  a last  resort  in  such  cases,  nations 
have  but  one.  Diplomacy  and  legislation  may  be 
first  tried,  but  if  these  fail,  war  must  be  the  final 
ordeal.  For  this  the  Administration  made  no  prep- 
aration, and  the  more  evident  the  unreadiness  the 
less  was  the  chance  of  redress  in  any  other  way. 
Immediate  war  would,  of  course,  have  been  un- 
wise ; for  what  could  a nation  almost  without  a 
ship,  hope  from  a contest  with  a power  having  the 
largest  and  most  efficient  navy  in  the  world  ? If 
this,  however,  was  true  from  1805  to  1807,  it  was 
not  less  true  in  1812.  But  it  need  not  have  been 


270 


JAMES  MADISON. 


true  when  war  was  actually  resorted  to,  had  the 
intervening  years  been  years  of  preparation.  The 
fact  was,  however,  that  the  party  which  supported 
the  Administration  was  no  more  in  favor  of  war 
at  the  earlier  period  than  the  Administration 
itself  was  ; and  meanwhile,  till  a war-party  had 
come  into  existence  and  gained  the  ascendency, 
the  country  had  been  growing  every  year  less  and 
less  in  a condition  to  appeal  to  war. 

The  first  measure  adopted  to  meet  the  aggres- 
sions of  the  English  was  an  act  prohibiting  the 
importation  of  certain  British  products..  This  had 
always  been  a favorite  policy  with  Madison.  He 
had  advanced  and  upheld  it  in  former  years,  when 
a member  of  Congress,  and  when  Great  Britain 
had  first  violated  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the 
United  States  by  interference  with  her  foreign 
trade  and  by  impressing  her  citizens.  Non-inter- 
course had  been  an  effective  measure  thirty  years 
before,  and  had  a kind  of  prestige  as  an  American 
policy.  It  was  not  seen,  perhaps  could  not  be 
seen  without  experience,  that  a measure  suited  to 
the  colonial  condition  was  not  sufficient  for  an 
independent  nation.  But  the  President  and  Sec- 
retary were  in  perfect  accord ; for  Jefferson  pre- 
ferred anything  to  war,  and  Madison  was  per- 
suaded that  England  would  be  brought  to  terms 
by  the  loss  of  the  best  market  for  her  manufac- 
tures. Others,  and  notably  John  Randolph,  saw 
in  the  measure  only  the  first  step,  which,  if  per- 


THE  EMBARGO. 


271 


sisted  in,  must  lead  to  war ; while,  in  the  mean- 
time, to  interfere  with  importations  would  he  quite 
as  great  an  injury  to  the  United  States  as  to  Great 
Britain.  Randolph  was  apt  to  blurt  out  a good 
deal  of  truth  when  it  happened  to  suit  him.  Im- 
pressment, he  said,  was  an  old  grievance  which 
had  not  been  thought  a sufficient  provocation  for 
war  when  the  nation  was  not  prepared ; and  it 
was  no  more  ready  to  resort  to  that  desperate 
remedy  now  than  it  had  been  in  the  past.  With- 
out a navy  it  would  be  impossible  to  prevent  the 
blockading  of  all  the  principal  American  ports 
by  English  squadrons.  The  United  States  would 
need  an  ally,  and  he  was  not  willing  she  should 
throw  herself  into  the  arms  of  that  power  which 
was  seeking  universal  conquest.  France,  he  said, 
would  be  the  tyrant  of  the  ocean,  if  the  British 
navy  should  be  driven  from  it.  The  commerce, 
moreover,  which  it  was  proposed  to  protect,  was 
not  the  “ honest  trade  of  America ; ” but  “ a 
mushroom,  a fungus  of  war  — a trade  which  so 
soon  as  the  nations  of  Europe  are  at  peace,  will 
no  longer  exist.”  It  was  only  “a  carrying  trade 
which  covers  enemy’s  property  ; ” and  he  did  not 
believe  in  plunging  a great  agricultural  country 
into  war  for  the  benefit  of  the  shipping  merchants 
of  a few  seaports.  There  were  many  who  agreed 
with  him  ; for  it  was  one  of  the  cardinal  principles 
of  the  Jeffersonian  school  of  politics,  that  be- 
tween commerce  and  agriculture  there  was  a nat- 
ural antagonism. 


272 


JAMES  MADISON. 


But  the  Administration  did  not  rely  upon  legis- 
lation alone  in  this  emergency.  The  President 
followed  up  the  act  prohibiting  the  introduction 
of  British  goods  by  sending  William  Pinkney  to 
England  in  the  spring  of  1806,  to  join  Monroe, 
the  resident  minister,  in  an  attempt  at  negotiation. 
These  commissioners  soon  wrote  that  there  was 
good  reason  for  hoping  that  a treaty  would  be  con- 
cluded, and  thereupon  the  non-importation  act  was 
for  a time  suspended.  In  December  came  the 
news  that  a treaty  was  agreed  upon,  and  soon  after 
it  was  received  by  the  President.  The  most  seri- 
ous difficulty  in  the  way  of  negotiation  had  been 
the  question  of  impressment.  The  British  gov- 
ernment claimed  the  right  to  arrest  deserters  from 
its  service  anywhere  outside  the  jurisdiction  of 
other  nations,  and  that  jurisdiction,  it  was  main- 
tained, could  not  extend  beyond  the  coast  limit 
over  the  open  sea,  the  highway  of  all  nations. 
There  was  an  evident  disposition,  however,  to  come 
to  some  compromise.  The  English  commission- 
ers proposed  that  their  government  should  pro- 
hibit, under  penalty,  the  seizure  of  American  cit- 
izens anywhere,  and  that  the  United  States  should 
forbid,  on  her  part,  the  granting  of  certificates  of 
citizenship  to  British  subjects  of  which  deserters 
took  advantage.  But  as  this  would  be  an  acknowl- 
edgment virtually  of  the  right  of  search  on  board 
American  ships,  and  the  denial  of  citizenship  in 
the  United  States  to  foreigners,  the  American 


THE  EMBARGO. 


273 


commissioners  could  not  entertain  that  proposi- 
tion. They  were  willing,  however,  if  the  assumed 
right  to  board  American  ships  were  given  up,  to 
agree,  on  behalf  of  their  government,  to  aid  in  the 
arrest  and  return  of  British  deserters  when  seek- 
ing: a refuge  in  the  United  States.  But  to  this 
the  British  commissioners  would  not  accede. 

Monroe  and  Pinkney  were  enjoined,  in  the  in- 
structions written  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  to 
make  the  abandonment  of  impressment  the  first 
condition  of  a treatj^.  A treaty,  nevertheless,  was 
agi’eed  upon,  without  this  provision.  But  when 
it  was  sent  to  the  President,  the  ministers  ex- 
plained : — 

“That,  although  this  government  [the  British]  did 
not  feel  at  liberty  to  relinquish,  formally,  by  treaty,  its 
claim  to  search  our  merchant  vessels  for  British  seamen, 
its  practice  would  nevertheless  be  essentially,  if  not  com- 
pletely, abandoned.  That  opinion  has  since  been  con- 
firmed by  frequent  conferences  on  the  subject  with  the 
British  commissioners,  who  have  repeatedly  assured  us 
that,  in  their  judgment,  we  were  made  as  sure  against 
the  exercise  of  their  pretension  by  the  policy  which  their 
government  had  adopted  in  regard  to  that  very  delicate 
and  important  question,  as  we  could  have  been  made  by 
treaty.” 

These  assurances  did  not  satisfy  the  President. 
Without  consulting  the  Senate,  though  Congress 
was  in  session  when  the  treaty  was  received,  and 
although  the  Senate  had  been  previously  informed 
18 


274 


JAMES  MADISON. 


that  one  had  been  agreed  upon,  the  President  re- 
jected it.  On  several  other  points  it  was  not  ac- 
ceptable ; but,  as  Mr.  Madison  wrote  to  a friend, 
“ the  case  of  impressments  particularly  having 
been  brought  to  a formal  issue,  and  having  been 
the  primary  object  of  an  extraordinary  mission,  a 
treaty  could  not  be  closed  which  was  silent  on  that 
subject.”  The  commissioners,  therefore,  were  or- 
dered to  renew  negotiations.  This  they  faithfully 
tried  to  do  for  a year,  but  were  finally  told  by  the 
British  minister  that  a treaty,  once  concluded  and 
signed,  but  afterward  rejected  in  part  by  one  of 
the  contracting  powers,  could  not  again  be  taken  up 
for  consideration.  The  opponents  of  the  Admin- 
istration made  the  most  of  this  action  of  Mr.  Jef- 
ferson. The  country  was  not  permitted  to  forget, 
even  were  forgetfulness  possible,  that  thousands 
of  seamen  had  been  taken  from  American  vessels, 
and  that  the  larger  proportion  of  these  were  na- 
tive-born citizens  of  the  United  States.  Not  that 
these  opponents  wanted  war  ; that,  they  believed, 
would  be  ruinous  without  a navy,  and  therefore 
some  reasonable  compromise  was  all  that  could  be 
hoped  for.  But  what  was  to  be  thought  of  an  ad- 
ministration that  would  not  go  to  war  because  it 
was  not  prepared  ; would  not  prepare  in  the  hope 
that  some  future  conjunction  of  circumstances 
would  stave  off  that  last  resort ; and,  meanwhile, 
would  accept  no  terms  which  might  at  least  miti- 
gate the  injuries  visited  upon  the  sea-faring  peo- 


THE  EMBARGO. 


275 


pie  of  the  United  States,  and  possibly  relieve  the 
nation  from  an  insolent  exercise  of  power  which 
it  was  not  strong  enough  to  resent? 

As  England’s  need  of  seamen  increased,  the 
captains  of  her  cruisers,  encouraged  by  the  failure 
of  negotiation,  grew  bolder  in  overhauling  Amer- 
ican ships  and  taking  out  as  many  men  as  they  be- 
lieved, or  pretended  to  believe,  were  deserters.  In 
the  summer  of  1807  an  outrage  was  perpetrated 
on  the  frigate  Chesapeake,  as  if  to  emphasize  the 
contempt  with  which  a nation  must  be  looked 
upon  which  only  screamed  like  a woman  at  wrongs 
which  it  wanted  the  courage  and  strength  to  re- 
sent, or  the  wisdom  to  compound  for.  The  Ches- 
apeake was  followed  out  of  the  harbor  of  Norfolk 
by  the  British  man-of-war  Leopard,  and  when  a 
few  miles  at  sea,  the  Chesapeake  being  brought  to 
under  the  pretense  that  the  English  captain  wished 
to  put  some  dispatches  on  board  for  Europe,  a de- 
mand was  made  for  certain  deserters  supposed  to 
be  on  the  American  frigate.  Commodore  Barron 
replied  that  he  knew  of  no  deserters  on  his  ship, 
and  that  he  could  permit  no  search  to  be  made, 
even  if  there  were.  After  some  further  alterca- 
tion the  Englishman  fired  a broadside,  killing  and 
wounding  a number  of  the  Chesapeake’s  crew. 
Commodore  Barron  could  do  nothing  else  but  sur- 
render, for  he  had  only  a single  gun  in  readiness 
for  use,  and  that  was  fired  only  once  and  then  with 
a coal  from  the  cook’s  galley.  The  ship  was  then 


276 


JAMES  MADISON. 


boarded,  the  crew  mustered,  and  four  men  arrested 
as  deserters.  Three  of  them  were  negroes,  — two 
natives  of  the  United  States,  the  other  of  South 
America.  The  fourth  man,  probably,  was  an  Eng- 
lishman. They  were  all  deserters  from  English 
men-of-war  lying  off  Norfolk  ; but  the  three  ne- 
groes declared  that  they  had  been  kidnapped,  and 
their  right  to  escape  could  not  be  justly  ques- 
tioned ; indeed,  the  English  afterward  took  this 
view  of  it  apparently,  for  the  men  were  released 
on  the  arrival  of  the  Leopard  at  Halifax.  But 
the  fourth  man  was  hanged. 

For  this  direct  national  insult,  explanation, 
apology,  and  reparation  were  demanded,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  President  put  forth  a procla- 
mation forbidding  all  British  ships  of  war  to  re- 
main in  American  waters.  Of  how  much  use  the 
latter  was  we  learn  from  a letter  of  Madison  to 
Monroe:  “ They  continue  to  defy  it,”  he  wrote, 
“not  only  by  remaining  within  our  waters,  but  by 
chasing  merchant  vessels  arriving  and  departing.” 
Some  preparation  was  made  for  war,  but  it  was 
only  to  call  upon  the  militia  to  be  in  readiness, 
and  to  order  Mr.  Jefferson’s  gunboats  to  the  most 
exposed  ports.  Great  Britain  was  not  alarmed. 
The  captain  of  the  Leopard,  indeed,  was  removed 
from  his  command,  as  having  exceeded  his  duty  ; 
but  a proclamation  on  that  side  was  also  issued, 
requiring  all  ships  of  war  to  seize  British  seamen 
on  board  foreign  merchantmen,  to  demand  them 


THE  EMBARGO. 


277 


from  foreign  ships  of  war,  and  if  the  demand  was 
refused  to  report  the  fact  to  the  admiral  of  the 
fleet.  It  was  not  till  after  four  years  of  irritating 
controversy  that  any  settlement  was  reached  in 
regard  to  the  affair  of  the  Chesapeake. 

New  perils  all  the  while  were  besetting  Amer- 
ican commerce.  In  November,  1806,  Napoleon’s 
Berlin  decree  was  promulgated,  forbidding  the  in- 
troduction into  France  of  the  products  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies,  whether  in  her  own 
ships  or  those  of  other  nations.  This  was  in  vio- 
lation of  the  convention  between  France  and  the 
United  States,  if  it  was  meant  that  American 
vessels  should  come  under  the  prohibition  ; but  for 
a time  there  was  some  hope  that  they  might  be 
excepted.  In  the  course  of  the  year,  however,  it 
was  officially  declared  in  Paris  that  the  treaty 
would  not  be  allowed  to  weaken  the  force  of  a war 
measure  aimed  at  Great  Britain.  Under  this  de- 
cision cargoes  already  seized  were  confiscated  and 
the  trade  of  the  United  States  faced  a new  calam- 
ity. The  decree,  it  was  declared,  was  a rightful 
retaliation  of  a British  order  in  council  of  six 
months  before,  which  had  established  a partial 
blockade  of  a portion  of  the  French  coast.  In  the 
kidnapping  business,  France  could  not,  of  course, 
compete  with  England  ; for  there  were  few  of  her 
citizens  to  be  found  on  board  of  American  vessels, 
and  to  seize  a Yankee  sailor,  under  the  pretense 
that  he  was  a Frenchman,  was  an  absurdity  never 


278 


JAMES  MADISON. 


thought  of.  But  hundreds  of  Americans,  the 
crews  of  ships  seized  for  violation  of  the  terms  of 
the  Berlin  decree,  were  thrown  into  French  pris- 
ons. So  far,  therefore,  as  the  United  States  had 
good  ground  of  complaint  on  any  score  against 
either  power,  there  was  little  to  choose  between 
them.  Mr.  Jefferson’s  repugnance  to  war  was  suf- 
ficient to  hold  him  back  from  one  with  England, 
though  he  might  have  had  France  for  an  ally ; still 
more  unwilling  was  he,  by  a war  with  France,  to 
make  a friend  of  England,  whom  he  still  looked 
upon  as  the  natural  enemy  of  the  United  States ; 
for,  notwithstanding  all  that  had  come  and  gone, 
he  still  regarded  France  with  something  of  the 
old  affection.  In  the  autumn  of  1807  he  called 
a special  session  of  Congress  in  consideration  of 
the  increasing  aggressions  of  Great  Britain,  espe- 
cially in  the  attack  upon  the  Chesapeake,  and  the 
injury  done  by  the  interdiction  of  neutral  trade 
with  any  country  with  which  that  power  was  at 
war.  But  he  had  no  recommendations  to  offer 
of  resistance  nor  even  of  defense,  except  that  some 
additions  be  made  to  the  gunboats,  and  that  sailors 
on  shore  be  enrolled  as  a sort  of  gunboat  militia. 
The  probable  real  purpose  of  calling  the  extra 
session,  however,  appeared  in  about  two  weeks, 
when  he  sent  a special  message  to  the  Senate,  rec- 
ommending an  embargo. 

An  act  was  almost  immediately  passed,  which, 
if  anything  more  was  needed  to  complete  the  ruin 


THE  EMBARGO. 


279 


of  American  commerce,  supplied  that  deficiency. 
A month  before  this  time  the  English  ministry 
had  issued  a new  order  in  council  — the  news  of 
which  reached  Jefferson  as  he  was  about  to  send 
in  his  message  — proclaiming  a blockade  of  pretty 
much  all  Europe,  and  forbidding  any  trade  in  neu- 
tral vessels,  unless  they  had  first  gone  into  some 
British  port  and  paid  duties  on  their  cargoes  ; and 
within  twenty-four  hours  of  the  President’s  mes- 
sage, recommending  the  embargo,  Napoleon  pro- 
claimed a new  decree  from  Milan,  by  which  it  was 
declared  that  any  ship  was  lawful  prize  that  had 
anything  whatever  to  do  with  Great  Britain  — 
that  should  pay  it  tribute,  that  should  carry  its 
merchandise,  that  should  be  bound  either  to  or 
from  any  of  its  ports.  All  that  these  powers  could 
do  to  shut  every  trading  vessel  out  of  all  European 
ports  was  now  done  ; and  at  this  opportune  mo- 
ment Mr.  Jefferson  came  to  their  aid  by  compelling 
all  American  vessels  to  stay  at  home.  It  is  not 
easy  in  our  time  to  conceive  of  a President  propos- 
ing, or  of  a party  accepting,  or  of  the  people  sub- 
mitting to  such  a measure  as  this.  But  Mr.  Jeffer- 
son's followers  were  very  obedient,  and  there  was, 
undoubtedly,  a very  general  belief  that  trade  with 
the  United  States  was  so  important  to  the  nations 
at  war,  that  for  the  sake  of  its  renewal  the  obnox- 
ious decrees  and  orders  in  council  would  soon  be 
repealed.  But,  except  upon  certain  manufacturers 
in  England,  little  influence  was  visible.  General 


280 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Armstrong,  the  American  minister  in  France, 
wrote : “ Here  it  is  not  felt ; and  in  England, 
amid  the  more  recent  and  interesting  events  of  the 
daj7,  it  is  forgotten.”  When,  however,  the  effect 
was  evident  at  home  of  a law  forbidding  any 
American  vessels  from  going  to  sea,  even  to  catch 
fish,  and  prohibiting  the  export  of  any  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  United  States  either  in  their  own  ships 
or  those  of  any  other  country,  then  there  arose 
a popular  clamor  for  the  abandonment  of  a policy 
so  ruinous.  Within  four  months  of  its  enactment, 
Josiah  Quincy  of  Massachusetts  declared,  in  a de- 
bate in  Congress,  that  “ an  experiment,  such  as  is 
now  making,  was  never  before  — I will  not  say 
tried — it  never  before  entered  into  the  human 
imagination.  There  is  nothing  like  it  in  the  nar- 
rations of  history  or  in  the  tales  of  fiction.  All 
the  habits  of  a mighty  nation  are  at  once  counter- 
acted. All  their  property  depreciated.  All  their 
external  connections  violated.  Five  millions  of 
people  are  engaged.  They  cannot  go  beyond  the 
limits  of  that  once  free  country  ; now  they  are 
not  even  permitted  to  thrust  their  own  property 
through  the  grates.”  While  American  ships  at 
home  were  kept  there,  those  which  had  remained 
abroad  to  escape  the  embargo  were  met  by  a new 
peril.  Some  of  them  were  in  French  ports  await- 
ing a turn  in  affaii’s ; others  ventured  to  load  with 
English  goods  in  English  ports,  to  be  landed  in 
France  under  the  pretense,  supported  by  fraudu* 


TEE  EMBARGO. 


281 


lent  papers,  that  they  were  direct  from  the  United 
States  or  other  neutral  country.  The  fraud  was 
too  transparent  to  escape  detection  long,  and  Na- 
poleon  thereupon  issued,  in  the  spring  of  1808,  the 
Bayonne  decree  authorizing  the  seizure  and  con- 
fiscation of  all  American  vessels.  They  were  either 
English  or  American,  he  said  ; if  the  former  they 
were  enemy’s  ships  and  liable  to  capture ; but  if 
the  latter,  they  should  be  at  home,  and  he  was 
only  enforcing  the  embargo  law  of  the  United 
States,  which  she  ought  to  thank  him  for. 

The  prosperity  and  tranquillity  which  marked 
the  earlier  years  of  Jefferson’s  administration  dis- 
appeared in  its  last  year.  Congress,  both  in  its 
spring  and  winter  sessions,  could  talk  of  little  else 
but  the  disastrous  embargo ; proposing,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  make  it  the  more  stringent  by  an  enforce- 
ment act,  and,  on  the  other,  to  substitute  for  it 
non-intercourse  with  England  and  France,  restor- 
ing trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  leaving 
the  question  of  decrees  and  orders  in  council  open 
for  future  consideration.  The  President  no  longer 
held  his  party  under  pei’fect  control.  The  mis- 
chievous results  of  the  embargo  policy  were  evi- 
dent enough  to  a sufficient  number  of  Republi- 
cans to  secure ; in  February,  1809,  the  repeal  of 
that  measure,  to  take  effect  the  next  month  as  to 
all  countries  except  England  and  France,  and 
with  regard  to  them  at  the  adjournment  of  the 


282 


JAMES  MADISON. 


next  Congress.  But  the  prohibition  of  importa- 
tion from  both  these  latter  countries  was  contin- 
ued till  the  obnoxious  orders  in  council  and  the 
decrees  should  be  repealed. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 

Mr.  Jefferson  named  bis  own  successor.  Of 
the  three  Democratic  candidates,  Madison,  Mon- 
roe, and  George  Clinton,  he  preferred  Madison 
now,  and  urged  Monroe  to  wait  patiently  as  next 
in  succession.  Beyond  two  lives  he  did  not,  per- 
haps, think  proper  to  dictate ; and,  besides,  Clin- 
ton was  not  a Virginian.  What  little  opposition 
there  was  to  Madison  in  his  own  party  came  from 
those  who  feared  that  he  was  too  thoroughly  iden- 
tified with  Jefferson's  policy  to  untie  the  knot  in 
which  the  foreign  relations  of  the  country  had  be- 
come entangled.  Of  the  175  electoral  votes,  how- 
ever, he  received  122 ; but  that  was  fewer  by  89 
than  had  been  cast  for  Jefferson  four  years  before. 
Of  the  New  England  States,  Vermont  alone  gave 
him  its  votes,  changing  places  with  Rhode  Island, 
which  had  wheeled  into  line  again  with  the  Fed- 
eralists. 

During  the  winter  of  1808-09,  after  Madison’s 
election  but  before  his  inauguration,  he  had  qui- 
etly conferred  with  Erskine,  the  British  minister 
at  Washington,  upon  the  condition  of  affairs. 


284 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Much  was  hoped  from  these  conferences  ; but  the 
end  which  they  helped  to  bring  about  was  the  re- 
verse of  what  was  hoped  for.  Could  Madison 
have  had  his  way,  he  would  probably  have  pre- 
ferred that  Congress  should  have  left  untouched 
at  that  session  the  questions  of  embargo  and  non- 
intercourse ; for  the  tone  of  the  debates  and  the 
tendency  of  legislation  naturally  led  the  English 
ministry  to  doubt  tbe  assurances  which  Erskine 
gave,  that  these  proceedings  did  not  truly  rep- 
resent the  friendly  disposition  of  the  incoming 
President.  In  answer  to  those  representations, 
however,  there  came  in  April  from  Canning,  the 
Foreign  Secretary,  certain  propositions  which  were 
so  presented  by  Erskine,  and  so  received  by  the 
Administration,  as  to  promise  a settlement  of  all 
differences  between  the  two  governments.  Er- 
skine was  a young  man,  anxious  very  likely  for 
distinction ; but  a laudable  ambition  to  be  of  ser- 
vice in  a good  cause  made  him  over-zealous.  He 
exceeded  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  while  keep- 
ing, as  he  thought,  to  their  spirit.  Probably  he 
mistook  their  spirit  in  assuming  that  his  govern- 
ment cared  more  to  secure  a settlement  of  existing 
difficulties  than  for  the  precise  terms  and  minor 
details  by  which  it  should  be  reached.  At  any 
rate  he  agreed  that  Great  Britain  would  withdraw 
her  orders  in  council  provided  the  United  States 
would  maintain  the  non-intercourse  acts  against 
France  so  long  as  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


285 


remained  in  force.  This  being  secured,  lie  did  not 
insist  upon  two  other  conditions — partly  because 
it  was  represented  to  him  that  they  would  need 
some  action  by  Congress,  and  partly  because  he 
believed  that  the  essential  point  was  gained  by  an 
agreement  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  en- 
force non-intercourse  against  France  while  her 
decrees  were  unrepealed.  These  other  conditions 
were,  first,  that  the  United  States  should  cease  to 
insist  upon  the  right  to  carry  on  in  time  of  war 
the  colonial  trade  of  a belligerent  which  had  not 
been  open  in  time  of  peace  to  neutrals  ; and  sec- 
ond, the  acknowledgment  that  British  men-of- 
war  might  rightfully  seize  American  merchant 
vessels  when  transgressing  the  non-intercourse 
laws  against  France.  He  also  proposed  a settle- 
ment of  the  Chesapeake  question,  but  omitted  to 
say,  as  Canning  had  instructed  him  to  say,  that 
some  provision  would  be  made,  as  an  act  of  gener- 
osity and  not  of  right,  for  the  wives  and  children 
of  the  men  who  were  killed  on  board  that  ship. 
But  when  that  settlement  was  accepted  by  the 
Administration,  he  failed  to  resent  some  reflections 
from  Robert  Smith,  the  Secretary  of  State,  on  the 
conduct  of  Great  Britain  in  that  affair,  which 
Canning,  when  he  heard  of  them,  thought  should 
have  been  resented  and  their  recall  demanded,  or 
the  negotiation  stopped. 

On  the  terms,  however,  as  Erskine  chose  to 
present  them,  an  agreement  was  reached,  and  the 


286 


JAMES  MADISON. 


President  issued  a proclamation  repealing  the  acts 
of  embargo  and  non-intercourse  as  against  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies  after  June  10.  On  that 
day  more  than  a thousand  ships,  loaded  and  riding 
at  anchor  in  all  the  principal  ports  in  anxious 
readiness  for  the  signal  for  flight,  spread  their 
wings,  like  a flock  of  long-imprisoned  birds,  and 
flew  out  to  sea.  There  was  an  almost  universal 
shout  of  gratitude  to  the  new  President,  who,  in 
the  first  three  months  of  his  administration,  had 
banished  the  fear  of  war  abroad,  and  at  home  was 
sweeping  away  involuntary  idleness,  want,  and 
ominous  discontent.  Madison  had  known  some- 
thing of  popularity  during  his  long  career ; but 
never  before  had  he  felt  the  exultation  of  riding 
upon  the  very  crest  of  a mighty  wave  of  popular 
applause.  But  it  was  one  of  those  waves  that 
collapse  suddenly  into  a surprising  flatness.  Can- 
ning repudiated  all  that  Erskine  had  done  and 
immediately  recalled  him.  The  ships  that  had 
gone  to  sea,  under  the  sanction  of  the  President’s 
proclamation,  were  permitted  by  an  order  in 
council  to  complete  their  voyages  unmolested  ; but 
otherwise  all  commerce  was  once  more  brought  to 
a stand-still.  It  would  have  been  easier  to  bear 
some  fresh  misfortune  than  to  be  compelled  to 
struggle  again  with  calamities  so  well  understood 
and  which  it  was  hoped  had  been  left  behind  for- 
ever. Madison  and  Gallatin,  who  had  been  re- 
tained in  the  Treasury  Department  and  was  the 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


287 


President’s  chief  adviser,  were  accused  of  having 
been  either  imbecile  or  treacherous.  It  was 
openly  said  that  they  had  led  the  young  minister 
to  agree  to  an  arrangement  which  they  knew  his 
government  would  not  sanction.  But  they  could 
hardly  have  been  so  foolish  as  to  make  a bargain 
with  the  certainty  that  it  would  stand  only  so 
long  as  a ship  could  go  and  come  across  the  At- 
lantic. Nobody  understood  better  than  Madison 
how  grateful  a reconciliation  with  England  would 
be  to  a large  proportion  of  the  people,  and  nobody 
was  more  disappointed  that  the  negotiations  came 
to  worse  than  nothing,  inasmuch  as  their  failure 
led  to  new  embarrassments. 

He  said  with  some  bitterness,  in  a letter  to  Jef- 
ferson, early  in  August : “You  will  see  by  the  in- 
structions to  Erskine,  as  published  by  Canning, 
that  the  latter  was  as  much  determined  that  there 
should  be  no  adjustment  as  the  former  was  that 
there  should  be  one.”  He  was  unjust  to  Can- 
ning ; the  real  fault  was  with  Erskine,  and  with 
him  only  because  his  zeal  outran  his  judgment. 
In  another  letter  to  Jefferson,  the  President  says: 
“ Erskine  is  in  a ticklish  situation  with  his  gov- 
ernment. I suspect  he  will  not  be  able  to  defend 
himself  against  the  charges  of  exceeding  his  in- 
structions, notwithstanding  the  appeal  he  makes 
to  sundry  others  not  published.  But  he  will 
make  out  a strong  case  against  Canning,  and  be 
able  to  avail  himself  much  of  the  absurdity  and 


288 


JAMES  MADISON. 


evident  inadmissibility  of  tlie  articles  disregarded 
by  him.”  Possibly  Mr.  Erskine  considered  that 
his  government  would  approve  of  bis  not  urging 
these  points  too  earnestly,  inasmuch  as  the  other 
side  refrained  from  insisting  upon  the  abandon- 
ment of  impressment  of  seamen  on  board  Ameri- 
can ships.  But  Mr.  Madison’s  indignation  must 
have  covered  up  a good  deal  of  mortification.  He 
could  hardly  have  been  without  the  sensation  of 
one  hoisted  by  his  own  petard.  It  was  only  two 
years  since  Mr.  Jefferson,  with  his  approval,  had 
rejected  the  Monroe- Pinkney  treaty  because  in- 
structions had  not  been  literally  complied  with. 
Mr.  Canning,  in  following  that  example,  could 
have  pleaded,  had  he  chosen,  much  the  stronger 
justification,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  two 
cases ; and  Mr.  Madison  could  not  fail  to  remem- 
ber, without  being  reminded  of  it,  when  this 
agreement  was  thrown  back  in  his  face,  that  he 
had  been  willing  to  accept  it  without  any  protec- 
tion of  the  rights  of  American  seamen,  the  want 
of  which  was  the  ostensible  reason  for  rejecting 
the  Monroe-Pinkney  treaty. 

However,  the  Administration  was  now  com- 
pelled to  meet  anew  the  old  difficulties  which  the 
Erskine  agreement  had  failed  to  dispose  of.  The 
President’s  first  duty  was  to  issue  a second  procla- 
mation, recalling  the  previous  one  which  had  sent 
to  sea  every  American  ship  in  port.  They  could 
all  come  back,  if  they  would,  to  be  made  fast 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


289 


again  at  their  wharves,  till  the  recurrent  tides  at 
last  should  ripple  in  and  out  of  their  open  seams, 
and  their  yards  and  masts  drop  piecemeal  upon 
the  rotting  decks.  But  many  never  came  back, 
preferring  rather  the  risk  of  being  sunk  or  burned 
at  sea,  which  happened  to  not  a few,  or  of  cap- 
ture and  confiscation  by  the  belligerents  whose 
laws  they  defied.  Erskine  was  followed  by  a new 
ambassador  from  England,  Mr.  Jackson.  His  mis- 
sion, however,  had  no  other  result  than  to  widen 
the  breach  between  the  two  nations.  A contro- 
versy almost  immediately  arose  between  the  min- 
ister and  Mr.  Smith,  the  Secretary  of  State,  — or 
rather  Mr.  Madison  himself,  who,  as  he  com- 
plained at  a later  period,  did  most  of  Smith’s 
work  as  well  as  his  own,  — touching  the  arrange- 
ment with  Erskine.  Jackson  intimated,  or  was 
understood  as  intimating,  that  the  Administration 
must  have  known  the  precise  terms  on  which  Er- 
skine was  empowered  to  treat  with  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States ; and  when  a denial 
was  made  with  a good  deal  of  emphasis  on  the 
part  of  the  Administration,  the  insinuation  was  re- 
peated almost  as  a direct  charge.  Of  course  there 
could  be  but  one  conclusion  to  correspondence  of 
this  sort;  further  communication  with  Jackson 
was  declined  and  his  recall  asked  for. 

It  was  plain  enough  in  the  latter  months  of  Jef- 
ferson’s administration,  to  himself  as  well  as  to 
everybody  else,  that  the  embargo  had  not  only 
19 


290 


JAMES  MADISON. 


failed  to  bring  the  belligerents  to  terms  abroad, 
but  that  it  bad  added  greatly  to  the  distress  at 
home.  That  the  measure  was  a failure,  Madison 
himself  acknowledged  in  one  of  his  retrospective 
letters  written  in  the  retirement  of  Montpellier, 
sixteen  years  afterward.  It  was  meant,  he  said 
in  that  letter,  as  an  experimental  measure,  prefer- 
able to  naked  submission  or  to  war  at  a time  when 
war  was  inexpedient.  It  failed,  he  added,  “ be- 
cause the  government  did  not  sufficiently  distrust 
those  in  a certain  quarter  whose  successful  viola- 
tion of  the  law  led  to  the  general  discontent,  which 
called  for  its  repeal.”  That  is  to  say,  the  govern- 
ment relied  too  confidently  upon  the  submission  of 
New  England;  was  too  ready  to  believe  that  her 
merchants  would  not  let  their  ships  slip  quietly  out 
to  sea  whenever  they  could  evade  the  officers  of  the 
customs,  nor  slip  in  to  land  a cargo  at  some  unfre- 
quented place  where  there  was  no  custom-house. 
“ The  patriotic  fishermen  of  Marblehead,”  he  says, 
“atone  time  offered  their  services ; ” and  he  re- 
grets they  were  not  sent  out  as  privateers  to  seize 
these  contraband  ships  as  prizes,  and  to  “ carry 
them  into  ports  where  the  tribunals  would  en- 
force the  law.”  Apparently  there  was  not  a rea- 
sonable doubt  in  his  mind  whether  such  tribunals 
could  be  found  in  any  port  along  the  coast  of  New 
England.  It  is  also  rather  more  than  doubtful  — 
even  assuming  that  there  was  much  of  the  kind 
of  patriotism  which  he  says  existed  in  Marblehead 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT.  291 

— how  long,  had  the  government  offered  commis- 
sions to  private  citizens  to  prey  upon  their  neigh- 
bors, the  embargo  would  have  been  respected  at 
all  east  of  Long  Island  Sound.  But  this  was  the 
afterthought  of  1826.  Madison’s  policy  in  1809- 
10  was  rather  to  conciliate  than  provoke  “ those 
in  a certain  quarter.”  He  could  not  command 
entire  unanimity  even  in  his  own  party.  Con- 
gress passed  the  winter  in  vain  efforts  to  find 
some  common  ground,  not  merely  for  Democrats 
and  Federalists,  but  for  the  Democrats  alone. 
Various  measures  were  proposed  to  meet  the  crit- 
ical condition  of  the  country.  Some  were  too  rad- 
ical ; some  not  radical  enough ; and  none  were  so 
acceptable  that  it  was  not  easy  to  form  combina- 
tions for  their  defeat.  All  were  agreed  that  the 
non-importation  act  must  be  got  rid  of  ; but  the 
difficulty  was  to  find  a way  to  be  rid  of  it  so  that 
the  nation  should  at  once  maintain  its  dignity,  as- 
sert its  rights,  and  escape  a war.  The  President 
would  have  preferred  that  all  British  and  French 
ships  be  excluded  from  American  ports,  and  that 
importations  from  both  countries  should  be  pro- 
hibited except  in  American  vessels ; and  a bill  to 
this  effect  was  one  of  several  that  was  defeated  in 
the  course  of  the  session.  But  at  last,  in  May 
(1810),  an  act  was  passed  excluding  only  the  men- 
of-war  of  both  nations,  but  suspending  the  non- 
importation act  for  three  months  after  the  ad- 
journment of  Congress.  The  President  was  then 


292 


JAMES  MADISON. 


authorized,  when  the  three  months  were  passed, 
to  declare  the  act  again  in  force  against  either 
Great  Britain  or  France,  should  the  commercial 
orders  or  decrees  of  either  nation  he  continued  in 
force  while  those  of  the  other  were  repealed. 

If  the  aim  of  the  dominant  party  had  been  to 
devise  a scheme  sure  to  lead  to  fresh  complications 
more  difficult  to  manage  than  any  that  had  gone 
before,  it  could  not  have  hit  upon  a better  one 
than  this.  Hitherto,  in  all  the  perplexities  and 
anxieties  of  the  situation,  the  government  had,  at 
least,  kept  its  relations  to  other  powers  in  its  own 
hands,  to  conduct  them,  whether  wisely  or  un- 
wisely, in  its  own  way.  It  could  resent  or  sub- 
mit to  encroachments  upon  the  commerce  of  the 
country  as  seemed  most  prudent ; it  could  close 
or  open  the  ports,  as  seemed  most  judicious  ; or  it 
could  join  forces  with  that  one  of  its  two  enemies 
whose  alliance  promised  to  secure  respect  on  the 
one  hand,  and  compel  it  on  the  other.  But  now 
it  had  tied  itself  up  in  a knot  of  provisos.  It 
would  do  something  if  England  would  do  some- 
thing else,  or  if  France  would  do  something  else. 
If  the  proposition  was  accepted  by  England  and 
was  not  accepted  by  France,  then  the  United 
States  would  remain  in  friendly  relations  with 
England,  and  assume  by  comparison  an  unfriendly 
attitude  toward  France;  and  if  France  accepted 
the  condition  and  England  declined  it,  then  the 
situation  would  be  reversed.  Nothing  would  be 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


293 


gained  in  either  case  that  might  not  have  been 
gained  by  direct  negotiation,  and,  no  doubt,  on 
better  terms.  But  if  the  proposition  now  offered 
should  be  disregarded  by  botli  powers,  the  situa- 
tion would  be  worse  than  before.  This  evidently 
was  Madison’s  view  of  the  question.  He  wrote  to 
Pinkney,  the  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James, 
a month  after  the  act  was  passed  : “ At  the  next 
meeting  of  Congress,  it  will  be  found,  according 
to  present  appearances,  that  instead  of  an  adjust- 
ment with  either  of  the  belligerents  there  is  an 
increasing  obstinacy  in  both  ; and  that  the  incon- 
veniences of  embargo  and  non-intercourse  have 
been  exchanged  for  the  greater  sacrifices,  as  well 
as  disgrace,  resulting  from  a submission  to  the 
predatory  system  in  force.”  Not  that  he  wanted 
war;  his  faith  in  passive  resistance  was  still  un- 
shaken ; embargo  and  non-intercourse  he  was  still 
confident  would,  if  persisted  in  long  enough, 
surely  bring  the  belligerents  to  terms.  But  as  to 
this  act,  he  weighs  the  chances  as  in  a balance. 
In  England  some  impression  may  be  made  by  the 
prices  of  cotton  and  tobacco  — “ cotton  down  at 
ten  or  eleven  cents  in  Georgia;  and  the  great 
mass  of  tobacco  in  the  same  situation.”  Pie  has, 
however,  no  “ very  favorable  expectations.”  But 
as  to  France  he  evidently  is  not  without  hope  that 
she  will  be  wise  enough  to  see  that  “ she  ought 
at  once  to  embrace  the  arrangement  held  out  by 
Congress,  the  renewal  of  a non-intercourse  with 


294 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Great  Britain  being  the  very  species  of  resistance 
most  analogous  to  her  professed  views.”  But  he 
was  clearly  not  sanguine. 

If  that  was  his  wish,  however,  it  was  gratified. 
Napoleon  did  take  advantage  of  the  act;  but 
in  such  a way  as  to  reverse  the  relative  positions 
of  the  two  nations  by  seizing  for  France  and  tak- 
ing from  the  United  States  the  power  or  the  will 
to  dictate  terms.  The  French  minister,  Cham- 
pagny,  announced  in  a letter  merely,  in  August, 
the  revocation  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees, 
from  the  1st  of  the  following  November;  and,  a 
day  or  two  after,  such  new  restrictions  wei'e  im- 
posed upon  American  trade,  by  prohibitory  duties 
and  a navigation  act,  as  pretty  much  to  ruin  what 
little  there  was  left  of  it.  The  revocation  of  the 
edicts,  moreover,  was  coupled  with  the  conditions 
that  Great  Britain  should  not  only  recall  her  order 
in  council,  but  renounce  her  “new  principles  of 
blockade,”  or  that  the  United  States  should 
“cause  their  rights  to  be  respected  by  the  Eng- 
lish.” Napoleon  had  in  this  three  ends  to  gain, 
and  he  gained  them  all:  First,  to  secure  France 
against  a I’enewal  of  the  non-importation  act  of 
the  United  States,  if  the  President  should  accept 
this  conditional  recall  of  the  decrees  as  satisfac- 
tory ; second,  to  leave  those  decrees  virtually  un- 
repealed, by  making  their  recall  depend  upon  the 
action  of  England,  who,  he  well  knew,  would  not 
listen  to  the  proposed  conditions ; and,  third,  to 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


295 


involve  the  United  States  and  England  in  new 
disputes,  which  might  lead  to  war.  Everything 
turned  out  as  the  Emperor  wished.  The  Presi- 
dent accepted  the  conditional  withdrawal  of  the 
French,  decrees,  as  in  accordance  with  the  act  of 
Congress  ; England  refused  to  recognize  a contin- 
gent withdrawal  as  a withdrawal  at  all ; and  the 
result  at  length  was  war  between  England  and 
the  United  States. 

The  acquiescence  of  the  President  in  the  decis- 
ion of  Napoleon  was  the  more  significant  inasmuch 
as  Mr.  Smith,  the  Secretary  of  State,  had  assured 
the  French  government,  when  a copy  of  the  act 
of  May  was  sent  to  it,  that  there  could  be  no  ne- 
gotiation under  the  act  until  another  matter  was 
disposed  of.  A decree,  issued  at  Rambouillet  in 
March,  1810,  and  enforced  in  May,  ordered  the 
confiscation  of  all  American  ships  then  detained  in 
the  ports  of  France,  and  in  Spanish,  Dutch,  and 
Neapolitan  ports  under  the  control  of  France. 
The  loss  to  American  merchants,  including  ships 
and  cargoes,  was  estimated  to  be  about  forty  mil- 
lion dollars.  This  decree  was  ostensibly  in  retal- 
iation of  that  act  of  non-intercourse  passed  by 
Congress  more  than  a year  before,  and  was,  there- 
fore, a retrospective  law.  The  non  - intercourse 
act,  moreover,  had  expired  by  its  own  limitation 
months  before  many  of  these  ships  were  seized ; 
, but  all,  nevertheless,  were  confiscated,  though  some 
of  them  had  entered  the  ports  merely  for  shelter. 


296 


JAMES  MADISON. 


By  order  of  the  President,  Smith  wrote  to  Arm- 
strong, the  American  minister  at  Paris,  that  “ a 
satisfactory  provision  for  restoring  the  property 
lately  surprised  and  seized  by  the  order,  or  at  the 
instance  of  the  French  government,  must  be  com- 
bined with  a repeal  of  the  French  edicts,  with  a 
view  to  a non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain ; 
such  a provision  being  an  indispensable  evidence 
of  the  just  purpose  of  France  toward  the  United 
States.”  The  injunction  was  repeated  a few  weeks 
later ; but  when  the  Emperor’s  decision  upon  the 
decrees  was  announced,  in  August,  the  “ indis- 
pensable” was  dispensed  with,  and  a few  months 
later  an  absolute  refusal  of  any  compensation  for 
the  spoliation  under  the  Rambouillet  decree  was 
quietly  submitted  to. 

But  meanwhile  the  President,  in  November,  is- 
sued a proclamation  announcing  that  France  had 
complied  with  the  act  of  the  previous  May,  and 
revoked  the  decrees,  while  the  English  orders  in 
council  remained  unrepealed.  But  England  still 
had  three  months,  according  to  the  act,  in  which 
to  make  her  choice  between  a recall  of  her  orders 
in  council  or  the  alternative  of  seeing  the  Amer- 
ican non-intercourse  act  revived  against  her. 
But,  it  is  to  be  observed,  the  French  minister’s 
announcement  of  the  acceptance  of  the  act  of 
May  was  not  made  till  August,  and  then  the  revo- 
cation of  the  decrees  was  not  to  take  effect  till 

* 

November.  November  came  bringing  with  it  the 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


297 


President’s  proclamation,  when  it  soon  appeared 
that  there  was  still  to  be  “ tarrying  in  the  eating 
of  the  cake.”  The  decrees  were  to  remain  in 
force  at  least  three  months  longer,  till  it  should  be 
known  whether  Great  Britain  would  comply  with 
those  terms  which  France  — not  the  United  States 
— made  the  condition  of  revoking  the  orders  in 
council ; and  if  Great  Britain  did  not  comply,  then 
the  French  decrees  were  not  revoked.  The  legal- 
ity of  the  President’s  proclamation,  of  course,  was 
questioned.  There  was,  as  Josiah  Quincy  said 
in  debate  in  the  House,  the  following  February 
(1811),  “a  continued  seizure  of  all  the  vessels 
which  came  within  the  grasp  of  the  French  cus- 
tom-house, from  the  1st  of  November  down  to  the 
date  of  our  last  accounts.”  Other  members,  not 
more  earnest,  were  less  temperate  in  the  expres- 
sion of  their  indignation  at  what,  one  of  them  said, 
would  be  called  swindling  in  the  conduct  of  pri- 
vate affairs  ; while  another  declared  that  the  Pres- 
ident was  throwing  the  people  “ into  the  embrace 
of  that  monster  at  whose  perfidy  Lucifer  blushed 
and  hell  stands  astonished.”  France  knew  all  this 
while  what  England's  decision  would  be.  She  was 
ready  to  rescind  the  orders  in  council  when  the 
French  edicts  were  revoked,  but  she  did  not  recog- 
nize a mere  letter  from  the  French  minister, 
Champagny,  to  the  American  ambassador  as  such 
revocation.  The  second  French  condition,  that 
England  should  abandon  her  “ new  principles  of 


298 


JAMES  MADISON. 


blockade  ” and  accept  in  tbeir  place  a new  French 
principle,  was  peremptorily  rejected  by  the  Eng- 
lish ministry.  That  proposition  opened  a question 
not  properly  belonging  to  an  agreement  touching 
the  decrees  and  orders  — a question  of  what  was 
a blockade,  and  what  could  properly  be  subject  to 
it.  Napoleon’s  doctrine  was,  not  only  that  a pa- 
per blockade  was  not  permissible  by  the  law  of 
nations,  but  that  there  could  be  no  right  of  block- 
ade “ to  ports  not  fortified,  to  harbors  and  mouths 
of  rivers,  which,  according  to  reason  and  the  usage 
of  civilized  nations,  is  applicable  only  to  strong  or 
fortified  places.”  Mr.  Emott,  a member  of  the 
House  from  New  York,  said  in  debate  that  the 
United  States  might  well  be  grateful  to  both  Eng- 
land and  France,  if  they  would  agree  upon  this 
doctrine  as  good  international  law ; since,  in  that 
case,  as  there  were  no  fortified  places  in  the  United 
States,  she  would  never  be  in  peril  of  a blockade. 
But  it  was  precisely  what  England  would  not  ad- 
mit nor  even  discuss  as  relevant  to  an  agreement 
to  revoke  the  orders  and  decrees. 

To  “ this  curious  gallamatry,”  as  Quincy  called 
it,  “ of  time  present  and  time  future,  of  doing  and 
refraining  to  do,  of  declaration  and  understand- 
ing of  English  duties  and  American  duties,”  was 
added  another  ingredient  of  Madison’s  own  devis- 
ing. The  American  ministers  in  England  and 
France  were  instructed  that  Great  Britain  would 
be  expected  to  include  in  the  revocation  of  her 


MADISON  AS  PRESIDENT. 


299 


orders  in  council  the  blockade  of  a portion  of 
the  coast  of  France,  declared  in  May,  1806  ; and 
the  President  offered,  unasked,  a pledge  to  the 
French  Emperor,  that  this  should  be  insisted  upon. 
Whether  he  meant  to  make  it  easier  for  Napo- 
leon and  harder  for  Great  Britain  to  respond  to 
the  act  of  May,  is  a question  impossible  to  answer  ; 
but  the  opponents  of  the  policy  he  was  pursuing 
were  careful  to  point  out  that  the  act  of  May 
said  nothing  whatever,  either  of  this  or  any  other 
blockade ; that  when,  the  year  befoi’e,  the  agree- 
ment was  made  with  Erskine,  the  President  did 
not  pretend  that  the  orders  in  council  included 
blockades ; and  that  it  was  remarkable  that  he 
should  forget  his  own  declaration  regarding  the 
monstrous  spoliation  of  a few  months  before  by 
the  French,  under  the  Rambouillet  decree,  and  yet 
remember  this  British  order  of  blockade  of  four 
years  before,  which  everybody  else  had  forgotten. 
Indeed,  so  completely  had  it  passed  out  of  mind, 
that  the  American  minister  in  London,  Mr.  Pink- 
ney, was  obliged  to  ask  the  British  Foreign  Secre- 
tary whether  that  order  had  been  revoked  or  was 
still  considered  as  in  force.  It  had  never  been  for- 
mally withdrawn,  was  the  answer,  though  it  had 
been  comprehended  in  the  subsequent  order  in 
council  of  January,  1807.  England  refused,  how- 
ever, to  recall  specifically  this  blockade  of  1806, 
for  that  would  have  been  construed  as*  a recogni- 
tion of  Napoleon’s  right  to  demand  an  abandon- 


300 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ment  of  her  “ new  principles  of  blockade  ; ” but 
in  fact  — as  the  British  minister  in  Washington 
afterward  acknowledged  — the  recall  of  the  order 
in  council  of  1807  would  have  annulled  the  order 
of  blockade  of  1806,  which  it  had  absorbed. 

The  truth  is,  the  whole  negotiation  was  a trial 
of  skill  at  diplomatic  fence,  in  which  England 
would  not  yield  an  inch  to  the  United  States  or 
to  France.  Madison  and  his  party  were  more  than 
willing  to  aid  Napoleon ; and  Napoleon  hoped  to 
defeat  both  his  antagonists  by  turning  their  swords 
against  each  other.  A quite  different  result  would 
have  followed  had  France  been  as  willing  as  Eng- 
land apparently  was  that  the  commercial  edicts 
should  be  considered  without  regard  to  other 
questions ; or  if  the  American  Executive  had  in- 
sisted that  it  would  accept  their  unconditional  rev- 
ocation, pure  and  simple  and  not  otherwise^  from 
either  power,  as  was  contemplated  in  the  act  of 
May,  1810.  But  instead,  when  Congress  rose  in 
March,  1811,  it  left  behind  it  an  act  renewing 
non-intercourse  with  England,  in  accordance  with 
Napoleon’s  demand  that  the  United  States  should 
“ cause  their  rights  to  be  respected  by  the  Eng- 
lish.” This  meant  war. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 

In  May,  1811,  there  occurred  one  of  those  acci- 
dents which  happen  on  purpose,  and  often  serve 
as  a relief  when  the  public  temper  is  in  an  exas- 
perated and  almost  dangerous  condition.  This 
was  the  fight  between  the  American  frigate  Pres- 
ident, of  forty-four  guns,  and  the  English  sloop- 
of-war,  Little  Belt,  of  eighteen  guns.  This  ves- 
sel belonged  to  the  British  squadron,  which  was 
ordered  to  the  American  coast  to  break  up  the 
trade  from  the  United  States  to  France  ; and  the 
President  was  one  of  the  few  ships  the  Govern- 
ment had  for  the  protection  of  her  commerce. 
The  ships  met  a few  miles  south  of  Sandy  Hook, 
chased  each  other  in  turn,  then  fired  into  each 
other  without  any  reasonable  pretext  for  the  first 
shot,  which  each  accused  the  other  of  having  fired. 
The  loss  on  board  the  English  ship,  in  an  en- 
counter which  lasted  only  a few  minutes,  was  over 
thirty  in  killed  and  wounded,  while  only  a single 
man  was  slightly  wounded  on  board  the  President. 
It  was,  as  Mr.  Madison  said,  an  “ occurrence  not 
unlikely  to  bring  on  repetitions,”  and  that  these 


302 


JAMES  MADISON. 


would  “ probably  end  in  an  open  rupture  or  a 
better  understanding,  as  the  calculations  of  the 
British  government  may  prompt  or  dissuade  from 
war.”  This  certainly  was  obvious  enough  ; though 
it  would  be  a great  deal  easier  for  England  to 
bring  on  a war  than  to  avert  it,  in  the  angry  mood 
in  which  the  majority  of  the  Democratic  party 
then  was.  But  Mr.  Madison  preserved  his  equa- 
nimity. Considering  his  old  proclivity  for  France, 
and  his  old  dislike  of  England,  his  impartiality 
between  them  is  rather  remarkable.  But  his  aim 
was  still  to  keep  the  peace  while  he  abated  noth- 
ing of  the  well-founded  complaints  he  had  against 
both  powers.  When  a new  Congress  assembled 
in  the  autumn  he  was  careful  to  point  out  in  his 
message  the  delinquencies  of  France  as  well  as  the 
offenses  of  England.  He  insisted  that,  while  Eng- 
land should  have  acknowledged  the  Berlin  and 
Milan  decrees  to  be  revoked  and  have  acted  ac- 
cordingly, France  showed  no  disposition  to  repair 
the  many  wrongs  she  had  inflicted  upon  American 
merchants,  and  had  lately  imposed  such  “ rigorous 
and  unexpected  restrictions  ” upon  commerce  that 
it  would  be  necessary,  unless  they  were  speedily 
discontinued,  to  meet  them  by  “ corresponding  re- 
strictions on  importations  from  France.” 

This  tone  is  even  more  pronounced  in  his  let- 
ters for  some  following  months.  If  anything,  it 
is  France  rather  than  England  that  seems  to  be 
looked  upon  as  the  chief  offender,  with  whom  there 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


303 


was  the  greater  danger  of  armed  collision.  A fort- 
night after  Congress  had  assembled  he  wrote  to 
Barlow,  the  new  minister  to  France,  that  though 
justified  in  assuming  the  French  decrees  to  be  so 
far  withdrawn  that  a withdrawal  of  the  British 
orders  might  be  looked  for,  “yet  the  manner  in 
which  the  French  government  has  managed  the 
repeal  of  the  decrees  and  evaded  a correction  of 
other  outrages,  has  mingled  with  the  conciliatory 
tendency  of  the  repeal  as  much  of  irritation  and 
disgust  as  possible.”  “ In  fact,”  he  adds,  “ with- 
out a S}Tstematic  change  from  an  appearance  of 
crafty  contrivance  and  insatiate  cupidity,  for  an 
open,  manly,  and  upright  dealing  with  a nation 
whose  example  demands  it,  it  is  impossible  that 
good-will  can  exist ; and  that  the  ill-will  which 
her  policy  aims  at  directing  against  her  enemy 
should  not,  by  her  folly  and  iniquity,  be  drawn 
off  against  herself.”  French  depredations  upon 
American  commerce  in  the  Baltic  were  “ kindling 
a fresh  flame  here,”  and,  if  they  were  not  stopped, 
“ hostile  collisions  will  as  readily  take  place  with 
one  nation  as  the  other ; ” nor  would  there  be  any 
hesitation  in  sending  American  frigates  to  that 
sea,  “with  orders  to  suppress  by  force  the  French 
and  Danish  depredations,”  were  it  not  for  the 
“ danger  of  rencounters  with  British  ships  of  supe- 
rior force  in  that  quarter.” 

By  this  time,  however,  Congress,  under  the  lead 
of  younger,  vigorous  men  — chief  among  them 


304 


JAMES  MADISON. 


Clay  and  Calhoun  — panting  for  leadership  and 
distinction,  was  beginning  its  clamor  for  war 
with  England.  How  much  respect  had  Madison 
for  this  movement,  and  how  much  faith  in  it  ? 
A letter  to  Jefferson  of  February  7 answers  both 
questions.  Were  he  not  evidently  amused  he 
would  seem  to  be  contemptuous.  “ To  enable  the 
Executive  to  step  at  once  into  Canada,”  he  says, 
“they  have  provided,  after  two  months’  delay, 
for  a regular  force  requiring  twelve  to  raise  it,  and 
after  three  months  for  a volunteer  force,  on  terms 
not  likely  to  raise  it  at  all  for  that  object.  The 
mixture  of  good  and  bad,  avowed  and  disguised 
motives,  accounting  for  these  things,  is  curious 
enough  but  not  to  be  explained  in  the  compass  of 
a letter.”  This  is  not  the  tone  of  either  hope  or 
fear.  If  war  was  in  his  mind  at  that  time,  it  was 
not  war  with  England.  Three  weeks  later,  he 
writes  to  Barlow  at  Paris.  On  various  points  of 
negotiation  between  that  minister  and  the  French 
government,  be  observes  much  that  “ suggests  dis- 
trust rather  than  expectation.”  He  complains  of 
delay,  of  vagueness,  of  neglect,  of  discourtesy,  of 
a disregard  of  past  obligations  as  to  the  liberation 
of  ships  and  cargoes  seized,  and  of  late  condemna- 
tions of  ships  captured  in  the  Baltic  ; and  con- 
cerning all  these  and  other  grievances  he  says, 
“ we  find  so  little  of  explicit  dealing  or  substantial 
redress  mingled  with  the  compliments  and  en- 
couragements which  cost  nothing  because  they 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


305 


mean  nothing,  that  suspicions  are  unavoidable  ; 
and,  if  they  be  erroneous,  the  fault  does  not  lie 
with  those  who  entertain  them.”  France,  he  be- 
lieves, in  asking  for  a new  treaty,  which  he  thinks 
quite  unnecessary,  is  only  seeking  to  gain  time 
that  it  may  take  advantage  of  future  events. 
The  commercial  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries are  so  intolerable,  that  trade  “ will  be  pro- 
hibited if  no  essential  change  take  place.”  Unless 
there  be  indemnity  for  the  great  wrongs  committed 
under  the  Rambouillet  decree,  and  for  other  spo- 
liations, he  declares  that  “ there  can  be  neither 
cordiality  nor  confidence  here  ; nor  any  restraint 
from  self-redress  in  any  justifiable  mode  of  effect- 
ing it.”  The  letter  concludes  with  the  emphatic 
assertion  that,  if  dispatches  soon  looked  for  “ do  not 
exhibit  the  French  government  in  better  colours 
than  it  has  yet  assumed,  there  will  be  but  one 
sentiment  in  this  country  ; and  I need  not  say 
what  that  will  be.” 

Congress  all  this  while  was  lashing  itself  into 
fury  against  England.  The  ambitious  young  lead- 
ers of  the  Democratic  party  in  the  House  wex-e,  so 
to  speak,  “ spoiling  for  a fight,”  and  they  chose 
to  have  it  out  with  England  rather  than  with 
France.  Not  that  there  was  not  quite  as  much 
reason  for  resentment  against  France  as  against 
England.  Some,  indeed,  of  the  more  hot-headed 
were  anxious  for  war  with  both  ; but  these  were 
of  the  more  impulsive  kind,  like  Henry  Clay,  who 
20 


306 


JAMES  MADISON. 


laughed  in  scorn  at  the  doubt  that  he  could  not  at 
a blow  subdue  the  Canadas  with  a few  regiments 
of  Kentucky  militia.  But  war  with  England  was 
determined  upon,  partly  because  the  old  enmity 
toward  her  made  that  intolerable  which,  to  the 
old  affection  for  France  was  a burden  lightly 
borne ; and  partly  because  the  instinctive  jealousy 
of  the  commercial  interest,  on  the  part  of  the 
planter-interest,  preferred  that  policy  which  would 
do  the  most  harm  to  the  North.  On  April  1, 
1812,  just  five  weeks  after  the  writing  of  this 
letter  to  Barlow,  Mr.  Madison  sent  to  Congress  a 
message  of  five  lines,  recommending  the  immedi- 
ate passage  of  an  act  to  impose  “ a general  em- 
bargo on  all  vessels  now  in  port  or  hereafter  arriv- 
ing for  the  period  of  sixty  days.”  It  was  meant 
to  be  a secret  measure  ; but  the  intention  leaked 
out  in  two  or  three  places,  and  the  news  was  hur- 
ried North  by  several  of  the  Federalist  members 
in  time  to  enable  some  of  their  constituents  to 
send  their  ships  to  sea  before  the  act  was  passed. 
Nor,  probably,  was  it  a surprise  to  anybody ; for 
war  with  England  had  been  the  topic  of  debate  in 
one  aspect  or  another  all  winter,  and  the  purpose 
of  the  party  in  power  was  plain  to  everybody. 
That  the  embargo  was  intended  as  a preparation 
for  war  was  frankly  acknowledged.  An  act  was 
speedily  passed,  though  the  period  was  extended 
from  sixty  to  ninety  days.  Within  less  than  sixty 
days,  however,  another  message  from  the  Pres- 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


307 


ident  recommended  a declaration  of  war.  On 
June  3,  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  of 
which  Calhoun  was  chairman,  reported  in  favor  of 
“ an  immediate  appeal  to  arms,”  and  the  next  day 
a declaratory  act  was  passed.  Of  the  seventy-nine 
affirmative  votes  in  the  House,  forty-eight  were 
from  the  South  and  West,  and  of  the  other  thirty- 
one  votes  from  the  Northern  States,  fourteen  were 
from  Pennsylvania  alone.  Of  the  forty-nine  votes 
against  it,  thirty-four  were  from  the  Northern 
States,  including  two  from  Pennsylvania.  On  the 
17th,  a fortnight  later,  the  bill  was  got  through 
the  Senate  by  a majority  of  six. 

Mr.  Madison  for  years  had  opposed  a war  with 
England  as  unwise  and  useless ; unwise,  because 
the  United  States  was  not  in  a condition  to  go  to 
war  with  the  greatest  naval  power  in  the  world ; 
and  useless,  because  the  end  to  be  reached  by  war 
could  be  gained  more  certainly,  and  at  infinitely 
less  cost  by  peaceful  measures.  The  situation  had 
not  changed.  Indeed,  up  to  within  a month  of 
the  message  recommending  an  embargo  as  a pre- 
cursor of  war,  his  letters  show  that,  if  he  thought 
war  was  inevitable,  it  must  be  with  France,  not 
England.  But  the  faction  determined  upon  war 
must  have  at  their  command  an  administration  to 
carry  out  that  policy.  Their  choice  was  not  lim- 
ited to  Madison  for  an  available  candidate.  Who- 
ever was  nominated  by  the  Democrats  was  sure  to 
be  chosen,  and  Madison  had  two  formidable  rivals 


308 


JAMES  MADISON. 


in  James  Monroe,  Secretary  of  State,  and  De  Witt 
Clinton,  Mayor  of  New  York,  both  eager  for  war. 
The  choice  depended  on  that  question,  and  be- 
tween the  embargo  message  of  April  1,  and  the 
war  message  of  June  1,  the  nomination  was  given 
to  Madison  by  the  congressional  caucus.  It  was 
understood  and  openly  asserted  at  the  time  by  the 
opponents  of  the  Administration,  that  the  nomina- 
tion was  the  price  of  a change  of  policy.  At  the 
next  session  of  Congress,  before  a year  had  passed 
away,  Mr.  Quincy  said  in  the  House  : “ The  great 
mistake  of  all  those  who  reasoned  concerning  the 
war  and  the  invasion  of  Canada,  and  concluded 
that  it  was  impossible  that  either  should  be  seri- 
ously intended,  resulted  from  this,  that  they  never 
took  into  consideration  the  connection  of  both 
those  events  with  the  great  election  for  the  chief 
magistracy  which  was  then  pending.  It  was  never 
sufficiently  considered  by  them  that  plunging  into 
a war  with  Great  Britain  was  among  the  condi- 
tions on  which  the  support  for  the  presidency  was 
made  dependent.”  The  assertion,  so  plainly  aimed 
at  Madison,  passed  unchallenged,  though  the 
charge  of  any  distinct  bargain  was  vehemently  de- 
nied. 

If  Mr.  Madison’s  conscience  was  not  always 
vigorous  enough  to  enable  him  to  resist  tempta- 
tion, it  was  so  sensitive  as  to  prompt  him  to  look 
for  excuses  for  yielding.  In  a sense  this  was  to 
his  credit  as  one  of  the  better  sort  of  politicians, 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


309 


without  assuming  it  to  be  akin  to  that  hypocrisy 
which  is  the  homage  vice  pays  to  virtue.  Per- 
haps it  was  this  sentiment  which  led  him  to  ac- 
cept so  readily  the  pretended  disclosui’es  of  John 
Henry,  and  to  make  the  use  of  them  he  did. 
These  were  contained  in  twenty-four  letters  for 
which  the  President,  apparently  without  hesita- 
tion, paid  fifty  thousand  dollars.  On  March  9 
he  sent  them  to  Congress  with  a message,  and  on 
the  same  day,  in  a letter  to  Jefferson,  alludes  to 
them  as  “ this  discovery,  or  rather  formal  proof 
of  the  cooperation  between  the  Eastern  Junto  and 
the  British  cabinet.”  In  the  message  he  inti- 
mates that  this  secret  agent  was  sent  directly  by 
the  British  government  to  Massachusetts  to  fo- 
ment disaffection,  to  intrigue  “ with  the  disaf- 
fected for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  resistance 
to  the  laws  and  eventually,  in  concert  with  a Brit- 
ish force,  of  destroying  the  Union,”  and  reannex- 
ing the  Eastern  States  to  England.  In  the  war- 
message  of  June  1,  these  charges  are  repeated  as 
among  the  reasons  for  an  appeal  to  arms.  Mr. 
Calhoun’s  committee  followed  this  lead  and  im- 
proved upon  it  in  the  report  recommending  an 
immediate  declaration  of  war.  The  Henry  affair 
was  declared  an  “ act  of  still  greater  malignity  ” 
than  any  of  the  other  outrages  against  the  United 
States  of  which  Great  Britain  had  been  guilty, 
and  that  which  “ excited  the  greatest  horror.” 
The  incident  was  seized  upon,  apparently,  to  an- 


310 


JAMES  MADISON. 


swer  a temporary  purpose,  and  then,  so  far  as  Mr. 
Madison  was  concerned,  was  permitted  to  sink 
into  oblivion.  In  the  hundreds  of  pages  of  his 
published  letters,  written  in  later  life,  in  which 
he  reviews  and  explains  so  many  of  the  events  of 
his  public  career,  there  is  no  allusion  whatever  to 
the  Henry  disclosures,  which,  in  1812,  were  held, 
with  the  ruin  of  American  commerce  and  the  im- 
pressment of  thousands  of  American  citizens,  as 
an  equally  just  cause  for  war.  In  truth  there  was 
nothing  whatever  in  these  disclosures,  for  which 
was  paid  an  amount  equal  to  the  salary  of  half  a 
presidential  term,  to  warrant  the  assumptions  of 
either  Mr.  Madison’s  messages  or  Mr.  Calhoun’s 
report.  The  man  had  been  sent,  at  his  own  sug- 
gestion, early  in  1809  by  the  Governor  of  Canada 
to  Massachusetts  to  learn  the  state  of  affairs  there 
and  observe  the  drift  of  public  opinion.  His  na- 
tional proclivity  — he  was  an  Irishman  — to  con- 
spiracy and  revolution,  had  led  him  to  see  in  the 
dissatisfaction  with  the  embargo  a determination 
in  the  New  England  people  to  destroy  the  Union, 
reannex  themselves  to  England,  and  return  to  the 
flesh-pots  of  the  colonial  period.  To  learn  how 
far  gone  they  were  in  these  designs,  to  put  him- 
self in  intimate  relations  with  the  leading  conspir- 
ators and  to  bring  them  into  communication  with 
Sir  James  Craig,  the  Governor  General  of  Can- 
ada, that  sufficient  aid  should  come  through  him 
at  the  proper  moment  from  the  British  govern- 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


311 


ment,  was  Henry’s  mission.  Of  this  truly  Irish 
plot  Henry  was  the  villain  and  Craig  the  fool ; 
but  it  is  hardly  possible  that  three  years  after- 
ward Madison  and  his  friends,  with  all  the  letters 
spread  before  them,  could  really  have  been  the 
dupes. 

Henry  went  to  Boston  and  remained  there 
about  three  months,  living  at  a tavern.  He  found 
out  nothing  because  there  was  nothing  to  be  found 
out.  He  knew  nobody,  and  nobody  of  any  note 
knew  him,  and  all  the  information  he  sent  to 
Craig  might  have  been,  and  doubtless  was,  picked 
up  in  the  ordinary  political  gossip  of  the  tavern 
bar-room,  or  culled  from  the  columns  of  the  news- 
papers of  both  parties.  He  compromised  nobody, 
for  — as  Mr.  Monroe  as  Secretary  of  State,  tes- 
tified, in  a report  to  the  Senate  — he  named  no 
person  or  persons  in  the  United  States,  who  had, 
“ in  any  way  or  manner  whatever,  entered  into 
or  countenanced  the  project  or  views  ” of  himself 
and  Craig  ; and  all  he  had  to  say  was  pointless 
and  unimportant,  except  so  far  as  his  opinions 
might  have  some  interest  as  those  of  a shrewd  ob- 
server of  public  events.  Indeed,  his  own  conclu- 
sion was  that  there  was  no  conspiracy  in  the  East- 
ern States;  that  the  Federal  party  was  strong 
enough  to  keep  the  peace  with  England ; and 
that  there  was  no  talk  of  disunion  nor  any  likeli- 
hood of  it  unless  it  should  be  brought  about  by 
war.  The  correspondence  itself  showed,  in  a let- 


312 


JAMES  MADISON. 


ter  from  Robert  Peel,  then  secretary  to  Lord 
Liverpool,  that  the  letters  of  Henry  were  found, 
as  a matter  of  course,  among  Canadian  official  pa- 
pers as  they  related  to  public  affairs;  but  they 
had  either  never  attracted  any  attention  or  had 
been  entirely  forgotten,  and  Lord  Liverpool  was 
quite  ignorant  of  any  “ arrangement  or  agree- 
ment ” that  had  been  made  between  the  Governor 
of  Canada  and  his  emissary  to  New  England. 
It  was  only  because  of  his  failure  to  get  any  re- 
ward from  the  British  government  or  from  Craig’s 
successor  in  Canada,  for  what  he  was  pleased  to 
call  his  services,  that  the  adventurer  came  to 
Washington  in  search  of  a market  for  himself  and 
his  papers.  He  came  at  an  opportune  moment. 
Notwithstanding  the  Secretary  of  State  frankly 
declared  that,  neither  by  writing  nor  by  word  of 
mouth,  did  the  man  implicate  by  name  anybody 
in  the  United  States ; notwithstanding  one  of  the 
letters  was  evidence,  the  more  conclusive  because 
incidental,  that  the  British  Secretary  of  State  had 
known  nothing  of  this  mission  contrived  between 
Henry  and  Craig ; yet  Mr.  Madison  pronounced 
the  letters  to  be  the  “ formal  proof  of  the  coopera- 
tion between  the  Eastern  Junto  and  the  British 
cabinet.”  The  charge  was  monstrous,  for  this 
pretended  proof  had  no  existence.  If  the  Presi- 
dent, however,  could  persuade  himself  that  the 
story  was  true  it  would  help  him  to  justify  him- 
self to  himself  for  a change  of  policy,  the  result  of 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND.  313 

which  would  be  the  coveted  renomination  for  the 
presidency. 

Not  that  there  had  never  been  talk  of  disunion 
in  New  England.  There  had  been  in  years  past, 
as  there  was  to  be  in  years  to  come.  But  talk  of 
that  kind  did  not  belong  exclusively  to  that  par- 
ticular period,  nor  was  it  confined  to  that  particu- 
lar region  of  country.  Ever  since  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution  the  one  thing  that  orators,  North 
and  South,  inside  the  halls  of  Congress  and  out- 
side  them,  were  agreed  upon  was,  that  in  all  de- 
bate there  was  one  argument,  equally  good  on 
both  sides,  to  which  there  could  be  no  reply ; that 
in  all  legislation  there  was  one  possible  supreme 
move  that  would  bring  all  the  wheels  of  govern- 
ment to  a dead  stop.  The  solemn  warning  or  the 
angry  threat  was  always  in  readiness  for  instant 
use,  that  the  bonds  of  the  Union,  in  one  or  an- 
other contingency,  were  to  be  rent  asunder.  But 
so  frequent  had  been  these  warning  cries  of  the 
coming  wolf  that  they  were  listened  to  with  in- 
difference, except  when  some  positive  act  indi- 
cated real  danger,  as  in  the  Jefferson- Madison 
“ Resolutions  of  ’98.”  It  was  easy,  therefore,  to 
alarm  the  public  with  confessions  of  a secret  emis- 
sary, as  he  pretended,  who  had  turned  traitor  to 
the  government  which  had  employed  him  and  to 
the  conspirators  to  whom  he  had  been  sent ; and 
the  more  reprehensible  was  it,  therefore,  in  a 
President  of  the  United  States,  to  make  the  use 


314 


JAMES  MADISON. 


that  was  made  of  this  story,  which  an  impartial 
examination  would  have  shown  was  essentially  ab- 
surd and  infamously  false.  Mr.  Madison’s  intelli- 
gence is  not  to  be  impugned.  He  was  too  saga- 
cious, as  well  as  too  unimpassioned  a man,  to  be 
taken  in  by  the  ingenious  tale  of  such  an  adven- 
turer as  Henry.  In  a letter  to  Colonel  David 
Humphreys,  written  the  next  spring,  in  defense  of 
the  policy  of  commercial  restrictions,  he  says  : “ I 
have  never  allowed  myself  to  believe  that  the 
Union  was  in  danger,  or  that  a dissolution  of  it 
could  be  desired,  unless  by  a few  individuals,  if 
such  there  be,  in  desperate  situations  or  of  un- 
bridled passions.”  New  England,  he  continues, 
“ would  be  the  greatest  loser  by  such  an  event, 
and  not  likely,  therefore,  deliberately  to  rush  into 
it.”  “On  what  basis,”  he  asks,  “could  New  Eng- 
land and  Old  England  form  commercial  stipula- 
tions?” Their  commercial  jealousy,  he  contends, 
forbade  an  alliance  between  them,  for  that  was 
“ the  real  soux-ce  of  our  revolution.”  He  closes 
with  the  significant  assertion  that,  “ if  there  be 
links  of  common  interest  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, they  would  connect  the  Southern  and  not 
the  Northern  States  with  that  part  of  Europe.” 
How,  then,  could  he  seiuously  accept  Henry’s  pre- 
tended disclosures  as  “formal  proof,”  as  he  wrote 
to  Jefferson  at  that  time,  “ of  the  cooperation 
between  the  Eastern  Junto  and  the  British  cabi- 
net?” By  the  Eastern  Junto  is  meant  the  Fed* 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


315 


eral  party,  or,  at  least,  the  influential  and  able 
leaders  of  that  party ; and  he  could  not  consider, 
nor  would  he  have  spoken  of  them  as  “ a few  in- 
dividuals, if  such  there  be,  in  desperate  situations 
or  of  unbridled  passions.”  He  accepted,  then,  the 
Henry  story  in  spite  of  his  deliberate  opinions,  as 
a help  to  involve  the  country  in  a party  war. 

Even  at  the  risk  of  some  prolixity  it  is  need- 
ful to  follow  the  course  of  events  that  led  to  this 
war  a little  farther  ; for  here  was  the  culmina- 
tion of  Mr.  Madison’s  career,  and  from  his  course 
in  shaping  and  directing  these  events  we  best 
learn  what  manner  of  man  he  was,  and  where  his 
true  place  is  among  the  public  men  of  our  ear- 
lier history.  For  a year  and  a half  the  United 
States  had  acted  on  the  assumption  that  France 
had  recalled  her  decrees,  and  that  England  had 
not  revoked  her  orders.  The  extracts  from  Mr. 
Madison’s  letters,  given  on  previous  pages,  show 
his  conviction  that  the  revocation  of  either  de- 
crees or  orders  was  practically  no  more  true  of  one 
power  than  it  was  of  the  other.  The  government 
of  the  United  States,  nevertheless,  submitted  to 
the  one,  and  against  the  other  it  first  reenacted  the 
non-intercourse  act,  then  proclaimed  an  embargo 
preparatory  to  war,  and  finally  declared  war.  Yet 
the  whole  world  knew,  and  nobody  so  surely  as 
the  Emperor  of  France,  that  the  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees  had  never  been  formally  repealed  at  all ; 
meanwhile  French  outrages  upon  American  com- 


316 


JAMES  MADISON. 


merce  had  continued,  and  all  redress  so  persist- 
ently refused,  that  so  late  as  the  last  week  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1812,  the  President  intimated  that  war  — 
war  with  France,  not  England  — might  prove  the 
only  remedy.  But  he  suddenly  yielded  to  the 
clamors  of  the  war  party  at  home,  whatever  may 
have  been  his  motive.  Then,  and  not  till  then, 
were  the  decrees  actually  revoked  by  Napoleon. 
In  May,  1812,  more  than  a month  after  the  Presi- 
dent had  recommended  an  embargo,  the  hostile 
purport  of  which  was  so  well  understood,  a de- 
cree was  proclaimed  by  the  Emperor  which  for 
the  first  time  really  revoked  those  of  Berlin  and 
Milan.  True,  it  was  dated  — “ purported  to  be 
dated,”  it  was  said  in  an  official  English  docu- 
ment — April,  1811.  But  that  was  of  no  mo- 
ment ; the  essential  point  was,  that  it  had  never 
seen  the  light ; that  any  hint  of  its  existence  had 
never  been  given  to  the  American  government  or 
its  representatives  abroad,  till  the  United  States 
had  taken  measures  to  “ cause  their  rights  to  be 
respected  by  the  English,”  which  was  the  original 
condition  of  a revocation  of  the  decrees.  Its  os- 
tensible date  was  when  the  news  reached  France 
that  non-intercourse  had  been  again  enforced 
against  England  in  March,  1811  ; but  its  promul- 
gation was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  real 
date,  when  news  reached  France,  in  April  or 
May,  1812,  that  war  against  England  was  finally 
determined  upon. 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


317 


The  Duke  of  Bassano,  the  French  minister,  had 
not,  moreover,  brought  out  this  year-old  decree 
without  pressure  from  the  American  minister, 
Barlow.  The  President  had  written  Barlow  in 
that  February  letter,  already  quoted,  that  if  his 
expected  dispatches  did  not  “ exhibit  the  con- 
duct of  the  French  government  in  better  colours 
than  it  has  yet  assumed,  there  will  be  but  one 
sentiment  in  this  country,  and  I need  not  say 
what  that  will  be.”  When  the  dispatches  came 
Mr.  Madison  received  no  assurances  of  redress  for 
past  wrongs  and  no  promises  for  the  future ; but 
he  learned,  on  the  contrary,  that  Bassano,  in  a 
recent  report  to  the  Emperor,  had  referred  to  the 
decrees  of  Berlin  and  Milan  as  still  in  full  force 
against  all  neutral  nations  which  submitted  to  the 
seizure  of  their  ships  by  the  British,  when  con- 
taining contraband  goods  or  enemy’s  property. 
Naturally  the  British  ministry  was  not  slow  in 
presenting  this  precious  acknowledgment  to  the 
United  States  as  a proof  that  she  had  all  along 
been  in  the  wrong,  and  that  in  common  justice  to 
England  the  non-importation  act  should  now  be 
repealed.  The  assurance  was  at  the  same  time 
repeated,  possibly  in  a tone  of  considerable  satis- 
faction, that  when  Napoleon  really  should  revoke 
his  decrees  Great  Britain  was  ready,  as  she  al- 
ways had  been,  to  follow  his  example  with  her 
orders.  It  was  an  awkward  dilemma  for  the 
President  and  his  minister  to  France.  But  by 


318 


JAMES  MADISON. 


this  time,  the  Presidential  nomination  impending, 
Mr.  Madison  had  made  up  his  mind  what  to  do.  He 
was  not  exactly  a wolf  ; neither  was  Great  Britain 
a lamb  ; but  the  argument  he  used  was  the  argu- 
ment of  the  fable.  Instead  of  advising  — Bassano 
having  declared  the  decrees  still  in  force — a re- 
peal of  the  non-importation  act,  as  Great  Britain 
claimed  was  in  justice  and  comity  her  due,  he  rec- 
ommended a war  measure.  But  Barlow  evidently 
felt  himself  to  be  under  some  decent  restraint  of 
logic  and  consistency.  He  urged  upon  the  French 
minister  the  necessity  now  of  a positive  and  impe- 
rial declaration  that  the  decrees,  so  far  as  regarded 
the  United  States,  were  absolutely  revoked  ; for 
this  recent  assertion  of  Bassano  that  they  were  still 
in  force,  put  the  United  States  in  an  attitude  both 
towards  France  and  England  utterly  and  absurdly 
in  the  wrong.  Barlow  represented  that,  should  the 
revocation  be  extended  only  to  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain  would  not  for  that  alone  repeal  her 
orders.  In  that  case  France  would  lose  nothing 
of  the  advantage  of  her  present  position,  while 
everything  would  be  lost  should  the  United  States 
be  compelled  to  repeal  her  non-importation  laws 
against  England.  Bassano  was  quick  to  see  the 
necessity  of  jumping  into  the  bramble-bush  and 
scratching  his  eyes  in  again,  and  he  then  produced 
his  year-old  edict.  Being  a year  old,  it,  of  course, 
covered  all  questions.  But  was  it  a year  old  ? 
Who  knew?  It  had  never  been  published?  No, 


WAR  WITH  ENGLAND. 


319 


the  Duke  said;  but  it  had  been  shown  to  Mr. 
Jonathan  Russell,  who,  at  that  time,  was  Charge 
(V Affaires  at  Paris.  Mr.  Russell  denied  it,  though 
a denial  was  hardly  needed.  He  would  not  have 
ventured  to  withhold  information  so  important 
from  his  government ; and  it  was  evident,  from  the 
tone  of  his  dispatches  of  a subsequent  date,  that 
he  had  no  suspicion  of  its  existence.  For  he  had 
maintained  it,  as  a point  of  “national  honor,”  that 
the  revocation  of  the  French  decrees  must  have 
preceded  the  President’s  proclamation  of  Novem- 
ber 1,  1810  ; and  this  he  would  not  have  dared  to 
do  had  he  known  that  the  actual  revocation  by  the 
French  minister  was  not  made  till  six  months 
after  the  date  of  the  President's  proclamation,  and 
was  then  made  secretly. 

However,  as  if  to  defeat  all  these  machinations 
of  France  and  the  United  States,  Great  Britain 
immediately  recalled  her  orders  in  council,  when, 
in  May,  1812,  the  Duke  of  Bassano  announced  the 
edict  of  April,  1811,  revoking  the  Bei’lin  and  Mi- 
lan decrees,  though  so  far  only  as  they  concerned 
American  vessels.  The  declaration  of  war  of  June 
18  had  not  reached  England,  and  there  was  still 
a chance  for  peace.  Foster,  the  late  English  min- 
ister to  the  United  States,  learned  at  Halifax  — 
where  he  had  stopped  on  his  way  home  — that  the 
orders  in  council  were  repealed,  and  he  took  im- 
mediate steps  to  bring  about  an  armistice  between 
the  naval  commanders  on  the  coast  of  Nova  Scotia, 


320 


JAMES  MAD  IS  ON. 


and  between  the  Governor  of  Canada  and  the 
American  general,  Dearborn,  in  command  of  the 
frontier.  The  government  at  Washington,  how- 
ever, refused  to  ratify  any  suspension  of  hostilities. 
Some  negotiations  followed,  but,  decrees  and  or- 
ders being  out  of  the  way,  there  was  nothing  left 
to  negotiate  about  except  the  question  of  impress- 
ment. Upon  that  question  the  two  governments 
were  as  wide  apart  as  ever  and  not  in  the  least 
likely  to  come  together.  Mr.  Madison  determined 
that  on  that  ground  alone  the  war  should  go  on. 
It  had  been  as  good  and  sufficient  ground  for  such 
a war  any  time  for  the  past  dozen  years ; but 
whether  it  could  be  settled  by  an  appeal  to  arms, 
was  a question  of  possibilities  and  probabilities  by 
which  both  Jefferson  and  Madison  had  hitherto 
been  ruled.  Was  that  still  the  essential  question? 
With  the  result  came  the  answer.  Two  years 
later  the  Administration  was  glad  to  accept  a 
treaty  of  peace  in  which  impressment  was  not 
even  alluded  to.  Great  Britain  did  not  relin- 
quish by  a syllable  her  assumed  right  to  board 
American  ships  in  search  of  British  seamen  ; and 
the  Administration  instructed  its  Peace  Commis- 
sioners not  even  to  ask  that  she  should. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


CONCLUSION. 

Early  in  the  war  Mr.  Madison  said  to  a friend, 
in  a letter  “ altogether  private  and  written  in  con- 
fidence,” that  the  way  to  make  the  conflict  both 
“ short  and  successful,  would  be  to  convince  the 
enemy  that  he  was  to  contend  with  the  whole  and 
not  part  of  the  nation.”  That  it  was  a war  of  a 
party  and  not  of  the  people,  was  a discouragement 
to  himself,  however  the  enemy  may  have  regarded 
it,  which  he  could  never  see  any  way  of  overcom- 
ing. He  could  not  listen  to  an  opponent  nor  learn 
anything  from  disaster.  “ If  the  war  must  con- 
tinue,” said  Webster  within  a year  of  its  end, 
“ go  to  the  ocean.  Let  it  no  longer  be  said  that 
not  one  ship  of  force,  built  by  your  hands  since 
the  war,  yet  floats.  If  you  are  seriously  contend- 
ing for  maritime  rights  go  to  the  theatre  where 
those  rights  can  be  defended.  . . . There  the 
united  wishes  and  exertions  of  the  nation  will  go 
with  you.  Even  our  party  divisions,  acrimonious 
as  they  are,  cease  at  the  water’s  edge.  ...  In 
protecting  naval  interests  by  naval  means,  you 
will  arm  yourself  with  the  whole  power  of  na- 
21 


322 


JAMES  MADISON. 


tional  sentiment,  and  may  command  the  whole 
abundance  of  national  forces.”  Taking  now  in 
one  view  the  events  of  those  years,  it  is  easy  to 
see  in  our  generation  how  mad  were  Madison  and 
his  party  to  turn  deaf  ears  to  such  considerations 
as  these.  Their  force  and  wisdom  had  already 
been  proved  by  eighteen  months  of  disaster  on 
land,  which  had  made  the  war  daily  more  and 
more  unpopular ; and  by  brilliant  success  for  a 
time  at  sea,  when  each  fresh  victory  was  hailed 
with  universal  enthusiasm.  “ Our  little  naval  tri- 
umphs,” was  the  President’s  way  of  speaking  of 
the  latter ; and  the  only  importance  he  seems  to 
have  seen  in  them  was,  that  they  excited  some 
“rage  and  jealousy”  in  England  and  moved  her 
to  increase  her  naval  force.  How  could  Mr.  Mad- 
ison expect  that  the  whole  and  not  a part  only  of 
the  nation  could  uphold  an  administration  which, 
after  eighteen  months  of  fighting,  could  be  re- 
proached on  the  floor  of  Congress  with  not  having 
launched  a ship  since  the  war  was  begun?  Or 
did  he  only  choose  to  remember  that  the  navy, 
which  alone  so  far  had  brought  either  success  or 
honor  to  the  national  arms,  was  the  creation  of 
the  Federalists  in  spite  of  the  Jeffersonian  policy? 
It  surely  would  have  been  wiser  to  try  to  propi- 
tiate New  England,  with  which  he  was  in  perpet- 
ual worry  and  conflict,  by  enlisting  it  in  a naval 
war  in  which  it  had  some  faith.  A large  propor- 
tion of  her  people  would  have  been  glad  to  escape 


CONCLUSION. 


328 


idleness  and  poverty  at  home  for  service  at  sea, 
though  they  were  reluctant  to  aid  in  a vain  at- 
tempt to  conquer  Canada. 

Even  to  that  purpose,  however,  Massachusetts 
contributed,  in  the  second  campaign  of  1814,  more 
recruits  than  any  other  single  State ; and  New 
England  more  than  all  the  Southern  States  to- 

O 

gether.  New  England  could  have  given  no 
stronger  proof  of  her  loyalty,  if  only  Mr.  Madison 
had  known  how  to  turn  it  to  advantage.  He  was 
absolutely  deaf  and  blind  to  it ; but  his  ears  were 
quick  to  hear  and  his  eyes  to  see,  when  he  learned 
presently  that  the  New  Englanders  were  seriously 
calculating  the  value  of  the  Union  under  such 
rule  as  they  had  had  of  late.  It  was  not  often 
that  he  relieved  himself  by  intemperate  language, 
but  he  could  not  help  saying  now,  in  writing  to 
Governor  Nicholas  of  Virginia,  that  “ the  greater 
part  of  the  people  in  that  quarter  have  been 
brought  by  their  leaders,  aided  by  their  priests, 
under  a delusion  scarcely  exceeded  by  that  re- 
corded in  the  period  of  witchcraft ; and  the  lead- 
ers themselves  are  becoming  daily  more  desperate 
in  the  use  they  make  of  it.”  The  “ delusion  ” 
was  taking  a practical  direction.  Mr.  Madison 
had  learned  before  the  letter  was  written  that  a 
convention  was  about  to  meet  at  Hartford,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  weigh  in  a balance,  upon 
the  one  side,  the  continuation  of  such  government 
as  that  of  the  last  two  or  three  years,  and,  upon 


324 


JAMES  MADISON. 


the  other  side,  the  value  of  the  Union.  He  ar- 
dently hoped  that  the  commissioners,  then  assem- 
bled at  Ghent,  would  agree  upon  a treaty ; and 
there  seemed  to  be  no  good  reason  why  there 
should  not  be  peace  when  nothing  was  to  be  said 
of  the  cause  of  the  war,  no  apology  demanded  for 
the  past,  and  no  stipulation  for  the  future.  But 
if  by  any  chance  the  commissioners  should  fail, 
Mr.  Madison  saw  in  the  Hartford  Convention  the 
huge  shadow  of  a coming  conflict  more  difficult 
to  deal  with  than  a foreign  war.  It  was  the  first 
step  in  dead  earnest  for  the  formation  of  a North- 
ern Confederacy,  and  it  is  quite  possible  he  may 
have  felt  that  he  was  not  the  man  for  such  a 
crisis.  Every  line  of  the  letter  pulsates  with  anx- 
iety. The  only  consoling  thought  in  it  is,  that 
without  “ foreign  cooperation  revolt  and  separa- 
tion will  hardly  be  risked,”  and  to  such  coopera- 
tion he  hoped  a majority  of  the  New  England 
people  would  not  consent.  A treaty  of  peace, 
however,  came  to  save  him  and  the  Union.  Within 
a few  weeks  the  administration  papers  were  laugh- 
ing at  Harrison  Gray  Otis  of  Boston,  who  had 
started  for  Washington  as  the  representative  of 
the  Hartford  Convention,  but  turned  back  at  the 
news  of  peace;  and  were  advertising  him  as  miss- 
ing under  the  name  of  Titus  Oates.  It  was,  how- 
ever, the  hysterical  laugh  of  recovery  from  a ter- 
rible fright. 

If  ambition  to  be  a second  time  President  led 


CONCLUSION. 


325 


Mr.  Madison  to  consent  against  his  own  better 
judgment  to  a war  with  England,  he  paid  a heavy- 
penalty.  It  was  the  act  of  a party  politician  and 
not  of  a statesman  ; for  the  country  was  no  more 
prepared  for  a war  in  1812,  when  as  a politician 
he  assented  to  it,  than  it  had  been  for  the  pre- 
vious half  dozen  years  when  as  a statesman  he 
had  opposed  it.  He  gave  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  in  support  of  a despotism  that 
aimed  at  the  subjugation  of  all  Europe;  he  threw 
a fresh  obstacle  in  the  way  of  that  power  to  which 
Europe  could  chiefly  look  to  resist  a common 
enemy ; and  he  did  both  under  the  pretense  that 
the  just  complaints  of  the  United  States  were 
greater  against  one  of  these  powers  than  against 
the  other.  He  declared  war  mainly  to  redress  a 
wrong  which  ceased  to  exist  before  a blow  was 
struck ; he  then  rejected  an  offer  of  peace  because 
another  wrong  was  still  persisted  in  ; but  finally, 
of  his  own  motion,  he  accepted  a treaty  in  which 
the  assumed  cause  of  war  was  not  even  alluded  to. 

That  Mr.  Madison  was  not  a good  war-Presi- 
dent,  either  by  training  or  by  temperament,  was,  if 
it  may  be  said  of  any  man,  his  misfortune  rather 
than  his  fault.  But  it  was  his  fault  rather  than 
his  misfortune  that  he  permitted  himself  to  be 
dragged  in  a day  into  a line  of  conduct  which  the 
sober  judgment  of  years  had  disapproved.  He  is 
usually  and  most  justly  regarded  as  a man  of 
great  amiability  of  character;  of  unquestionable 


326 


JAMES  MADISON. 


integrity  in  all  the  purely  personal  relations  of 
life ; of  more  than  ordinary  intellectual  ability  of 
a solid,  though  not  brilliant,  quality ; and  a dili- 
gent student  of  the  science  of  government,  the 
practice  of  which  he  made  a profession.  But  he 
was  better  fitted  by  nature  for  a legislator  than 
for  executive  office,  and  his  fame  would  have  been 
more  spotless,  though  his  position  would  have 
been  less  exalted,  had  his  life  been  exclusively  de- 
voted to  that  branch  of  government  for  which  he 
was  best  fitted.  It  was  not  merely  tlmt  for  the 
sake  of  the  Presidency  he  plunged  the  country 
into  an  unnecessary  war ; but  when  it  was  on  his 
hands  he  neither  knew  what  to  do  with  it  himself 
nor  how  to  choose  the  right  men  who  did  know. 

It  is  our  amiable  weakness  — if  one  may  ven- 
ture to  say  so  of  the  American  people  — that  all 
our  geese  are  swans,  or  rather  eagles ; that  we  are 
apt  to  mistake  notoriety  for  reputation  ; that  it  is 
the  popular  belief  of  the  larger  number  that  he 
who,  no  matter  how,  has  reached  a distinguished 
position,  is  by  virtue  of  that  fact  a great  and  good 
man.  This  is  not  less  true,  in  a measure,  of  Mr. 
Madison  than  of  some  other  men  who  have  been 
Presidents,  and  of  still  more  who  have  thought 
that  they  deserved  to  be.  But,  if  that  false  esti- 
mate surrounds  his  name,  there  is  a strong  under- 
current of  opinion,  common  among  those  whose 
business  or  whose  pleasure  it  is  to  look  beneath 
the  surface  of  things  historical,  that  he  was  want- 


CONCL  US  ION. 


327 


ing  in  strength  of  character  and  in  courage.  He 
did  not  lack  discernment  as  to  what  was  wisest 
and  best ; but  he  was  too  easily  influenced  by 
others  or  led  by  the  hope  of  gaining  some  glitter- 
ing prize  which  ambition  coveted,  to  turn  his  back 
upon  his  own  convictions.  It  was  this  weakness 
which  swept  him  beyond  his  depth  into  troubled 
waters  where  his  struggles  were  hopeless.  Had 
he  refused  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  a war 
which  his  judgment  condemned,  and  which  he 
should  have  known  that  he  wanted  the  peculiar 
ability  to  bring  to  a successful  and  honorable  con- 
clusion, he  might  never  have  been  President,  but 
his  fame  would  have  been  of  a higher  order. 
History  might  have  overlooked  the  act  of  politi- 
cal fickleness  in  his  earlier  career,  which  was  so 
warmly  resented  by  many  of  his  contemporaries. 
Abandonment  of  party  is  too  common  and  often 
too  justifiable  to  be  accounted  as  necessarily  a 
crime ; and  it  can  rarely  be  said  with  positiveness, 
whatever  the  probabilities,  that  a political  de- 
serter is  certainly  moved  by  base  motives.  It  is 
rather  from  ex  post  facto  than  from  immediate  ev- 
idence, as  in  Madison’s  case,  that  a just  verdict  is 
likely  to  be  reached.  But  there  can  be  neither 
doubt  nor  mistake  as  to  the  President’s  manage- 
ment of  foreign  affairs  during  the  two  years  pre- 
ceding the  declaration  of  war  against  England ; 
nor  of  the  remarkable  incompetence  which  he 
showed  in  rallying  the  moral  and  material  forces 


328 


JAMES  MADISON. 


of  the  nation  to  meet  an  emergency  of  his  own 
creation. 

Opposition  to  war  generally  and,  therefore,  op- 
position to  an  army  and  navy  were  sound  cardinal 
principles  in  the  Jeffersonian  school  of  politics. 
Mr.  Madison  was  curiously  blind  to  the  logical 
consequences  of  this  doctrine  ; he  could  not  see, 
or  he  would  not  consider,  that,  when  war  seemed 
advisable  to  an  administration,  the  result  must  de- 
pend mainly  upon  the  success  of  the  appeal  to  the 
people  for  their  countenance  and  help.  But  he 
unwisely  sought  to  raise  and  employ  an  army  for 
the  invasion  and  conquest  of  the  territory  of  the 
enemy  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  a large  propor- 
tion of  the  wealthiest  and  most  intelligent  people 
in  the  country  ; while  at  the  same  time  he  refused 
to  see  any  promise  or  any  presage  in  a naval  war- 
fare which  had  opened  with  unexpected  brilliancy 
and  would,  had  it  been  followed  up,  have  been 
sure  of  popular  support.  His  title  to  fame  rests, 
with  the  multitude,  upon  the  fact  that  he  was  one 
of  the  earlier  Presidents  of  the  Republic.  But  it 
is  that  period  of  his  career  which  least  entitles 
him  to  be  remembered  with  gratitude  and  respect 
by  his  countrymen. 

Its  crowning  humiliation  came  with  the  capture 
of  Washington  in  August,  1814,  when  the  British 
admiral,  Cockburn,  entered  the  Hall  of  Represen- 
tatives, at  the  head  of  a band  of  followers,  and 
springing  into  the  speaker’s  chair  shouted : “ Shall 


CON  CL  USION. 


329 


this  harbor  of  Yankee  Democracy  be  burned  ? 
All  for  it  will  say,  Aye  ! ” Early  in  the  war 
Madison  had  written  to  Jefferson,  “ we  do  not 
apprehend  invasion  by  land  ” — the  one  thing,  it 
would  seem,  that  a commander-in-chief  should 
have  apprehended,  whose  single  aim  was  the  in- 
vasion and  conquest  of  the  enemy’s  territory. 
His  devotion  to  this  one  purpose,  to  the  exclusion 
of  any  other  idea  of  either  offense  or  defense  and 
in  spite  of  continued  failure,  was  almost  an  in- 
fatuation. Within  a year  of  that  expression  of 
confidence  to  Mr.  Jefferson  the  whole  coast  was 
blockaded  from  the  eastern  end  of  Long  Island 
Sound  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  For  a 
year  before  Washington  was  taken,  the  shores  of 
Chesapeake  Bay  were  harassed  and  raided  and 
devastated  by  a blockading  force,  till  the  people 
were  reduced  almost  to  the  condition  of  a con- 
quered country.  Two  months  before  the  British 
commanders,  Ross  and  Cockburn,  went  up  the  Po- 
tomac, Mr.  Gallatin,  who  was  then  in  London, 
had  informed  the  President  that  the  fleet  was  to 
be  reinforced  for  that  very  purpose ; but  neither 
he  nor  Congress  took  any  effective  measures  to 
meet  a danger  so  imminent.  Their  eyes  were 
fixed  with  a far-off  gaze  across  the  Northern  bor- 
der, while  only  five  hundred  regular  troops,  a 
body  of  untrained  militia  who  had  never  heard 
the  whistle  of  a bullet,  and  a few  gunboats  on  the 
Potomac,  guarded  the  national  capital  against  a 


330 


JAMES  MADISON. 


British  fleet,  a thousand  marines,  and  thirty-five 
hundred  men  from  Wellington’s  best  regiments. 
The  President  fleeing  in  one  direction  with  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the 
general  in  command ; Mrs.  Madison  fleeing  in 
another,  with  her  reticule  filled  with  silver  spoons 
snatched  up  in  haste  as  she  left  the  White  House ; 1 
behind  them  all  as  they  fled,  the  horizon  red  with 
the  blaze  of  the  largest  navy  yard  in  the  country 
and  of  all  the  public  buildings,  but  one,  of  the 
capital ; — these  incidents  are  an  amazing  com- 
mentary on  the  early  assertion  that  invasion  was 
not  to  be  apprehended. 

The  end  of  this  wretched  war,  which  has  been 
foolishly  called  the  second  war  of  independence, 

1 Paul  Jennings,  who  was  a slave  and  the  body-servant  of  Mr. 
Madison,  says  in  his  Reminiscences : “ It  has  often  been  stated 
in  print,  that  when  Mrs.  Madison  escaped  from  the  White 
House,  she  cut  out  from  the  frame  the  large  portrait  of  Washing- 
ton (now  in  one  of  the  parlors  there)  and  carried  it  off.  This  is 
totally  false.  She  had  no  time  for  doing  it.  It  would  have  re- 
quired a ladder  to  get  it  down.  All  she  carried  off  was  the  silver 
in  her  reticule,  as  the  British  were  thought  to  be  but  a few 
squares  off,  and  were  expected  every  moment.  John  Suse  (a 
Prenchman,  then  doorkeeper,  and  still  [1865]  living),  and  Ma- 
graw,  the  President’s  gardener,  took  it  down  and  sent  it  off  on  a 
wagon,  with  some  large  silver  urns  and  such  other  valuables  as 
could  hastily  be  got  hold  of.  When  the  British  did  arrive,  they 
ate  up  the  very  dinner,  and  drank  the  wines,  etc.,  that  I had  pre- 
pared for  the  President’s  party.”  On  a previous  page  he  had  re- 
lated that:  “Mrs.  Madison  ordered  dinner  to  be  ready  at  three 
as  usual ; I set  the  table  myself,  and  brought  up  the  ale,  cider, 
and  wine,  and  placed  them  in  the  coolers,  as  all  the  cabinet  and 
several  military  gentlemen  and  strangers  were  expected.” 


CON  CL  USION. 


331 


came  four  months  afterward.  Never  was  a peace 
so  welcome  as  this  was  on  all  sides.  England 
was  exhausted  with  the  long  contest  writh  Napo- 
leon ; and  now,  that  being  over,  as  there  was  no 
practical  question  to  differ  about  with  the  United 
States,  the  ministry  were  not  unwilling  to  listen 
to  the  demands  of  the  commercial  and  manufac- 
turing classes.  In  America  so  great  was  the  uni- 
versal joy  that  the  Federalists  and  the  Democrats 
forgot  their  differences  and  their  hates,  and  wept 
and  laughed  by  turns  in  each  other’s  arms  and 
kissed  each  other  like  women.  One  party  was 
delivered  from  calamities  for  which,  if  continued 
much  longer,  there  seemed  only  one  desperate  and 
dreaded  remedy ; the  other  was  overjoyed  to  back 
out  of  a blunder  which  was  the  straight  and  broad 
road  to  national  ruin.  Of  all  men,  Mr.  Madison 
had  the  most  reason  to  be  glad  for  a safe  deliver- 
ance from  the  consequences  of  his  own  want  of 
foresight  and  want  of  firmness.  Less  than  two 
years  remained  to  him  of  his  public  career.  In 
that  brief  period  much  was  forgotten  and  more 
forgiven  — as  our  national  way  is  — in  the  prom- 
ise of  a great  prosperity  to  be  speedily  achieved 
in  the  released  energies  of  a vigorous  and  indus- 
trious people.  He  had  not  again  to  choose  be- 
tween differing  factions  of  his  own  party,  nor  to 
carry  out  a policy  against  the  will  of  a formidable 
opposition.  To  the  Federalists  hardly  a name 
was  left  in  the  progress  of  events  at  home  and 


332 


JAMES  MADISON. 


abroad ; while  all  immediate  vital  questions  of  dif- 
ference vanished,  the  party  in  power  remained 
in  almost  undisputed  ascendency.  The  most  im- 
portant Democratic  measures  it  then  insisted  upon 
were  a national  bank  and  a protective  tariff.  To 
the  establishment  of  a bank  Mr.  Madison  assented 
against  his  own  conviction  that  any  provision 
could  be  found  for  it  in  the  Constitution  ; and  a 
tariff,  both  for  revenue  and  for  the  protection  and 
encouragement  of  American  industry,  he  agreed 
with  his  party  was  the  true  policy. 

For  nearly  twenty  years  after  his  retirement  to 
Montpellier  — a name  which,  with  rare  exceptions, 
he  always  spelled  correctly,  and  not  in  the  Amer- 
ican way  — it  was  his  privilege  to  live  a watchful 
observer  of  the  prosperity  of  his  country.  If  it 
ever  occurred  to  him  in  his  secret  soul  that  at  the 
period  of  his  preeminence  he  had  done  anything 
to  arrest  that  prosperity,  he  gave  no  sign.  He 
loved  rather  to  remember  and  sometimes  to  recall 
to  others  the  part  he  had  taken  in  the  nurture  of 
the  young  Republic  in  the  feeble  days  of  its  in- 
fancy.' Of  his  own  administration  and  the  events 
of  that  time  he  had  much  less  to  say  than  of  the 
true  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  of  the 
intent  of  its  framers,  and  the  circumstances  that 
influenced  their  deliberations.  His  voluminous 
correspondence  shows  the  bent  of  his  mind  as  a 
legislator  and  a student  of  fundamental  law  ; and 
on  that,  rather  than  on  his  ability  and  success  as 


CON  CL  US /ON. 


333 


the  chief  magistrate  of  the  nation,  rests  his  true 
fame. 

These  twenty  years,  though  passed  in  retirement, 
were  not  years  of  leisure.  “ I have  rarely,”  he 
wrote  in  1827,  “ during  the  period  of  my  public 
life,  found  my  time  less  at  my  disposal  than  since  I 
took  my  leave  of  it ; nor  have  I the  consolation  of 
finding,  that  as  my  powers  of  application  necessa- 
rily decline,  the  demands  on  them  proportionally 
decrease.”  Much  as  he  wrote  upon  questions  of 
an  earlier  period,  there  were  no  topics  of  the  cur- 
rent  time  that  did  not  arouse  his  interest.  Upon 
the  subject  of  slavery  he  thought  much  and  wrote 
much  and  always  earnestly  and  humanely.  How 
to  get  rid  of  it  was  a problem  which  he  never 
solved  to  his  own  satisfaction.  Though  it  was  one 
he  always  longed  to  see  through,  it  never  occurred 
to  him  that  the  way  to  abolish  slavery  was  — to 
abolish  it.  How  kind  he  was  as  a master,  Paul 
Jennings  bears  witness.  “ I never,”  he  says,  “ saw 
him  in  a passion,  and  never  knew  him  to  strike 
a slave,  though  he  had  over  a hundred;  neither 
would  he  allow  an  overseer  to  do  it.”  If  they 
were  in  fault  he  rebuked  them  ; but,  adds  Jen- 
nings, he  would  “ never  mortify  them  by  doing  it 
before  others.”  It  will  be  remembered  that  on 
the  first  occasion  of  his  being  a candidate  for 
public  office  he  refused  to  follow  the  universal  Vir- 
ginian habit  of  “treating”  the  electors.  To  the 
principle  which  governed  him  then  he  adhered 


334 


JAMES  MADISON. 


through  life,  and  bis  letters  show  the  warm  inter- 
est he  always  took  in  every  phase  of  the  temper- 
ance movement.  “ I don’t  think  he  drank  a quart 
of  brandy  in  his  whole  life,”  says  Jennings.  A 
single  glass  of  wine  was  all  he  ever  took  at  din- 
ner, and  this  he  diluted  with  water,  when,  says 
the  same  witness,  “ he  had  hard  drinkers  at  his 
table  who  had  put  away  his  choice  madeira  pretty 
freely.”  This  will  go  for  something,  considering 
the  times,  with  even  the  most  zealous  of  the  mod- 
ern supporters  of  that  cause ; but  they  must  be 
quite  satisfied  to  know  that  “ for  the  last  fifteen 
years  of  his  life  he  drank  no  wine  at  all.”  Consid- 
eration for  his  own  health,  always  feeble,  may 
have  led  him  to  this  abstinence ; but  it  is  rather 
remarkable  that  a man  of  his  position  should  have 
held,  fifty  years  ago,  the  advanced  notions  which 
he  certainly  did  upon  this  question  ; and  that  the 
doubt  only  of  the  possibility  of  enforcing  laws  for 
prohibiting  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  spirits 
seems  to  have  withheld  him  from  proposing  them. 

Social  as  well  as  moral  questions  he  discussed 
with  evident  interest  and  without  passion  or  prej- 
udice. Aside  from  the  party  meaning  of  the  term, 
he  belonged  to  that  school  of  democracy,  now  ex- 
tinct, which  believed  that  the  highest  object  of 
human  exertion  is  to  improve  man’s  condition  and 
to  secure  to  each  the  rights  which  belong  to  all. 
He  did  not  agree  with  Robert  Owen  as  to  meth- 
ods ; but  neither  did  he  reject  his  schemes  as  in- 


CON  CL  US  ION. 


335 


evitably  absurd  because  they  were  new  and  untried. 
One  would  not  gather  from  bis  correspondence 
with  Frances  W right  that  this  was  the  notorious 
Fanny  Wright  whom  the  world  chose  to  consider, 
as  its  way  is,  a disreputable  and  probably  wicked 
woman,  inasmuch  as  she  proposed  some  radical 
changes  in  its  social  relations,  which  she  thought 
would  be  a gain.  He  gave  much  attention  to 
popular  education,  and  all  the  influence  he  could 
command  was  devoted,  through  all  the  later  years 
of  his  life,  to  the  establishment  and  well-being  of 
the  University  of  Virginia.  Education,  he  main- 
tained, was  the  true  foundation  of  civil  liberty,  and 
on  it,  therefore,  rested  the  welfare  and  stability  of 
the  Republic.  It  is  probable  that  he  would  have 
drawn  a line  at  difference  of  color  then,  simply 
because  of  the  difference  of  condition  implied  by 
color.  But  he  made  no  such  distinction  in  sex. 
Sixty-three  years  ago  he  saw  his  way  quite  clearly 
on  a question  which  is  a sore  trial  now  to  many 
timid  souls.  The  capacity  of  “ the  female  mind  ” 
for  the  highest  education  cannot,  he  said,  “be 
doubted,  having  been  sufficiently  illustrated  by  its 
works  of  genius,  of  erudition,  and  of  science.”  The 
capacity,  he  assumed,  carried  with  it  the  right. 
In  short,  he  was  ready  always  to  consider  fairly 
questions  relating  to  the  well-being  of  society 
which  since  his  time  have  deeply  agitated  the 
country  ; and  he  approached  them  all  much  in  the 
spirit  of  the  reformer  who  hopes  to  leave  the  world 


336 


JAMES  MADISON. 


a little  better  and  happier  because  be  has  lived 
in  it. 

“ Mr.  Madison,  I think,”  says  Paul  Jennings, 
“ was  one  of  the  best  men  that  ever  lived.”  This 
is  the  testimony  of  an  intelligent  man  whose  op- 
portunities of  knowing  the  personal  qualities  of 
him  of  whom  he  was  speaking  were  more  intimate 
than  those  of  anj^  other  person  could  be  except 
Mrs.  Madison.  “ He  was  guilty,”  says  Hildreth, 
“of  the  greatest  political  wrong  and  crime  which 
it  is  possible  for  the  head  of  a nation  to  com- 
mit.” One  saw  the  private  gentleman,  always 
conscientious  and  considerate  in  his  personal  rela- 
tions to  other  men  ; the  other  judged  the  public 
man,  moved  by  ambition,  entangled  in  party  ties 
and  supposed  party  obligations,  his  moral  sense 
blinded  by  the  necessities  of  political  compromises 
to  reach  party  ends.  It  is  not  impossible  to  strike 
a just  balance  between  these  opposing  estimates, 
though  one  is  that  of  a servant,  the  other  that  of 
a learned  and  judicious  historian. 

Mr.  Madison  left  a legacy  of  “ Advice  to  My 
Country,”  to  be  read  after  his  death  and  to  “ be 
considered  as  issuing  from  the  tomb,  where  truth 
alone  can  be  respected,  and  the  happiness  of  man 
alone  consulted.”  It  is  the  lesson  of  his  life,  as 
he  wished  his  countrymen  to  understand  it.  “The 
advice,”  he  said,  “ nearest  to  my  heart  and  deepest 
in  my  convictions  is,  that  the  Union  of  the  States 
be  cherished  and  pei’petuated.  Let  the  open  enemy 


CON  CL  USION. 


337 


to  it  be  regarded  as  a Pandora  with  her  box 
opened,  and  the  disguised  one  as  the  serpent  creep- 
ing with  his  deadly  wiles  into  Paradise.”  The 
thoughtful  reader,  as  he  turns  to  the  first  page  of 
this  volume  to  recall  the  date  of  Mr.  Madison’s 
death,  will  hardly  fail  to  note  how  few  the  years 
were  before  these  open  and  disguised  enemies, 
against  whom  he  warned  his  countrymen,  were 
found  only  in  that  party  which  he  had  done  so 
much,  from  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Consti- 
tution, to  keep  in  power. 


INDEX 


Adams,  j'ohn,  on  presidential  titles, 
129, 131 ; his  administration,  240. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  memoir  of  Madison,  1, 
2 ; opinion  of  Jefferson,  254. 

Alien  and  Sedition  Laws,  240,  250. 

Ames,  Fisher,  on  the  slave-trade,  137  ; 
on  site  of  Federal  capital,  147  ; on 
a United  States  bank,  170;  the  ap- 
peals to  the  Constitution,  182,  note  ; 
opinion  of  Madison,  200. 

Annapolis,  first  convention  at,  61  ; 
second  convention  at,  64,  88. 

Bank.  United  States,  170 ; speculation 
in  stock  of,  186. 

Barbary  States,  war  with,  262. 

Barlow,  Joel,  minister  to  France,  ap- 
peal to  Duke  of  Bassano,  318. 

Barron,  Commodore,  of  frigate  Chesa- 
peake, 275. 

Bassano,  Duke  of,  announces  repeal 
of  decrees,  317. 

Bayonne,  decree  issued  at,  281. 

Berlin  decree  issued,  277  ; informal 
repeal  of,  316  ; final  repeal  of,  316. 

Breckenridge,  offers  resolutions  in 
Kentucky  legislature  in  1799,  249. 

Bonaparte.  See  Napoleon. 

Butler,  Peirce,  proposes  fugitive  slave 
clause  in  Federal  Constitution,  111. 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  in  Congress,  304. 

Canning,  George,  repudiates  Erskine’s 
treaty,  284. 

Capital,  site  of  the,  discussed,  128, 
146  ; the  bargain  for,  149,  159. 

Champagny,  French  minister,  infor- 
mal revocation  of  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees,  294. 

Chesapeake,  frigate,  attacked  by  the 
Leopard,  man-of-war,  275;  proposed 
settlement  of  the  case  of,  by  Er- 
skine,  385. 

Clay,  Henry,  in  Congress,  304  ; his 
proposal  to  take  Canada,  305. 


Clinton,  De  Witt,  a candidate  for 
presidential  nomination,  308. 

Cockbum,  Admiral,  in  Washington, 
328. 

Commerce  of  the  United  States,  264 
et  seq. 

Compromises  of  the  Constitution,  98, 

110. 

Congress,  meeting  of  the  First,  under 
the  Federal  Constitution,  128. 

Constitution,  the,  112  ; adoption  of, 
115  et  seq.  ; in  New  Hampshire 
and  Virginia,  120. 

Constitutional  Convention,  88  ; de- 
bates in  the,  115  et  seq. ; character 
of  the,  112. 

Craig,  Sir  John,  and  John  Henry,  310 
et  seq. 

Curtis,  George  T.,  History  of  the  Con- 
stitution, 98. 

Debt,  public,  the,  22,  29,  152  et  seq. 

Dexter,  Samuel,  estimate  of  New  Eng- 
land people,  217. 

Disunion,  frequent  threats  of,  31,  313. 

Draper,  Lyman  C.,  correspondence 
with  Madison,  4,  5,  6. 

Duties.  See  Tariff. 

Ellsworth,  Oliver,  Member  of  Con- 
gress, 31 ; on  slavery,  106,  107. 

Embargo,  the,  264  ; repealed,  286. 

Essex  Junto,  312,  314. 

Federal  Government,  organization  of 
the,  under  the  Constitution,  128, 
143. 

Federalists,  origin  of  the  name  of  the, 
90. 

Federalist,  The,  writers  of,  116. 

Floyd,  Catherine,  affianced  to  Madi- 
son, 43. 

France,  payments  to,  201  ; Revolu- 
tion in,  202 ; declares  war  against 
England,  203  ; influence  of  revolu 


340 


INDEX. 


tionary  ideas  of,  in  the  United 
States,  216. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  on  slavery,  160. 

Freneau,  Philip,  176  et  seq.  ; Wash- 
ington’s opinion  of,  214. 

Friends,  petitions  of  the  Society  of, 
for  abolition  of  slavery,  160  ; de- 
nounced in  Congress,  166. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  fears  of  effect  of  laws 
against  aliens,  243  ; Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  286. 

Genet,  G.  C.,  received  as  minister 
from  France,  208  ; his  recall  pro- 
posed, 218. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  on  slavery,  167. 

Giles,  W.  B.,  attack  on  Hamilton, 
197. 

Great  Britain,  non-observance  of 
treaty  of  1783,  64  : tonnage  duties 
of  ships  of,  141  ; war  with  France, 
203;  Jay’s  treaty  with,  220  ; trade 
with,  264  ; Monroe-Pin kney  treaty 
with,  273  ; orders  in  council,  277  ; 
war  declared  against,  by  United 
States.  307  ; repeals  orders  in  coun- 
cil, 319  ; peace,  1814,  331. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  in  Congress,  31; 
on  right  of  taxation,  37  ; on  basis 
of  representation,  98  ; report  of,  as 
Secretary  of  State  in  1790.  151  ; dif- 
ference with  Madison,  170,  190  ; at- 
tacked by  the  Republicans,  193  ; 
letter  to  Washington,  196. 

Hartford  Convention,  323. 

Henry,  John,  309  et  seq. 

Henry,  Patrick,  opposes  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution,  117  ; opposed 
to  Madison  and  “ Gerrymanders  ” 
the  State,  126. 

Impressment  of  seamen,  229,  268, 272, 
274,  275,  288. 

Jackson,  F.  J.,  British  minister,  289. 

Jay,  John,  minister  to  Spain,  32,  34 ; 
negotiations  on  the  Mississippi  ques- 
tion, 82  ; negotiates  treaty  with 
Great  Britain,  220. 

Jefferson.  Thomas,  on  religious  free- 
dom, 68,  note  ; on  use  of  steam,  74  ; 
his  geological  theory,  75  ; on  Shays’s 
Rebellion,  78  ; letter  to  Washing- 
ton on  condition  of  affairs,  195  ; re- 
lations with  Washington,  214 ; Ken- 
tucky resolutions  of  1798-99,  246; 
inauguration  of,  252  ; inaugural 
speech,  253  ; purchase  of  Louisiana, 
258  ; rejects  Monroe-Pinkney  treaty, 
274  ; names  his  successor  to  the 
presidency,  283. 


Jennings,  Paul,  on  the  capture  of 
Washington,  336. 

Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798-99,  243 
et  seq. 

Leopard,  man-of-war,  fight  with  the 
Chesapeake,  275. 

Lewis  and  Clarke  Expedition,  260. 

Library,  Congressional,  proposed  by 
Madison,  32. 

Little  Belt,  sloop-of-war,  fight  with 
the  President,  301. 

Livermore,  Samuel,  on  slave-trade, 
137. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  ignorance  of  Henry, 
312. 

Louisiana,  purchase  of,  257. 

Madison,  James,  birth  and  death,  1 ; 
ancestry,  3 et  seq.;  education,  10; 
on  religious  liberty,  13,  17,  66  ; 
member  of  Committee  of  Safety,  16 ; 
of  Virginia  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, 16  ; of  Assembly,  20  ; delegate 
to  Congress,  20  ; letter  on  public 
affairs,  1789,  21  ; his  faithfulness 
and  industry,  24;  his  pay,  25:  in- 
structed on  the  right  to  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  on  imposts, 
34  ; position  on  public  debt,  36, 
154 ; and  on  taxation,  38 ; and  on 
basis  of  representation,  39  ; engaged 
to  be  married,  43;  elected  to  State 
Assembly,  47  ; on  national  and  state 
commerce,  53  ; navigation  of  the 
Potomac,  55 ; proposition  to  Mary- 
land, 56 ; on  state  of  commerce  in 
Virginia,  58  ; proposes  a national 
convention,  59  ; position  on  treaty 
obligations,  65  ; his  tastes  and  stud- 
ies, 71  ; on  steam-power,  73 : pre- 
historic relics  in  Virginia,  74  ; on 
necessity  of  union  of  the  States,  77, 
79,  314,  336 ; course  on  the  Missis- 
sippi question  and  National'Conven- 
tion  in  Virginia  Assembly,  85  ; 
“father  of  the  Constitution,”  88; 
on  slave  representation,  98 ; differ- 
ence between  the  North  and  the 
South,  104  ; on  slavery,  109,  162, 
333  ; in  the  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, 113  ; author  of  papers  in  “ The 
Federalist,”  116  ; delegate  to  Con- 
stitutional Convention  of  Virginia, 
117  : de  Warville's  sketch  of  him, 
122  ; candidate  for  First  Congress, 
124  ; opposed  by  Patrick  Henry, 
126  ; on  presidential  title,  130  ; on 
free  trade,  132 ; on  the  slave-trade, 
137;  difference  with  Hamilton,  174; 

I changes  his  party,  181  et  seq. ; jour* 


INDEX.  341 


ney  northward,  184  ; Hamilton's 
opinion  of,  190 ; leads  attack  on 
Hamilton,  193  ; on  neutrality,  206  ; ! 
interest  in  Genet,  208  ; his  pity 
for  Washington,  212  ; disapproves 
Jay’s  treaty,  226;  as  leader  in  Con- 
gress, 232  ; marries  Mrs.  Todd,  233  ; 
value  of  his  writings,  235,  333  ; his 
private  life  and  habits,  236,  334  ; 
resolutions  of  ’98,  244  et  seq. ; Sec- 
retary of  State,  252 ; elected  Presi- 
dent, 283;  proclamation  repealing 
embargo,  286  ; proclamation  re- 
called, 288 ; letter  to  Pinkney,  293  ; 
pledge  to  Napoleon  on  blockade, 
299  ; attitude  toward  France  and 
Great  Britain,  302  ; letter  to  Jeffer- 
son on  preparations  for  war,  304  ; 
to  Barlow,  302,  317  ; complains  of 
France,  305  ; proposes  general  em- 
bargo and  war  with  England,  306  ; 
r<  nominated  for  President,  308  ; 
purchases  Henry's  papers,  309  : re- 
turns to  Montpellier,  332  : his  char- 
acter, 324,  333  ; legacy  to  his  coun- 
try, 336. 

Marblehead,  patriotic  fishermen  of, 
290. 

Martin,  Luther,  fears  of  a monarchy, 
78  ; on  the  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, 92,  93;  in  the  Virginia  Con- 
vention, 119  ; opposes  Madison,  126. 

Maryland,  proposes  meeting  of  com- 
missioners, 57,  60. 

Mason,  George,  on  slavery,  106. 

Massachusetts,  revolutionary  services 
and  public  debt  of,  158  ; in  war  of 
1812,  324. 

Merino  sheep,  277. 

Mifflin,  Warner,  petitions  Congress, 
169. 

Mississippi,  navigation  of,  32,  80. 

Monroe,  James,  Minister  to  France, 
228  et  seq. ; candidate  for  presiden- 
tial nomination,  308  ; testimony 
against  Henry,  311. 

Monroe-Pinkney  treaty  rejected,  288. 

Morris,  Gouvemeur,  on  Jefferson, 
254,  300. 

Morris,  Robert,  on  slavery,  102,  104. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  his  policy,  defi- 
nition of  blockade,  298. 

Nicholas,  George,  offers  Kentucky 
Resolutions  of  ‘98,  243. 

Non-importation  Act  of  1810,  291 ; of 
1811,  300. 

Nullification,  Madison’s  opinion  of, 
246  ; Jefferson  the  father  of,  249. 

Otis,  Harrison  Gray,  advertised  as 
missing,  324. 


Owen,  Robert,  corresponds  with  Mad- 
ison, 334. 

Paper  money,  70. 

Parker,  Jonathan,  proposes  duty  on 
importation  of  slaves,  135. 

Patterson,  William,  on  slavery,  99. 

Peel,  Robert,  on  the  Henry  letters, 
312. 

Pinckney,  C.  C.,  on  slavery,  102,  148  ; 
on  the  Union,  113 ; on  Jefferson, 
254. 

Pinkney,  William,  minister  to  Eng- 
land,*272. 

Potomac  Company,  plan  of,  57. 

Potomac,  navigation  of,  55. 

Pre-historic  remains  in  Virginia.  74. 

Presidency,  succession  in  the,  184 

President,  title  of  the,  129. 

President,  the  frigate,  battle  of,  with 
the  Little  Belt,  301. 

Quakers.  See  Friends. 

Quincy,  Josiah,  on  the  embargo,  280; 
on  French  outrages,  297 ; on  foreign 
relations,  298  ; on  Madison’s  nomi- 
nation and  the  war,  308. 

Rambouillet  decree,  295. 

Randolph,  John,  on  the  embargo, 
270. 

Religious  freedom,  13,  17,  66,  68. 

Representation  in  Congress,  basis  of, 
39,42. 

Rhode  Island,  rejects  impost  law,  34  ; 
joins  the  Republican  party,  253 ; 
returns  to  the  Federalist  party,  283. 

Rives,  William  C.,  biography  of  Mad- 
ison, 3,  9,  19  ; on  Virginia  planta- 
tion life,  50. 

Rumsey,  J.,  application  of  steam- 
power,  73. 

Rutledge,  John,  on  the  slave-trade, 
106. 

Shays’s  Rebellion,  76. 

Sherman,  Roger,  on  slavery,  107. 

Slavery,  possible  extinction  of,  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  41 ; influence 
of,  in  Virginia,  49  et  seq.;  in  the 
Constitution,  95 ; debate  on,  in  the 
Constitutional  Convention  99  et  seq.; 
petitions  on,  to  Congress,  160. 

Slave-trade,  domestic,  135 ; in  Louis' 
iana,  261. 

Slave-trade,  foreign,  debate  on  duty 
upon,  136  et  seq.;  abolition  of,  140: 
policy  of  the  government  on,  153, 
note. 

Smith,  Robert,  Secretary  of  State, 
285  ; demands  satisfaction  of  France 
295. 


842 


INDEX. 


Solomon,  Hayne,  a Jew,  befriends 
Madison,  25. 

South  Carolina,  revolutionary  debt  of, 
158. 

Steam-power  first  used,  73. 

Tariff,  proposed  in  First  Congress, 
132  ; dreaded  effect  of,  in  New  Eng- 
land, 133 ; and  at  the  South,  134 ; 
on  importation  of  slaves,  135  ; on 
foreign  ships,  142. 

Taxation,  31,  34. 

Todd,  Dolly,  marries  Madison,  233. 

Virginia,  ratifies  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  120;  religious 
freedom  in,  13, 17, 66  ; on  the  Missis- 
sippi question,  33,  85  ; on  imposts, 
34  ; public  debt,  49  ; planters  of,  49  : 
port  bill  passed,  53  ; proposed  in- 
structions to  her  delegates  in  Con- 
gress, 59  ; delegates  to  Convention  at 
Annapolis,  63;  refuses  compliance 


with  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  64*, 
“ Gerrymandering  ” in,  125  ; reso- 
lutions of  ’98,  246. 

Warville  de  Brissot,  sketch  of  Madi- 
ison,  122. 

Washington,  city,  proposed  site  of  cap- 
ital, 146,  159  ; taken  by  the  British, 
328. 

Washington,  George,  delegate  to  Con- 
stitutional Convention,  63  ; inaug- 
uration as  first  President,  128  ; the 
official  title,  129 ; proclamation  of 
neutrality,  206  ; Jefferson's  and 
Madison's  attitude  toward,  212  ; 
principles  of  his  administration, 
216;  portrait  of,  saved,  330. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  the  war  with 
Great  Britain,  321. 

Wilson,  James,  member  of  Congress, 
31 ; on  slavery,  100. 

Wright,  Frances,  corresponds  with 
Madison,  325. 


/ 


American  Statesmen. 


A Series  of  Biographies  of  Men  famous  in  the 
Political  History  of  the  United  States.  Edited  by 
John  T.  Morse,  Jr.  Each  volume,  i6mo, 
gilt  top,  $1.25;  half  morocco,  $2.50. 

JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS.  By  John  T.  Morse,  Jr. 
ALEXANDER  HAMILTON.  By  Henry  Cabot  Lodge. 
JOHN  C.  CALHOUN.  By  Dr.  H.  Von  Holst. 

A NDR E W JACKSON.  By  IV.  G.  Sumner. 

JOHN  RANDOLPH.  By  Henry  Adams. 

JAMES  MONROE.  By  D.  C.  Gilman. 

THOMAS  JEFFERSON.  By  John  T.  Morse,  Jr. 
DANIEL  WEBSTER.  By  Henry  Cabot  Lodge. 
ALBERT  GALL  A TIN.  By  John  Austin  Stevens. 
JAMES  MADISON.  By  Sydney  Howard  Gay. 
JOHN  ADAMS.  By  John  T.  Morse , Jr. 

JOHN  MARSHALL.  By  Allan  B.  Magruder. 
SAMUEL  ADAMS.  By  James  K.  Hosmer. 
THOMAS  H.  BENTON.  By  Theodore  Roosevelt. 
HENRY  CL  A Y.  By  Carl  Schurz.  2 vols. 

PATRICK  HENRY.  By  Moses  Coit  Tyler. 
GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS.  By  Theodore  Roosevelt. 
MARTIN  VAN  BUREN.  By  Edward  M.  Shepard. 
GEORGE  WASHINGTON.  By  H.  C.  Lodge.  2 vols. 
BENJAMIN  FRANKLIN.  By  John  T.  Morse,  Jr. 
JOHN  JA  Y.  By  George  Pellew. 

LEWIS  CASS.  By  Andrew  C.  McLaughlin. 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  By  J.  T.  Morse,  Jr.  2 vols. 
Others  to  be  announced  hereafter. 


CRITICAL  NOTICES. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS.  ^^'.aTtaThe  S 

be  those  of  posterity  we  have  very  little  doubt,  and  he  has  set  an 
admirable  example  to  his  coadjutors  in  respect  of  interesting 
narrative,  just  proportion,  and  judicial  candor.  — New  York 
Evening  Post. 

TT n MTT  TT)  AT  TIle  biography  of  Mr.  Lodge  is  calm  and 

Ul  . dignified  throughout.  He  has  the  virtue  — 
rare  indeed  among  biographers  — of  impartiality.  He  has  done 
his  work  with  conscientious  care,  and  the  biography  of  Ham- 
ilton is  a book  which  cannot  have  too  many  readers.  It  is  more 
than  a biography;  it  is  a study  in  the  science  of  government.— 
St.  Paul  Pioneer  Press. 

p a r tern  tt at  Nothing  can  exceed  the  skill  with  which  the 
c/IL/Jt/t  . political  career  of  the  great  South  Carolinian 
is  portraved  in  these  pages.  The  work  is  superior  to  any  other 
number  of  the  series  thus  far,  and  we  do  not  think  it  can  be  sur- 
passed by  any  of  those  that  are  to  come.  The  whole  discussion 
in  relation  to  Calhoun’s  position  is  eminently  philosophical  and 
just.  — The  Dial  (Chicago). 

‘yjryfM/k  Professor  Sumner  has  ...  all  in  all,  made 
/dl/Aowv.  the  justest  long  estimate  of  Jackson  that  has 
had  itself  put  between  the  covers  of  a book.  — New  York 
Times. 

P , NrpfgiT  pur  The  book  has  been  to  me  intensely  inter- 

E'U  P • esting.  ...  It  is  rich  in  new  facts  and  side 

fights,  and  is  worthy  of  its  place  in  the  already  brilliant  series 
of  monographs  on  American  Statesmen.  — Prof.  Moses  Coit 
Tyler. 

AT  n ATP  DR  -*-n  Nearness  of  style,  and  in  all  points  of  liter- 
Hl  U1VJX.  UJd.  ary  Workmanship,  from  cover  to  cover,  the 
volume  is  well-nigh  perfect.  There  are  also  a calmness  of  judg- 
ment, a correctness  of  taste,  and  an  absence  of  partisanship 
which  are  too  frequently  wanting  in  biographies,  and  especially 
in  political  biographies.  — American  Literary  Churchman  (Bal- 
timore). 

TfTT  T7TTP  P SO  AT  The  book  is  exceedingly  interesting  and 
j-jnst  u . readable.  The  attention  of  the  reader  is 
strongly  seized  at  once,  and  he  is  carried  along  in  spite  of  him- 
self, sometimes  protesting,  sometimes  doubting,  yet  unable  to  lay 
the  book  down.  — Chicago  Standard. 

Vf/77  R C TJ7  P It  read  by  students  of  history  ; it  will 

IV LLnEl  LLK.  ke  inva]uap,le  as  a work  of  reference;  it 
will  be  an  authority  as  regards  matters  of  fact  and  criticism  ; it 
hits  the  keynote  of  Webster’s  durable  and  evergrowing  fame; 
it  is  adequate,  calm,  impartial ; it  is  admirable.  — Philadelphia 
Press. 


T J T T A TTJV  's  one  most  carefully  prepared  of 

Lr/lEPri  ■-  . ^ese  very  valuable  volumes,  . . . abound- 
ing in  information  not  so  readily  accessible  as  is  that  pertaining 
to  men  more  often  treated  by  the  biographer.  . . . The  whole 
work  covers  a ground  which  the  political  student  cannot  afford 
to  neglect.  — Boston  Correspondent  Hartford  Courant. 

M A 71  T’sDJV  Tim  execution  of  the  work  deserves  the  high- 
IVlsiui  . est  praise-  jt  is  very  readable,  in  a bright 

and  vigorous  style,  and  is  marked  by  unity  and  consecutiveness 
of  plan.  — 7 he  Nation  (New  York). 

<vrt  IP  AT  A n J T/N  A g°°d  Piece  of  literary  work.  ...  It 
' covers  the  ground  thoroughly,  and 
gives  just  the  sort  of  simple  and  succinct  account  that  is  wanted. 
— Evening  Post  (New  York). 

T,r  < n o tta  t t Well  done,  with  simplicity,  clearness,  pre- 
1 * ' cision,  and  judgment,  and  in  a spirit  of 

moderation  and  equity.  A valuable  addition  to  the  series.  — 
New  York  Tribune. 


SAMUEL  ADAMS. 


Thoroughly  appreciative  and  sym- 
pathetic, yet  fair  and  critical.  . . . 
This  biography  is  a piece  of  good  work  — a clear  and  simple 
presentation  of  a noble  man  and  pure  patriot ; it  is  written  in  a 
spirit  of  candor  and  humanity.  — Worcester  Spy. 


BENTON  An  intetesting  addition  to  our  political  liter- 
ature, and  will  be  of  great  service  if  it  spread 
an  admiration  for  that  austere  public  morality  which  was  one  of 
the  marked  characteristics  of  its  chief  figure.  — The  Epoch 
(New  York). 


(JNA  Y.  Mre  l'ave  'n  this  life  of  Henry  Clay  a biography  of 
one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  American  states- 
men, and  a political  history  of  the  United  States  for  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  In  each  of  these  important  and 
difficult  undertakings,  Mr.  Schurzhas  been  eminently  successful. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that,  for  the  period  covered, 
we  have  no  other  book  which  equals  or  begins  to  equal  this  life 
of  Henry  Clay  as  an  introduction  to  the  study  of  American  pol- 
itics.— Political  Science  Quarterly  (New  York). 


JTENRY.  Pr°fessor  Tyler  has  not  only  made  one  of  the 
best  and  most  readable  of  American  biographies  ; 
he  may  fairly  be  said  to  have  reconstructed  the  life  of  Patrick 
Henry,  and  to  have  vindicated  the  memory  of  that  great  man 
from  the  unappreciative  and  injurious  estimate  which  has  been 
placed  upon  it.  — New  York  Evening  Post. 

MORRIS  Mr.  Roosevelt  has  produced  an  animated  and 
intensely  interesting  biographical  volume.  . . . 
Mr.  Roosevelt  never  loses  sight  of  the  picturesque  background 
of  politics,  war -governments,  and  diplomacy.  — Magazine  oj 
American  History  (New  York). 


VAN  B UREN  more  generous,  appreciative,  or  just 
biograph}',  and  no  more  interesting  or 
philosophical  piece  of  political  history  has  appeared  in  this  valu- 
able series  . . . than  this  absorbing  book.  . . . To  give  any  ad- 
equate idea  of  the  personal  interest  of  the  book,  or  its  intimate 
bearing  on  nearly  the  whole  course  of  our  political  history  would 
be  equivalent  to  quoting  the  larger  part  of  it.  — Brooklyn  Eagle. 

l/VA  ’sFTTNCTO N Mr.  Lodge  has  written  an  admirable 
biography,  and  one  which  cannot  but 
confirm  the  American  people  in  the  prevailing  estimate  concern- 
ing the  Father  of  his  Country ; but  its  deepest  and  most  impor- 
tant significance  appears  to  us  to  consist  in  its  testimony  to  the 
exaltation  and  the  uniqueness  of  a character  whose  like  comes 
seldom  to  the  world,  and  only  in  periods  of  great  stress  and  cri- 
sis. — New  York  Tribune. 

ERAAR'L IAT  He  ^as  n'anage(I  to  condense  the  whole 

mass  of  matter  gleaned  from  all  sources 
into  his  volume  without  losing  in  a single  sentence  the  freedom 
or  lightness  of  his  style  or  giving  his  book  in  any  part  the 
crowded  look  of  an  epitome.  He  has  plenty  of  time  and  plenty 
of  room  for  all  he  wishes  to  say,  and  says  it  in  the  very  best  and 
most  interesting  manner. — The  Independent  (New  York). 

JAY.  In  his  long  career  — as  member  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  President  of  Congress,  member  of  the  Con- 
stitutional Convention,  Foreign  Secretary,  Chief  Justice  of  the 
United  States,  governor  of  New  York,  Minister  to  Spain,  spe- 
cial envoy  to  England  — no  breath  of  suspicion  or  doubt  attached 
to  his  fame.  ...  It  is  an  important  addition  to  the  admirable 
series  of  “ American  Statesmen,”  and  elevates  yet  higher  the 
character  of  a man  whom  all  American  patriots  must  delight  to 
honor.  — New  York  Tribune. 

CASS.  Professor  McLaughlin  has  given  us  one  of  the  most 
satisfactory  volumes  in  this  able  and  important  series. 
It  ought  to  be  read  in  the  East  as  well  as  the  West,  but  in  the 
Northwest  it  ought  to  be  read  in  every  hamlet  from  Detroit 
to  Puget  Sound.  The  early  life  of  Cass  was  devoted  to  the 
Northwest,  and  in  the  transformation  which  overtook  it  the 
work  of  Cass  was  the  work  of  a national  statesman.  — New  York 
Times. 

LINCOLN.  Asa  Life  of  Lincoln  it  has  no  competitors  ; as 
a political  history  of  the  Union  side  during  the 
Civil  War,  it  is  the  most  comprehensive,  and,  in  proportion  to 
its  range,  the  most  compact.  — Harvard  Graduates’  Magazine. 


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